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Abstract 
The present research is about relations between Iran and the West from the communication 
point of view and the role of the media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments 
amongst the Iranians. It studies how Occidentalism has evolved in Iran and how, as an ideological 
representation, it has influenced the press portrayal of the West in the country. It also identifies 
dominant frames in newspaper reporting of the West and indicates how the perception of reality and 
meaning construction work in mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
The present thesis seeks to investigate, through content analysis of news items and critical 
discourse analysis of news editorials, the impact of political affiliation of newspapers (as the first 
independent variable) and the political period in which they are published (as the second 
independent variable) on the representation of the West (as the dependent variable) in Iran.  
The results and findings of the present study are yet another contribution to the study of the 
West, particularly in the Iranian context. In fact, the representation of the West in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers in the way discussed throughout this thesis signifies the creation of a new type 
of Occidentalism in the Orient, which I here brand as “Iranoccidentalism”.  
Iranoccidentalism is an ideological concept, which is under the influence of the prevailing 
discourse; It projects the West, through media, as “arrogant/imperial and interventionist”; It is 
coupled with anti-Americanism and opposition to the West, and is linked to the history of 
colonialism and imperialism in Iran as well as the Iranian encounter with modernity; Moreover, it is 
a reaction to Orientalism and seeks to spread the Islamic ideology of governance and awakening 
within the framework of the Shiite ideology;  
Furthermore, Iranoccidentalism pursues a “nativistic” and “nationalistic” approach which 
manifests itself in the Iranians’ national resolve to develop indigenous technologies such as the 
nuclear, aerospace and missile technologies as well as biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
I argue in the course of this thesis that Occidentalism is evolving and turning into a 
structured discourse in Asia and especially in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, including in 
Iran where it is under the great influence of the history of relations with the West and in particular 
the Iranian response to Western-driven modernity.    
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i. Statement of the problem 
             A quick summary of a recent Gallup report suggests:  
Iranians’ already low approval of US leadership did not get worse 
after the US toughened sanctions in late 2011. Eight percent of 
Iranians approved of US leadership in late 2011 and early 2012 -- 
one of the lowest ratings the US receives worldwide. While nearly 
half of Iranians (46 per cent) support cutting ties with countries that 
impose economic sanctions on Iran, nearly one in three (31 per cent) 
do not, showing a sizable minority of Iranians still value relations 
(Ray, 2012). 
          A previous Gallup poll in 2009 on the US image in the Middle East and North Africa 
revealed that the image of the United States in the predominantly Muslim regions, 
including in the Islamic Republic of Iran, is “very poor” (Ray, 2009). In particular, the 
unfavourability trend of the United States in Iran has been on the rise since 2001 (Mogahed, 
2005). Some 52 per cent of Iranians had an unfavourable view of the United States in 2001 
while the figure, according to the Gallup Centre for Muslim Studies, rose to 63 per cent in 
2005 and 84 per cent by February 20091. A recent poll in December 2011 indicated that the 
majority of Iranians disapprove of the leadership of the US (65 per cent), the UK (62 per 
cent), Germany (57 per cent) and the European Union (49 per cent) (Morales and Ray, 
2011).  A similar trend could be spotted with regards to European countries (the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France) which form the wider “Occident” region when combined 
with the United States.  
A number of reasons have been previously explored with regards to the rise of anti-
Westernism in Iran (albeit before the 1979 revolution). Researchers have mainly attributed 
it to the impacts of imperialism and colonialism (Keddie, 1983, 1994; Makdisi, 2002; 
Moaddel, 1992; Vahdat, 2003; Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994), which could be regarded as two 
main factors leading to the Iranian “Occidentalisation” of the West2.  
                                                           
1 The issue of the favourability of the US among the Iranians is of a paradoxical nature. Some might argue 
that the reality of the perception of the US in Iran is different from what is suggested by opinion polls. This 
could be true. However, despite being passionate towards the US culture, freedom and democratic values, the 
majority of Iranian people are critical of the United States because of its “foreign policy” in the Middle East 
and especially towards Iran (This “hatred” could have been a result of the Iranian press portrayal of the West, 
which is the subject of the present research).  
2 One limitation with this explanation is, however, that it fails to study the role of the media inter alia in 
creating anti-Western sentiments among the Iranians. 
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 Nobody could deny the role the media have played in this area. Sreberny-
Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) believe this role was played by “small media” which 
marked a “big revolution” through the traditional channels of communications such as 
tapes, graffiti and night letters. Moreover, Ayatollah Khomeini, the late founder of the 
Islamic revolution, emphasised on many occasions on the importance of media including 
the radio and television in Iran’s anti-West drive. He urged the Iranian television to act as a 
“general university to raise people who can fight” against the Western hegemony and 
propaganda and “save the cultural apparatus of the country from Westoxication and 
imperialistic training” (Khomeini, Vol. 9:185). Such an awareness-raising role was 
primarily played by the clergy and the intelligentsia prior to the revolution. In fact, events 
during the 1950s and 1970s led to the formation of an anti-Western “discourse” which was 
later changed into an anti-Western (and particularly anti-American) “revolutionary 
ideology” after the Islamic revolution, continuing to this date.    
The present research seeks to investigate the ways and mechanisms through which 
the West is portrayed and characterised in the Iranian press after the 1979 revolution. To 
study how these mechanisms are used by the state and the press to portray the West (UK, 
Germany, France plus the United States), the researcher analyses the content of the press 
during the two different presidential (political) terms, when the most striking developments 
happened between Iran and the West1.  
 
ii. Statement of the aims 
In recent decades and specifically after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent 
“war on terror”, anti-Westernism (and particularly anti-Americanism) has become mostly 
associated with the Middle East (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Criss, 2003; Faath, 2006; 
Makdisi, 2002; O’Connor and Griffiths, 2006), and particularly with Iran which is 
portrayed as an “evil” state accused of imposing “serious threats” to the stability of the 
region and the West. The political relations between the West and Iran should be examined 
as part of a project if one wishes to understand how the Occident is generated in the 
Oriental thought of the Iranians.   
This study aims to identify the roots of anti-Westernism in Iran and discuss various 
aspects of the representation of the West in the Iranian press during two politically-
significant historic periods after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The researcher views the 
                                                           
1 They include, but are not limited to, disputes between Iran and the West in areas such as the nuclear issue, 
the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue.   
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rising “negative” perception of the West in the Islamic Republic of Iran as possibly a by-
product of the portrayal of the West in the country’s press (although other factors are 
definitely engaged). This research aims to investigate the way the negative descriptions of 
the West are generated in Iran, the (evolution) process of Occidentalism or the 
Occidentalisation of the West in Iran and the social, political, and intellectual factors that 
lead to Occidentalist constructions of alien societies in that country. The present project 
also seeks to provide a comprehensive outline of the concept of the West as the “Occident” 
in Iran and the portrayal of the West in the Iranian press.  
 
iii. Significance and contribution to knowledge   
The current research would make several new scholarly contributions. First and 
foremost, it analyses the media “strategies” through which the West is portrayed in Iran and 
with a very specific focus on “Occidentalism”. Regardless of the fact that the anti-Western 
nature of the Iranian regime is already known to everyone, the “portrayal of the West in the 
Iranian press” or “Occidentalising the West in Iran” has been much understudied and 
poorly understood.  
Second, whereas extensive research has been conducted with the objective of 
understanding the image of the West among the Iranian intelligentsia (Mirsepassi, 2000; 
Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001; Vahdat, 2002; Nabavi, 2003; Boroujerdi, 2006), the current 
literature has partly failed to study the image of the West as characterised by the Iranian 
“press” for the people and the intelligentsia and from the communication point of view. In 
other words the role of the media in portraying such a negative view of the West remains 
largely untouched in academic research. 
Third, by examining the press’ narratives on Occidentalism, this research sheds light 
on how the media representation strategies are carried out in reality and how journalists use 
them to lead (or mislead) the public opinion.   
Fourth, not only is this research new and fresh in the decision to take on the 
Occidental view from the Iranian press “after” the 1979 revolution (and in recent years), it 
will also break with previous research regarding Occidentalism in Iran, which has often 
limited its focus to Iran-West relations “before” the revolution. Moreover the present 
research presents a political analysis from the academic point of view of major 
developments in recent years affecting the interaction between Iran and the West in two 
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significant presidential terms1.  
No organised and comprehensive research has been published to study the role of the 
media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments among the Iranian public 
opinion. The present research could be the first academic material in the filed and could be 
used as a model to study the rising trend of the Occidentalisation of the West in the Middle 
East.  
Findings of this study could be used by politicians and decision makers to set new 
agendas for improving relations between Iran and the West. Given the proximity in 
geography and culture between Iran and other nations in the Middle East and the Islamic 
world, the results of the present research could be generalised to the whole Muslim 
countries or be treated, at least, as an Iranian model of political communication.     
 As stated above, this research could be the first wide-ranging original study of 
mainstream Iranian newspapers and their portrayal of the West. The present research is 
undoubtedly the first study of Occidentalism in the Iranian context from the viewpoint of 
the Iranian press.  
I believe the current research will contribute considerably to knowledge in the sense 
that it is:  
 detailed and in-depth as it covers four mainstream Iranian newspapers; with 
different political affiliation; during a time span of eight years; from the 
various communication/journalistic point of view  
 original as it is the first study of its kind to the way the West is portrayed in 
Iranian newspapers within the context of Occidentalism2  
 innovative as it studies newspapers from two different political wings within 
the context of Occidentalism and ends up with a new characterisation of the 
West by the East 
 pioneering as it could turn into a model and example of similar and 
progressive research into the image of the West in the East 
 academic as it uses scientific methods to describe the image of the West in 
the Iranian press 
                                                           
1They include, but are not limited to, disputes between Iran and the West in areas such as the nuclear issue, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue.   
2 There is only one scholarly study to investigate how the outside world is depicted in the Iranian press. And 
that research is rather old and restricted to only one Iranian newspaper. In 1991, Shoar-Ghaffari examined the 
coverage of the West in “Ettelaat” newspaper during 1979 and 1988.   
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 historical as it provides a history of relations between Iran and specific 
Western countries about which one can rarely find an analysis, and also it 
discusses two important historical stages of the Iranian politics  
 objective and systematic as it uses Content Analysis as a scientific method of 
analysing media messages (in addition to Critical Discourse Analysis)    
 interdisciplinary as it studies media and politics  
In general, the present research would help fill the gap in knowledge about relations 
between Iran and the West from the communication point of view and the role of the media 
in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments amongst the Iranians.  
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Occidentalism: The West as the “Occident” 
The West, as defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, is the region in 
the Western Hemisphere encompassing Europe, North America and Canada, contrasted 
with the East which includes Asia and the Middle East. Geographically, the West today 
normally includes Europe and the overseas territories belonging to the Anglosphere, the 
Hispanidad, Lusosphere and the Francophonie1.   
From the political point of view the concept of the West (versus the East), or the 
Occident (as opposed to the Orient), which emerged in the late nineteenth century, is a 
political construct and a dialogue between the Old World or “Europe” and the New World 
or “the United States” (Coker, 1998)2. According to Raymond Williams (as cited in 
Coronil 1996), the West-East distinction dates back to the Roman Empire era and to the 
separation between the Christian and Muslim worlds during the third and fifth centuries, 
even though Hobson (2006) attributes the rise of the West to the period between 500 to 
1800.  
In his “Twilight of the West”, Coker (1998) describes the West as “an elusive” term 
which sometimes includes even Japan (as the “emblem of the East” (Coronil, 1996:53), 
“Western-type society” (Williams, 1983:333 as cited in Coronil 1996), “honorary 
European” (Chomsky, 1991:13 as cited in Coronil 1996)), Russia and other countries such 
as Australia and New Zealand that are outside the institutions that have constituted the 
“Western community” or “Western coalition or alliance”.   
Studying the debate over the West between Hegel and Goethe, two of the most 
important thinkers of the nineteenth century, Coker (1998) recognises that America, as the 
most modern society in history, would be “the master builder” of the Western world. 
Therefore, it might be inferred, as explained below by Coronil (1996), that the United 
States is the “representative” of the Occident before the Orient. In other words, the West is 
“exemplified” by the United States (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:4)3; therefore, the two 
words “West” and the “United States” could be used interchangeably:   
With the consolidation of US hegemony as a world power after 1945, the 
                                                           
1The word “Occident” (meaning the West) was used primarily, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
originally with reference to Western Christendom or the Western Roman Empire, or to Europe as opposed to 
Asia and the Orient; It is now usually used with reference to Europe and America as opposed to Asia and the 
“Orient”, or occasionally to America or the Western hemisphere as opposed to the Old World.   
2 Coronil (1996:52) believes that using binary words such as the “West”, the “Occident”, the “center”, the 
“first world”, the “East”, the “Orient”, the “periphery” and the “third world” sets forge links in a paradigmatic 
chain of conceptions of geography, history, and personhood that reinforces each link and produces an almost 
tangible and inescapable image of the world. 
3 While the West is generally recognised, in political terms, with the United States, Furumizo (2005: 128-
137) believes the term “the West” as a set of ideas has a root in Britain and France as well. 
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“West” shifted its centre of gravity from Europe to “America”, and the 
United States became the dominant referent for the “West”. Because of 
this recentering of Western powers, “America”, ironically, is at times a 
metaphor for “Europe” (Coronil, 1996: 54).  
Zinkin (1953) defines the West as a “cultural” and not a geographical concept, 
which means “the countries of city corporations, free association, and Biblical religion” 
(Zinkin, 1953: 9). In his analysis of the “Western City” and its comparison with the 
“Eastern Village”, Zinkin highlights the role of the West in pioneering personal freedom, 
urbanisation, modernity and technology.  
In the Western town all men started equal...There was no aristocracy of 
birth resting upon military prowess and monopolistic offices as there 
was in the countryside. Any man, if he was successful in his business 
and respected by his fellow citizens, could aspire to anything. But in 
Asia...real opportunity did not exist. There is no Asian equivalent for the 
Fuggers, Counts of the Empire, the Medici, Grand Dukes of Tuscany. In 
Asia government was carried on by the appointees of the monarch or the 
lord (Zinkin, 1953:16-17).  
 Originally, the Western philosophy, as contrasted with the Eastern philosophy, 
started in the 1800s and 1900s by ideas such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and 
Colonialism which emanated mainly from Europe.  
The ideas of the West then spread so widely in the early twenty-first century and 
since the end of the Cold War (1945-1991) that many modern and developed countries are 
to some extent influenced by different aspects of the Western or Occidentalist philosophy. 
Presenting a critical analysis of Jack Goody’s “The theft of history” (2006), Santos 
(2009:104) argues that the West, from the sixteenth century onwards, started to “impose its 
conceptions of past and future, of time and space, on the rest of the world”:  
It has thus made its values and institutions prevail, turning them into 
expressions of western exceptionalism, thereby concealing similarities 
and continuities with values and institutions existing in other regions of 
the world (Santos, 2009:104). 
Hobson (2006: 408-410) observes that such a discourse of “racist-Eurocentrism or 
Orientalism”, which reached its peak in the nineteenth century, led to the formation of 
Orientalist and “civilisational-apartheid” themes such as the superiority of the West to the 
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East with the former being “exceptional, progressive and superior” and the latter 
“regressive and inferior”1.  
The struggle between the West (Occident) and the East (Orient), defined by Said 
(1994: xi) as “mostly ideological oppositions”, is more linked to the history of imperialism 
and colonialism than modernism and its confrontation with traditionalism. Indeed, Buruma 
and Margalit (2005:33) try to demonstrate that the West simply is equal to “Roman 
imperialism, Anglo-American capitalism, Americanism, Crusader-Zionism and American 
imperialism” and can be discussed through a thorough investigation of Occidentalism.  
 
i. Occidentalism: different approaches   
Edward Said (1978:12) has divided the world into two “unequal halves” of Orient 
and Occident. The relationship, or in Said’s words, the “ontological and epistemological 
distinction”, between them is a “man-made” relationship of power, domination and 
hegemony (Said, 1978:5). In his seminal work on the Orient and Orientalism, Said (1978) 
explains how representations of the Orient in the literary works of Westerners have been a 
source for the knowledge of the West about the East, and the power the Occident exercised 
over the Orient. Said (1978:3) believes the West gained strength and built up its power 
through the East and the “weakness” of the East.   
In Said’s view, Orientalism is a strategy of Western world domination which began 
with the domination of Britain and France (until the Second World War) and the United 
States (after the end of the Second World War) on the Orient. Throughout his book, Said 
(1978) tries to tell the reader that the West is wielding power over the East through his 
concept of Orientalism. He highlights the role culture played in the formation of “political 
and ideological” Orientalism and how the latter “borrowed” from the former (Said, 
1978:22).  
…Orientalism offers a marvelous stance of the interrelations between 
society, history, and textuality; moreover, the cultural role played by the 
Orient in the West connects Orientalism with ideology, politics, and the 
logic of power… (Said, 1979:24).  
Said’s work on Orientalism has been criticised widely, from issues related to the 
originality of his work (Sardar, 1999), to questions of the basis of his theory of Orientalism 
(Porter, 1994), and feminists complaints about the absence of any discussion of gender in 
                                                           
1 Having studied East and West in “global history”, Hobson (2006:410) attributes the rise of the West during 
500 and 1800 to the “diffusion of Eastern resource portfolios” and the “imperial appropriation of Eastern 
resources”.     
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the text (Kennedy, 2000). 
 Despite criticisms, Orientalism has turned into a political discourse, dominating 
relations between the West and East. Orientalism is, however, one end of the spectrum. The 
other end is Occidentalism. Like its counterpart, Occidentalism is an overarching discourse 
which is employed with respect to historical context, although it is not yet as structured as 
Orientalism1.    
The Oxford English Dictionary traces the use of the word “Occidentalism” in 
writings back to 1839 when “Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine” carried a story about an 
Iranian king, Soltan Mahmoud Ghaznavi (971-1030)--the ruler of the Persian Ghaznavid 
dynasty2:  
“…The Sultan Mahmoud and his Turkish subjects...have no taste 
for...the Occidentalism, the journalism, the budgetism, the 
parliamentaryism of the nineteenth Century (Vol. 46, 1839:105).”  
 Occidentalism can be discussed from two “general” and “political” points of view. 
By definition, Occidentalism, as in the example of Soltan Mahmoud, accounts for any 
Occidental quality, style, character, or spirit or any Western customs, institutions, 
characteristics, etc. More precisely, Occidentalism is the knowledge of the West (in terms 
of language, history, culture and …) in/by the East.  
Similarly, an “Occidentalist” is either a student of Western languages, history, 
culture, etc. or a person who favours or advocates Western customs and ideas (Iranian 
intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad describes so Westernised people as “Westoxicated” i.e. 
Eastern people who excessively devote themselves to adopting Western ideas)3.  
As stated above, the term Occidentalism and its derivatives were being used during 
the eighteenth century mostly in academic contexts to refer to “Western customs”. 
However the term has taken a more political and ideological meaning, almost similar to its 
counterpart—Orientalism—which will be explained below. The very term “Occidentalism” 
politically has generated some controversy in recent years as very few organised and fully-
scholarly piece has been written about it and the field remains much understudied.  The 
                                                           
1 By discourse, I mean the Foucaultian approach ie “a specific form of knowledge with its own object of 
study, premises, rules, conversations and claims to truth”.   
2 Other derivatives of the word “Occidentalism” have a longer track of historical use. For example, 
“Occidentalise”, as a verb, was used for the first time in 1829.   
3 Occidentalise” is another derivatives of the word Occident. To “Occidentalise” means to Westernise or to 
imbue with Western ideas or characteristics. The verb “Occidentalise” was first used in 1829 in a piece of 
writing about the Chinese language in which the author complains that the native Chinese language was 
“strangely Occidentalised” (Imaginary conversations of Greeks and Romans, 1853: 123). The word 
“Occidentalist” has been also used very rarely to refer to an advocate or user of the artificial language called 
“Occidental”.   
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major literature in the field could be attributed, but not limited, to the works of Carrier 
(1992), Chen (1992), Cole (1992), Howard (1995), Ning (1997) Coronil (1996), Venn 
(2001), Buruma and Margalit (2004, 2005),  Furumizo (2005), Bilgrami (2006), Roth-
Seneff (2007), Friedman (2009) and Santos (2009).   
 
a. Occidentalism: Orientalism in reverse or opposition?  
According to Boroujerdi (1996), the concept of Occidentalism in the Orient has 
been formulated by the Syrian critic Jalal Sadik al-Azm. Writing an essay in 1981, al-Azm 
proposes the concept of “Orientalism in reverse”. In it, he accepts the basic dichotomy of 
East and West and reiterates that only Islam is authentic and solution to the problems. 
Reviewing the literature related to Occidentalism, one can identify a group of 
“similar” vocabularies used to define Occidentalism. They include words such as “mirror”, 
“mirror image”, “reverse”, “obverse” and “inversion” which denote that the signified is 
“the same as” the signifier.  
For example, Coronil (1996:56) defines Occidentalism as “not Orientalism in 
reverse” but its dark side as in a mirror; which means Occidentalism is in opposition to 
Orientalism. Such a definition has been reiterated by Ning (1997: 62) who defines 
Occidentalism as “opposed to Orientalism”. In other definitions, Howard (1995:111) 
believes Occidentalism is the “obverse of Orientalism” and Cole (1992: 15) defines it as 
“not the mirror-image” of Orientalism, while Friedman (2009: 92) describes Occidentalism 
as “an inversion of the former Orientalism”.  
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Santos (2009: 105) has identified “two very distinct” conceptions with regards to 
the definition of Occidentalism:  
First, Occidentalism as a counter-image of Orientalism: the image that 
the ‘others’, the victims of Western Orientalism, construct concerning 
the West. Second, Occidentalism as a double image of Orientalism: the 
image the West has of itself when it subjects the ‘others’ to Orientalism 
(Santos: 105).  
He further explains that the first conception is a “reciprocity trap” as victims of the 
Western stereotypes have “the same power” to construct stereotypes of the West while the 
second conception is related to the “critique of the hegemonic West”. In fact, Santos 
(2009:103-104) argues that Westerners in the Occident have used Occidentalism as a 
double-image to Orientalism to castigate hegemonic Eurocentrism and Western values, 
exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority in the same way as Easterners in the Orient 
have applied it as a counter-image of Orientalism to criticise the West1. He believes 
Occidentalism, as a double image of Orientalism, has been ignored or sidelined in the West 
because it did not “fit the political objectives of capitalism and colonialism at the roots of 
Western modernity” (Santos, 2009:103)2.  
 The use of Occidentalism as a counter to Western colonialism and hegemonism has 
been also stressed by Ning (1997). She describes Occidentalism as a “decolonising” and 
“anti-colonialist” strategy and a challenge to “those Western hegemonists who have always 
had a bias against the Orient” (Ning, 1997:62).  
Ning (1997:62-65) argues that Occidentalism manifests itself among the people in 
Muslim countries in the Middle East as “an antagonistic form” that strongly opposes 
Western hegemonism represented and identified by the United States.   
In these cases, “Occident” is also constructed as an “other”, and the 
Occidentalism in the eyes of the Oriental is obviously characterised by 
the Third World’s anticolonialist and antihegemonic tendency (Ning, 
1997:62).   
Although Ning (1997: 62-64) defines Occidentalism as “opposed” to Orientalism, 
she believes looking upon it as a “counterpart” to Orientalism is “undesirable”. 
                                                           
1 Based on this definition, Westerners such as Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, who are critical of the 
foreign policy of the United States, fall in the category of Occidentalists and end up being Occidentalist in 
their struggle against Eurocentrism.   
2 Studying Jack Goody’s “The Theft of History”, Santos (2005: 121) enhances the possibility of a “non-
Occidentalist West” by linking it to the possibility of a “non-capitalist” future.  
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Notwithstanding, Ning attributes the rising of China as a global power to the Chinese 
Occidentalism in the form of its “struggle against imperialism and hegemonism”.  
Occidentalism manifested itself in different forms during different 
periods, but its fundamental tone was hostile to the West, especially the 
US imperialists, and sometimes even the Soviet social imperialists 
(Ning, 1997:64).   
From the viewpoint of Ning, Occidentalism is a social and cultural “discourse” 
opposed to Western cultural hegemonism and an “ideological force” challenging the West 
(Ning, 1997: 66). Such a perspective has been echoed by Furumizo (2005: 128-137) who 
has described Occidentalism as an “ideological” concept and a “confusion of views 
opposed to Western culture”. This opposition in fact shares with Orientalism many 
“ideological techniques and strategies” which, according to Chen (1992:688), draw the 
discursive practice of Occidentalism into a “paradoxical relationship” to Orientalism.   
In his study of the Chinese Occidentalism, Chen (1992) argues that the Chinese 
Occidentalism, as a “counter-discourse” of Orientalism, has served mainly as an 
“ideological function” quite different from that of Orientalism.  
Orientalism, in Said’s account, is a strategy of Western world 
domination, whereas…Chinese Occidentalism is primarily a discourse 
that has been evoked by various and competing groups within Chinese 
society for a variety of different ends, largely, though not exclusively, 
within domestic Chinese politics. As such, it has been both a discourse 
of oppression and a discourse of liberation (Chen, 1992:688). 
According to him, Occidentalism in China has been employed for two contrasted 
purposes of “justifying” and at the same time “countering” domestic oppression.  Chen 
(1992:680-691) explains that the Chinese government uses “Maoist Occidentalism” as a 
means for the domestic oppression of political opponents, while the intelligentsia uses 
“anti-official Occidentalism” as a strategic move to stand against government crackdown.  
Throughout Chinese history, literary and political texts have often been 
composed by the intelligentsia as deliberate endeavors of anti-official 
discourse…Accused of being “Western” both by virtue of their cultural 
status and their political sympathies, they had little choice but to assert 
that the Western Other was in fact superior to the Chinese Self (Chen, 
1992: 691). 
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 From this viewpoint, Chen (1992:710) equates Occidentalism with Orientalism by 
justifying that “if it is imperialistic for the Occident to “misrepresent” the Orient, then the 
Orient can also anti-imperialistically use the “Occident” to achieve its own political aims at 
home”. However, Chen’s equation of Occidentalism to Orientalism should not be regarded 
as a “double-image” relationship but a “counter-image” relationship. In other words, Chen 
acknowledges that Occidentalism is an anti-imperialistic concept in opposition to 
Orientalism whose main aim is imperialistic.  
One of the other scholars who have attributed Occidentalism to opposition to 
Western hegemonism and dominance is Coronil. He believes Occidentalism is 
“inseparable” from Western hegemony.  
Coronil (1996: 56-57) defines Occidentalism not as the reverse of Orientalism but 
as “its condition of possibility, its dark side (as in a mirror)”, which refers to the 
conceptions of the West “animating” the West’s representations of the Orient. He defines 
Occidentalism as the study of “how ‘Others’ represent the ‘Occident’” to help them counter 
the West’s dominance of publicly circulating images of difference and as the “ensemble of 
representational practices” that participate in the production of conceptions of the world. 
Coronil (1996: 56) is also of the opinion that Occidentalism should not be 
“opposed” to Orientalism because this opposition “runs the risk of creating the illusion that 
the terms can be equalised and reversed, as if the complicity of power and knowledge 
entailed in Orientalism could be countered by an inversion”.  
“Occidentalism is thus the expression of a constitutive relationship 
between Western representations of cultural difference and worldwide 
Western dominance Coronil (1996: 56).” 
 Coronil has defined three modes of Occidentalist representation: the dissolution of 
the Other by the Self; the incorporation of the Other into the Self; and the destabilisation of 
the Self by the Other. Here the “Other” represents the East and the “Self” represents the 
West. 
 
b. Coronil’s modes of Occidentalist representation  
1. The dissolution of the Other [East] by the Self [West] (Coronil, 1996:58-61)  
In this modality of representation, Western and non-Western cultures are opposed to 
each other as radically different entities, and their opposition is resolved by absorbing non-
Western peoples into an expanding and victorious West.  
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The question of the Other [East] is presented as a problem for the Self [West], not 
of the Self or for the Other. In this modality of Occidentalism, the Self is assumed. Analysis 
centers on the problems the Self confronts but does not include the constitution of the Self 
as a problem. The other question is not asked: the question of the Self.   
In this representational modality, America becomes but the territorial stage for the 
expansion of the West, and its diverse cultures the object to be absorbed. Since the Self is 
identified with history’s victors, it is understandable that the increasingly powerful United 
States was identified with America and became a metaphor for Europe1.   
 
2. The incorporation of the Other [East] into the Self [West] (Coronil, 1996:61) 
In this second modality of Occidentalism, a critical focus on Western development 
unwittingly obscures the role of non-Western peoples in the making of the modern world, 
subtly reiterating the distinction between Other and Self that underwrites Europe’s imperial 
expansion.  
Coronil develops this argument through a discussion of Eric Wolf’s “Europe and 
the People Without History” (1982), which presents Western capitalism as a transformative 
process that originates in the centre and engulfs non-Western peoples, and Sidney Mintz’s 
“Sweetness and Power” (1985), which analyses sugar’s place in the modern world in terms 
of the interplay between commodity production in the colonies and consumption in the 
imperial center.  
 
3. The destabilisation of the Self [West] by the Other [East] (Coronil, 1996:68) 
  While in the previous two modalities of Occidentalism, non-Western peoples are 
either dissolved or incorporated by the West, in this third form they are presented as a 
privileged source of knowledge for the West. This knowledge becomes available, as in the 
first modality, by opposing Western and non-Western peoples as contrasting entities, but in 
this case the depiction of radical Otherness is used to unsettle Western culture.  
By examining Michael Taussig’s “The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South 
America” (1980) and Timothy Mitchell’s “Colonizing Egypt” (1988), Coronil shows how 
the use of polarised contrasts between cultures that are historically interrelated has the 
effect of exalting their difference, erasing their historical links, and homogenising their 
                                                           
1 In the context of Iranian Occidentalism, the researcher will later discuss that Iranian intellectuals (such as 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad) and presidents Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have shown their 
opposition to this modality because they do not want their nation to be “dissolved” by or “absorbed” to the 
West.  
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internal features, unwittingly re-inscribing an imperial Self-Other duality even as it seeks to 
unsettle colonial representations1. 
 
c. Occidentalism: Hatred of the West (anti-Westernism)?   
One of the most organised existing works on Occidentalism is perhaps the 
investigation by Buruma and Margalit in 2005 of anti-Western stereotypes in the East2. In 
their book, “Occidentalism, a short history of anti-Westernism”, Buruma and Margalit 
present a history of anti-Westernism which, they describe, as being in close link to 
Occidentalism.  
Buruma and Margalit (2005: 5-6) define Occidentalism as the “dehumanising 
picture of the West painted by its enemies” as a “hateful caricature” of Western modernity. 
Studying the case of Occidentalism in both the West (Germany and Russia) and the East 
(Japan, China, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), they see Occidentalism as the expression 
of hatred toward “an offensive display of superiority by the West” (Buruma and Margalit, 
2005:95). They in fact equate Occidentalism to anti-Westernism.  
They argue that Occidentalism in the Third World (the East) was inspired during 
1960s-1970s by Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China followed by the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran in 1979. However, Occidentalism in Europe is older than Occidentalism in East and 
originated from Nazi Germany’s hatred for “Jewfied” American, French and British people 
during 1930s-1940s (although they describe that the Germany army started attacks on the 
British in Flanders in 1914 as the first European war against the West)3. They also 
associate the nineteenth-century Occidentalism with Russia though it was imported from 
Germany.  
It is indeed one of our contentions that Occidentalism, like capitalism, 
Marxism and many other modern isms, was born in Europe, before it 
was transferred to other parts of the world (Buruma and Margalit, 
2005:6).   
 In Russia, Occidentalism turned into an ideology in the 1800s under the influence of 
Russian Orthodoxism in opposition to Roman Catholicism. The West in the minds of the 
                                                           
1 In the context of Iranian Occidentalism, the research will later discuss that none of the Iranian leaders seem 
to be following this model out of the fear that it might lead to military confrontation with the West.     
2 In 2004, Buruma and Margalit published their first book on Occidentalism under the title of “Occidentalism: 
West in the Eyes of its Enemies”. In 2005, they published this book under a new title “Occidentalism, a short 
history of anti-Westernism”.  
3 German nationalists view of the West was of an “old World, effete, money-grubbing, selfish and shallow” 
(Buruma and Margalit, 2005: 58). 
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Russian way of thinking was “decay” (as labeled by Konstantin Leontiev)--an entity 
constructed on “rotten foundations” (as described by Ivan Kireyevsky) which makes 
decisions only by resorting to rationalism and scienticism and ignoring other faculties such 
as emotion or religion. In the Russian mindset, rationalism was equal to imperialism (of 
mind) which was a source of Occidentalism not only in Russia but also in China. Under the 
influence of Chinese nativism, Mao believed that Western imperialism and moral 
decadence was a destroyer of Chinese traditions and thoughts (Buruma and Margalit, 
2005). In 1950s, he ordered intellectuals to be cleansed of bourgeois ideology 
(individualism and pro-Americanism) in a similar way two decades later revolutionaries in 
Iran set up the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution to clear universities of the 
sympathizers of the Western ideology and mindset—a move which was repeated in the 
aftermath of the controversial 2009 elections.  
 In Egypt, from the nineteenth century onward, the West was associated, in Buruma 
and Margalit words, with “emptiness” (as described by Sayyid Qutb), “materialism” and 
the “worship of money” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:70)—a tendency vehemently rejected 
by Muslim scholars and radicals who called for a holy war with Westernisation and rulers 
who had been “corrupted” by the Western ways. Sayyid Qutb revived the concept of 
“Jahiliyya” (used to describe and era of ignorance of people in pre-Islamic history) to 
describe the West in such terms as a “gigantic brothel, steeped in animal lust, greed and 
selfishness” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:117). In his view, the Western Jahiliyya culture is 
only valued for sex, food, drink and things fit for animals. Such an Occidentalist mindset 
encouraged him to join the Muslim Brotherhood and work to develop an Islamic ideology 
(religious Occidentalism) to confront the West. 
 The concept of Jahiliyya was also developed in the twentieth century in Pakistan. 
Abulala Maududi proposed the “new Jahiliyya” and called for the exercise of the Sharia 
rule in Muslim countries in order to avert the influence of the West and Western agents. 
Maudidi later set up the Jamaat Islami party (in 1941 in India and in 1947 in Pakistan) to 
“struggle against the enemies of Islam”. Allameh Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), known by 
many as the spiritual father of Pakistan, was another Pakistani philosopher who turned 
against the West. However, the opposition of Iqbal to the West was rather different from 
that of Maududi and his sympathisers in other Islamic states. Iqbal was more a critic than 
an Occidentalist. He was only against the Western economic exploitation and he never 
dehumanised the West.      
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In the 1900s in Japan, the West was regarded as shallow, materialistic, rootless and 
“un-Japanese”. When new Western-manufactured machineries were introduced to Japan’s 
industries, the West was described as a “machine civilisation, mechanical and without 
soul.” In Kyoto in 1942, intellectuals convened a conference to denounce Westernisation as 
a disease which had infected the Japanese spirit. They wanted to become modernised and at 
the same time preserve their past. And they were ready to sacrifice themselves in order to 
reach this goal. The so-called Kamikaze pilots hurtled themselves to death onto enemy 
vessels.  
Kamikaze pilots were not just fighting the Americas; they saw 
themselves as intellectual rebels against what they considered Western 
corruption of Japan, the selfish greed of capitalism, the moral emptiness 
of liberalism, the shallowness of American culture (Buruma and 
Margalit, 2005:66). 
A similar “extremist and violent” mindset later prevailed Afghanistan where the 
Taliban regime confronted all signs of Westernisation such as Western hairstyle, fashion, 
ornamentals, clothing and even music, television and games such as kite flying, chess and 
soccer. In order to erase elements of Westernisation, the Taliban resorted to force and 
violence as well as the strict application of the Shariah law. But this was not sufficient and 
led Al-Qaeda terrorists to attack twin towers in 2001 and mark the beginning of violent 
anti-Americanism followed by several other abortive attempts to blow up US planes and 
shopping centres.   
The Kamikaze-style resistance was also reinvented by the Hezbollah in Lebanon 
after the Israeli invasion of 1982 when hundreds of US soldiers were killed by a suicide 
bomber who drove a truck full of explosives to the US military base. Such a tactic was later 
adopted by the Palestinians as well.  
Buruma and Margalit’s concept of Occidentalism is an accumulation of destructive 
images constructed by either East (mainly Maoist China and Kyoto intellectuals) or the 
West (Germany) about the West—what they call “intellectual destruction” which they 
believe are consequence of “metropolitan hubris” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:19): The 
West is soulless, shallow, rootless, godless, mechanical, superficial, trivial, corrupt, greedy, 
money-grubbing, insensitive, parasitic, mediocre, fashion-addicted poisonous materialist 
civilisation and destructive of creative power1.   
                                                           
1 Another scholar Howard (1995:120) explains that the West in Occidentalist eyes is both monolithic (all 
Westerners represent and are represented by the US) and without history.   
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Although Buruma and Margalit (2005:9-15) believe that Occidentalism is not the 
same as anti-Americanism, they attribute Occidentalism (hatred of the West) mainly to anti-
Americanism and dissatisfaction with the US foreign policy.  In general, they blame 
Occidentalism simply on an “arrogant Western mindset” (Westernism) and what they call 
“Western influences” on modernism, urbanism, “Jewified” Americanism, imperialism, 
colonialism and capitalism.   
 Historical origins of the hatred of the West or anti-Westernism have been traced 
back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the idea of the “universal 
West” emerged in Europe and Asia (Aydin, 2007: 15). In fact, from the 1870s onward in 
Asia, pan-Islamist Ottoman and pan-Asian Japanese intellectuals proposed critiques of the 
West and opposed the “Westernisation” project and the “imperialist West” while in Europe, 
Americaphobia was widespread among the ruling classes and the intelligentsia from 1766 
on (Ross and Ross, 2004)1.     
 In his analysis of “The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia”, Aydin (2007) 
compares Ottoman pan-Islamic and Japanese pan-Asian visions of the West from the mid-
nineteenth century to the end of World War II and concludes that their anti-Westernism is 
not about Western values but the Western imperialism.  
 In order to have a better understanding of anti-Westernism, one should study this 
concept in a close relationship with anti-Americanism because, as discussed earlier, the 
West is usually represented and identified by the United States as a superpower which has a 
“special relationship” with Britain and enjoys the backing of France and Germany2. This is 
more relevant in the case of Iran as the country regards the United States as the 
representative of the West. In fact, when Iranian leaders talk about the West, they are 
indeed referring to the United States. This is particularly true when it comes to Iran’s 
nuclear dispute with the West3.  
 Anti-Americanism is largely associated with either a series of “criticisms” 
regarding the United States (Tai et al, 1973; O’Connor, 2006) or any “hostile” or “hateful” 
                                                           
1 We will later discuss that anti-Westernism in fact was also prevalent in Europe in the early nineteenth 
century when some European countries turned against the United States.  
2 Anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism (as well as their derivatives) are, therefore, used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. Since this study is about the perceptions of the West in a non-Western (Muslim) 
country, anti-Westernism could be identified with anti-Americanism (and vice versa) as the West equals 
America (and vice versa) in the mind of a non-Westerner Muslim living in the Middle East.  
3 The dispute is always referred to by Iranian leaders as an issue between Iran and the United States. For 
example, two days after the Security Council passed its sixth resolution against Iran on 9 June 2010, President 
Ahmadinejad told reporters in Shanghai that “this resolution is said to aim to open the way for diplomacy. 
However, the reality is that we face America. The American government is misusing the Security Council to 
impose its own will on nations.”  
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action against or “systematic opposition” to the US foreign policy, society, culture and use 
of military might (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988; Toinet, 1990; Ross and Ross, 2004; Nolan, 
2005; Chiddick, 2006)1. Although there is no widely-agreed-upon definition for anti-
Americanism, the common denominator of available definitions is that anti-Americanism is 
any “hostility” towards the United States (and the West). This hostility could be expressed 
in the form of protest, criticism and negatively sanction of the US (Tai et al, 1973: 470).   
 O’Connor (2006) has defined four chronological phases for the “hermetical” 
development of anti-Americanism, each with a specific theme: culture, politics and 
ideology, globalisation and terrorism. According to him, anti-Americanism started in 
Europe (and mainly in France) in the nineteenth century by criticising the American culture 
and lack of manners and developed to new forms of anti-Americanism in later decades.  
 During the first phase, which started with the inception of America as a European 
settlement to the end of World War II in 1945, anti-Americanism was largely associated 
with the “cultural” criticism of America by Europe.  
In short, Americans were seen as overconfident and self-important 
and...it was this American ‘egocentricity’ that most aggravated 
Europeans...with the United States being depicted as the antithesis of 
Europe (O’Connor, 2006:13).       
 The second phase of anti-Americanism happened during the Cold War (1945-
1989) and it was charecterised with the “political and ideological” criticism of America, 
either in the West or the East. Much of this criticism in the East tended to be leftist and by 
communists while the European criticisms were about the American policies during the 
Vietnam War (1955-1975) and towards Israel’s occupation of Palestine in 1967 as well as 
the presence of American bases and nuclear weapons in Britain and West Germany in the 
1980s. Ross and Ross (2004) observe that Washington’s “unswerving” pro-Israel policy is 
the most “salient reason” for hostility towards America.    
 With the end of the Cold War in 1989, criticism of America in the third phase was 
focused on the “ill effects” of American capitalism and Americanisation in the name of 
globalisation (O’Connor, 2006:12). Ross and Ross (2004:7-8) blame this type of anti-
Americanism on the “new imperialism” or “liberal imperialism” or “limps” exercised by 
the United States.    
The anti-Americanism of this period is frequently associated with the 
                                                           
1 Ross and Ross (2004) attribute this hostility to the “overstated” profile of Americanism and the Only-in-
America stereotype.  
 32 
anti-globalisation movement and its fears of a world dominated by 
American capital interests and American culture (O’Connor, 2006:18).            
 The fourth and the most recent phase of anti-Americanism began in 2001 with the 
arrival of “terrorist or violent anti-Americanism” which carried with itself the concerns of 
previous phases.  O’Connor (2006:18) traces this type of anti-Americanism to some 
previous actions against the United States. They included the killing of Americans in Beirut 
and the Iranian hostage crisis in the 1970s as well as several car bomb attacks on US 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole 
destroyer in Yemen. O’Connor (2006:19) believes terrorist anti-Americanism is motivated 
by what he calls “religious and territorial” concerns created by the American silence 
towards Israeli occupation of holy Muslim places in Jerusalem, the US invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the Jewish influence over America “as a puppet of Israel”.  
 O’Connor’s classification of anti-Americanism into “cultural, political and 
ideological” arenas was earlier underlined by Naim’s identification of five types of anti-
Americanism: politico-economic, historical, religious, cultural and psychological (Naim, 
2002).   
There is a consensus among scholars and researchers that rising anti-Americanism 
in the Middle East should be blamed on the US foreign policy in particular its support for 
Israel in the Palestinian conflict and its engagement in the occupation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan which lie at the heart of Middle Eastern construction of the US image (Nolan, 
1995; Gerges, 2003; Islam, 2006; Chiddick, 2006; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Graber, 
2009)1.  
The Intifada renewing violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 
2000 made things worse, especially because harm done to 
Palestinians was televised. The wars on Iraq and even the war on 
terrorism have further exacerbated the situation [of rising anti-
Americanism] (Graber, 2009:736). 
This has been also documented in numerous public opinion surveys in the Middle 
East by major American polling firms including the Gallup Organization, Zogby 
International and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press since 20012.  
                                                           
1Since its inception in 1948 and its intensification in 1967, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the 
greatest factors in regional and international equations including the formulation of the US foreign policy in 
the Middle East. As reiterated by Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008: 47), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been 
also a “major contributing force” to anti-Americanism in the Arab world given the “special relationship” 
between Israel and the United States.    
2 According to a Zogby survey in 2002 (as cited in Nisbet et al, 2004:15), a majority of respondents in Egypt, 
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There is historical tendency in the Middle East to portray America as an 
“interventionist and occupier” power. This tendency which started by the CIA-engineered 
coup in 1953 in Iran came into light after the Cold War in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 In a valuable analysis of the conflicts in the Middle East, Baxter and Akbarzadeh 
(2008) review the historical aspects of the major conflicts in the Middle East during the 
past century and their impact on rising anti-Americanism.  
 Analysing the Muslim reaction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iranian 
revolution as well as the wars in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, Baxter and 
Akbarzadeh (2008) blame US reactions to these conflicts as the main factor contributing to 
anti-Americanism. 
They argue that “double standards” in the US foreign policy in the Middle East 
particularly in relation to its “special treatment” of Israel and failing to act as an “honest 
broker” in the peace process between Israel and Palestine culminated in anger and 
abhorrence among the Arabs of America (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:56-62). 
From the Arab perspective, Israel was receiving special treatment 
and the United States was turning a blind eye to a flagrant breach of 
international law (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:56).  
 According to Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:136-155), there is a “symbiotic” 
relationship between anti-Americanism in the Middle East and the US-Israel alliance at the 
expense of Palestinians as Arab perceptions of the United States changed from a “natural 
ally of Arab anti-colonial movements” in the early years of the twentieth century to an 
“untrustworthy”, “hypocritical” and “double standard” broker in the late years of the 1900s.      
The consistent use of its veto power in the UN Security Council to 
protect Israel from resolutions that insist that Tel Aviv change its 
policy towards the Occupied Territories, the continued and increased 
funding of Israel’s already formidable military capacity, and the 
unstinting political support for Israel’s regional policy have all 
greatly affected Arab view of the United States... [and] damaged its 
standing in the broader Middle East (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 
2008:156).   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates named US policies, rather than the American 
values of freedom and democracy, as the reason for their negative opinions of America. In another poll in 
2004, majority of respondents in six Middle Eastern countries opined that America should “change its Middle 
East policy, stop supporting Israel and get out of Iraq” if it wants to improve its standing among Muslims (as 
cited in Chiddik, 2004: 99).  
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One of the other developments which greatly impacted upon the image of the US in 
the Middle East was the Iraq war in 2003 which Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:161-169) 
believe was perceived by the people of the region as “a neo-colonialist adventure to secure 
America’s interest” and also a “pattern of US interference” in regional politics particularly 
after it was revealed that there were no WMDs in Iraq.  
The US invasion of Iraq could not but...give Arabs further reason to 
view Washington as a global bully...Public anger over the role and 
actions of the US military stirred popular discontent (Baxter and 
Akbarzadeh, 2008:170).   
 Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:105) also argue that the US support for the formation 
of the Taliban in 1980s in Afghanistan as a force against the Soviet was also a source of 
anti-Americanism among the Muslims as the emergence of Taliban was “a product of the 
betrayal of the US” which continued in the 1990s with the support it offered to Saddam 
Hussein in its war against Iran and the intervention by US soldiers in “liberating” Kuwait.  
...[I]t was oil, rather than a political commitment to respecting the 
fate of the region, that was seen as integral to Washington’s decision 
to carry out a military liberation. This...strengthened Arab distaste for 
US regional policy (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:132).    
 
 ii. Occidentalism, modernity and the Iranian response  
Apart from dissatisfaction with the US foreign policy, the other reason behind the 
Iranian Occidentalisation of the West could be traced to the Iranian encounter with the 
“Occidental modernity” which was later intertwined with the “Occidental imperialism”. 
Here, I study the encounter of the East (including Iran) with the Western concept of 
modernity and its role in the formation of Occidental thoughts about the West. Before 
going to this main point, I would like to emphasise the relationship between modernity and 
Occidentalism.  
In the West, Orientalism has been formed mainly through literature, stories, movies 
and sometimes through the first-hand accounts of diplomats and travelers1. However, in the 
East, Occidentalism has been formed mainly by the Westerners themselves through their 
policies towards the East. Additionally, thanks to their colonial and imperial (military) 
presence in the East, the Westerners gained information about the East and became 
                                                           
1 Primarily, the Western knowledge of the East was taken through literature and films; therefore, there were 
assumptions about the East which were later, with the passage of time, turned into stereotypes about the 
Orient, leading to the formation of Orientalism.  
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familiarised with the Oriental way of life. However, the Easterners have been deprived 
from this advantage; instead, they have been exposed to the colonial and imperial policies 
of the West. In the best possible manner, the Easterners became familiarised with the 
Western “modernity” and were forced to attract some of its positive (in science and 
technology) and negative (in sexual relationships) aspects.  
In English, they say “always trust your first impression”.  The first impression 
people in the East and Iranians got with the West was with modernity. The concept of 
modernity started from the West with the introduction of new ideas, norms and institutions 
as well as news sciences and technologies. It then spread to the East (Asia), including Iran, 
where it was later accompanied by Western “colonisation, territorial expansion and 
economic exploitation” (Vahdat, 2002:XI). Venn (2000:19) explains that Occidentalism is 
closely related to the “becoming-modern of the world and the becoming-West of Europe 
such that Western modernity gradually became established as the privileged, if not 
hegemonic”.  
Exploring the encounter of Muslim scholars in the East with the Occidental concept 
of modernity, one can identify two rather different views. One group of scholars believes 
that Muslim states should accommodate the Western concept of modernity in its entirety 
while others should reject the “Western” model of modernity unless it is modified to 
welcome Islamic principles and in some cases the indigenous (native) features of the 
society concerned. Throughout the past centuries, the former has welcomed different 
aspects of modernity while the latter has rejected aspects which were perceived to be 
against Islamic tenets and/or the native structure. Although supporters of the second view 
outnumbered their rivals, these two views survived together in various periods of history, 
marking revolutions in Muslim countries of the Middle East. In fact, the common 
denominator of the Occidentalisation of the West in the East was their resistance against the 
West-driven modernisation programmes. They assumed that modernisation is equal to 
secularisation which is against religion (Buruma and Margalit, 2005)1.  
In Egypt, for example, Muhammad Abduh, the Egyptian scholar and a student of 
Jamaloddin Asadabadi, believed that Muslims should integrate change into their society 
based on the principles of Islam if they want to bridge the gap between Islam and 
modernity. He believed that Islam should be the moral basis of a modern society but it 
should not approve everything done in the name of modernisation.  
                                                           
1 British Orientalist Bernard Lewis argues that Islam’s “war against modernity” would eventually escalate 
into “a clash of civilisations” between the United States as the “archenemy, the incarnation of evil” and 
“theocratic zealots from Lebanon to Iran” (Little, 2002:36).  
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A rather similar attitude prevailed among the other Egyptian scholars. Sayyid Qutb, 
a prominent Arab thinker from Egypt, was of the opinion that Islam and the West are 
incompatible and that modernisation was a defeat for Muslims. Even though he welcomed 
Western scientific advances, he believed that Western materialism and capitalism will be 
destroyed and modernity dismantled. Similarly, Hasan al-Banna, founder of Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood, perceived the West as a threat which has invaded the Muslim life and 
a challenge “which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and degenerative 
influences of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, material enjoyment, power and means of 
propaganda” (as cited in Hopwood, 2002: 6). 
Hassan al-Turabi, a Sudanese leader, believed that modernity should be “Islamised” 
rather than Islam be modernised. Similarly in India, scholars Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
Altaf Husain Hali tried to Islamise European modernism in the late nineteenth century. 
They tried to “appropriate rather than simply imitate” Western modernity in their works of 
literature (Majeed, 2000:12).  
On the other side of the spectrum, Muhammad Talbi, from Tunisia, was more 
moderate towards integrating Islam with modernity. He believed that Islam should coexist 
with modernity. He advocated a “positive Islamic vision of people with freedom of choice, 
able to interpret the contemporary world and to fix their position in it for themselves” 
(Hopwood, 2002: 9).  
Mohamed Abed Jabri, another prominent Arab philosopher, was a supporter of 
Western concepts such as democracy and human rights. He was of the belief that not all 
modern concepts were the direct outcome of the traditional Western principles and 
therefore cannot be considered as “Occidental”. He believed that such concepts which are 
perceived to be Western fall in fact within the Islamic framework (Filali-Ansari, 2000).  
Muhammad al-Ghazali, an ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had a similar 
idea. He welcomed the scientific aspect of the Western modernity but rejected its 
philosophy such as atheism and communism (Hopwood, 2002).  
In Turkey, both the nationalists and those inclined to the West regarded Islam as 
contradictory to Westernisation and modernisation. Occidentalism in Turkey was a “way of 
restoring the authenticity of the past lost due to modernisation in the form of the nation, 
while at the same time catching up with the time of modern history” (Ahiska, 2010:41). 
  Iran’s encounter with modernity took place within a similar context. In fact, the 
issue of modernity, since the nineteenth century, was a pre-occupation for not only scholars 
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in other Muslim countries across the Middle East and the wider Asia, but also for the 
intellectuals and religious leaders in Iran, formulating the foundation of their encounter 
with the West1.  
 In Iran, modernity, which began with the Period of Awakening during the reign of 
Naseroddin Shah Qajar,  enticed many political, social and cultural responses from 
intellectuals, religious leaders and state actors in the form of acceptance or rejection (of 
some ascpects) of this “Western” concept. Miresepassi (2000:13) has defined three phases 
of Iranian modernity: 1)an uncritical embrace of modernity as a Western model designed to 
totally replace the Iranian culture, 2)a shift to a leftist paradigm of modernity critiquing 
imperialism and capitalism, and 3)the turn towards Islamist discourses of authenticity. 
Those who warmly welcomed the Western concept of modernity (first phase) were labeled 
by intellectuals and religious leaders as “Westoxicated”, and those who rejected the 
Western modernity (phases 2 and 3) were described by the other group as “anti-Westerner 
backwarded”2. Proponents of the first view (phase 1) were mainly the officials of the Shah 
government and the King himself at the lead. Supporters of the second view (phases 2 and 
3) were led by intellectuals Al-e Ahmad and Shariati3.  
Although both views have prevailed in Iran throughout history, the view that 
rejected the Western concept of modernity gained more support and strength than the view 
which accommodated the West without any resistance4. The prevalent view was promoted 
by opinion leaders such as Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini, as the founders of the 
1979 revolution, who developed the revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Republic as “a 
direct and indirect response to the discourse of modernity” in the way implemented by the 
Pahlavi regime (Vahdat, 2002:131).  
Broadly, Iranian responses to modernity throughout the past century and a half can 
be analysed from political and socio-cultural aspects which have their roots in the tradition 
of Islam and nativism, respectively.  
From the political point of view, those who were against welcoming modernity in 
                                                           
1 For more reflections of modernity and the Iranian experiment with Western modernity, see Vahdat, Farzin 
(2002), God and Juggernaut; Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity, US: Syracuse University Press.  
2 Vahdat (2002:212) summarises the Iranian responses to modernity to “denial, emulation, infatuation, 
confrontation, resentment, or a combination of these”. He believes that Iran’s encounter with modernity is 
unique in the sense that the country’s intellectuals and opinion leaders were preoccupied with “the 
metaphysical foundations of modernity” routed in monotheism and sense of cultural identity.   
3 The former believed that modernisation should take place but under the “cultural and ideological base of an 
authentic Islamic culture and government” (Mirsepassi, 2000:13). The latter wanted to reconcile Shiism with 
modernisation. Both adopted a nativistic approach towards modernisation.     
4 The early political encounter of Iranians with modernity can be traced back to the 1800s when the Qajar 
kings were interested in exploiting Western technology, science and military “to resist the military threat 
posed by Britain and Russia” (Vahdat, 2002:28).   
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its entirety gradually gained power. Concepts related to political Islam were developed in 
confrontation with the Western model of modernity and its products (colonialism and 
imperialism). This led to the spread of an anti-Western ideology at different levels.  
From the socio-cultural viewpoint, Iranian intellectuals called for a return to self 
and native (indigenous) Iranian and/or Islamic culture (nativism) in confrontation with the 
West. They played a crucial role in making two major revolutions (namely the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979). At the same time, 
they welcomed “positive” aspects of modernity (such as science and technology) to the 
Iranian society. For example, Amir Kabir’s famous reforms were based on importing 
Western modern sciences and technologies1 to Iran (such as university and hospital) and 
gaining access to the Western military sciences against the British, Russians and the 
French2. Iran’s insistence on using nuclear power is another example.  
Such a “duality” in the Iranian encounter with modernity from the beginning has 
been described as “a strong interest in the military and technological aspects of modernity 
side by side with a weaker appreciation of its sociopolitical aspects—in particular, 
democratic institutions” (Vahdat, 2002:28).  
This has been reflected in the thoughts and speeches of top Iranian leaders, 
particularly after the 1979 revolution. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei has on many 
occasions during his meetings with university scholars and students as well as the members 
of the State Expediency Council responsible for devising the country’s long-term vision, 
called for the development of “indigenous inward-looking development plans”. In fact, the 
concern of such leaders in the Muslim world is how to modernise without becoming a 
“mere clone of the West” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:40). Mirsepassi (2000:94) attributed 
the rise of political Islam in Iran to the presentation of an “alternative discourse to 
overcome Western-centric projects of modernisation, enabling Iran to try and accommodate 
modernity within the context of her own historical and cultural experiences and specifities”. 
In a meeting with the students of Ferdosi University in Mashhad on 15 May 2007, the 
Iranian leader criticised the Western model of development and modernity:  
There are two misguided approaches towards development…One is the 
damages and betrayals in the name of development … by people who 
were dependent on the West and colonial policies such as the Qajar 
                                                           
1 Such sciences and technologies included engineering, infantry, cavalry, artillery, medicine and surgery, 
mineralogy, physics, chemistry, mathematics and pharmacology.  
2 The first regular Iranian newspaper was also published by Amir Kabir to “enlighten and educate” the people 
of Persia (Farman Farmayan, 1996: 128 as cited in Vahdat, 2002:29). 
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kings and Reza Khan [founder of the Pahlavi dynasty]… and the other 
approach is those who are completely against development (Khamenei, 
2007).  
Elsewhere in his remarks, Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated that the “Western model 
of development is misguided and dangerous”. He said that in the minds of many people 
“development equals West and becoming Westernised”. At the end, Ayatollah Khamenei 
proposed that Iranian elites and scholars should find the Islamic-Iranian pattern of 
development:  
Why do we say Islamic and why do we say Iranian [model of 
development should be devised]? Islamic because it should be based on 
the mental and philosophical principles of Islam…Iranian because it 
should be based on the Iranian mindset and initiative…Therefore, it 
should be an Islamic-Iranian model (exerpts from Khamenei speech, 
2007).  
 Ayatollah Khamenei’s opposition to Western modernity and Western-style 
development, like his predecessor’s, stems from the experience of the former regime of 
Shah and other US-installed regimes in the wider Middle East, such as Iraq and Libya 
where ambitious programmes of Westernisation and economic growth were designed by 
the United States to avert the Soviet influence in these countries—a failed policy which 
ultimately resulted in the spread of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism. Little 
(2003:194) describes such a failure as not a “surprise” given the policies of the West: 
Having insisted for twenty years that economic development and 
political reform would contain Nasserism and bring stability to Iraq, 
Libya, and Iran, US policymakers were stunned when modernisation 
brought xenophobic nationalism and revolutionary Islam instead (Little, 
2003: 194).  
 In the case of Iran, the miscalculation of the West in exporting Western-style 
modernity speedily into the Iranian society was reflected in CIA reports and White House 
expert comments on Iran. CIA analysts reported in 1970 that ambitious programmes of 
modernisation by the Shah had given him over-self-confidence “that his the master in his 
own house” (Little, 2003: 222). In another example, White House Middle East expert, Gary 
Sick, warned the government that Shah reforms under the Western modernisation 
programme is “backfiring”: Sick referred to the “reactionary Muslim right wing…which 
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finds his [Shah’s] modernisation programme too liberal and moving too fast away from the 
traditional values of the Iranian society” as a threat to the Shah regime (Little, 2003:224). 
George Ball, an advisor to Jimmy Carter, envisaged a similar conclusion and blamed 
“imported modernisation” programmes behind the failure of the Shah regime and the 
“unintended revolutionary consequences” for the United States which later led to the 
Iranian Occidentalisation of the West (Little, 2003:226).   
     
 
iii. Anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in the Iranian context 
 To establish its hegemony in the Middle East, America has relied on two major 
tactics: strengthening allies and weakening foes. To fulfill the former, America has 
supported its Arab allies as a means of undermining local political forces who challenge it 
regional hegemony. To materialise the latter, America has relied on either direct military 
intervention or the intensification of regional conflicts1.  
 Mitchell (2004:88) believes these tactics were employed apparently to establish the 
position of America and fight its enemies (i.e. anti-Americans) but surprisingly led to the 
rise of hatred against America (anti-Americanism). He blames this anti-Americanism 
principally on (1) Washington’s support for “unpopular client regimes” in the Middle East 
such as Iran (before 1979) and (2) the failure of US military interventions in the long term 
at the cost of millions of people and billions of dollars.  
 The US support for the repressive regime of Iran during the 1970s was one of the 
roots of anti-Americanism. Scholars blame this on the full support by the United States to 
unpopular “absolutist dictatorship” of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi who established the 
notorious torturing SAVAK intelligence service under the direct support of America with 
Israeli advisers to torture Iranian revolutionaries (Makdisi, 2002; Keddie, 1981; Baxter and 
Akbarzadeh, 2008; Graber, 2009). Such a support resulted in public resentment towards 
America among the Iranians. An American citizen who was at that time teaching at the 
University of Pahlavi (which later changed its name to the University of Shiraz) describes 
this anti-Americanism months before the revolution:   
                                                           
1 Mitchell (2004:100) observes that America tried to “prolong and intensify” the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
well as the war between Iran and Iraq, which lasted for nearly a decade, as a means of weakening the newly-
formed Islamic Iran because it refused to “accept the US hegemony”. US military invasions of Afghanistan in 
2001 and Iraq in 2003 as well as the CIA-coup against Iran in 1953 and the Persian Gulf War of 1990 are 
examples of direct American military intervention in the region which were launched against the countries US 
presidents labeled “rogue states” or “axis of evil”. According to the US National Security Strategy, “rogue 
states” are countries that “hate the United States and everything for which it stands”.  
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There was a very clear anti-Americanism right from the start, but it was 
restrained and polite. They wanted the US to leave Iran alone for awhile, 
to be able to develop the country at a pace and in a manner of their 
choosing. Our first experience came immediately after a statement of 
support for the Shah by Carter, around October 10. “Yankee go home” 
was whispered by a passer-by. This whispering was the usual although 
later it became louder, more passionate, and more dramatic…A low level 
advisory from the US consulate in Shiraz told us to lay low. The French 
began to leave at this time, apparently for contract reasons: they were 
having trouble getting paid…“Out with the US” was certainly a demand. 
A group of us went to talk with the consul at this time. We told him we 
saw a direct cause and effect relationship with Carter's statements 
supporting the Shah and the heckling we were experiencing in the 
streets. We had a few unpleasant experiences beginning in early 
November. My wife was trailed in the bazaar by seven young men who 
unofficially escorted her out of the bazaar, and she was hit with a 
rock…We felt that the demands were legitimate and would sympathize 
with what was happening. Americans were encountering increasing 
hostility, such as garbage thrown over their walls, heckling, spitting 
(cited in MERIP Reports, 1979:15-16).  
 Another American living in Shiraz described the situation during the revolution in 
the following manner:  
The American community numbered about 1,500, including about 300 
dependents mostly American wives of Persian husbands. There was a 
fairly large British community. There were French and German 
communities large enough to have a German-speaking institute there…A 
number of restaurants and cinemas were bombed or burned during the 
summer. These were primarily Western-oriented establishments. There 
were only four such restaurants in town and they were all closed down 
when we returned. Some burned out, some just closed. None of the local 
kebab shops were touched (cited in MERIP Reports, 1979:14).  
 Iranians’ perceptions of the US presence in their country during the 1970s were 
also expressed months before the victory of revolution in the form of leaflets, flyers and 
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night letters. In them, Iranian activists criticised the US government for “helping the Shah 
survive” and hindering Iran’s struggle for independence (from America). Following is an 
excerpt of a night letter given to an American national living in Iran at the time of 
revolution:  
Dear Foreign Residents of Iran: Please Read 
As you are well aware, except for a few privileged groups around the 
Shah, all Iranians have joined hands in their efforts against him, even in 
the army, where contact with the rest of the people is severely restricted 
and possessing a night-letter (such as this) would mean facing the firing 
squad. We hear about desertions everyday. But the Shah, supported by 
foreign powers, especially the US, the UK, and Germany, is still hanging 
on to the throne and killing and jailing more innocent people every 
single day. . .and you, being a foreigner, have some direct or indirect 
bearing on the situation whether you like it or not. A lot of foreigners 
have left Iran in recent weeks; some out of fear and others in order to 
show support for our nation (by leaving their positions vacant). Those 
still around could be of three categories:  
1. Those who could not care less what was going on around them, or 
what kind of money they’d be making as long as they could make more.  
2. Those who are members of foreign military and intelligence agencies 
and are therefore directly helping the Shah survive.  
3. Those who have enjoyed living in Iran, met nice Iranians, would like 
to see our nation succeed in its efforts to gain independence and 
freedom, would like to help, and would feel cheap about bailing out now 
that things are getting rough. 
…except for reporters, we suggest and strongly recommend that the rest 
of you leave Iran as soon as possible (cited in MERIP Reports, 1979: 14-
15).  
 Lake (1983: 144) suggests that the rise of anti-American sentiments during the 
1970s in Iran enabled religious leaders of the revolution to “lead and redirect” the 
revolution and conceal the struggle of power after the revolution:  
Resentment at American intrusion into Iranian military, industrial and 
technological matters grew to fever pitch in 1978 when the Shah visited 
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the White House and the mullas used this emotionalism to show 
America as a spiritual graveyard and an Islamic Iran, on the other hand, 
as ‘freeing men from submission and from the rule of one person or 
group of people’. Moreover, by focusing attention on ‘the great Satan’ 
during the early months of the Republic the mullas could conceal the 
power-struggle in the Central Government (Lake: 144-145). 
Such an attitude has been also underlined by Tai et al (1973) who attribute the rise 
of anti-Americanism to “ideological” confrontations with the United States in the form of 
“resistance” and “scapegoating”.  
 Tai et al (1973:456) argue that anti-American hostility is an independent positive 
function of the US “presence” and “internal politico-economic stress”. They explain that 
anti-Americanism is a “justifiable response” to (or “resistance” against) the US economic 
and cultural penetration to and its political and military intervention in other societies.  
The argument underlying our “resistance” hypothesis is that the greater 
the US economic, cultural, or military presence in another country, the 
greater the indigenous opposition…xenophobia is often a result, among 
both the elite and the populace at large. Political intervention is even 
more likely to generate hostility. Few indigenous elites welcome the 
sharing of influence or control with foreigners, and alien troops stationed 
even in a friendly country seem almost universally despised (Tai et al, 
1973:457-458).  
Tai et al (1973:456) also believe that some states tend to blame “internal hostilities” 
on a “convenient external target” i.e. the US.  
Why the United States should become the target of scapegoating is 
easily explained. It is one of the most visible and powerful actors in the 
international arena. The total magnitude of its economic linkages with 
other nations is greater than those of any other international actor. Its 
corporations own more overseas property, and it has more citizens 
abroad, than any other contemporary nation. It manifests in most 
developed form a social and economic system which is widely believed 
in non-Western countries to be the epitome of social injustice and the 
precursor of a golden age of egalitarianism (Tai et al, 1973:459). 
 This view has been echoed by Snyder (1999) who argues that radicals in 
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revolutionary states such as Iran began hostilities with the US to “externalise” their 
domestic conflicts with the liberals1.  
 Citing the theory of externalisation, Snyder (1999:270) argues that leaders of Iran, 
Cuba and Nicaragua had “strong incentives” to promote anti-Western and anti-American 
foreign policies and antagonise domestic liberals with close ties with the West.    
Since the [liberals] bourgeoisie had strong transnational ties with the US, 
the radicals believed they had to defeat these moderates in order 
establish completely new orders (Snyder, 1999:266).  
 Studying the process from friendship to hostility between Cuba, Nicaragua and Iran 
on one hand and the United States on the other, Snyder (1999:266) blames the hostility 
between these revolutionary states and the US and breakdown of their relations on (1) 
America’s economic and ideological goals, (2) mutual suspicion and misrepresentations of 
the two states and (3) domestic politics in the revolutionary states.  
Synder (1999:273) argues that this process took place through four stages: Domestic 
conflict, externalisation, US hesitation and US hostility.  
In Stage One, domestic conflicts developed between the radicals and 
moderates in the revolutionary states. In Stage Two, the radicals became 
hostile to the US. In Stage Three, Washington resisted responding to the 
revolutionary states’ hostility. In Stage Four, the US reciprocated the 
revolutionary states’ antagonism for fear of Soviet gains, and the radicals 
then moved to defeat the bourgeoisie. Stage Four differs in the Iran case, 
for the US reacted to the taking of the US Embassy as opposed to the 
fear that Tehran was becoming too close to the Soviet Union (Snyder, 
1999:273).  
Snyder (1999:277) analyses these four stages in the context of Iran. In the first 
stage, he argues that, the post-revolution struggle of power between moderates and radicals 
in Iran led to the rise of a “domestic conflict” over the ruling system of the country which 
was won by the radicals over the moderates.  
In the second stage, Snyder (1999: 277) explains that the hostage-taking of 
Americans by Iranian students in November 1979 was not a blow to the US but aimed at 
preventing the moderates from increasing relations with the US in order to “eliminate the 
moderates and US influence”.  
                                                           
1 Snyder (1999:269) refers to this as the “theory of externalisation” which argues that revolutionary states 
were proactive and became antagonistic to the West for ideological and domestic reasons.  
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The third stage began with US hesitation. Snyder (1999:277) observes that the lack 
of action by America was because Americans did not want to “hurt the moderates and help 
the radicals”. However, Jimmy Carter changed this policy in 1980 and broke diplomatic 
relations with Iran. In the fourth stage, the US hostility began with an ill-fated rescue 
operation (in Tabas). According to Snyder (1999: 277), this was a victory for the radicals 
who managed to set up an Islamic Constitution.  
In sum, the radicals used Iran’s conflict with the US to attack the 
moderates on the grounds that they were too pro-Western and not 
sufficiently Islamic. In building its institutions and political coalition, the 
Iranian Revolution largely defined its Islamic identity in opposition to 
the West (Snyder, 1999:279).  
In his analysis of why the United States could not tolerate the Iranian revolution as 
well as the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, Snyder (1999:268-272) refers to the 
opposition of these states to “capitalism”. He argues that because Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua 
challenged capitalism, the United States pushed them to an unwanted anti-American camp 
through antagonistic measures such as economic sanctions, military threats, covert aid and 
political pressure to overturn the revolution.  
Explaining the rise of political Islam and in particular Shiism which led to Iran’s 
revolution and its subsequent anti-Americanism, Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:70) argue 
that the emergence of an anti-US regime in Iran reflected the “wave of popular discontent 
with US interference and influence throughout the region”. They further discuss that 
America’s siding with Iraq and in particular arming Saddam with chemical weapons during 
the 1980-88 war with Iran was another source anti-Americanism among Iranians1. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States played a central 
role in the arming, advising and finally fighting that consumed the 
Persian Gulf. The United States...pursued and increasingly 
interventionist regional agenda that was aimed at securing both 
influence and resources. As a result, Middle Eastern perceptions of 
the superpower and its intentions in the region were adversely 
affected (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:109).  
    
 
                                                           
1 Iranian anti-Americanism will be discussed in more detail in the section on Iran’s relations with the United 
States.   
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The concept of the West in Iran  
A Gallup poll on the “US image in the Middle East and North Africa” revealed that 
the image of the leadership of the United States in the predominantly Muslim Middle East 
and North Africa is relatively “very poor” with the regional median approval standing at 15 
per cent (Ray, 2009). This image even deteriorated with the advent of the Arab Spring in 
2011. Such a finding might not be a surprise to policymakers and researchers of political 
sciences, as the United States is already in many troubles in that region, ranging from the 
war in Afghanistan to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear dispute.  
However, what could be of interest to policymakers and researchers of political 
sciences is the approval rating of the leadership of the United States in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Surprisingly, a Gallup poll in 2009 found that 16 per cent of Iranians, compared to 
12 per cent of people in Saudi Arabia (as a strong US ally), six per cent of people in Egypt 
(as a strong US ally) and four per cent of Syrians had approved the US leadership. Such an 
approval rating (16 per cent) is low; yet, it is higher than ratings among the populations of 
key US allies in the Middle East. This is interesting because Iran and the United States had 
no formal diplomatic relation for three decades1. In fact, a Gallup poll in 2011 
demonstrated that fewer Iranians approve of US and EU leadership. Morales and Ray 
(2011) indicated that most Iranians disapprove of the West (65 per cent against the US, 62 
per cent against the UK and 57 per cent against Germany).  
                                                           
1 The poll also suggested that unlike other populations in the region, relatively few Iranians (21 per cent) rate 
US withdrawal from Iraq as very significant to improving their opinion. Also, Iranians (45 per cent) were 
most likely to say greater technology transfer and the exchange of business expertise with their country would 
improve their opinions of the United States very significantly, while 40 per cent of Iranians say actions related 
to economic development and aid would improve their opinions of the United States very significantly. 
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The unfavourable image of the United States in Iran, judging from Gallup surveys 
since 2001, is on the rise (Mogahed, 2005). While 52 per cent of Iranians had an 
unfavourable view of the United States in the early 2000s, the figure increase to 65 per cent 
by the end of the decade1. But what are the reasons behind such rising resentment of 
Iranians with the West? In order to answer this question, history of relations between Iran 
and the West should be investigated.   
 
i. Iran-West relations; a historical perspective 
 In the Persian language and in the contemporary literature, the word “West” has 
been equivalent to “Farang” (or Farangestan) and more recently to “Maghreb” or “Gharb”. 
In the fifth century Iranian literature, Farang was a title given to France which was 
gradually used to refer to the West.   
 Few researches have been done into the representations of Europeans in Iranian 
works before the eighteenth century. Cole (1992) has undertaken an analysis of eighteenth-
century depictions of the West in three Persian texts by Shiite high-class Indo-Iranian 
authors Abdollatif Khan (1805), Mirza Aboutaleb Khan (1812) and Aqa Ahmad Behbahani 
(1810)2. Cole (1992) recognises two paradoxical conceptions of the West (in Cole’s 
analysis Britain) among Iranian intellectuals:  
…[Intellectuals] became divided between those who opposed the 
expansion of European [Western] power in the Muslim world and those 
willing to ally themselves or collaborate with the foreigners. Sometimes 
the career of a leader…demonstrated both leanings, with early 
opposition to the foreigners followed by a collaborationist phase in the 
                                                           
1 This is while another Gallup poll in January 2009 indicated that 67 per cent of people in the Middle East 
and North Africa disapprove of the leadership of the United Kingdom. The polls conducted from 2005 to 
2008 in more than 140 countries and areas find that only in Africa is median approval of British leadership 
above 50 per cent.  This is while the median global approval of British leadership is statistically similar to that 
of other major world players such as the United States and France, but significantly lower than that of German 
leadership (Brown and Nyiri, 2009). The Gallup poll, based on responses on the leadership of the United 
Kingdom from 143 countries including in the Middle East, suggested that while the disapproval rating for the 
United States stands at 35 per cent, it is 21 per cent for Britain and France and 16 per cent for Germany (Ibid). 
Another poll in September 2008 within the European Union showed that the approval of the leadership of 
Germany has received the most favour (51 per cent) than that of other powerful Western nations.  Based on 
this poll, France, (41 per cent) Britain (39 per cent) and the United States (20 per cent) respectively obtained 
the highest approval rating in Europe (Nyiri and English, 2009).   
2 Cole (1992:6) observes that intellectuals often received “patronage” from European consuls or agents to 
write Persian chronicles about the local political events of the day from a point of view that “flattered” the 
British.  
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wake of a decisive defeat in the British hands (Cole, 1992: 5)1. 
 In his analysis, Cole (1992:6-13) discovers three positive themes about Britain in 
the works of the authors: egalitarianism (particularly with regards to gender relations and 
female dress code), the system of government (parliamentarianism) and scientific and 
technological advancement (as in printing press, shipbuilding, arms manufacturing, and 
industrial mechanisation).  
He also discovers negative points in the Persian writings about Britain: high levels 
of individualism and mercenary attitudes, coward, lack of manliness, lack of religious 
belief, inclination to secular philosophy and dishonesty among the lower class. In 
particular, Abutaleb devotes a whole chapter to criticise the Europeans for being “selfish, 
irritable, inconsiderate, consumed with acquiring material things…and…for living 
extravagantly”. One most significant criticism in the Persian writings about Britain (and the 
West) was raised, according to Cole (1992: 14), by Abutaleb about “colonialism”—a 
concept which entertained Iranian intellectuals and politicians for more than one and a half 
centuries later when the Islamic revolution became victorious in Iran and the “political 
West” was perceived negatively among the Iranians.  
 Many people might think that any image of the West in Iran is only attributed to the 
hostage-taking crisis in 1979 or even the CIA-engineered coup in 1953 which has been 
described as “an orchestrated program of destabilisation” by CIA participants who spent at 
least 60,000 dollars to topple the Iranian government (Gasiorowski, 1987: 272-77). 
However, the history of relations between Iran and the West in the contemporary history of 
the country dates back to the Safavids (1501-1736) and the Qajar era (1796-1925)2. 
 The revival of the Silk Road in the sixteenth century, as the trade route between the 
East and West, had a great impact on the relations between Iran and the West as Shah 
Abbas Safavai (1587–1629) was heavily engaged in establishing diplomatic relations with 
the West, particularly with Europe. However, these relations reached its peak during the 
reign of Nasseroddin Shah Qajar (1831-1896) who was the first Iranian king after Islam to 
visit Europe.  
                                                           
1 The “ambivalent” approach by Iranians towards the West has been also underlined by distinguished Iranian 
historian and author Homa Katouzian (2010).   
2 The history of relations between Iran and the West dates back to the Sassanid era (224-651 AD) when 
Persians first encountered the European civilisation. During this period, Persia was the only transaction route 
between Greece, Rome, Asia and Egypt on one side and China, India and Middle Asia on the other. In that 
era, Persia exported many commodities such as silk and textile items to Europe. Such a geographical (and 
geostrategic) privilege of Persia later turned it into a hot spot of the West in the Middle East, mainly for 
commercial and political purposes.   
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 Nasseroddin Shah paid three visits to Europe in 1869, 1874 and 1885 during which 
he became largely familiarised with the Western culture. He was the first Iranian to be 
photographed and became a patron of photography in Iran. Under the influence of his 
Westernised prime minister Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini, Nasseroddin Shah introduced a 
number of Western technologies to Iran, including modern postal, transport and banking 
systems and newspaper publishing.  He even founded the first hospital in Iran in 1869. The 
Shah visited Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria and 
Turkey.  
 Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini, entitled “Sepahsalar”--the highest government rank 
after Shah, translated literally as “Brigadier General”--was fluent in English and French as 
he had spent 20 years studying and working abroad as an Iranian envoy. He was a strict 
follower of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Nazem or Amir Kabir, the first prime minister of 
Nasseroddin Shah, who is known as the first Iranian reformist. Amir Kabir tried to 
introduce political, economic and cultural reforms to the then society of Iran.  
 Amir Kabir succeeded in encouraging Nasseroddin Shah to make reforms to 
develop the country in almost every sector of science and technology. However, due to the 
conspiracies of some allies to the Shah and foreign intervention of Russia and Britain which 
considered a developed Iran against their interests, Amir Kabir was assassinated and failed 
to complete his reforms. When Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini also known as Moshiroddoleh 
came into power, he tried to persuade Nasseroddin Shah to keep on the development path 
of Amir Kabir and continue his reforms. Moshiroddoleh managed to persuade the Shah by 
encouraging him to tour Europe so that he could be acquainted with developments of 
science and technology in the West. During one of his visits, Nasseroddin Shah said he 
aims to procure more equipment and ammunition for his armed forces.  
However, apart from the benefits of establishing ties with Europe, Nasseroddin 
Shah gave several remarkable concessions to the West which raised bitter criticisms against 
him later. In his last trip, the British received several important contracts such as the permit 
to exploit Iran’s resources (mine and jungle), roads and shipping. British diplomats could 
also secure a contract to exploit Iran’s lucrative tobacco industry which later led to an all-
out religious ban on consuming tobacco (or the so-called Tobacco Movement of 1891) until 
the contract was annulled. Other concessions Nasseroddin Shah gave to Westerners 
included the Harat (Paris) Treaty under which Iran left Afghanistan and recognised its 
independence, and the concession of establishing a bank by the Russians.   
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Notwithstanding, Nasseroddin Shah’s visits to Europe had also positive 
implications for the Iranian society. For example, he learnt from Europe to form a cabinet 
of ministers and structure a Government Consultancy Council which later led to the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911). Moreover, he established a Justice Fund to deal 
with the legal enquires and complaints of the people.  
However, he gradually turned against the West by preventing students from going 
abroad or establishing universities in Iran. He was quoted as saying that “going abroad will 
have very bad effects and it is very bad to allow Iranians to go to Europe.” In response to a 
demand by eager students to establish a university, Nasseroddin Shah rejected and insulted 
them. Such reactions disappointed Iranian intellectuals and religious sources who believed 
his costly trips to Europe had a negative impact on Shah. Keddie (1983:584) observes that 
those Iranians who were sent to study abroad were mesmerised by “economic development, 
comparative justice and lack of arbitrary rule” in the West and began to criticise the Shah.    
Nasseroddin Shah’s successor, Mozaffaroddin Shah, continued the path of his 
“Westernised” father. Mozaffaroddin Shah even spent far more money on trips to Europe. 
He also borrowed two Russian loans in return of giving further economic concessions to 
the Russians. The British also managed to guarantee several important economic 
concessions such as the William Knox D’Arcy oil concession in 1908 (Keddie, 1983). 
Keddie (1983:592) argues that the last shahs during the Qajar period “tended to squander 
the state’s funds on luxurious living and foreign travel for court favorites and members of 
the royal family without foreseeing the disastrous financial consequences.”   
Such sentiments towards the West were later reinforced by the religious society of 
Iran in 1935 when Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), issued a 
directive to provinces “forcing women to abandon their hijab” (Islamic dress code). Such a 
hasty decision was taken after Reza Shah made his only foreign trip in 1934 to secular 
Turkey whose leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was largely under the influence of the 
Western culture. Shah was impressed by Turkish women who did not wear hijab despite 
being Muslims and shortly upon arrival ordered a “compulsory” ban on hijab. Women who 
resisted this compulsory unveiling had their veils forcibly removed. 
Reza Shah’s decision on hijab was largely rejected by Iranian women and religious 
scholars who were unhappy about him on many previous occasions including his Western-
inspired modernisation projects. 
In 1928, for example, Reza Shah instituted a law, requiring everyone (except 
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clerics) to wear Western dress code and a special Pahlavi hat. This decision angered 
religious authorities whose followers were unable to reach their foreheads to the ground 
during the prayers because of the long brim of the hat. In other events, female teachers were 
ordered to discard hijab while going to schools; women were allowed to study law and 
medicine; cinemas, restaurants and hotels were given orders to receive both men and 
women; The Shah restricted religious mourning days during Muharram1 and ordered 
mosques to use chairs instead of the traditional sitting by mourners. In another incident in 
1928, Reza Shah beat a cleric in the holy city of Qom who had admonished the Shah’s wife 
to observe the full hijab when visiting the holy Shrine.  
He dealt harshly with opposition; troops were sent to massacre protesters at 
mosques and nomads who refused to settle; newspapers were closed and liberals 
imprisoned. He also used his power to vastly increase his fortune, becoming the biggest 
landowner in Iran, proprietor of nearly three thousand villages, as well as many factories 
and enterprises. 
Such measures were widely rejected by Iranian clerics and some intellectuals who 
accused the Shah of being too Westernised (or Westoxicated) under the influence of 
foreigners, although he cancelled several concessions awarded to West by previous 
governments2.  
During the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), he established close ties with 
Germany—Iran’s biggest trade partner which dispatched hundreds of technicians and 
advisors to the country. This led to chilly ties with Britain and Russia. In 1931, he nullified 
the concession given to Britain to fly in Iran’s air space, rendering it to the German-owned 
Lufthansa Airlines. In 1932, Reza Shah unilaterally withdrew from an oil concession given 
to Britain’s D’Arcy. He employed American consultants to develop Western-style financial 
and administrative systems in Iran3.   
However, before Americans could open their way to Iran, Iranians were largely 
discouraged by the role the British were playing in their country. Under the Anglo-Russian 
                                                           
1 In Muharram, the first lunar calendar month, Muslims mourn the martyrdom of the third Shiite Imam 
Hossein (AS). Traditionally, Iranians mourn the first 10 days of Muharram, every night by going to mosques. 
Reza Shah restricted this period to one day.  
2 In 1928, he dropped the controversial Capitulation Act under which Europeans were no more given political 
and judicial impunity in Iran. The right to print money was also taken from the British Imperial Bank and was 
transferred to Bank Melli Iran, as was the administration of the telegraph system from the Indo-European 
Telegraph Company to the Iranian government, in addition to the collection of customs by Belgian officials.  
3 In an interesting note from exile, Reza Shah was quoted as urging Iranians against the Americans.  
“Write to Iranians that they (should) fear from Americans more than Russians or the 
British. This is the last word of Reza Shah and this advice will be proved by history 
(Khandaniha, 1944).”   
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Convention between Britain and Russia in 1907, they divided Iran into two “spheres of 
influence” without informing the Iranian government of their decision. The northern part 
was occupied by the Russian Army while the southern part was given to the British. This 
was seen by Iranians as a “betrayal” and further added insult to the injury of Iranians by the 
Westerners.   
In 1919, British Foreign Secretary Earl Curzon tried to finalise the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement with Iran under the terms of which Iran could have turned into a British colony 
in practice. The terms of the agreement were so “imperialistic, colonialist and hegemonic” 
in nature that it raised the ire of even the United States, France and Russia in addition to 
domestic opposition. If it had been concluded, as observed by Sir Denis Wright1, Britain 
would have had total influence in Iran.  
For Britain, a Persia...“friendly to Great Britain and independence of 
foreign control”...became a fixation in its (British) foreign policy. In 
order to protect Iran...from France...and...Soviet Union, Britain often 
rode rough-shod over Iranian sensibilities and interests. In doing so, the 
“English”...left on many Iranian minds feelings of awe, resentment and 
distrust rather than affection--awe for British power...cleverness-- 
resentment that the British...(did) not to treat Persians on equal terms; 
distrust because Britain was seen to have reneged on treaty obligations 
negotiated with Fath Ali Shah (which) had forced Iran to abandon its 
historic claims to Herat and had ignored Iran’s declared neutrality in 
World War I (Wright, 2001: ix-x).      
Elsewhere in his book, Wright (2001) confesses that “in Iranian eyes Curzon’s 
cherished Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was an unwanted take-over of their country” 
(Ibid). He believes that even after the revolution of 1979, old feelings about “the English” 
(as all Britons are known in Iran) still linger.   
The oil nationalisation movement in 1951, as Keddie (1983) argues, indicated the 
“deep anti-imperialistic” sentiments of the Iranians when the first democratically-elected 
prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq, complained to the International Court of 
Justice of what he called the “cruel and imperialistic” nature of Britain stealing from a 
“needy and naked people”. Such a nationalistic fevour of Mosaddeq and his opposition to 
the British imperialism led to his overthrow by the United States and Great Britain in 1953 
(Keddie, 1983). There are many other developments and bones of contention between Iran 
                                                           
1 He was British ambassador in Iran for eight years (1963-71).  
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and the West which will be discussed hereafter.  
In order to understand the context of Occidentalism in Iran, one should also study 
the history of relations between Iran and the West. This is necessary to perceive 
developments and points of contention and cooperation between the two sides.  
 
a. Relations with the United States  
1. Before the 1979 revolution 
Iran and the United States did not have much interaction before the Second World 
War. However, Iran became a “pivotal state” during 1945 and 1991--the Cold War Era 
(Lytle, 1987; Snyder, 1999). The two countries did have “nominal diplomatic 
representations”; however, American diplomats in Iran “did little more than monitor the 
policy of the major powers involved in the region” since the United States had little 
interests in the Iranian affairs (Lytle, 1987: 13). This is how Lytle (1987) describes 
interaction between Iran and the US in the 1940s: 
In 1941 most Americans probably could not have located Iran on a 
world map, much less explained its importance to the United States. 
Only a handful of American missionaries, travelers, oilmen and 
diplomats had visited Iran. Trade between the two nations amounted 
to about $15 million annually. In fact there was little in the historical 
traditions of either Iran or the United States to draw the two together 
(Lytle, 1987: 1). 
In spite of this all, the two countries set up diplomatic relations after signing the 
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce at Constantinople on 13 December 1856 (Yeselson, 
1956). The treaty provided for diplomatic and consular representations in addition to 
commercial clause and extra-territorialities.  
The US Congress in 1882 legalised the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Iran. On 14 February 1883 US Secretary of State Frelinghuysen appointed Samuel G. W. 
Benjamin as charge d’Affairs and Consul General of the US at Tehran with a salary of 
5,000 dollars plus 3,000 dollars for expenses (Yeselson, 1956). In the same year, Benjamin 
set up the American legation in Iran. His activities focused on promoting Christianity. F. H. 
Winston was the second US ambassador to Iran. He arrived in Tehran on April 2, 1886. He, 
however, resigned two months later saying “the expenditure for a mission to Persia was 
unwarranted” as he saw no commercial interests for the US in Iran (Yeselson, 1956: 32). E. 
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Spencer Pratt was the next US envoy who served in Tehran for five years. He believed in 
the “great natural wealth of this land and of the profits that must result from its 
development (Yeselson, 1956: 33)1. Pratt further managed to persuade the Shah to send an 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the US. Haji Hossein Qoli Khan 
arrived in Washington on 5 October 1888. He pleased to US President Cleveland to “save 
Persia from Britain and Russia” by going into a “treaty of alliance” and exploitation of 
Iran’s resources by Americans (Yeselson, 1956: 39).     
In 1935, Reza Shah removed Iran’s ambassador from Washington after he was 
arrested by the Maryland police for speeding and a Hearst newspaper reported that the Shah 
was once a “stableboy” at the British legation (Lytle, 1987). Iran later re-opened its legation 
in Washington in 1939. During the 1940s, the US State Department started to sent advisors 
to Iran in five key missions of army, finance, gendarmerie, urban police and food and 
supply to transform Iran from what they believed to be an “impoverished, semifeudal, 
traditional rural society into a progressive nation” (Lytle, 1987: 103).   
The first serious political encounter between Iran and the US could be traced back 
to 1953 when the Eisenhower administration decided to support a coup against the 
government of Iran in favour of the pro-America Shah (Snyder, 1999:277). In fact, the first 
case of the US involvement in the Iranian politics, Gasiorowski (1987: 266) suggests, 
happened when Mosaddeq broke diplomatic relations with Britain on 16 October 1952 and 
the British were forced to bring the US officially into Iran as they had no base for operation 
inside the country.  
Thanks to its geopolitical position and geostrategic privileges, Iran has been always 
at the heart of attention in the Middle East throughout the history. However, during the 
1950s, which coincided with the height of the Cold War, Iran, which enjoyed long border 
with the Soviet Union, took the centre stage in the regional affairs for the United States. 
Moreover, the emergence of the Toudeh Party with communist Soviet-lined inclinations 
and growing confrontations between Iran and Britain over the nationalisation of oil led US 
policymakers to become increasingly concerned about Iran.   
Gasiorowski (1987: 267) observes that under such circumstances Iran was turned 
into a suitable place for America’s “espionage and other covert activities” against the 
Soviets. The US administration increased its CIA and embassy staffs in Tehran and 
appointed Henry Grady, who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, as the new 
                                                           
1 The next US envoy to Iran was Watson R. Sperry who went to Tehran in around 1906 to be succeeded by 
Alexander McDonald.  
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ambassador to Iran. 
Out of the fear of losing its huge interests in Iran, the US government also inked a 
military aid agreement with the Shah and pledged a yearly 23-million-dollar military aid 
package. Another agreement was reached between the two countries under which the 
United States vowed to give a 25-million-dollar loan to Iran and support the allocation of 
another 10-million-dollar loan by the World Bank.  
America’s political support for and military aid to Iran was so great that some 
described the Shah as the “Local Gendarme” and “regional kingpin” of the US in the 
Middle East1. As reported by Ayoob (1973: 1415), Washington was going to sell two to 
three billion dollars in value of the most sophisticated weapons to Iran while up to 14,000 
American “advisors” were already present at the country2.  
In 1951, the Truman administration outlined two major goals regarding the US 
interest in Iran. In the first hand, Americans wanted to keep Iran in the “Western camp at 
all costs” and secondly they wanted to maintain stability in the global “oil markets” 
following the mayhem created by the oil nationalisation movement in Iran (Gasiorowski, 
1987: 267). However, these goals were interpreted by some as aiming to challenge Iran’s 
sovereignty while others said they were designed to weaken the Soviet rather than 
Mosaddeq’s position in Iran3. As suggested by Gasiorowski (1987: 268), the United States 
began “covert” intelligence efforts to control and “manipulate” the political process in Iran 
in the late 1940s when the CIA designed five types of activity in Iran:   
First, stay-behind networks had been organised among the tribes in 
southern Iran to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet 
invasion. Second, escape and evasion routes had been set up for use in a 
major war. Third, cross-border espionage and subversion operations 
were being launched into the Soviet Union using Azerbaijanis, 
Armenians, and other ethnic groups living on both sides of the border. 
Fourth, Soviet activities in Iran were being monitored with espionage 
and counter-espionage operations. Finally, an operation [propaganda 
campaign] codenamed BEDAMN had been started in 1948 to counter 
                                                           
1 America regarded Iran as the regional kingpin in the CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) alliance which 
incidentally had been reactivated.  
2 On the huge “political investment” of the United States in Iran, Ayoob (1973) argues that America’s 
interests in Iran were increased manifold following reports of a major energy crisis overtaking the US in the 
1980s. This was reinforced by America’s not too happy relations with oil-producing Arab states for its 
support for Israel.   
3 US officials were, however, aware of British covert activities against Mosaddeq in this period and 
occasionally discussed these activities with their British counterparts.  
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Soviet and Tudeh influence in Iran (Gasiorowski, 1987: 268) (brackets 
added).   
 Although Gasiorowski believes these operations were conducted against the Soviet 
Union, critics believe one can understand the real intention of Americans of undertaking 
covert operations particularly when they were used to overthrow the Mosaddeq government 
in the 1953 coup.  
 
2. After the 1979 revolution 
Twenty-six years after the 1953 coup was conducted by the US in Iran, the 
American ambassador left Tehran and the US suspended arms shipments in February 1979, 
when Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France and established the Islamic regime 
(Snyder, 1999:277). In fact the Islamic revolution of 1979 was a “direct challenge” to the 
US hegemony and America’s “strategic position” in the Middle East (Makdisi, 2002:551) 
as the Shah and his large and advanced military had been America’s “chief surrogate” 
securing US interests in the region (Criss 2002:588).   
The revolution not only ended Iran’s close relationship with the United 
States, but Iran was transformed from a status quo power into a state 
intent on bringing radical political change to the region (Criss 
2002:588). 
 This radical change had the “most formative effect” on the foreign policy of 
America and inflicted the “real damage” on US interests as it lost “a staunch...ally whom 
President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, once counted on to 
police the Persian Gulf” (Gerges, 2003:76-77)1.  
 Relations between Iran and the United States after the 1979 Islamic revolution have 
been based on one “principal benchmark” which is now at the forefront of Iran’s foreign 
policy principles particularly during the reins of the Conservatives under President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2012). That principal principle is “Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e 
Jahani” or the “fight against global imperialism/arrogance”, which is an indirect reference 
to the fight against the United States2. But why has the United States turned into a target of 
                                                           
1 This was also stressed in the US National Security Strategy in March 2006 that “we face no greater 
challenge from a single country than from Iran...The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks 
to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom” 
(as cited in Mishra, 2008:156). 
2 The term“Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e Jahani” is literally translated as the “fight against global arrogance”. 
“Estekbar” or “arrogance” is the behaviour of a person when they feel that they are more important than other 
people, so that they are rude to them or do not consider them. Arrogance, when used by Iranian officials, is a 
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Iran’s aggression?  
 To answer this question, one needs to review major developments after 1979 which 
have since overshadowed relations between Iran and the US and resulted in the post-
revolution hostility between the two (although one should not underestimate developments 
before 1979 in particular in the 1950s). These developments include hostage crisis (1979-
1981), Iraqi-imposed war (1980-88), IranAir Flight 655 shooting down (1988), war on 
terror and the US regime-change ambitions (2001), Iran’s nuclear dispute (2003) and US 
unilateral sanctions against Iran, Obama’s New Year message and Iran’s response (2009 
and 2010)1.  
 Arrangements to resume full relations between the new revolutionary regime in Iran 
and the US in the aftermath of the 1979 (as cited in Snyder, 1999: 277) were blocked by the 
444-day-long hostage-taking crisis. Less than nine months after the victory of revolution 
and the day after American diplomats were taken by Iranian students, Ayatollah Khomeini 
the then supreme leader branded the US as the “Great Satan” and its embassy as the “Den 
of Espionage”.  
November 5, 1979 was the start of hostilities between Iran and the US which began 
with Carter-administered sanctions in April 1980.   
President Carter responded immediately by issuing Proclamation 
4702, imposing a ban on the importation into the US of Iranian oil. 
Ten days later, he issued Executive Order 12170, which blocked all 
property within US jurisdiction owned by the Central Bank and 
Government of Iran. In April 1980, President Carter issued Executive 
Order 12205, instituting an embargo on US exports to Iran (including 
restrictions on financial transactions) and Executive Order 12211, 
imposing a ban on all imports from Iran and prohibiting US citizens 
from traveling to Iran or conducting financial transactions there 
(Franssen and Morton, 2002).  
 Although most of these sanctions were removed after the hostages were released 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
direct reference usually to the West and the United States in particular (when collocated with adjective 
“global”). According to Farhang-e Moin (Moin Persian Dictionary), “estekbar” means “having megalomaniac 
behaviour” or “having excessive pride”. In political terms within the Iranian context of relations with the 
West, “Estekbar” equals “imperialism”. Exclusively, when “estekbar” is collocated with the adjective 
“jahani” or “global”, it means “global imperialism” which is an indirect reference to the United States as a 
symbol of imperialism and global power which seeks to broaden its influence in other regions including the 
Middle East.       
1 Of these six major developments, five either were created by hostility (from either sides) or resulted in 
contention between the United States and Iran. Except Obama’s New Year message, the other five 
developments are described here as “points of contention”.  
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(and many more were later reinforced by other US governments), the US government 
continued to block the property of the Iranian government in the US soil—a main point of 
contention to the present day.   
 The second major development which negatively affected Iran-US ties after 1979 
was the political and logistic supports given to Saddam in the longest conventional war of 
the twentieth century. The costs of Iran-Iraq war included not only human casualties 
(estimated at around a million dead and injured), but also continued devastating impacts on 
the economy of Iran. Saddam used chemical weapons (believed to have been supplied by 
the West) against Iranian soldiers (and the Kurds inside Iraq) and inflicted physical 
damages on Iranian cities which continue to the present time. Iranians blame their 
underdevelopment on this eight-year war which they perceive as a product of US anger at 
the Islamic revolution1.  
 The finishing months of Iran-Iraq war coincided with the third major development 
which affected relations between Iran and the US. A civilian flight belonging to Iran, 
known as IranAir Flight 655, was shot down by the USS Vincennes en route to Dubai. The 
US shooting, which occurred in the Iranian waters and airspace, killed 290 passengers2. 
Iran accused the US of “knowingly” targeting the passenger plane. Although the American 
government agreed to pay 6.8 million dollars in compensation to the families of victims, 
not only did it never take responsibility for it, but also it awarded the USS Vincennes 
commander with the Navy Commendation Medal “for acts of heroism or meritorious 
service” in the Persian Gulf. This commendation and the failure of the US to apologise to 
Iran remain as another important point of contention between Iran and the US, clearly being 
stated in a report by the official news agency of Iran on the anniversary of the IranAir 
Flight 655 incident:  
The airplane...was targeted on purpose by the aggressive and 
criminal forces of the Great Satan...Shooting down of Iran’s 
passenger plane by American criminals was in fact another stage of 
the confrontation of the global arrogance with the Islamic Republic 
of Iran aimed at reinforcing Iraqi aggressors in frontlines and 
bringing the officials of the Islamic system to knee...This was a 
                                                           
1 Iran-Iraq war damages were so great and progressive that Iranians commemorate it each year. Some of such 
damages to buildings continue to the present time (despite eight years of re-construction) while war 
handicapped suffering from Saddam’s chemical weapons wounds are dying every year. 
2 It was the highest death toll of any aviation incident in the Indian Ocean and the highest death toll of any 
incident involving an Airbus A300 anywhere in the world. 
 60 
totally hostile act [by America]...which was recorded alongside other 
countless murders by the American government in the black file of 
the global arrogance...(part of a report entitled Shooting Down of 
Iranian Passenger Flight by America by IRNA).   
 The fourth major point of contention between Iran and the United States is related to 
the war on terror and regime-change ambitions of the US administration which started in 
2001 with the Afghan war.  
 Condemning and describing the 9/11 attacks as “horrific and terrorist” perpetrated 
by “cult of fanatics who…could only communicate with perceived opponents through 
carnage and devastation”, President Mohammad Khatami was unhappy about the lack and 
unwillingness of the Bush administration to heed his offer of cooperation in hunting down 
the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan1.  
We have not been given any clear or written evidence in this regard 
[Osama Bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11 attacks]. Some activities 
attached to these people or these groups have carried out acts no 
doubt that can be interpreted as acts of terrorism, but in this 
particular respect we have no evidence except this speculation that 
has been made and statements made about having the evidence 
(Khatami in an interview with The New York Times, 2001).     
  The moderate government of Iran, which had based its foreign policy on detente 
with the West, took another opportunity two years later in 2003 to propose its offer of 
cooperation2. This offer widely known as the “grand bargain” was a fax from the Swiss 
                                                           
1 Iran’s willingness to cooperate with America in the war on terror as a starting point for normalising 
relations with the West was underlined by the then US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage who said in 
an interview with the PBS’ Frontline series that the “Iranians were not unhelpful mostly by staying out of the 
way [of US forces to invade Afghanistan]”. Armitage further said both Iran and the US “share a general view 
that stability in Afghanistan would very much benefit everybody”. One example of Iran’s cooperation with 
the US was that Tehran encouraged its ally in Afghanistan, namely the Northern Alliance, to fight alongside 
US Special Forces against the Taleban and al-Qaeda. This paved the way for Hamid Karzai to go to 
Afghanistan as the Taliban regime collapsed within weeks of Iran’s cooperation.   
2 There are mixed opinions regarding this proposal. Senior figures from both Iran and the US including 
Richard Armitage and Hossein Shariatmadari (editor in chief of Kayhan newspaper), believe this document 
was redrawn by the Swiss ambassador to Tehran who faxed it to the US Department of State. Shariatmadari 
(as cited in PBS http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/interviews/shariatmadari.html) said 
“I’m quite certain that this did not happen. We are even a bit suspicious that the Swiss ambassador wrote that 
fax himself; we don’t know it for sure. It was not an important issue and I’m sure the Supreme Leader and the 
National Security Council had nothing to do with it”. Armitage remembers “talking with people from our 
Near East division about a fax that came in from the Swiss ambassador, and I think our general feeling was 
that he had perhaps added a little bit to it because it wasn’t in consonance with the state of our relations. And 
we had had some discussions, ... particularly through intelligence channels with high-ranking Iranian 
intelligence people, and nothing that we were seeing in this fax was in consonance with what we were hearing 
face to face. So we didn't give it much weight”. 
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Embassy in Tehran (as the protecting power for US interests in Iran) outlining areas of 
bilateral cooperation and terms and conditions of a peace treaty1. However, it was turned 
down by the Bush administration, killing any glimmer of hope for the resumption of formal 
relations2. Iranians then were alarmed that Bush might invade Iran after Iraq to change the 
Islamic regime and set up a democracy as part of his Greater Middle East Initiative3.  
 At a time when American forces were harshly struggling with terrorist groups in 
Iraq, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad broke with the 27-year Iranian tradition and wrote the 
first formal letter to his American counterpart George Bush on 8 May 2006. The “surprise 
letter”, 18 pages in Persian (around 10 in English), was handed over to the Swiss Embassy, 
which safeguards the US interests in Tehran. When the news was released, some analysts 
predicted an “opening” in relations between Iran and the United States. However, the Bush 
administration ignored the letter, suggesting that it does not contain any “proposal” for 
resolving Iran’s nuclear issue4.  
 On 17 March 2006 and less than two months before the Iranian president wrote his 
letter, US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that “back-channel discussions” 
were underway with Iran on resuming direct talks about Iraq that broke off shortly after the 
2003 US-led invasion. The first such talks were conducted in May 2007 between US 
Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Kazemi Qomi. The 
talks, first high-level face-to-face contact between the two countries in 28 years, were about 
                                                           
1According to New York Times (as cited in PBS 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html), the grand bargain on Iran’s 
behalf included: full transparency with regards to Iran’s nuclear programme, decisive action against terrorism, 
support for a stable Iraq , acceptance of the two-state solution regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
abandoning support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The US commitments included the abolishment of all 
sanctions and hostile behaviour including the axis-of-evil branding towards Iran as well as US support for 
anti-Iran terrorist organisations, recognition of Iran’s security interests and national interests in Iraq and full 
access to peaceful nuclear technology.     
2Flynt Leverett, the then Middle East director at the US National Security Council (as cited in PBS) described 
the content of the document as an “extraordinary proposal” for a “diplomatic process” to resolve all 
outstanding differences between the United States and Iran.  (as cited in PBS 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html). 
3 Hossein Shariatmadari, the chief editor of influential Conservative newspaper Kayhan spoke in an interview 
with PBS about the fear of the Supreme Leader of any regime change in Iran by the US which had stationed 
thousands of troops in nearby Iraq. Shariatmadari exclaimed “we consider al-Qaeda is an American creation. 
So 9/11 was created to justify the next move of Mr. Bush...to invade Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran as well”.  
4 There are two approaches regarding Ahmadinejad’s letter. One approach says the letter offered no grounds 
for the resumption of ties with the US. Supporters of this approach believe that there was nothing important in 
the letter and that it was not related to Iran’s nuclear issue. They argue that Ahmadinejad’s letter was in line 
with an unsolicited epistle in January 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, to 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, predicting the collapse of communism. The second approach, however, 
says the opposite. Proponents of this approach describe the letter as a “turning point” in relations between the 
two countries. They believe that although the “bold” letter made no specific request for direct diplomatic 
exchanges between Iran and the United States, it presented “global problems” and “new solutions”, which if 
understood deeply, could provide new diplomatic opportunities in the region and subsequently between the 
two countries. 
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Iraq’s security only. The second round of these talks was held in July 2007 but did never 
continue in view of US allegations that Iran had increased support for militia groups in Iraq 
acting against American forces.  
 The fifth major and maybe the most significant point of contention between Iran 
and the US (West) is about Iran’s nuclear programme and subsequent sanctions imposed by 
the US. Since its inception in 2003, the nuclear issue turned into a dispute between Iran and 
the US.  
 The nuclear dispute started when an anti-Iran opposition group provided some 
documents for a US news channel of undeclared nuclear activities of Iran. The dispute, 
usually referred to as an “issue” in the Iranian media, was initially dealt with on the Iranian 
side by President Khatami’s government during the reformist period (1997-2005). 
Khatami’s policy was based on cooperation and engagement. He suspended enrichment 
activities temporarily and entered into negotiations with the West (UK, Germany and 
France known as EU3). This policy was later slammed by President Ahmadinejad who 
based his own policy on confrontation and engagement.   
It was for the first time during Khatami’s administration that three European foreign 
ministers went to Tehran together to discuss the nuclear issue. However, Iran was 
confronted with the Security Council Resolution 1696 just three days before Ahmadinejad 
took office.   
The Ahmadinejad’s government decided not only to revoke the suspension of 
uranium enrichment activities but also to reinforce the number of centrifuges and nuclear 
sites. This led to the passage of five more resolutions and four rounds of sanctions in the 
Security Council and many more restrictions unilaterally imposed by the United States and 
Britain against Iranian companies and financial institutes.  
The hardship felt under these sanctions strengthened Iran’s resoluteness to continue 
with its nuclear activities in particular enriching uranium in “breach” of UN resolutions. 
These sanctions and restrictions were interpreted as an action against the Iranian “nation” to 
deprive them from exercising their “right” of exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. The more pressure was imposed by the US and allies on the Iranian government 
to give up enriching uranium, the more support it could gain from the Iranian people for the 
nuclear programme, now turned it to a “national pride”. This gave the go-ahead for 
Ahmadinejad in his confrontation with the West over the nuclear dispute. In a radio 
interview on 7 December 2009, Ahmadinejad said that the “global arrogance”, an indirect 
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reference to the US, is the “biggest impediment to the administration of justice in the 
world” (Ilna news agency, 07 December 2009).  
 The number of centrifuges operating in Iran reached from 1274 in 2004 to at least 
6,000 in 20101. Also, new generations of centrifuges capable of enriching uranium in a 
shorter period and larger capacity five times greater than previous generations were 
unveiled by Ahmadinejad on various national ceremonies and occasions. On the number of 
centrifuges, President Ahmadinejad told a France 24 interview in 2007 that:  
Do you know how many centrifuges are being operated by the US 
and Britain? They are operating hundreds of thousands. Why should 
the US and Britain, which are [like Iran] members of the 
[International Atomic Energy] Agency, have the permit to operate 
hundreds of thousands of centrifuges but we are not allowed to install 
centrifuges? Where among the Agency’s regulations and articles has 
this been mentioned? (Ahmadinejad, 2007)    
 Increased number of centrifuges enabled Iran to produce large quantities of uranium 
enriched up to 20 per cent. However, Iranian scientists were unable to convert enriched 
uranium to nuclear fuel required for Tehran Research Reactor used for purely medical 
purposes. It was running out of fuel and Iran, at that time, did not have the technology to 
produce fuel2. Therefore, this encouraged Ahmadinejad to hold a new round of 
negotiations with the EU3+3 (UK, France and Germany, plus US, Russia and China) to 
reach agreement on swapping enriched uranium with nuclear fuel.   
 It was the first time Iran’s negotiating team held “direct” talks with their American 
counterpart. Iranian diplomat Saeed Jalili and US negotiator William Burns held the highest 
level one-to-one talks between the two countries in 30 years in Geneva on 1 October 2009. 
A few days before the talks, it was revealed that Iran was constructing another enrichment 
site in Qom3. The Geneva talks resulted in Iran agreeing in principle to export much of its 
stock of enriched uranium for processing into fuel and to open the newly revealed 
                                                           
1 President Ahmadinejad announced in the fourth annual commemoration of the National Day of Nuclear 
Technology in March 2010 that the number of centrifuges in Natanz, where the largest enrichment site of Iran 
exists, will exceed 60,000 as soon as the third generation of centrifuges are tested positively by the end of 
2011. Earlier in November 2009, Ahmadinejad told a cabinet meeting that Iran needed 500,000 generation I 
and II centrifuges to generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity as instructed by the Fourth Development Plan 
(2005-2010).       
2 Two yeas later, Iranians claimed they have managed to produce nuclear fuel for their research reactor. 
3 In a letter to the IAEA on 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that “based on [its] sovereign right 
of safeguarding … sensitive nuclear facilities through various means such as utilisation of passive defence 
systems … [Iran] has decided to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant (up to five per cent enrichment)”. 
This letter was not publicised until 25 September 2009 when the United States accused that Iran had been 
building the site “secretly”.   
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enrichment plant to UN inspections.   
On 25 October 2009, UN inspectors visited the Qom facilities1. However, Iran and 
the US failed to reach a final agreement on swapping uranium with fuel2. This resulted in 
the sixth resolution (and fourth round of sanctions) by the Security Council against Iran’s 
nuclear programme. President Ahmadinejad responded to the sanctions by calling the 
resolution as “not worth a dime for the Iranian nation”. He further said “the resolutions you 
[the West] issue are like a used hanky which should be thrown in the bin”.   
 The fourth round of US-sponsored sanctions were imposed 14 months after Barack 
Obama offered his “olive branch” to Iran 59 days after taking oath as the new US president. 
On 19 March 2009, Obama sent a televised message to Iran on the occasion of the New 
Iranian Year (Norouz), calling for a “new beginning” in relations with Iran3.  
...I would like to speak directly to the people and leaders of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran... For nearly three decades relations between 
our nations have been strained. But at this holiday we are reminded 
of the common humanity that binds us together...We have serious 
                                                           
1The IAEA later confirmed in a report  
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf)that the plant corresponded with 
the design information provided by Iran and that the IAEA “still had questions about the purpose for which 
the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme”.       
2 Iran held a meeting with the representatives of the US, France, Russia and the IAEA to agree on the details 
of a swap deal. Under the deal, Iran was asked to ship most of its uranium abroad to be enriched to higher 
levels in Russia, then turned into fuel rods in France and finally returned to Tehran. Iran said the exchange 
should take place in “phases” rather than all “at once”. It was rejected by the US even though it was later 
discovered that Obama had primarily asked Turkey and Brazil to conclude this agreement with Iran but 
revoked from it at the last minute. Six months later, Iran reached an agreement (known as the Tehran 
Declaration) with Turkey and Brazil to transfer its enriched uranium abroad to be turned into fuel. However, it 
was too late to stop the US pushing for new sanctions against Iran. Hours before passing Resolution 1929, the 
US, France and Russia responded to the Tehran Declaration. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had 
earlier said Tehran Declaration had “a number of deficiencies” and was a “transparent ploy” by Iran to 
avoid further sanctions. 
3Obama’s message proceeded a letter by Ahmadinejad to him. On 6 November 2008 and two years after 
Ahmadinejad’s letter to Bush, the Iranian president wrote a congratulatory message to his newly-elected 
counterpart, Barack Hussein Obama. Like the letter to Bush, Ahmadinejad’s message to Obama was a rare 
event. It was the first time after the revolution that an Iranian president was congratulating his American 
counterpart on victory in presidential elections. The congratulatory message was delivered at a time when 
Obama had earlier declared, in his election campaigns, that he will support a diplomatic (and not military) 
engagement with Iran without any pre-condition. Obama’s overture to Iran is not limited to the nuclear issue 
as he is seeking to resolve the problems in the Middle East with the contribution and help of Iran. It is 
remarkable to mention that there were unconfirmed reports that Obama had written a confidential letter in 
response to Ahmadinejad’s before sending his New Year message. On 29 January 2009, a Guardian 
newspaper report revealed Obama had drafted the letter to unfreeze relations and open the way for face-to-
face talks. Although the US State Department denied that such a letter has been drafted, Iran’s supreme leader 
acknowledged in his Friday prayers on 19 June the receipt of the letter and said Obama has expressed his 
“respect for the Islamic Republic and for re-establishment of ties”. Obama’s letter to Iran, like Ahmadinejad’s 
letters to US, was described by observers as both historic and historical. The content of this letter was never 
released. 
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differences that have grown over time. My administration is now 
committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before 
us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran 
and the international community. This process will not be advanced 
by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded 
in mutual respect (Obama, 2009). 
 Obama’s message was responded a day later by the Supreme Leader of Iran. 
Ayatollah Khamenei replied that: 
We do not have any record of the new US president. We are 
observing, watching and judging. If you change, we will also change 
our behaviour. If you do not change, we will be the same nation as 30 
years ago (excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2009).  
Iran’s leader also recited a list of grievances against the US over the last three 
decades, including the 1988 downing of the Iranian civilian plane, the freezing of Iranian 
assets and strong support for Israel and armed Iranian opposition groups.  
 Obama was not satisfied with Khamenei’s response and sent another New Year 
message in 2010. This time, Obama highlighted the continuation of differences and hinted 
at the anti-American sentiments of the Iranian leaders:  
For three decades, the United States and Iran have been alienated 
from one another. Iran’s leaders have sought their own legitimacy 
through hostility to America. And we continue to have serious 
differences on many issues…We are familiar with your grievances 
from the past--we have our own grievances as well, but we are 
prepared to move forward. We know what you’re against; now tell us 
what you’re for…You have refused good faith proposals from the 
international community…Faced with an extended hand, Iran’s 
leaders have shown only a clenched fist (Obama, 2010). 
 Ayatollah Khamenei responded that his country needs to see “in practice” Obama’s 
extended hand:  
“The US president’s message speaks of normalising relations but in 
practice plotted against the Islamic Republic. The words contradict 
the actions” (excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2010).  
 He also borrowed a very famous phrase from the late founder of the revolution 
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Ayatollah Khomeini who described Iran’s relations with America as a relationship between 
a “wolf and sheep”1. In response to Obama’s overture, Ayatollah Khamenei this time added 
another aspect to this relationship. He said the “US sometimes speaks like a fox but acts as 
a wolf” (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 2010).   
“We said that if they are extending a metal hand inside a velvet 
glove, we won’t accept. Unfortunately, what we had guessed turned 
out to take place” (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 
2010). 
 Ayatollah Khamenei also added another item to his list of grievances with the US: 
inciting Iranians to take the streets in the aftermath of June 2009 elections to protest the 
results.   
The US president called those street fighters “civil rights activists”. 
You talk of human rights and democracy…then you take the side of a 
bunch of rioters and call this a civil rights movement. Aren’t you 
ashamed of yourself? (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 
2010)  
 Relations between Iran and the United States were further overshadowed by several 
other developments. In December 2011, Iran announced that it had captured a hi-tech US 
stealth drone in the Iranian soil. The capture of the sophisticated RQ-170 Sentinel’s was 
regarded as a real achievement for the Iranian armed forces. President Obama urged Iran to 
return the reconnaissance drone. Iran filed a complaint with the United Nations accusing 
the US of spying and intruding to the Iranian soil. Days after downing the US drone, Iran 
said it had arrested Amir Mirza Hekmati an Iranian-American “CIA spy” with the mission 
of jeopardising the Iranian national security. Months earlier in May 2011, 30 Iranians had 
been arrested on charges of spying for the US and Israel.  
These happened shortly after the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced 
the opening of the US “Virtual Embassy” in Iran—a move which was rejected vehemently 
by Iran’s Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehias being a “espionage trap”. The US State 
Department said the virtual embassy was set up to provide “another perspective and another 
source of information…[for Iranians as]… the Iranian government, like other authoritarian 
regimes, tries to limit what its citizens see, hear, think, and feel by placing an ‘electronic 
                                                           
1 Developments between Iran and the United States after the 1979 revolution are largely affected by the 
thoughts and attitudes of Ayatollah Khomeini. More on this will follow in the section on Ayatollah Khomeini 
and the West.     
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curtain’ around its people”1. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin 
Mehmanparast said the virtual embassy is an indication of “admission of error by the US 
for cutting ties with Iran”.  
 
b. Relations with the United Kingdom  
1. Before the 1979 revolution 
 Britain is perhaps the only Western country with the most fluctuated and troubled 
relations with Iran. It was Iran which first officially sent an envoy to England in 1611. 
During 1611 and 1926, 19 Iranian representatives at different levels (special envoy to 
ambassador) were sent to UK. Likewise, Britain, up to 1926, sent 34 envoys and special 
missions to Iran, beginning in 1627 (Wright, 1985:216-220).  
A glance at the chronology of relations between Iran and Britain shows that the two 
countries have severed diplomatic relations at least eight times throughout the history of 
bilateral relations. In the first instance, in 1838, the British diplomatic and military missions 
were expelled from Iran after British forces from India occupied the Kharq Island following 
the Iranian attack on Herat. Diplomatic ties resumed in 1841 but again broke off in 1855 
following a personal dispute between British Minister Charles Murray and the Iranian 
government. In 1952, Prime Minister Mosaddeq closed the British Embassy in Tehran. In 
1980, the UK Foreign Office shut down its embassy and moved its diplomatic staff to the 
Swiss Embassy concurrent with the start of the Saddam-imposed war. Later in 1989, 
bilateral diplomatic relations were cut off following the Rushdie verdict. In 2009, the 
British Council shut its office in Iran because of what it described as “intimidation and 
harassment” of its staff by the Iranian government. In June the same year, two British 
diplomats were expelled from Iran when Britain was accused of fomenting riots in the 
aftermath of the controversial presidential elections. Two Iranian diplomats were also 
expelled from London in tit for tat retaliation. In December, 2011, the Iranian parliament 
passed a resolution asking the government to downgrade UK relations to the lowest 
possible level i.e. charge d’affaires. One day after the motion was ratified, Iranian students 
stormed the British Embassy in Tehran. The Foreign Office, accordingly, recalled all 
embassy staff and ordered the closure of the embassy. Likewise, the UK government 
expelled Iranian diplomats from London, creating another serious tension in bilateral 
relations.         
                                                           
1 In addition, the US State Department appointed Alan Eyre—an American fluent in Persian—as its Farsi 
Spokesman.  
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 Denis Wright is a former UK ambassador to Iran who has written two valuable 
volumes on Iran-UK relations. According to him, the first Iranian visited England in 1238 
during the reign of Henry III to ask the English for help against the Mongol raid in favour 
of Persian ruler Ala ud-Din Mohammad. Nearly 400 years later, in February 1626, Naqd 
Ali Beg landed at Portsmouth as the first “Persian” ambassador to England of Shah Abbas 
(Wright, 1985). He left London in 1627 and died on the way to Iran. Since then until 1809, 
no other Iranian envoy appeared in England, a “clear indication that neither country had 
much interest in the other” (Wright, 1985: 9).  
 In 1598, the famous Sherley brothers arrived in Qazvin. They persuaded Shah 
Abbas to send a diplomatic mission headed by Anthony Sherley and Hossein Ali Beg to 
England to seek their help in return for “trading facilities in Persia” (Wright, 1985: 3).  
 The sixteenth century was a turning point in relations between Iran and Britain as 
the latter located interests. At first, British interests in Iran were purely commercial but 
were later turned overriding political in defense of India (Ahmad, 1974; Wright, 1985). As 
the British imperial interest was expanding in India, it became important to keep Iran and 
the Persian Gulf under the control “so that India could be made safe from any possible 
aggression by other powers” (Ahmad, 1974:1). The English sent Mehdi Ali Khan, 
originally an Iranian national living in Bombay to represent them at the Shah’s Court in 
1798. In 1800, the English “alive to the possibility of an invasion of India by France and 
Russia” signed an alliance with Fath Ali Shah of Qajar (Martin, 1989:13). After Mehdi, the 
British Governor-General of Calcutta decided to send Captain John Malcolm as the second 
UK envoy to Iran. He arrived in Bushehr on May 4, 1800, aiming at promoting the political 
interests of the UK in Iran (Wright, 1985).  
   
1238 Persian ruler Ala ud-Din sends an envoy to Henry III 
1290  Edward I send Geoffrey de Langley to Persia  
1562  Queen Elizabeth I sends a letter through Anthony Jenkinson to 
Shah Tahmasp’s Court in Qazvin1  
1611-1613 Sir Robert Sherley sent to Britain as Iran’s envoy  
1624-1627 Sir Robert Sherley sent to Britain as Iran’s envoy (disputed)  
1626-1627 Naqd Ali Beg sent to Britain as official Iran’s envoy 
1627 Britain sends Sir Dodmore Cotton as its envoy to Iran 
1800-1801 John Malcolm comes to Iran as UK’s envoy  
1801 Iran and UK sign Anglo-Persian Political and Commercial Treaties 
                                                           
1 Jenkinson was later expelled by the Shah who, under the influence of Turkish merchants, said “we do not 
need the friendship of the Koffars (non-Muslims).  
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in Tehran negotiated by Malcolm 
1804 UK sends Samuel Manesty to Iran as envoy  
1808 John Malcolm re-appointed as UK envoy  
1809-1810 Iran sends Mirza Abdolhassan Shirazi as envoy to UK 
1809-1811 Sir Harford Jones appointed UK envoy to Iran  
1811-1814 Sir Gore Ouseley appointed UK envoy to Iran 
1814-1815 James J. Morier appointed UK envoy to Iran 
1815-1826 Henry Willock appointed UK envoy to Iran 
1819-1820 Iran sends Mirza Abdolhassan Shirazi as envoy to UK 
1851-1853 Shafi Khan becomes Iran’s envoy to UK 
1859-1860 Hassan Ali Khan serves as Iran’s envoy o UK 
1860-1861  Mirza Jafar Khan becomes Iran’s envoy to UK 
Table 1 An Anglo-Persian Chronology up to 1925. Source: (Wright, 1985: 216-220) 
 
Replacing the Portuguese and the Dutch, the British emerged as the predominant 
European power in the Persian Gulf in the course of the eighteenth century (Cole, 1992). 
However, two major developments led to the deterioration of relations between Iran and the 
United Kingdom before the 1979 revolution. And both developments were related to the 
issue of oil. 
The main point of contention between the two countries happened in the 1950s 
when the Iranian government declared the country’s oil industry “nationalised”, even 
though Iran-Britain relations were going to sever after the conclusion of the Anglo-Iranian 
(-Persian) Agreement of 1919. The agreement was provided by the British government to 
Iran in August 1919 in order for the former to exploit the huge oil resources of the latter. 
According to Katouzian (1998:5) the agreement, which was finally revoked by the Iranian 
parliament in 1921, was designed to “turn Iran into a British protectorate” but received 
great opposition by Iranians from different political backgrounds as well as Iranian 
expatriates and even foreigners1. The terms of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 were 
so “exploitative” and “imperialistic” that even the British Treasury, War Office and India 
Office as well as the government of India regarded that as “costly and/or offensive to the 
surging nationalist sentiments” in Iran (Ibid,6)2. 
It lit the touch-paper of the surging Iranian nationalism and aroused the 
                                                           
1Katouzian (1998:8) observes that not only the modern nationalists (pro-Qajar, pro-Pahlavi, conservative, 
liberal, democrat, Marxist-Leninist, and Islamist), but the ulama and religious community, Democrats and 
popular constitutionalists, the Gendarmerie and some of the Cossack officers were united in the belief that 
Iran had become a British protectorate if the agreement would have been concluded. 
2 Even the then Shah of Iran who got stuck in France as the result of the turmoil inside Iran revolving the 
agreement, described it as a “British plot to get rid of him” (Katouzian, 1998: 31-2).  
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anger and suspicion of the other great powers into the belief that Iran 
had lost her independence, and henceforth would be ruled by the 
combined dictatorship of Britain’s Iranian agents and her technical 
advisers (Katouzian, 1998:7).  
 Foreign opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 was also a factor which 
ultimately led to the failure of the British to persuade Iran to implement the agreement. 
France, the United States and Russia viewed the agreement as “hegemonic” and against 
their interests in Iran (Katouzian, 1998: 12-19). 
In his deep analysis of the reasons behind the failure of the Anglo-Iranian 
Agreement of 1919, Katouzian (1998: 45-6) raises four main reasons which, he concludes, 
“paved the way” for the coup d’etat of 1921. The reasons include:  
…its unqualified rejection by Iran’s body politic; the confirmation of 
their worst fears by France, America and Russia; the refusal of the 
[British] War Office, the Treasury, the India Office and the government 
of India to supply the necessary instruments for its defence; and [British 
Foreign Secretary Earl] Curzon’s incredible rigidity in dealing with a 
rapidly deteriorating situation… (Katouzian, 1998: 45-6).  
 The second point of contention between Iran and Britain before the revolution was 
again related to the issue of oil. The democratically-elected government of Mohammad 
Mosaddeq managed to revoke the concession given to the British government to exploit the 
Iranian oil. This resulted in tit-for-tat political conflict over the concession to exploit oil 
between Iran and Britain. Iran finally won the case in The Hague. Mosaddeq ordered the 
UK Embassy closed. This led the British government to stage a coup and topple Mosaddeq 
in 1953, marking the main source of Iranian pessimism and hatred towards not only Britain 
but also the United States as two major powers “interfering in the domestic affairs” of their 
country.    
In his deep analysis of the 1953 coup, Gasiorowski (1987: 279) points out that the 
American complicity in the British plot was the foundation of the “anti-American 
character” of the 1979 revolution and in the many “anti-American incidents” after the 
revolution.  
Gasiorowski (1987: 261-3), who claims his analysis is “more complete” than 
previous accounts of the 1953 coup, maintains that the British government, in consultation 
with Americans, had adopted a “three-track strategy” to regain its control over Iran after 
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Mosaddeq’s nationalisation efforts:  
The first component of this strategy consisted of a series of legal 
maneuvers [through the International Court, the United Nations, and 
mediation by the United States]… The second component of the British 
strategy was to undermine Mosaddeq’s base of support by imposing 
economic sanctions on Iran and carrying out military maneuvers in the 
region… The third component of the British strategy was to try to 
remove Mosaddeq from office…mainly through covert political action, 
undertaken with the help of a network of pro-British politicians, 
businessmen, military officers, and religious figures Gasiorowski (1987: 
263). 
 The first tactic was futile as international negotiations failed; the second tactic also 
bore no result when Mosaddeq announced that the first shot fired would “signal the start of 
World War III” and US President Truman advised the British government that the United 
States would not back an invasion of Iran. Therefore, the British and Americans reached 
consensus over the third tactic: to oust Mosaddeq from power. Gasiorowski (1987: 261) 
argues that this tactic which led to the 1953 coup marked the “first peacetime use of covert 
action” by the United States to overthrow a foreign government, even though low-level 
CIA experts were against the coup and viewed it as “putting US support behind Anglo-
French colonialism”.  
According to Gasiorowski (1987: 272), the 1953 coup had four main components: 
First, the propaganda and political action capabilities of BEDAMN1 
were to be turned immediately against Mosaddeq. Second, opposition 
figures were to be encouraged to create a disturbance that would 
dramatise the situation by taking bast [sanctuary] in the Majlis. Third, 
since the Shah had not been consulted about the coup, his agreement to 
dismiss Mosaddeq and appoint Zahedi was to be obtained. Finally, the 
support of key active-duty military officers was to be sought 
Gasiorowski (1987: 272).   
 
2. After the 1979 revolution 
                                                           
1 BEDAMN was the codename of an American propaganda operation which started in 1948 to counter Soviet 
and Tudeh influence in Iran through the press. 
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 Iran-UK relations after the revolution have been full of highs and lows. The first 
instance of “lows” happened in 1980 when the Foreign Office shut down its embassy and 
moved its diplomatic staff to the Swiss Embassy concurrent with the start of the Saddam-
imposed war.  
In the same year on 30 April, the Iranian Embassy in London was taken over by six 
terrorists who introduced themselves as members of the “Democratic Revolutionary 
Movement for the Liberation of Arabestan”, demanding autonomy for the southern oil-rich 
province of Khouzestan and release of some prisoners from the Iranian jails. They took the 
embassy occupants (26 people) hostage and killed one embassy staff. The six-day siege was 
ended when British Special Forces stormed the building and killed five of the terrorists. 
There is still a controversy about this incident as some argue that the terrorists were Arabs 
with Iraqi passports who entered London to storm the Iranian Embassy in cooperation with 
Iraq’s defence attaché. There is also mystery about the way the British government handled 
the situation. Some say British forces “deliberately” killed the hostage-takers as they had 
hinted that they are ready to surrender if interviewed by an Arab newspaper or escorted to 
Heathrow by an Arab ambassador. These conditions were all rejected by the British 
government. Moreover, the court hearing of the sixth terrorist who was captured alive was 
held behind closed doors. He was later released from prison and given British citizenship.  
In 1981, the British charge d’affaires in Tehran met Majlis speaker and called for 
the improvement of relations. However, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then Majlis 
speaker, declined and responded that it is the basic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
not to have “friendly relations with countries which have imperialistic and domineering 
tendencies”. In 1986 and two years before the end of the war imposed by Saddam, who 
many Iranians now believe was supported by the West including Britain, Margaret 
Thatcher called for the amelioration of bilateral ties. However, Thatcher’s call was 
overshadowed by the arrest of a British national Roger Cooper in Iran on charges of spying 
in 1985 (until 1991) and the arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Manchester in 1987.  
In 1988 after eight years of turmoil in relations, the British Embassy was reopened 
in Tehran and foreign ministry officials of both countries visited their capitals. However, 
improved relations did not take more than several months until February 1989 when Britain 
cut diplomatic relations after Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death religious edict (fatwa) 
against Salman Rushdie, a British citizen, for authoring his “Satanic Verses”. Iran’s 
parliament also passed a resolution, obligating the government to suspend all political ties 
 73 
with Britain. Diplomatic ties were broken off only to be resumed at a chargé d'affaires level 
in 27 September 1990.  
In 1998 full diplomatic relations were restored at ambassadorial level when 
reformist Mohammad Khatami was elected Iran’s president and adopted a detente foreign 
policy. Jack Straw, the then British Foreign Secretary, became the first high ranking British 
official to visit Tehran in 2001 since the revolution. He later made five visits to Iran and 
received his Iranian counterpart Kamal Kharrazi three times in London the first in January 
2000.  
Improved relations suffered a setback in 2002 when David Reddaway was rejected 
by Tehran as London’s ambassador on charges of being a spy, and further deteriorated 
when Iran detained eight British sailors in June 2004 after their vessel strayed into Iranian 
waters near the border with Iraq1.  
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the establishment of British soldiers near 
Iranian borders raised serious concerns for Iran as the country’s nuclear programme was 
also turning into a bitter dispute with the West including Britain who played a key role in 
resolving the dispute and imposing unilateral and multilateral sanctions on Iran2. Such 
measures were interpreted by Iranians as “interference” by Britain in their affairs, 
instigating occasional anti-British demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Tehran3.  
Iran-UK relations remained at the ambassadorial level with the inauguration of 
President Ahmadinejad’s government. He was highly likely to drop his predecessor’s 
detente foreign policy. And he did it.  
In November 2006, the Metropolitan Police arrested a retired Iranian diplomat 
Nosratollah Tajik on charges of trying to illegally buy night vision goggles for Iran from 
US mediators4. The British government announced it was going to extradite Tajik to the 
                                                           
1 British sailors were released three days later. Two similar incidents happened during the presidency of 
Ahmadinejad. The first was on 23 March 2007 when 15 British sailors were captured in Iranian waters but 
were released 12 days later. The third incident occurred in November 2009 when five British sailors strayed 
unintentionally into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Like the two previous incidents, they were released 
five days later. There has been always controversy over Iranian sea borders in the Persian Gulf. One such 
incident also happened in 2008 when Iranian military boats approached three US Navy ships near the Strait of 
Hormoz. No fighting was reported.   
2 On 21 August 2003 an Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour was arrested in London on charges related to 
the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina.  
3 On 15 October 2005, nine Iranians were killed and 45 injured in explosions in the southern city of Ahvaz. 
Iran’s Intelligence Ministry attributed the bombings to “English spies” and said the bombers were “connected 
to British intelligence services”. The British Embassy in London denied allegations.   
4 According to some reports, undercover FBI agents posing as international military equipment dealers 
offered to sell Tajik night vision goggles valued over £50,000 while secretly filming him. Tajik and his 
lawyers argue that the US agents planned to incriminate and frame him, as they were not following a 
legitimate lead. 
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US. This increased tensions between Iran and the UK at a time when Gordon Brown 
became the British premier in 2007. Iran’s Embassy in London described Brown’s era in an 
analysis as below:  
Britain’s hostile policy towards Iran was continued when Gordon 
Brown assumed power and guided harsh economic sanction plans 
through 5+1 Group against Iran. The British Prime Minister [Brown] 
was the first Western leader calling for imposing all-out sanctions on 
Iran’s oil and gas industries (Iran’s Embassy analysis, 2010)1.   
On 5 February 2009, the British Council shut its office in Iran because of what it 
described as “intimidation and harassment” of its staff by the Iranian government. The 
British Council’s chief executive, Martin Davidson, told the Guardian that the 16 local 
staffers of his office in Tehran had been ordered by Iranian security forces to resign2.  
Relations between Iran and Britain reached its lowest dimension in the aftermath of 
the disputed presidential elections in June 2009. Iran officially accused Britain of “overt 
and covert interferences in the domestic affairs” of the country after people took the streets 
to protest the results of the elections which handed President Ahmadinejad a decisive 
victory for another four years.  
 Two British diplomats were expelled from Iran and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei described Britain on 19 June 2009 as the “most evil” of enemies3.   
This is a reality. These conspiracies which were undertaken in the 
past 30 years by various enemies-of course America in the lead and 
Britain the most evil of them- against the Islamic Republic 
system...They fear and they plot...Today, pioneers of imperialist 
policies-America and Zionists and other arrogant powers, have 
mobilised all their efforts to marginalise the Islamic Republic system 
(excerpts from khamenei speech, 2009).  
 Although British officials denied allegations of interference in the Iranian affairs 
and avoided making comments on the post-election incidents in Iran, relations between the 
two countries were overshadowed by such allegations. The Iranian parliament announced it 
                                                           
1 On 12 October 2009, HM Treasury issued a direction under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, requiring the 
financial sector in Britain to cease business relationships and transactions with Bank Mellat and Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and do not enter into new business relationships and transactions 
with the two Iranian companies and their branches. Such a restriction was a unilateral measure taken by the 
British government to stop the development of Iran’s nuclear and missile ballistic programmes.   
2 The British Council was invited to open an office in Tehran in 2001 under Khatami’s administration.  
3 The British Foreign Office also expelled two Iranian diplomats from London in retaliation.   
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is seeking to pass a proposal, calling for the severance of relations with Britain in various 
sectors of commerce and education.  
Less than 10 days after the leader’s speech, Iranian intelligence officials arrested 
nine local staffs of the British Embassy in Tehran. They were charged with inciting street 
protests and stoking riots which London denied. Eight of them were released. Hossein 
Rassam, the embassy’s chief political analyst, remained in prison for less than one month 
and was released on bail, but charged with espionage and harming national security. 
Rassam later admitted during a trial described by many as a “show trial” that “based on the 
order of British embassy, the local staff were asked to be present in the riots”. The 
Guardian newspaper described the post-election events in Iran and their impacts on 
relations with Britain in this way:     
Distrust of Britain in Iranian official circles goes back to colonial 
days. State-sponsored media often accuse British intelligence of 
being behind acts of sabotage and attacks by rebels in its provinces, 
and Britain is blamed for rallying UN Security Council support for 
sanctions resolutions aimed at Iran’s nuclear programme (Borger, 
2009). 
 In fact, President Ahmadinejad referred to this distrust in an interview with France 
24 in which he elaborated on his attitudes towards Britain and other Western countries:  
Our country does not have any expectation from Britain because our 
history has many bitter memories of interference by British 
statesmen...And about other European countries like France and 
Germany, we want them to help Europe...And about the United 
States, America has devised conspiracies against our country for 27 
years and the Europe followed. However, we progressed during this 
period...America is the most hated in the Middle East…America is 
using the Europeans as puppets to reach its own interests  
(Ahmadinejad, 2007).     
 Elsewhere during a provincial visit, Ahmadinejad said he believed that Britain has 
been pursuing “imperialistic goals” under the cover of “humanitarian motifs” in the past 
three centuries in the Middle East:  
Having formed an emperor in that time [300 years], Britain dominated 
the Middle East. The issues of human rights, democracy and the war on 
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terror are big lies and Western statesmen have never had the courage to 
express their goals [in the Middle East] (Ahmadinjead’s speech during a 
provincial visit, 14 Jan. 2010, brackets added). 
 Later on 27 September 2010, President Ahmadinejad proposed the “National Day of 
Combat Against the British Imperialism”. His proposal was accepted by the Cabinet. It 
assigned 12 Shahrivar in the Iranian calendar as the national day of combat against the 
British imperialism. This day coincides with the martyrdom anniversary of Reis Ali 
Delvari—a prominent Iranian rebel who fought the British during the First World War and 
was killed in 1915, becoming the symbol of struggle against Britain.  
 Iran-UK relations entered a new low stage in 2011 after the Iranian parliament, in 
response to the unilateral act by the UK government to restrict transactions with the Central 
Bank of Iran, passed a resolution urging the government to downgrade relations with 
Britain to the lowest possible level1. This could have resulted in expelling the newly-
arrived British Ambassador to Iran Dominick Chilcott.  
 On November 29, 2011, a day after the resolution was ratified, Iranian students 
stormed the British Embassy during a rally to demonstrate against unilateral restrictions 
imposed by Britain. Demonstrators protested against new sanctions imposed by the British 
government on Iran. They also showed their resentment to a report published on 2 
November by the Guardian newspaper that revealed the British armed forces are 
considering contingency plans to back up a possible US attack on Iran.   
 According to the Reuters News Agency report, “several dozen protesters broke 
away from a crowd of a few hundred outside the main British embassy compound in 
downtown Tehran, scaled the gates, broke the locks and went inside” (Pomeroy, 2011)2.  
 British diplomats left Iran several hours later upon the order by British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague who announced the British Embassy in Tehran closed, despite the 
assurances given by the Iranian government to safeguard British diplomats and compounds 
and investigate the incident3. The British Government also decided to close the Iranian 
                                                           
1 London unilaterally banned all British financial institutions from doing business with their Iranian 
counterparts, including the Central Bank of Iran, after an IAEA report accused Iran of developing nuclear 
weapons—a claim rejected by Iran.  
2 Another report said six British embassy staff had been briefly held by the protesters. British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague said the situation had been “confusing” and that he would not have called them 
“hostages”. 
3 Several protestors were arrested by the Iranian police. The deputy commander of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Police also attended to the scene in person when the attack was reported. There are some mysteries 
surrounding the British Embassy assault. Some argue that the attack had been orchestrated by elements of the 
British government. They argue that the gate and doors of the embassy are heavily guarded and well secured. 
They ask how ordinary protestors could have passed through such secured doors and even reached the office 
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Embassy and Consulate in London. Iranian diplomats were given 48 hours to leave the 
country.  
 Major European countries such as France and Germany recalled ambassadors from 
Tehran for further consultation. Thousands of Iranians and British people both in Iran and 
Britain were left with no consular service. Relations were severed once again.        
 
c. Relations with Germany 
1.  Before the 1979 revolution  
Germany and France are the only Western countries with less imperialistic and 
colonialist history in Iran. The first semi-official contact between Iran and Germany has 
been recorded during the Safavid Era (1502–1736) and dates back to 1523. King Esmael I 
of Iran wrote a letter to Germany’s Emperor Charles V to seek his union to attack the 
Ottomans from East and West. Charles V agreed with King Esmael’s proposal and sent 
Johann Balbi as his envoy to Iran in 1529 (Mahdavi, 2009). In 1600 and during Shah Abbas 
reign, an Iranian delegation met the Germany’s Emperor and singed an agreement with him 
against the Ottomans (Mousavian, 2006). Then, in 1602, both emperors, Rudolf II and Shah 
Abbas, established diplomatic relations.  
Official political relations between the two countries, however, were not established 
until three centuries later when Iran’s ruler Nasseroddin Shah expressed his deep interest in 
opening relations with Germany to counter the influence of the Russians and Britons in 
Iran. He visited Germany in 1873 and met German Emperor Wilhelm I and German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. They signed a friendship pact under which both sides 
agreed to open diplomatic missions and expand relations.   
On June 20, 1874, Nasseroddin Shah requested the presence of a German minister 
and diplomatic mission in Tehran. However, the Germans said they would only establish a 
legation in Tehran if Iran would do the same in Berlin (Martin, 1959). Ultimately, a 
German mission led by Ernest von Braunschweig was sent to Tehran by Bismarck to 
prepare the grounds for the establishment of a diplomatic representation in Iran (Martin, 
1959).  
In 1885, Nasseroddin Shah dispatched Mirza Reza Khan Moayyedossaltaneh 
Geranmayeh as Iran’s first plenipotentiary envoy to Berlin in exchange for Graf von 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of the ambassador and how come the embassy staff had been present in the embassy despite receiving prior 
notice by the police to be vigilant. They base their argument on the fact that Britain could have been dealt a 
humiliating blow in the international scene should British ambassador had been expelled from Iran in view of 
the Iranian Parliament ratification to downgrade ties with Britain. This argument has not been supported by 
the two governments.     
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Braunschweig who established the first German Embassy in Tehran. This was followed by 
several military and commercial contracts and cultural agreements which raised the outcry 
of the Russians and Britain, leading to the cancellation of commercial contracts between 
Iran and Germany. In 1897, Germany set up a consulate in the southern Iranian city of 
Bushehr to promote ship building and establish its influence in the Persian Gulf1. While the 
Qajar Empire had become the plaything of British-Russian rivalries, Iran and Persia signed 
a Trade and Partnership Act in 1857. So, the German prestige in Persia was more of 
economic nature and was less marked by political and colonial interests.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, when Anglo-Russian 
antagonism over Persia was at its height, the political situation there 
was complicated by the irruption of a third contender: Imperial 
Germany (Martin, 1959:7). 
The most important aspect of Iran-Germany relations before the 1979 revolution is 
related to their role in the two world wars. Although Iran tried to keep its neutrality in the 
First World War, it was forced to take side with the Allies (UK, Russia and France) against 
the Alliance (led by Germany) despite the general will of the Iranian nation in favour of 
Germany.  
During the years between the two world wars, the Germans played a key role in 
industrialising Iran. German companies took the responsibility of Iran’s air mail and 
national bank services respectively in 1927 and 1930 while being engaged in building some 
parts of the country’s railway network2. The two countries sealed three more agreements in 
1929 to promote friendship and commerce.  
The peak of relations between Iran and Germany occurred during 1930s when Adolf 
Hitler became the Germany’s ruler. He promoted the idea that the Iranian and German 
nations have many things in common particularly with regards to their Aryan race and their 
struggle against communism and imperialism. Bilateral trade relations expanded rapidly in 
1935. Germany’s exports to Iran increased by five times in five years and Germany became 
the largest importer of Iran’s raw material in 19393. In 1938, a direct shipping line was set 
up between Hamburg and Khorramshahr and the Lufthansa started flights between Tehran 
                                                           
1 In 1910, Germany opened a second consulate in Tabriz, northwest of Iran.  
2 German engineers established the first sugar company in Iran in 1904 (Mousavian, 2006).  
3 Former Iranian ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian, notes that the German industries are 
dependent on Iran for supplying energy and selling their products. Likewise, Iran relies on the transfer of 
technology and industrial equipment from Germany to feed domestic manufacturers. For facts and figures of 
trade between Iran and Germany, see Mousavian, Hossein (2006). Chaleshhaye ravabete Iran va Gharb: 
Barresiye ravabete kharejiye Iran va Alman (Challenges of Iran-West Relations: Analysis of Iran-Germany 
Relations). Tehran: State Expediency Council, Strategic Research Centre Publications   
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and Berlin1. However, in 1943 and under the extent pressure by the Allies, Iran was forced 
to declare war with Germany in the Second World War. All bilateral agreements were 
suspended.  
After the end of the Second World War, Iran resumed diplomatic relations with 
Germany. Iran’s head consulate was opened in Stuttgart in 1951 and later in Hamburg, 
Munich and Berlin in 1952. Bilateral accords were revived and strengthened. Four years 
later diplomatic relations reached the highest possible (ambassadorial) level. In excess of 
300 official visits were exchanged during 1990 and 1996. Many agreements in different 
economic and cultural sectors were exchanged between Iran and Germany during 1950s 
and 1970s2. Supported by the development funds of Shah Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), 
thousands of students attended German universities in the 1960s and 1970s in order to 
transfer German technological knowledge to Iran. 
 
2. After the 1979 revolution   
No official political delegation was exchanged between the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Germany during the 1979 and 1984 although some Iranian officials paid unofficial 
visits to Germany3.  
The Islamic Revolution in 1979 censured the mutual ties for a short while, but never 
interrupted the export of German technology, machines, and other industrial goods to Iran. 
The basis of the current Iranian nuclear programme that started in 1985 was laid with the 
help of German and French technology during the Shah period. 
In 1984, Germany’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visited Tehran at the 
lead of a business delegation—the first visit by a high-ranking German official after the 
revolution. In his meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei, the then-president of Iran, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher was reminded that the German government “has been better among the 
Westerners’ stances against us in dealing with us. Stances of your government concerning 
the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime have been fair” (Khamenei as cited in 
Mousavi, 2006:42)4. According to former Iranian ambassador to Germany, Hossein 
Mosavian, Germany recognised Iraq as the aggressor during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) 
                                                           
1 Germany set up its first shipping line between Hamburg and Persian Gulf in 1904 (Mousavian, 2006).  
2 For the details of these agreements, see Mousavian, Hossein (2006). Chaleshhaye ravabete Iran va Gharb: 
Barresiye ravabete kharejiye Iran va Alman (Challenges of Iran-West Relations: Analysis of Iran-Germany 
Relations). Tehran: State Expediency Council, Strategic Research Centre Publications   
3 They visited Germany in 1980, 1981, 1983 and 1984.  
4 Mousavi (2006:141) notes that Germany played a “significant role” during the years after the Iranian 
revolution in confronting with American policies to marginalise Iran.  
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but failed to denounce Saddam.  
It was revealed after the war that German companies had played an 
important role in exporting the technology of chemical weapons to 
Iraq. Some of these companies were tried in German courts but the 
German government did not pay any compensation to Iran…neither 
did Germany apologise to the Iranian government (Mousavian, 
2006:47-48).  
 An analysis of Iran-Germany relations by Mousavian (2006:141) suggests that 
bilateral relations between the two after 1979 was “unique” in various aspects such as trade 
compared to Iran’s relations with other Western countries. He also states that such good 
relations were being influenced negatively by foreign players particularly by the United 
States, Britain and Israel. Such interference and pressure on Tehran-Bonn relations were in 
the form of obstructing Iran-Germany ties and influencing the Mykonos court 
proceedings1.  
According to Mousavi (2006: 224), the Berlin court verdict in 1997 with regards to 
Mykonos was politically-motivated and “the most serious damage” to the relations between 
Iran and Germany (and Europe). Four Iranian diplomats and some intelligence agents of 
Iran were expelled from Germany. Iran also expelled four German diplomats; the German 
government suspended the so-called “Europe’s Critical Dialogue” with Iran (mediated by 
Germany); ministerial meetings were also suspended. Mosavian (2006:233) describes this 
as “the biggest political crisis” in the history of relations between Iran and Germany (and 
Europe) after the Second World War2.  
In sum, according to Mousavian (2006), relations between Iran and Germany during 
1979 and 1997 were affected by 1) foreign players (US, UK and Israel) 2) differences of 
opinion about human rights, WMDs and the Middle East peace process 3) Iranian 
opposition groups movements in Germany and 4) the Mykonos case.  
Relations between Iran and Germany improved during the reformist presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami. He paid the first visit by an Iranian head of state to Germany after the 
1979 revolution. This landmark three-day visit in July 2000 was described by Gerhard 
                                                           
1 In 17 September 1992, some members of Iranian opposition groups were murdered in a restaurant named 
Mykonos. A court in Germany accused top Iranian officials of ordering the assassination—a claim dismissed 
categorically by Iran.  
2 Tensions between Iran and Germany over the Mykonos case eased after their leaders exchanged letters in 
1996 and stressed that bilateral relations should not be further affected by the verdict.  However, Iran-
Germany relations were strained in 2004 with the unveiling of a plaque in Berlin commemorating the 
Mykonos incident. In response, Iranian war veterans unveiled a plaque outside the German Embassy in 
Tehran accusing Germany of supplying chemical weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. 
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Schroeder, the then German chancellor, as a “substantial new start” in relations with Iran. 
Khatami said his visit signified that Iran wanted to cooperate with the West. Export 
guarantees for German investments in Iran was planned to increase five-fold to 490 million 
dollars while a bilateral economic commission (which had not met since 1991) was 
discussed to be revived. As a result of Khatami’s official visit, Schroder promised to 
expand economic and cultural cooperation and to increase the volume of Hermes-Export 
Funds for Iran1. 
In 2001, Iran’s Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi paid a surprise visit to Germany 
and met many German officials2. The German Foreign Ministry reported that Kharrazi’s 
discussions with the Germans went well. The official Iranian News Agency reported an 
“expansion of bilateral relations, particularly in the areas of economics and trade”. It said 
that Germany had agreed to fund higher export credits.   
Tehran’s relations with Germany particularly in the trade area during Reformism 
(1997-2005) were among the closest with any Western nation since Iran’s 1979 revolution. 
However these ties were overshadowed during Conservatism (2005-2013) when the nuclear 
programme of Iran came into spotlight3. Chancellor Angela Merkel showed a tougher 
stance toward Iran. In a newspaper article in 2007, she wrote “it is dangerous and still 
grounds for great concern that Iran, in the face of the UN Security Council’s resolutions, 
continues to refuse to suspend uranium enrichment.” Merkel also stressed that she wanted 
“to reduce our own trade relations with Iran”, noting that the German government was 
restricting export guarantees and that German banks had moved to halt business with Iran4. 
In 2005, Germany had the largest share of Iran’s export market with 5.67 billion 
dollars--14.4 per cent of the country’s total exports. In 2008, German exports to Iran 
increased 8.9 per cent and comprised 84.7 percent of the total German-Iranian trade 
volume. The overall bilateral trade volume until the end of September 2008 stood at 4.19 
                                                           
1 At the end of Schroder’s chancellorship (1998-2005), economic relations between Germany and Iran had 
reached a volume of 6.3 billion dollars.   
2 During the two-day trip he met with Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer (Green party), Federal 
Economics Minister Werner Müller (non-party), the chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, 
Hans Ulrich Klose, as well as Bundestag (parliament) President Wolfgang Thierse and Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder (Social Democratic Party). 
3 Germany is one of three European powers alongside France and Britain negotiating with Iran over its 
nuclear programme. The engagement of Germany as a non-permanent member of the Security Council along 
with other permanent members (US, Russia, China, Britain and France) in nuclear talks with Iran is evident of 
the significance of its ties with Iran. Germany has strongly opposed any probable Iranian efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons but has adopted a softer tone than Britain and France. 
4 Despite this, according to the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), economic sanctions 
against Iran may cost more than 10,000 German jobs and have a negative impact on the economic growth of 
Germany in particular the medium-sized companies which depend heavily on trade with Iran.  
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billion dollars, compared to 3.78 billion dollars the previous year. Such a high amount of 
trade between Iran and a Western country resulted in Germany becoming the biggest trade 
partner of Iran in the European Union1.    
Other developments affecting relations between Iran and Germany during 
Conservatism included Ahmadinejad’s controversial Holocaust statements, his aggressive 
stances concerning Israel (as a close ally to Germany) and the contested presidential 
elections in 2009 which forced Merkel to accuse Iran of “blatantly crossing the red line”.  
In February 2006, Merkel compared Ahmadinejad to Hitler and said “a president 
who questions Israel’s right to exist, a president who denies the Holocaust cannot expect to 
receive any tolerance from Germany”.   
In June 2009, Germany summoned its ambassador from in Tehran in a clear 
opposition to the “government crackdown on demonstrations”. At the same time, Merkel 
said in a joint press conference with Barack Obama that “the Iranian people need to be 
given the right to peaceful demonstrations; that the Iranian people have the right to have 
votes be counted and the election results substantiated; that the rights of human beings, of 
individuals, of citizens are indivisible the world over, and also apply, therefore, to the 
Iranian people”2.  
 
d. Relations with France  
1.    Before the 1979 revolution  
As stated earlier, France, alongside Germany, is the only Western country with less 
imperialistic and colonial history in Iran. After Britain, Russia, Germany, Portugal and 
Spain, France was the other Western (European) country which tried to establish relations 
with Iran. While Britain and Russia had imperialistic ties with Iran, Germany’s relations 
were mostly economic and France’s were cultural.  
Throughout the sixteenth century, there was no official relation between Iran and 
France as the latter, under the Valois Dynasty (1328-1589), allied with the Ottomans who 
were enemies to the former. Upon the extinction of the Valois Dynasty in France, Henry IV 
who had founded the Bourbon Dynasty (1589-1792) dispatched Pere Juste (a French priest) 
                                                           
1 Until 2008, some 1,700 German companies including giants such as Siemens and chemical group BASF 
were operating in Iran. 
2 Germany’s Iran policy, according to Wall Street Journal columnist Matthias Künzel (2008), is very 
ambivalent and at the crossroads under the Social-Christian Grand Coalition of Angela Merkel. The Federal 
Foreign Ministry sets the Iranian nuclear issue on the top of its global agenda, but the public information flow 
and influence is very little. While policy consultants of Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier (SPD) preach accommodation and even a strategic partnership with Iran, Chancellor 
Merkel calls for tougher sanctions if necessary to stop an Iranian bomb. 
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to Shah Abbas Safavi in 1610 to persuade him to set up relations with France.  
Iran-France relations during the sixteenth and nineteenth century were not of a 
political nature. In 1636, Louis XIII sent a letter to Shah Safi (1629-1642) of Iran asking 
him to promote Christianity—a demand met by Shah Safi1.  
During the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), France got stronger and established the 
French East India Company in 1664. In November the same year, Jean-Baptiste Colbert the 
minister of France sent a delegation led by Messrs Lalain and Laboulay to Shah Abbas II 
who exempted French merchants from custom duties and agreed with the establishment of 
the French East India Company branch in Isfahan.  
Officially, it was in 1705 that Jean-Baptiste Fabre, a merchant from Marseille, was 
sent as the first Ambassador Extraordinary of France to Iran (Amini, 1998: 17). Shah Abbas 
II then sent Mohammad Reza Beg to France in 1715 to meet Louis XIV. Beg signed a 
treaty of alliance with Louis. Bilateral relations were downgraded with the fall of the 
Safavid Dynasty in 1722 and the French Revolution during 1789 and 1799.  
Franco-Persian relations continued to the nineteenth century. France was trying to 
unite Iran with the Ottomans against Russia. For example, Jean Francois Rousseau, the 
French consul in Iraq, encouraged the French King to reinforce Iran’s military force against 
French enemies and expand trade and political relations. Such efforts strengthened between 
1807 and 1809 as part of a Napoleonic plan to counter the British influence in the strategic 
Iran2. At a time when French victories across Europe was increasing and Napoleon decided 
to conquer India through Iran and the Black Sea as a major blow to the UK, the British sent 
John Malcolm to Iran. In 1801, he managed to seal a politico-economic pact with Fath Ali 
Shah who promised to be an ally of Britain and prevent any attack from Afghanistan to 
India3. In return, Britain vowed to provide Iran with weapons in the event of a Franco-
Afghan attack on the country. Britain also promised to fight with French forces if they 
attacked Iran from the Persian Gulf.  
Franco-Iranian relations during the 1800s were limited to military cooperation such 
as the Finkenstein Treaty in 1807. Napoleon sent General Claude Mathieu de Gardanne at 
the lead of a 20-strong-military-expert team to train the Iranian army after providing Iran 
                                                           
1 This happened again 30 years later when Shah Abbas II guaranteed that Christians were free to preach in 
Iran. Also, French envoys Sercey and Sartiges pressed Iran respectively in 1840 and 1844 to improve the life 
for Christians and give them more freedom to preach their religion.   
2 This led to the formation of the so-called Franco-Persian Alliance to conquer India.   
3 Under this agreement, British merchants were free to travel inside Iran and were exempt from duties and 
tax. Malcolm was awarded with the Order of Knighthood. Sir Malcolm returned to India and the French plan 
to conquer India was cancelled.  
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with weaponry1. The two countries signed another military contract in 1808 under which 
France sold 20,000 weapons and artilleries to Iran. These weapons were never sent to Iran 
as the country was engaged in a war with Russia—a French ally. The war with Russia made 
France unwilling to expand cooperation with Iran. General Gardanne left Iran in 1809 and 
Britain entered into a friendship pact with Iran in the absence of France.  
Thirty years after Gardanne’s departure, a new French diplomatic corps entered Iran 
in 1840. Comte de Sercey stayed in Iran for two years but left the country in view of 
pressure by Russia and Britain on Mohammad Shah Qajar to sever ties with France. Such 
influences and interferences continued for nearly a decade, ultimately resulting in the 
break-off of relations between Iran and France in 1849 when Comte de Sartiges, the French 
ambassador, left Tehran.   
Under Napoleon III (1825-1870), the French government was again keen on 
restoring ties with Iran. He sent an ambassador to Iran. Prosper Bourte’s arrival in Tehran 
was concurrent with the declaration of war by Britain to Iran over Afghanistan’s Herat and 
the Iranian government was seeking a mediator. Napoleon III welcomed Nasseroddin 
Shah’s envoy Farrokh Khan Aminolmolk in Paris and mediated peace talks between Iran 
and Britain in Paris in 18572. The Paris Treaty was concluded and Britain withdrew its 
troops from Iran which then pulled out its troops from Herat.  
    Iran-France relations entered a new era during Napoleon III in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The two countries had cordial relations. In 1873, Nasseroddin Shah 
made his first foreign trip to France3. After this visit, Iran and France stepped up 
cooperation mainly in the cultural areas as the latter had lost its politico-military might and 
could never again play a key role in the Iranian politics. Iran sent many students to France 
which in return opened religious missions throughout Iran to promote Christianity and the 
French language which became the first foreign language being taught in Iran and had a 
great influence on the Persian language. Many French teachers were also admitted to Darol 
Fonoon—the first Iranian university4.  In 1895, a French archeological team was given the 
permit to excavate the historically-significant Shoush area in southern Iran. France 
continued its Iran ties mainly in the cultural sector.  
Relations continued during the first half of the twentieth century when Reza Shah 
established the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979). Reza Shah was brought into power by the 
                                                           
1 They trained 4,000 ground forces.  
2 During his stay in France, Farrokh Khan re-opened the Iranian Embassy in Paris.  
3 Nasseroddin Shah later made two more trips to France in view of good relations.   
4 In 1900, two French schools were opened in Tehran: The Saint Louis for boys and Joan de Arc for girls.  
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British. The French press had therefore adopted a very critical approach towards him. In 
January 1937, a Paris-based newspaper, Excelsior, published an article on Reza Shah, 
criticising him harshly. This raised the agony of Reza Shah. He summoned the Iranian 
ambassador and ordered the severance of relations with France. Relations remained severed 
for tow and a half years until the French government sent General Maxim Weygand to 
attend the wedding ceremony of the Iranian prince. Reza Shah welcomed the move and sent 
a new ambassador to Paris, normalising bilateral relations in 1939—the year Tehran-Paris 
relations were overshadowed by the Second World War at the end of which Americans 
entered into the Iranian political domain and France and Germany were sidelined. Under 
such circumstances, Franco-Iran relations continued at a lower level although Iran bought 
weaponries from France and sent students to France1.    
 
2. After the 1979 revolution  
France occupied a special place among the Iranian nation (and not government) 
during the 1970s when the French president snubbed the Iranian King’s invitation to 
monarchical ceremonies to mark 2,500 years of Persian Empire in 1971. Later in 1978 and 
months before the Iranian revolution, France hosted Ayatollah Khomeini (the leader of the 
revolution) for four months2. In 1979, the first ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Shamsoddin Amir-Alaei was sent to Paris. Observers had hoped relations between Iran and 
France would improve in an unprecedented manner in the near future, given the assistance 
Paris offered to Ayatollah Khomeini to mark the revolution and the fact that France had no 
colonial/imperialistic aspirations in the Iranian history.     
However, with the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran and the adoption of 
Nor-East-Nor-West-only-the-Islamic-Republic strategy by Iran, relations with France (as a 
major Western country) did not improve. They even deteriorated when France gave refuge 
to several Iranian opposition figures such as the former Iranian prime minister Shapour 
Bakhtiar, former president Abolhassan Banisadr and Maryam Rajavi the co-founder of 
Mojahedin Khalq Organisation—a terrorist group which assassinated many Iranian 
officials.   
                                                           
1 In 1945, Iran upgraded the level of its diplomatic mission to ambassador and sent Zeinolabedin Rahnam as 
its ambassador to France. Various high-level official visits were also exchanged between the two countries.   
2 The French public opinion and press were in favour of the Iranian revolution and compared it with their 
own revolution in 1789. Ayatollah Khomeini published its longest interview ever in Le Monde. He was also 
given the opportunity to communicate with revolutionaries in Iran and provide them with his support in the 
form of speeches and written announcements.   
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In 1980, Iran-France relations downgraded to the charge d’affaires level following 
the hostage-taking crisis of 1979. France saw Iran as a destablising force. Agreements 
between the two countries in different military, heavy-industries and agricultural sectors 
were also suspended. France refused to deliver three military speed boats ordered by the 
King of Iran in earlier years. It also refused to refund Iran’s 10-per cent share in France’s 
Sofidif, a joint French-Iranian company with a major stake in Eurodif-- the world’s largest 
uranium enrichment plant1. In 1982 the issue of Iran’s shares in Eurodif was raised. French 
president Francois Mitterrand again refused to give Iran’s stake of enriched uranium. Nor 
did he agree to pay Iran’s debt. In 1991, however, France agreed to refund more than 1.5 
billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif but did not receive any 
enriched uranium. The issue of Iran’s stakes in the world’s largest uranium enrichment 
plant was later raised in 2009 by Iran’s nuclear negotiation team in their talks with Russia, 
France and the IAEA about the nuclear fuel swap. Iran said France had not abided by its 
commitments concerning the Eurodif and therefore cannot be trusted to be given the whole 
of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile in exchange for nuclear fuel.    
Like other Westerners, French officials were of the opinion that Iran was seeking to 
spread its influence and revolutionary ideology in the Islamic world through supporting 
radical Shiite groups in Lebanon and Palestine. They accused Iran of bankrolling violent 
actions against Western interests. France believed that these efforts could threaten the 
secure and free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, as well as the stability and security of 
the Middle East and the West. Such views crashed the prospects of better Franco-Iranian 
alliance.   
Saddam-imposed war during 1980 and 1988 dealt another blow to Iran-France 
relations as Iraq enjoyed a high level of military support from France. Iraq’s military 
purchase from France exceeded 5.5 billion dollars in 1985 as dozens of Mirage F1s, 
Dassault Super Etendards and Aerospatiale Gazelles were sold to Saddam to fight against 
Iran. On several occasions including one in Egypt in 1982, France expressed its support for 
Saddam. This led to further deterioration of relations between Iran and France until the end 
of the war in 1988 and Iran’s need for foreign reconstruction aid. France was an important 
potential source of foreign loans, credits, and investments since US sanctions were still in 
                                                           
1 Eurodif was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975, Iran lent one billion dollars 
(and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory and bought Sweden’s 10 
per cent share under an agreement with France. France and Iran then established Sofidif enterprise with 
respectively 60 and 40 per cent stakes. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25 per cent share in Eurodif, which gave 
Iran its 10 per cent share of it.  
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force. For the Europeans, including France, Iran was an attractive large market and a source 
of energy supplies. During the reconstruction period in Iran (1989-1997), when both Iran 
and France explored expansion of cooperation, two major events shaped the Iranian-French 
relations: the freeing of French hostages in Lebanon thanks to Iran’s mediation; and the 
contract between the French oil company Total and the Iranian government despite US 
pressures.  
In 1989, following Ayatollah Khomeini’s verdict against Salman Rushdie, Britain 
severed diplomatic relations with Iran and other European countries including France 
recalled their ambassadors in protest, creating another downturn in relations with Iran.   
A glimmer of hope was created in the relations between France and Iran when 
reformist Mohammad Kharami became president in 1997. In this period European 
countries, including France, tried to resolve their differences with Iran, which were mostly 
related to their conflicting worldviews. They set up a “critical dialogue” strategy with Iran. 
In their opinion, interaction with Iran could be more effective than sanctions in moderating 
Iran’s behaviour1.  
President Khatami paid a visit to Paris in 1999—a turning stone in bilateral relations 
as he was the first Iranian head of state to be welcomed in France2. This was a 
complimentary to Jacques Chirac’s lenient approach towards Iran. He had earlier ruled out 
marginalisng Iran through US D’Amato sanctions, saying bilateral relations with Iran 
should enhance. In view of such an approach, business expanded between Iran and France 
and oil giant Total invested in Iran’s oil sector.  The first direct Paris-Tehran flight by Air 
France was set up in 2004. France became Iran’s sixth largest supplier in 2005 with 6.25 
per cent of the exports market share of Iran which in turn was France’s third largest 
customer in the Middle East. The majority of French exports to Iran were in the auto sector. 
Iran Khodro, Middle East’s largest car manufacturer, entered into several new lucrative 
agreements with France’s Peugeot. About 64 per cent of Iran Khodro’s passenger cars and 
pickups produced in 2007 were manufactured Peugeot models. Similar agreements were 
concluded between Saipa (Iran’s second largest car manufacturer) and Renault.   
Many positive developments happened in relations between Iran and France during 
Reformism: French foreign minister met his Iranian counterpart in 1998, calling for the 
expansion of relations; former French president Valery Giscard visited Tehran; French 
                                                           
1This period witnessed an overall improvement in political and economic relations between Iran and France 
although the Mykonos incident in Germany produced another setback and European ambassadors were once 
again recalled from Iran and critical dialogue was suspended.    
2 Khatami made a second trip to Paris at the end of his presidency.   
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reiterated its opposition to D’Amato sanctions; many high-ranking Iranian and French 
diplomats met at the sidelines of international conferences and summits; French continued 
oil cooperation with Iran, granting a 900-million-dollar loan; A delegation of French 
lawmakers visited Tehran to discuss peace in the Middle East; A 192-million-Euro in value 
deal in the energy and transport sector was announced shortly after Khatami’s first visit to 
France1. Thanks to these developments, France became the main European proponent of 
“constructive dialogue” with Iran2.  
Constructive relations between Iran and France went on the right track until 2003 
when the issue of Iran’s nuclear activities was raised in the international scene. Since then, 
suspicion prevailed from both sides. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
France became engaged in direct talks with Iran. Alongside foreign ministers of Britain and 
Germany, France’s foreign minister visited Tehran and concluded an agreement on 21 
October 2003 with Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. It was the first time three 
foreign ministers of European countries gathered in Tehran altogether.  
In 2005, Conservative Ahmadinejad became president and Franco-Iran relations, 
already affected by the nuclear issue and allegations of terrorism and human rights issues, 
were overshadowed by President Ahmadinejad’s controversial comments on Israel and 
Holocaust3. As a strong ally of Israel, French foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy 
condemned Iran, saying the country was “ruining its chances to play a positive and 
stabilising role in the Middle East”. He also summoned Iran’s ambassador in protest. 
Resumption of uranium enrichment by Iran further dealt another blow to relations with 
France. Iran’s nuclear issue was referred to the Security Council in 2006 and the first anti-
Iran resolution was passed with France in favour.  
Relations between Iran and France further deteriorated in 2007 when Nicholas 
Sarkozy was elected French president and adopted a foreign policy more convergent with 
the US. He was unanimous with other European countries and the Untied States in 
imposing more sanctions and human rights resolutions on Iran. France made no single 
protest to four rounds of sanctions by the Security Council against Iran. On various 
                                                           
1 These developments happened between 1997 and 2000.  
2 A BBC report on 27 October 1999 described the foreign policy of the Reformist government of Iran as 
“widely appreciated”, saying relations between Iran and European Union countries had improved.  
3 On many occasions, the French government expressed its concerns with regards to the human rights 
situation in Iran. In 2005, France awarded a human rights prize to an Iranian activist being in prison in Iran. 
The French government also summoned the Iranian chargé d'affaires to Paris in August 2005 to express its 
concerns regarding the fate of journalist Akbar Gandji. Such measures also led to the exacerbation of 
bilateral relations.  
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occasions when President Ahmadinejad was delivering a speech in international gatherings 
(such as his speeches to the UN General Assembly), the French delegation walked out in 
protest.  
In December 2008, Sarkozy slammed Ahmadinejad for his belligerent comments on 
Israel and his insistence on pursuing nuclear ambitions. He said “I know perfectly well that 
we must resolve what is perhaps the most serious international crisis we are having to 
resolve: that of Iran moving towards a nuclear bomb…I find it impossible to shake hands 
with somebody who has dared to say that Israel must be wiped off the map.”  Sarkozy’s 
comments raised the Iranian outcry. Tehran summoned French envoy Bernard Poletti, and 
told him that “France’s approach towards Iran would leave unsuitable consequences on 
bilateral ties”.  
Any glimmer of hope in improvement of Iran-France relations was dashed when 
Ahmadinejad won the contested elections of 2009. Alongside the other EU states, France 
summoned Iranian ambassador in coordinated protest at the post-election crackdown on 
Iranian demonstrators. Relations between Iran and France exacerbated when Iranian 
security forces arrested Clotilde Reiss, a French teacher residing in Iran, who was convicted 
on espionage charges as part of a Western plot1--an accusation which was also brought 
against local staffers of the British Embassy in Tehran.     
In July 2009 when Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of elections and Western 
countries did not have any choice but to recognise him as the president of Iran, France’s 
foreign minister Bernard Kouchner said his country will recognise Ahmadinejad’s re-
election. But Kouchner noted that Paris will strengthen builds with the opposition 
movement created in the aftermath of elections in Iran and continue to oppose Iran’s 
nuclear programme—two redline issues for Iran. Since then, France continued to support 
Iranian opposition movement (the Green Movement) by giving refuge to activists and 
journalists who introduced themselves as supporters of the Green Movement. France was 
also a strict supporter of further US and EU sanctions on Iran.  
 
 
 
                                                           
1Reiss was finally released in 2010. Her discharge came five days after France refused an American request 
to extradite Majid Kakavand, an Iranian businessman who is wanted in the US for evading export controls 
and buying technology that could be used in Iranian missiles. He was released along with Ali Vakili-Rad, 
another Iranian who was convicted of murdering Shapour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister of Shah and was 
imprisoned in France. Their release and subsequent return to Tehran prompted speculation of a deal over 
Reiss.  
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ii. The West among Iranian opinion leaders  
  As discussed earlier, many might attribute anti-Westernism (or anti-Americanism) 
to the hostage crisis of 1979, in which 53 Americans, mostly diplomats, were held hostage 
by Iranian students for 444 day and the 1953 coup engineered by America and Britain to 
topple the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. However, according to 
renowned Iranian thinker Al-e Ahmad (1964), the first signs of Occidentosis or anti-
Westernism in Iran could be attributed to the time when Cyrus the Great (600-530 
BC) ruled Persia. Al-e Ahmad (1964) believes the Western conspiracy led the Mongols to 
invade Iran in 1219 and that the West and Westerners were involved in the Shiitisation of 
Iran during the Safavids (1501-1736), the conflicts between the Safavids and the Ottomans, 
the promotion of Baha’ism during the Qajar era (1794-1925), the defeat of the Ottomans in 
the First World War and the turmoil during the Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1905-
1911).  
Iranian anti-Westernism in the contemporary era could be dated to the early 1870s 
and 1880s where Iranian people became disappointed with what the West could contribute 
to their society. In fact, the failure of Nasseroddin Shah in realising completely the 
ambitions of reformists, who were trying to promote the “goods” of the West by taking him 
to European tours, led to the early emergence of anti-Westernism in Iran.  
However, not all Iranians were against the West. Conversely, there were so many 
people who had such great ambitions towards the West that they lost their cultural identity 
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and originality (nativity) through the adoption and imitation of Western models in different 
sectors of society, education, art and culture as well as the transformation of Iran into a 
passive market for Western commodities, according to Al-e Ahmad. Such people with a 
high passion for the West were described by him and other Iranian opinion leaders as 
“Gharb Zadeh” meaning “Westoxicated”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Al-e Ahmad’s “Westoxication”1  
The term “Gharb Zadehgi”, translated as “Occidentosis” or “Westoxication” was 
coined by Iranian philosopher Seyyed Ahmad Fardid (1921-1994) in 1956 (Vahdat, 2003: 
604). 2 But it was popularised in 1962 when eminent Iranian writer and critic Seyyed Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) published a book on the negative aspects or what he called the 
“plagues” or “diseases” of the West3.  
Al-e Ahmad’s “Occidentosis: The Plague of the West” was in fact the beginning of 
the foundation of a discourse-turned-ideology which has since plagued Iran-West relations. 
The name of Al-e Ahmad has become synonymous with the concept of Occidentosis in Iran 
as it greatly influenced the country (Vahdat, 2003).  
Al-e Ahmad’s Occidentosis played an important role in the formation of the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 as he blamed Westoxication as “the most prominent socioeconomic, 
cultural force at work in Pahlavi Iran” (Hanson, 1983:1) being dependent on the West. The 
discourse of Westoxication was perceived as a “traditionalist critique of modernity” and a 
                                                           
1 The researcher had primarily studied related thoughts and works of Fardid and Shariati in addition to Al-e 
Ahmad, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei. However, due to space constraints (as per the 
University’s regulations), the researcher had to set aside some of the related literature.  
2 Seyyed Ahmadi Fardid coined “Gharb Zadegi” in a meeting with his colleagues in 1956 (Fardid Wesbsite, 
2008). In fact, Gharb Zadegi was “discovered” by Fardid but “theorised” by Al-e Ahmad to designate 
Iranians’ loss of “subjectivity” by “surrendering” their identity to the West (Vahdat, 2003: 604). Some 
researchers have used vocabularies such as, “Weststruckness”, “Westomania”, “Westernitis” 
“Westamination”, “Blighted by the West”, “Plagued by the West” and “West-strickenness” as equivalents for 
Gharb Zadehgi. For the purpose of this research, the researcher prefers to use Occidentosis and 
Westoxication, interchangeably. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994:97) have referred to Gharb 
Zadegi as “Westoxification” and “Occidentitis”. 
3 Al-e Ahmad authored his book on Occidentosis primarily in 1961 in the form of reports for Iran’s Culture 
Target Council. The council however refused to publish the book (according to Hanson (1983), Al-e Ahmad 
published part of the book “secretly” in 1961). So, Al-e Ahmad decided to publish it a year later in 1962. The 
book was revised in 1965.  
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call for “return to Islamic traditions and mode of life” (Mirsepassi, 2000:78).  
The Occidentosis discourse, mingled with a sense of nativism, influenced Iranian 
intellectuals, political activists and Islamists who were opposed to the Pahlavi “regime” and 
viewed the Shah as the “agent” of the West, and America in particular. Such a discourse 
later upgraded to an ideology of anti-Westernism (and anti-Americanism) after the 
revolution.   
The book “Gharb Zadegi”, which Keddie (1994:486) describes as a “central” text 
that led Al-e Ahmad to “seek in Islam the solution to Iran’s problems” and Hanson 
(1983:8) describes as a “systematic historical and cultural analysis of Westernisation in 
Iran”, focuses on the disadvantages of the West for Iran (in the East) in different political, 
social and economic sectors. Al-e Ahmad argues that Iran should not turn into a sole 
“consumer” of Western products and technologies and become West-stricken.    
Ghab Zadehgi, I say, is like cholera-strickenness. Or if not appropriate, 
let’s say (it is like) frostbite or burn. But no. At least it is something like 
wheat stem sawflies. Have you seen how they infest the wheat? From 
within. The healthy skin remains untouched but it is only a skin, just like 
the same shell of a cicada on a tree. Anyway, it (Gharb Zadehgi) is a talk 
of disease (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:3). 
 Al-e Ahmad does not see Occidentosis as limited to politics and economy. He says 
the same could be traced in culture and even literature as well as news. On one occasion, 
Al-e Ahmad elaborated on the “Westoxicated” features of some Arabic magazines from 
Egypt and Lebanon and criticised their use of stories on “tanks”, “wine-drinking” and 
“naked women” (Hanson, 1983:9).  
All the news (from the West) is about Nobel (prizes), replacement of 
Pope, Cannes awards, latest Hollywood films and… (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:48).    
 Hanson (1983:1) believes that Al-e Ahmad uses “Westoxication” to convey both 
“intoxication” (the infatuation with the West) and “infection” (the poisoning) of 
Westernisation of an indigenous native culture. Also, Gharb Zadegi was the “anti-Western 
nostalgia” of Iranian intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994: 61).  
Bayat (1990:41) explains that Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxication referred to the “overall 
technological, economic, and especially cultural dependency of the Third World nations on 
the West”. Keddie (1983:595) confirms such socioeconomic and cultural dependence on 
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the West was the reason of the opposition of Iranian revolutionaries to the “evils” of the 
society.  
Moreover, Tavakoli-Targhi (2000:566) defines Gharb Zadigi as the “nodal point of 
a populist discourse critical of Iran’s dominant developmental strategy and its 
subordination to the West”. 
Al-e Ahmad maintains that Westoxication has two sides: one is the West and the 
other is “us”, as a part of the East, who is West-stricken. He sees the concept of the West as 
something beyond geopolitics. He gets concepts such as “developed states”, “progressive 
countries”, “industrial nations” and “those countries that are able to process the raw 
materials by machines and distribute them to the market as a commodity” as equivalents to 
the West.  
And these raw materials are not just iron ore or oil or...they include 
mythology, they include ideology, they include music,...For me, East and 
West are not two geographical concepts. For an American or European, 
the West means Europe and America and the East means the Soviet 
Russia and China and Eastern European states (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:8-9). 
 From the perspective of Al-e Ahmad, the West and East are not viewed as political 
and geographical concepts. However, they are “two economic concepts”:  
West means countries which are full and East is countries which are 
hungry. For me the South African government is part of the West...but 
most Latin American countries are in the East (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:10). 
 In his further investigation of the West, Al-e Ahmad defines the specifications of the 
West versus the East. From his viewpoint, in Western countries “salaries are high, death 
and birth rates are low, social services are regulated and democracy is prevalent with a 
heritage of the French revolution” while in Eastern countries “salaries are low, death rate is 
high, birth rate is even higher (than the death rate), there is no social services, and 
democracy is zero with a heritage of colonialism.”  
 Al-e Ahmad distinguishes between East and the West in terms of “rich and poor”, 
“power and inability”, “knowledge and ignorance”, “development and underdevelopment” 
and “civilisation and barbarity.”  He in fact polarises the concepts of the East and the West 
with one polar being in the hands of “power holders, the rich and exporters” and the other 
in the hands of “the powerless, the poor and importers and consumers”.  
 In his book “Khasi dar Miqat” (A Chaff at Appointment), his account of his 
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pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964, Al-e Ahmad lashes out at the appetite of pilgrims (or Hajis) 
for purchasing Western and Japanese products as souvenirs. He sarcastically explains that 
Hajis see development in buying Western products.  
If you look with a Western viewpoint, then “civilisation” means 
“consumption” (and greater needs); thus, these hajjis are “backward” and 
in the process of development. When will they reach “development”? 
Certainly, when they “consume” as much as possible of the products 
made in the West (Al-e Ahmad as cited in Hanson, 1983:9).  
 As a prominent social critic, Al-e Ahmad questions the basis of the formation of 
international organisations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, FAO and what he terms 
as “other so-called international institutes” which are global and public in appearance but 
colonial in reality.”  
 Contrary to public beliefs about Al-e Ahmad’s rejection of the modernisation, his 
Occidentosis was not about the repulsion of Western modernism or “mechanisation”. He 
believed that universality of mechanisation and modernisation is historical “determinism”. 
Notwithstanding, he was critical of those Westernised people who have been unable to 
“preserve” their “cultural and historical personality”, or in Boroujerdi’s words “nativism”, 
against machine and its “deterministic assault” on the East.    
The issue is not the repulsion of mechanisation...Never...The issue lies 
with how we deal with machine and technology. The issue is we as 
developing states...are not the manufacturers of machine. But we have to 
be...consumers of the products of the Western industry because of the 
determinism of economics and politics (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:13).          
 Al-e Ahmad believes people who have not perceived the nature, basis and 
philosophy of Western civilisation by heart are just pretending to be Westernised and are 
like a “donkey in the skin of a lion” (ibid).  
Such a feeling of being “invaded by an evil alien force” was prevalent over much of 
the Persian literature in the 1980s during which Iranian writers felt overwhelmed with a 
sense of “cultural alienation”, expressing it in a posture of “wide-eyed bewilderment” 
(Karimi-Hakkak, 1991:523). 
 Westoxication in the view of Al-e Ahmad is related partly to consumerism. He 
states that “we are westoxicated until we are consumers and have not built machine”. By 
bringing the example of Western colonialism in Africa, Al-e Ahmad believes Westerners 
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exploited Africa and its people for not only colonial purposes, but also for religious and 
commercial goals as they could preach Christianity in Africa and turn it into a consumer 
market and what he calls “laboratory”.  
 He also believes that Muslim Middle Easterners were not receptive of Westerners 
because of their religious and Islamic nature. Al-e Ahmad in fact attributes “the 12-
century conflict between the East and the West” to the “struggle between Islam and 
Christianity”. As observed by Moaddel (1992: 364), Al-e Ahmad believed that the 
problem has roots in the “contradiction between Islam and Western culture”, even though 
Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994: 62) suggests that Al-e Ahmad saw the roots of Gharb Zadegi 
in the “mid-nineteenth-century intellectual movement of secular ideas and Western-
oriented political systems”. That’s why Al-e Ahmad insisted that a “defense of Islam” was 
the only path to national liberation and development of Iran and that the solution was the 
“emancipation of Iranian culture from Western domination” (Moaddel, 1992: 365) and its 
return to its “own [nativistic] and Oriental ways” (Keddie, 1983:594).  
 In defining Westoxication or West-strickenness as a “disease”, Al-e Ahmad 
highlights the cultural and non-material aspects of anti-Westernism.  
Let’s...as an Easterner...define Gharb Zadegi like this: a set of symptoms 
which have been created in the life and culture and civilisation and 
attitude of the people of a spot in the universe without any tradition as a 
support and without any consistence in history. Without any 
development. But only as the souvenir of machine (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:17).        
 Al-e Ahmad believes as soon as the Easterners reach self-sufficiency and master 
new sciences and technology and know-how of manufacturing machine, they are not 
branded “Westoxicated”.  
 Although he argued that Iranians have been forced to be “servile consumers” of 
Western industry and to “reshape” themselves, their government, culture, and everyday 
lives to resemble a machine (Moaddel, 1992: 364), Al-e Ahmad was not opposed to the 
concept of machine and mechanisation. He is in fact a supporter of machine but he rejects 
the notion of absolute reliance on it or what is called “Mashin Zadegi” or machinisme 
which he practically equated with Gharb Zadegi (Hanson, 1983:12). 
 He states that “machine should be built and owned but not relied on because 
machine is only a means and not an end (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:65). The end, he says, is 
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eradicating poverty and providing spiritual and material welfare for all. He describes 
machine as a “spell” by the West for the Westoxicated which could lead to 
“unemployment” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:54).  
 Hanson (1983:12) explains that Al-e Ahmad was a strong supporter of technological 
and scientific self-sufficiency of Iranians as a way to “gain economic and cultural 
independence” from the West. This view was also prevalent in post-Mao China where the 
Chinese rulers wanted Western science and technology only for “economic reform” while 
wholly rejecting the Western political and legal systems (Chen, 1992:706)1.  
 Judging from Al-e Ahmad, the first route of Westernism in Iran should be traced in 
urban civilisation and urbanisation of villages which he terms as a “cancer gland”. He 
believes the discovery of oil in southern Iran turned the country into a hot sport for Britain 
and the United States and a struggle between East and the West. He refers to oil as the 
major factor of “underdevelopment” in the East and “development” in the West for three 
centuries.  
 He also attributes anti-Westernism to the struggle between Islam and Christianity. In 
fact, Al-e Ahmad believes that the West started to exploit the East out of the fear of the 
spread of Islam in the West (Al-e Ahmad, 1964). He also states that the West tried to create 
a division among Shiites and Sunnis to reach its own goals.  
We started from where the West finished, when the West stood up, we 
sat down. The West woke up in the aftermath of its industrial revival, we 
went into a deep sleep…it was like a see-saw…the West started 
intellectualism in early eighteenth century while we started it in early 
twentieth (with the Constitutional Movement) when Europe was moving 
towards socialism and guided styles in economics, politics and culture 
(Al-e Ahmad, 1964:40).          
 The ramifications of Occidentosis, as reiterated by Al-e Ahmad, are not solely 
limited to the negative impacts of mechanisation. He argues that Occidentosis will result in 
migration from rural areas to the cities, which will subsequently lead to the escalation of 
                                                           
1 Such an anti-imperialist approach and attitude towards “machinisme” exists today among the Iranian leaders 
who are seeking scientific technological dominance over the West, in many areas including the nuclear 
energy, nanotechnology and biotechnology. They have in fact achieved commendable accomplishments. For 
example, in nuclear energy, Iran is among the world’s top 10 countries which have mastered the nuclear fuel 
production cycle—a very sophisticated phenomenon. In nanotechnology Iran is again among the top 10 
globally and is the top in the Middle East. In biotechnology, the Islamic Republic is also a pioneer worldwide 
by producing stem cell and cloning sheep and goats.  It is important to note here that based on one of Iran’s 
most strategic development plan called “Vision 2025”, the country is planning to become the top powerhouse 
of the Middle East in science and technology. This shows the importance of mastering new science and 
technologies as the main vehicle for confronting the West and Westoxication, as reiterated by Al-e Ahmad1.  
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“insecurity” and rising “unemployment” while threatening the extinction of “traditions and 
handicrafts” in villages (Al-e Ahmad, 1964: 52-55).  
 Al-e Ahmad also believes that Occidentosis have negative impacts upon “schools” 
(Al-e Ahmad, 1964:59), while it “pretends” to give women their rights of freedom.  
The ramification of Occidentosis is to give introductory freedom to 
women in a way that women can go to school and remove their 
headscarf and that’s all; but they do not enjoy suffrage and the right to 
become judges and give testimonies at court. We have only provided 
women with the right to “pretend” in society and this for a woman 
means social irresponsibility and not social accountability (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:56).          
   One other ramification of Occidentosis, according to Al-e Ahmad, is that in the 
religious society of Iran people do not trust the government and are after “their own 
religious beliefs and superstitions” while evading taxes and conscription (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:59), therefore forcing the government to “resort to the West and its military aid, 
newspaper and political men” to survive (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:60-61).  
 Al-e Ahmad believes the most dangerous impact of Occidentosis is the proximity of 
Iran to the West out of fear of the spread of communism as the result of inclination towards 
the former Soviet Union. Al-e Ahmad describes this situation as “the most dangerous 
paradox emanating from Westoxication” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:60-63). He argues that the 
Iranian government (the Shah) managed to “steer a middle course with religion and the 
clergy” (who was against communism) yet established close ties with the West which was 
being opposed by the clergy (Ibid). Such a paradox, he states, is because the fear of the 
Shah of communism and the former Soviet Union.   
 Al-e Ahmad also criticises Iranian clergy as the “last arm of resistance against the 
West” for failing to resist against the assault of mechanisation and “closing doors to the 
outside world” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:42). He urges clerics to rise against Occidentosis of 
radio and television by “being armed with radio and television as is Vatican” (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:44).   
 Al-e Ahmad attributes the peak of Occidentosis to the time when Sheikh Fazlollah 
Nouri, the forerunner Iranian cleric who championed “legitimacy” or “mashrou’e” 
(religious constitutionalism) to “constitution” or “mashrouteh” (monarchical 
constitutionalism), was executed:  
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I regard the corpse of this revered cleric as a flag which was hoisted (in 
Iran) as the result of the domination of Occidentosis after 200 years of 
struggle. And now under this flag, we are foreign to ourselves (Al-e 
Ahmad, 1964:42).          
 He believes that Islam as equals “legitimacy and religion” has the capacity to be a 
shield against the infiltration of machine and the West.  
 Explaining the chronology of events related to the issue of the nationalisation of the 
oil industry in Iran and the intervention of Britain and the United States during 1901 (when 
the Qajars gave the oil concession to the British) and 1332 (when Iran’s Constitutional 
Revolution occurred), Al-e Ahmad argues that “imitation of the West, oil companies and 
Western governments, is the highest extreme of Occidentosis” in Iran.  
And this is how the Western industry loots us and governs us and 
controls our destiny. It is clear that when you give the control of the 
country’s economy and politics to foreign companies, they know what to 
sell to you or at least what not to sell to you…they loot your oil and give 
you whatever you want (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:48).          
 Al-e Ahmad implicitly describes oil as one of the main instigators Westoxicating 
Iranian rules. From his viewpoint, with the oil sector of the economy in the hands of 
Western companies, it is only a matter of time until the West makes Iran totally dependent 
(Hanson, 198310). The hatred towards the West by Al-e Ahmad can be clearly spotted in 
the following:  
Forty per cent (of our oil) belongs to the United States; 40 per cent to 
Britain and the rest likewise to France, Holland and the like. In return of 
the oil they take from us, we have to import machine and after that 
experts (machine operators) and after that machine…I wish the day 
could come and we would have no need to the army of (Western) experts 
and advisors (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:72-78).   
 From the viewpoint of Al-e Ahmad, the causes and effects of Occidentosis is the 
same as the old-age dilemma of chicken and egg. He states that the Iranian politics and 
economics in the past three centuries has been “a function of the West” (Al-e Ahmad, 
1964:69-71).     
 Rejecting Western values, Al-e Ahmad believes that a Westoxicated government 
only “pretends to have Western democratic values…as freedom of expression, freedom of 
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speech…” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:95) and is under an autonomous ruler who is “unrestrained 
and fully controls the army” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:93).     
From the social and economic point of view, the (Westoxicated) society 
is plagued with a non-coherent organisation, a mishmash of shepherded 
economy…under the influence of foreign economic conglomerates such 
as cartels or trusts (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:88).     
 
b. Ayatollah Khomeini and the “Satanic” US  
 Having learnt many lessons from distinguished Iranian religious scholars as well as 
his own political observations during the 1940s and 1950s, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini 
revived “Islamic philosophy” studies in the twentieth century in Iran after the demise of 
Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi in 1961 and continued it until the end of 1970s.  
 One of the concerns of Ayatollah Khomeini, as for Al-e Ahmad, was the issue of 
Gharb Zadegi among Muslims, particularly among the elite and intellectuals. Ayatollah 
Khomeini led protests against the increasingly powerful influence of the United States in 
Iran by resorting to political Islam (Shiism) as a means of opposing Shah (Mirssepasi-
Ashtiani, 1994:66). On many occasions and sermons even from exile in Iraq and France, 
Ayatollah Khomeini warned against the spread of Westoxication and the dangers of 
Westernism.  
 From his viewpoint, Gharb Zadegi meant “the failure of people to rely on their own 
potential and actual abilities and resort to foreigners for development and progress instead 
of trying to overcome their problems” (Kosar, 2000). He also defined a Westoxicated 
person as the “one who feels that he and his society have no ability in resolving his material 
and spiritual problems and that the only way to resolve problems and reach progress and 
perfection moves through the West and the Western culture (Ibid).       
 In his “Sahifey-e Nour” (Book of Light), in 22 volumes, Ayatollah Khomeini 
describes the West as the “source of many calamities of Muslims and the Iranian nation” 
(Khomeini, Vol. 11: 183). 
…Today our county is Westoxicated, which is worse than an 
earthquake. Today, some people in this country want to prevent the 
materialisation of Islam…Now we are quake-hit, we are West-hit. We 
should join hands altogether to continue this way we have passed 
through until now (Khomeini, Vol. 7:120).    
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 Ayatollah Khomeini divided the dangers of Occidentosis into three categories: 
“nehilisation1” of humans (Khomeini, Vol. 7: 53), separating humans from morality and 
dignity and making humans go barbaric (Khomeini, Vol. 7: 66).  
 He believed that Westoxicated and “alien-hit” people are “nihilists” who are strange 
with “humanity and morality” while they are “savage, cannibal and murderer”.  
Many of the things they (the Westerners) have built are against 
humanity. This is the West which is destroying the basis of human 
morality…and human personality and we imagine that the West has 
everything; (Do you suppose that) now that the West has built cars, so 
the West should have everything? (Khomeini, Vol. 7:66).    
 Comparing the West with the Muslim word, Ayatollah Khomeini explained that 
“Islam is (a) human-making (religion) and the West and Western culture are the destroyer 
of human” (Ibid). He states that the Islamic law, contrary to the Western law, is 
“progressive” (Ibid).  
 Ayatollah Khomeini’s perception of the dangers imposed by the West on the East is 
very similar to Al-e Ahmad’s. Both believe that the West regards economy as an “end” 
while Islam uses economy as a “means”. Both regard the concept of freedom in the West as 
a matter of “irresponsibility” and against “morality”.    
 Ayatollah Khomeini believed that there are two types of West-stricken people as far 
as politics and governance are concerned. The first group, he explained, are “betrayers who 
say, on purpose, that Islam should not interfere in governance (politics). They want to form 
a non-Islamic but a democratic republic.” The second group, according to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, are ignorant people “who have heard and believed in the ideas of the first group 
but they do not intend to betray Islam and Muslims and might otherwise publicise the 
Western attitude and way of life to serve people” (Ibid, 71).  
  One of the most compelling reasons Ayatollah Khomeini brings for rejecting 
Gharb Zadegi is his perception of the West as a power who wants to “exploit” Muslims 
(Khomeini, Vol. 7:85) and prevent the East from “taking steps towards progress” 
(Khomeini, Vol. 10:55). Ayatollah Khomeini is so opposed to the West that he describes 
the link between the West and the East as the relation between a wolf and sheep—a 
metaphor which has crippled relations between Iran and the United States since the 
victory of the revolution.  
Don’t imagine that our relation with the United States and our relation 
                                                           
1 The process of making somebody void of life and “nihilist”.  
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with, say for example, the Soviet Union…will benefit us. This is like the 
relation between sheep and wolf. The relation between sheep and wolf is 
not beneficial to the sheep. They (Westerners) want to swindle us. They 
don’t want to give us something [beneficial] (Khomeini, Vol. 10:55).       
 From the cultural perspectives, Ayatollah Khomeini elucidates the ways the West 
employs to expand its “hegemony” as well as mechanisms to counter the West. According 
to him, Westerners try to “weaken Islam” (Khomeini, Vol. 9:25), “separate people from the 
clergy (Islam)” (Ibid), “misuse sacred principles such as development, civilisation, 
democracy and freedom” (Khomeini, Vol. 3:156), “mislead the youth” (Khomeini, Vol. 
9:109) and “hire intellectuals” (Khomeini, Vol. 7:23).       
Nowadays…pens…and papers instead of lances and guns have turned 
against Islam. Now, our problem is the pen, people of pen and the 
intellectuals…and those who are seeking freedom but do not know what 
freedom is (Ibid).  
 Mechanisms proposed by Ayatollah Khomeini to counter the Western “hegemony” 
were mainly based on Islamic tenets and the need to stand against the West. They included 
“reaching independence, self-sufficiency and self-reliance” (Khomeini, Vol. 11:183, Vol. 
14:193), “advancing cultural revolution” (Khomeini, Vol. 5:198, Vol. 1:276, Vol. 15:160), 
“revamping the radio and television” (Khomeini, Vol. 5:198), “exposing Western 
conspiracies and cultural corruption” (Khomeini, Vol. 1:152, 161), “promoting progressive 
Islamic principles” (Khomeini, Vol. 12:52, Vol. 13:80, Vol. 1:260, Vol. 9:185) and 
“avoiding division and enhancing unity” (Khomeini, Vol. 3:88)1.  
 “You raised an uprising…against big powers…the result is that it is 
possible to stand against the West…You witnessed that we can go ahead 
with empty hands…(Khomeini, Vol. 14:193).”  
  Apart from these mechanisms, Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranian officials to gain 
independence from the Western influence in political, economic and cultural areas and 
clear the society from the Westoxicated. He warned officials against “internal division” and 
called on them to prevent “imperialist governments” from “spreading rumors” in the 
Islamic Republic.   
“The most important and painful problem confronting the subjugated nations of the 
world, both Muslim and non-Muslim”, Ayatollah Khomeini believed, “is the problem of 
                                                           
1 These mechanisms later turned into the pillars of the Islamic Republic and formed the basis of the Iranian 
politics, including the nuclear and defensive doctrine of the country after the 1979 revolution.  
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America”:   
America is the number-one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people 
of the world. There is no crime America will not commit in order to 
maintain its political, economic, cultural, and military domination of 
those parts of the world where it predominates. It exploits the oppressed 
people of the world by means of the large-scale propaganda campaigns 
that are coordinated for it by international Zionism. By means of its 
hidden and treacherous agents, it sucks the blood of the defenseless 
people as if it alone, together with its satellites, had the right to live in 
this world. Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan 
and it is for this reason that it now finds wars imposed upon it (as cited 
in Makdisi, 2002:551).  
 Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised on many occasions on the importance of media 
including the radio and television in Iran’s anti-West drive. He urged the Iranian television 
to act as a “general university to raise people who can fight” against the Western hegemony 
and propaganda and “save the cultural apparatus of the country from Westoxication and 
imperialistic training” (Khomeini, Vol. 9:185).      
 The adoption of such an anti-West “discourse” by Ayatollah Khomeini before the 
1979 revolution and its promotion after it was in fact an influential “doctrine” which was 
not only turned into a “theory” but also an “ideology” which influenced greatly the 
Iranian domestic and foreign politics. He in fact created a new political discourse and 
agenda for young Iranian revolutionaries who had passionate interest in following “the 
Imam path”.  
 Ayatollah Khomeini managed to turn anti-Westernism and particularly anti-
Americanism dominant in line with his notion of “the rule by jurisprudent1” and Islamic 
governance theory which later enabled him to employ concepts such as “imperialism”, 
“oppression”, “imperialists”, “the oppressed2” as well as “global arrogance” (an indirect 
reference to America) and “capitalism” to denounce or demonise the West (Khomeini, 
Vol. 5:109, Vol. 6:30, Vol. 8:117, Vol. 11:262).  
 Khomeini’s arguments about the West and Islamic governance were suitably 
welcomed by the “anti-state and anti-foreign” orientation of the bazaaris and landowners 
(Moaddel, 1992: 364). He blamed “imperialists” and “their agents” for creating conditions 
                                                           
1 Velayat-e Faqih  
2 Ayatollah Khomeini used these concepts to inspire Iranians about the Palestinian cause. He referred to 
Israelis as “the oppressors and usurpers” and Palestinians as “the oppressed”.    
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leading to the division of Muslims into “oppressors” and “the oppressed”. Khomeini also 
provided the solution to these problems by urging Muslims to “overthrow oppressive 
governments and form Islamic systems” (Ibid).  
 Ayatollah Khomeini managed to set up an Islamic revolutionary discourse against 
the West and the United States as the symbol of “global arrogance” as he was the “most 
uncompromising” opponent of “Taghout” (monarchy) and particularly of “foreign control 
and cultural domination” (Keddie, 1983:596)1. As observed by Makdisi (2002:551): 
Khomeini did not hide his antipathy to the West and the United States in 
particular for propping up the Shah’s repressive regime. “With the 
support of America”, Khomeini wrote in 1978, “and with all the infernal 
means at his disposal, the Shah has fallen on our oppressed people, 
turning Iran into one vast graveyard” (Makdisi, 2002:551).  
  
c. Ayatollah Khamenei and the “Evil” Britain   
 As the current leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that anti-Westernism 
is not related to the issue of rejection of science and technology. He explains that the “anti-
Western ideology” of Iran after the 1979 revolution is a “political” issue.  
“Opposition to the West does not mean opposition to Western 
technology, science, development and experiences, at all and no wise 
man will do this (and oppose the Western science and technology) 
(Khamenei as cited in Kayhan newspaper, 2007).”  
 Ayatollah Khamenei explains that the repulsion of the West is in fact the repulsion of 
the “Western dominance and hegemony” in political, economic and cultural areas (Ibid). 
 He describes that the Western culture is a set of “beauties and ugliness” as well as 
“goods and evils” and that a wise nation “would absorb the goods, add it to its own culture 
and reject the evils” (Ibid).  
 In a remarkable speech in 1999, Ayatollah Khamenei referred to the “Western liberal 
democracy2” as the main challenge of the Islamic Republic after the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union (Kayhan newspaper, 2007).   
 Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the West was that Western governments or 
                                                           
1 The word “arrogance” (which is the translation of Estekbar) equals “imperialism” in the Iranian political 
context.  
2 Liberal democracy also known as constitutional democracy is the dominant form of democracy in the 21st 
century. 
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“liberal democracies” are against the applicability of religion in politics and society. 
According to his views, anti-Westernism has two main benchmarks: trying to magnify the 
role of religion and Islamic governance in politics and society and rejecting the Western 
domination and arrogance in imposing the Western way of democracy and governance.  
“There is an important point regarding the Western culture...The culture 
of the West i.e. the culture of Europeans has a problem...i.e. it is seeking 
(political) domination (Khamenei as cited in Kayhan newspaper, 2007).” 
 Referring to the historical aspects of Occidentalism, Ayatollah Khamenei explains 
that the West dominated science and technology and tried to exploit it for its own politico-
economic interests which led to the “Western colonialism” in the nineteenth century.  
 Ayatollah Khamenei rejects the idea that the West should impose its culture and 
values on other nations, even if such values and culture are good. He likens such an 
imposition of the Western culture on the East to the situation when “they put Kebab in your 
mouth and order you to eat it while you definitely prefer yogurt and bread to eat” (Ibid).  
When a thing is imposed from the position of power, stubbornly and 
arrogantly, every nation will and should reject it. For example, tie is a 
Western phenomenon. The Westerners want this. They like it as their 
tradition. However, if you are from another country and have 
accidentally chosen suit as your (formal) clothes, and you refuse to wear 
a tie, you will be regarded as impolite. Why? (Khamenei as cited in 
Kayhan newspaper, 2007). 
 From the viewpoint of Ayatollah Khamenei, certain state leaders and “corrupt 
regimes” are trying to “inject” the Western culture to the nations. Referring to the Pahlavi 
period, Ayatollah Khamenei states that the “regime tried to impose the Western culture and 
traditions on the people by humiliating the national culture and beliefs”—a clear reference 
to Reza Khan’s brutality in forcing women to remove their hijab.  
 Like Al-e Ahmad and Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei also believes that 
the Westoxicated rulers of Iran during Pahlavi and the late Qajar eras rejected the notion of 
“self-sufficiency” and relied on Western products, hindering development in Iran.  
 On the attitudes of Ayatollah Khamenei who has the final say on Iran’s foreign policy 
and domestic issues, Zibakalam (as cited in BBC Persian, 2009), University of Tehran’s 
professor of political science, states that Iran’s leader believes in “a historical confrontation 
between developing states and the countries to which he (Khamenei) refers to as belonging 
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to the imperial order”. One such attitude can be obviously seen in Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He encourages Palestinian groups as well as 
Islamic and Arab states to “resist” against Israel and the United States as they are “arrogant 
and imperial” powers.  
 Ayatollah Khamenei is of the opinion that dividing countries to developed and 
developing categories is a “shrewd Western tactic” to impose Western values and culture 
on the East (Khamenei, 2009). He believes that there could be no single pattern of 
development for all countries as it largely depends on the historical, geographical, political 
and cultural circumstances of each country.  
Considering the history and culture and other special circumstances of 
Iran, we cannot progress by following the (development) patterns of the 
United States, Western or Eastern Europe or other models. Yet the art is 
we seek an indigenous (local) model (Ibid).  
 As with Ayatollah Khomeini who emphasised the importance of relying on Islamic 
tenets, Ayatollah Khamenei also highlights the need to incorporate Islamic economic, 
political and social principles into the macro-planning decision-making processes of the 
Islamic Republic1. On such a basis, he devised the long-term strategic planning document 
of Iran known as the “20-Year Vision Plan” which envisages that by the end of 2015, Iran 
should turn into the Middle East’s number one state in terms of science and technology and 
economy.  
 Rejecting Western capitalism2, Ayatollah Khamenei believes “toeing the line of the 
United States and others is not a sign of development and has no value”.   
“Countries should retain their political and economic independence as 
well as their decision-making power should globalisation is to be 
realised properly (Ibid)”.  
  Like Al-e Ahmad, Ayatollah Khamenei urges senior Iranian officials not to 
“marginalise” themselves and retreat from “the front of confrontations with arrogant power 
centres”. One the occasion of the second investiture ceremony of President Ahmadinejad, 
Ayatollah Khamenei said “the decisive and unparalleled vote of people to the respected 
elected president is in fact a vote for the records of the ninth [Ahmadinejad] government in 
                                                           
1 For example, he believes that while Western patterns regard the rise in the GNP as an important benchmark 
of development, “Islamic principles stipulate that as far as there is injustice and huge class divisions, true 
development would be impossible even if the GNP increases by ten-fold” (Ibid). 
2 The collapse of the Soviet communism, opposition to Marxism and growing post-modernism provided the 
space for Islam to be a substitute for the Western capitalism and consumerism.   
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the past four years…this is a vote for the blessing and dignified discourse of the Islamic 
revolution; a vote for anti-arrogance and brave resistance against global arrogance”.  
  Ayatollah Khamenei’s agenda in foreign policy is largely influenced by Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s anti-Westernism ideology which has turned into one of the pillars of Iran’s 
foreign policy particularly towards the United States and Israel—two countries to which 
Iran is ideologically opposed. Although such an ideological influence cannot be denied, 
Ayatollah Khamenei has prioritised “expedient pragmatism” to “ideological anti-
Americanism” in several occasions such as direct talks between Iran and the United States 
on Iraq in 2007. Such an approach could be also seen after the election of Barack Obama as 
the US president and his promise of adopting a “direct engagement” policy with Iran.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3: Iran’s two main political wings and the problem of the West   
 Like many political systems in other countries, Iran’s political system is non-
partisan parliamentary based, although the parliament in practice is divided into two main 
factions with affiliations to political wing parties: the Majority Faction and the Minority 
Faction1. There are three main branches of state i.e. executive, legislative and judicial 
bodies which are overseen by three more organisations: the Supreme Leader’s Office, the 
State Expediency Council and the Guardian Council2.  
 Traditionally and historically there have been two main “ideological camps” active 
in the Iranian politics: the leftists or liberals (also known as Reformists) and the rightists or 
fundamentalists (also known as Conservatives). The former has a desire for more Western 
                                                           
1 These factions are usually occupied in each term of the parliament by dominant political wing parties. For 
example, in the sixth round of parliament, Reformists formed the Majority Faction while Conservatives took 
the Majority Faction in the seventh, eighth and ninth rounds.  
2 According to the law, the Parliament (Majlis) is duty-bound to supervise the Government; the Judiciary is 
under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader’s Office and there is currently no official mechanism to 
supervise the Parliament. All the three branches of state as well as other organisations and bodies are 
unofficially under the supervision of the Supreme Leader’s Office. It has the ultimate power as an arbitrator 
and is itself overseen by the Assembly of Experts, according to the law.   
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ideals while the latter strictly seeks return to pure Islamic principles and revolution 
achievements1.  
 Such a composition was prevalent in the two Iranian revolutions of 1905 and 1979 
and continued in the same manner under the rightists’ domination until 1997 when 
Mohammad Khatami won presidential elections in a landslide victory.  
      The party politics in its modern form in Iran was brought into the limelight in the 
third decade after the revolution when the Second of Khordad Movement was formed after 
the 1997 elections. This movement later changed its name to the Reform Movement and 
that was the beginning of competition and rivalry between Conservatives and Reformists.  
 Before 1997, political currents in Iran were being identified usually with titles such 
as the “religious/Islamic current”, “nationalist current”, “nationalist-religious current”, 
“liberal current” and the “Marxist left current”. The strongest amongst them was the 
religious/Islamic current which was ultimately divided after the demise of Ayatollah 
Khomeini into the Society of Combatant Clergy and the Association of Combatant Clerics. 
The former was the representative of the Right Wing (Conservatives) and the latter was the 
birthplace of the Left Wing (Reformists). After the 1997 elections, the Left Wing became 
known as Reformism while the Right Wing was introduced as Conservatism after the 2005 
elections2.  
 Since 23 May 1997, which is known as the Second of Khordad (the day presidential 
elections were held and Reformists became victorious), the leftists introduced themselves 
as “Eslah Talaban3” or “Reformists” and set up the Reforms Movement which led to the 
formation of the Reform Wing or the Reformism mannerism in the Iranian politics.  
 Likewise, when the rightists won the 2005 presidential elections through their 
candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they represented themselves as “Osoul Gerayan4” or 
“Principlists5” (hereafter referred to as Conservatives) which resulted in the formation of 
                                                           
1 In her sociological comparison of the two Iranian constitutional and Islamic revolutions, Keddie (1983: 592-
593) argues that the liberals desire for “Westernisation”, while fundamentalists wish to “return to pure Islam”. 
The former was prevalent in the constitutional revolution and the latter won out in the Islamic revolution. Paul 
(1999:183-184) argues that religious forces “systematically” consolidated the political power within the new 
government of Iran after the 1979 revolution.   
2 The Islamic reformism movement, in the broader sense, has been the “main intellectual trend” in the 
Muslim world since the late nineteenth century (Keddie, 1994: 484). The central idea of the reformism 
movement is to reach sustainable development by “imitating and naturalising Western thought” on liberal 
issues such as the formation of a parliament or women’s rights (Ibid).  
3 Literally means “Reform Seekers”  
4 Literally means “Principle Aspirants” (“Gera” is a suffix in the Persian language which means “having a 
desire for”. “Gerayan” is the plural form of “Gera”).   
5 They call themselves “Principlists” because they believe they should return to the “principles” of Islam and 
the Islamic revolution.  
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the Principlist Wing or the Conservatism mannerism1.   
 Reformism and Conservatism are both religiously-oriented and share many 
principles in common particularly when it comes to major national issues such as the 
nuclear programme. They adhere to the principles in which the Islamic revolution of 1979 
was based and became victorious. Both identify themselves as the “followers of the path of 
Imam” Ayatollah Khomeini.  
Such proximity between the two encouraged the Conservatives in view of the 2009 
controversial presidential elections, to propose the idea of “Osoul Gerayan-e Eslah Talab” 
or “Reformist Conservatives” and the Reformists to raise the prospects of “Eslah Talaban-e 
Osoul Gara” or the “Conservative Reformists”2. Such a nominal paradox was in fact the 
product of pre-presidential-election negotiations in 2009 among and within various political 
parties from the Reformist and Conservative camps about who to nominate.  
Due to differences of opinion among prominent political figures and unclear 
boundaries between Reformism and Conservatism (before the elections), some candidates, 
whose main aim was to cover their affiliated party’s deficiencies and attract more voters, 
decided to identify themselves as Conservative Reformist or Reformist Conservative 
instead of Reformist or Conservative alone.  
Among such prominent hopefuls from the Conservative wing was Tehran mayor 
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf who is widely known as the founder of Reformist 
Conservatism3. When asked about his motivation to set up such a political current, he said 
in an interview on 17 March 2009 that Reformist Conservatism is a new “political 
discourse inspired by the Supreme Leader” which has been established to stop “extremism, 
populism, backwardness, violence, freedomophobia” and in order to “escape from the 
                                                           
1 Followers of this wing adopted the term “Principlists” as their official name because they desired to adhere 
to the “principles” and achievements of the 1979 Islamic revolution laid out by Ayatollah Khomeini. Since 
there is no direct equivalent to describe the term “Principlists” in the English language, the researcher prefers 
to use the term “Conservatives” as it is the closest equivalent in political terms as Conservatives are opposed 
by Liberals (or in the case of Iran the Reformists). The researcher avoids using the term “Fundamentalists” to 
describe “Principlists” because the former is used frequently in religion (and Taleban-style fundamentalism) 
and not politics while Principlists are not religiously-oriented only. In other words, Principlists adhere to both 
Islamic and the 1979 Revolutionary tenets while Reformists adhere to the 1979 Revolutionary and Islamised 
Western principles.    
2 Some members of the Conservative wing prefer the use of “Osoul Gerayan-e Montaqed” or “Critic(al) 
Conservatives” instead of “Osoul Gerayan-e Eslah Talab” or “Reformist Conservatives”. They believe that 
because Reformists are opposed to the Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent) or the current Valiy-e Faqih 
(Supreme Leader), they should avoid using the term Reformist to describe Conservatives. In fact, opposition 
to Velayat-e Faqih or Valiy-e Faqih (Supreme Leader) has long been a political taboo in Iran.   
3 A similar situation happened in the Reformist camp. Mir Hossein Mousavi, long struggling to throw his hat 
in the ring, identified himself as a “Reformist who does not miss the principles”. It was inferred among the 
media and political circles that Mousavi is the candidate of a new current—the Conservative Reformism. This 
current however was never formed as Mousavi lost the elections according to official results and his main 
affiliated front, the Reformist Wing, was marginalised with two of its important parties dismantled.    
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present crisis”. He also rejected that Reformist Conservatism is a composition of 
Reformism and Conservatism. In the Reformist Conservatism, he said, reforms are 
formulated in the society within the framework of Islamic and revolutionary principles. 
 We are Muslim and pious people who are committed to Islamic 
values particularly justice...We have been also dreaming a developed 
society for more than a century...Experience has it that Conservatism 
and Reformism have highlighted only one of these two factors while 
ignoring the other...Reformist Conservatism is based on underscoring 
both of them (excerpts from Qalibaf speech, 2009)1. 
 The idea of Reformist Conservatism was initiated in a speech by Ayatollah 
Khamenei during a visit to the Kerman province weeks before the 2005 presidential 
elections. Addressing a gathering of students and professors, he elaborated on the new 
concept:  
I don’t accept the clash between Reformism and Conservatism. I 
believe this is a misguided categorisation. The opposite point of 
Conservatism is not Reformism; the opposite point of Reformism is 
not Conservatism [either]. The opposite point of Conservatism is...a 
person who does not believe in any principle; a person who changes 
religion [beliefs frequently]...The opposite point of Conservatism is 
corruption. I believe in Reformist Conservatism [which believes in] 
strong principles emanating from Islamic epistemological 
fundamentals [coupled] with reforming methods day by day and 
according to new issues [requirements of the time] (Khamenei, 2005) 
[brackets added].  
  In terms of foreign policy, one might juxtapose the foreign policy line of the two 
major political wings in Iran (Reformists and Conservatives) with the foreign policy of the 
two US parties towards Muslim states. In other words, to have a better understanding of 
Iranian Reformism and Conservatism, it could be helpful to first study dominant 
approaches to the US foreign policy and then compare the two.   
       According to Niva (1998:27), there are two “dividing” foreign policy approaches in 
the United States with regards to dealing with what might be ignorantly or wrongly called 
“Islamic threat”: the conservative “Cold War vision” of Samuel Huntington and the neo-
liberal “end of history” triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama.  The former portrays Islam as a 
                                                           
1 The Supreme Leader’s views on Reformist Conservatism are further discussed in details in the next section.  
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“new Communism” and a “great threat” to Western civilisation while the latter urges 
accommodation with Islam.  
The first camp seeks to create a new “threat” to justify its strict “national security” 
strategy and is largely influenced by America’s pro-Israeli lobby--the AIPAC-- and pro-
Israeli media such as the “Weekly Standard” (Niva, 1998:27).1  
Uniting proponents of this view is the belief that “Muslim 
fundamentalism” constitutes an openly revisionist approach to the 
regional and international systems…because it is “the only expressly 
anti-Western ideology of any importance in the world and it means to 
destroy the Western position, Western institutions and Western culture, 
wherever it can” (Niva, 1998:27).  
Supporters of this approach call on the US government to confront rouge states 
militarily, punish acts of terrorism, block any access by Muslim states to weapons of mass 
destruction, prevent any takeover of power by Islamic states in the Middle East and 
strengthened deterrent military presence in the Persian Gulf. Niva (1998:27-8) calls this 
approach to foreign policy as “Islam-as-threat” or “lesser-of-two-evils” school which only 
serves the United States interests in the region:  
The “Islamic threat” scenario reproduces the Cold War paradigm of 
mutually hostile blocs and ideologies, thus perpetuating familiar modes 
of US intervention in the Third World that rely upon high levels of 
militarisation. For these policy makers, defending a global network of 
authoritarian political and social arrangements remains the most 
expedient way for the US to maintain its hegemony and the operation of 
international capital. Confronting the “Islamic threat” provides the best 
pretext for preserving the existing status quo of authoritarian Middle 
Eastern regimes and alliances that served US Cold War aims of ensuring 
the flow of cheap oil, providing military bases for US power projection 
and guaranteeing Israel's military hegemony in the region (Niva, 
1998:28). 
Proponents of the second approach to the US foreign policy vis-à-vis Islamic states 
                                                           
1 Notable purveyors of this line include Daniel Pipes, editor of The Middle East Quarterly, Peter Rodman, a 
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former member of the Reagan National 
Security Council, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, and Bernard Lewis, professor of Middle East 
studies at Princeton University.  
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perceive Islam not as a “threat” but as an “opportunity”1. They believe that the US can 
approach certain Islamic states and Iran in particular by adopting a more constructive and 
nuanced but less confrontational policy.  
…[They] argue that Islamism has been nurtured by the failure of 
existing secular regimes to deliver economic justice and democracy, 
coupled with popular desires for independence from Western 
domination. Moreover, they suggest that US policy is partly responsible 
for the emergence of such movements due to its support of repressive 
dictatorships and its unconditional support of Israel (Niva, 1998:28). 
They maintain that the US should adopt a new approach regarding Islamic states in 
the Middle East and replace its strict “containment” of Islamist states with policies of 
“constructive engagement” and “critical dialogue”. They believe that “carrots such as 
economic integration are more likely to influence these states than the stick of isolation” 
(Ibid). They urge the US to help promote “civil society” principles in Islamic states and 
encourage more IMF- and World-Bank-style “reforms” on them.  
Proponents of this policy, fearful of repeating the mistakes made in Iran, 
urge the US to adopt a more accommodating policy towards 
Islamists…The intellectual edifice of this emerging paradigm derives 
from Fukuyama’s “end of history” liberal universalism rather than 
Huntington’s conservative “clash” (Niva, 1998:28). 
 In the case of Iran, the Reformists influenced by Khatami’s “dialogue-among-
civilisations theory” believe in “cooperation and engagement” with the West much in the 
same way as Fukuyamaian supporters wish to accommodate Islam in contrast with 
Huntington’s “clash-of-civilisations” approach. 
 This is while Iran’s Conservatives are pursuing policies to “confront” with the West 
but not in the total same manner Huntingtonian followers desire to confront Islam. To put it 
differently, Iranian Conservatives have adopted an approach to foreign policy similar “only 
in content” (and not in format) to American neo-Conservatives2. Although Iran’s 
Conservatives seek to confront the West, they might even accommodate it in order to 
exploit for their interests and ultimately confront it. Such a policy could be clearly tracked 
                                                           
1 Figures of this group include James Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau, as well as Middle East specialists and scholars in the US such as 
Georgetown University professor John Esposito and former CIA analyst Graham Fuller.  
2 That Iran’s Conservatives regard America (the West) as a “threat” is similar in content to American neo-
Conservatives describing Islamic civilisation as a menace to the Western civilisation.  
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in Iran’s foreign policy towards the West during the conservative rule of Ahmadinejad 
when he wrote to German and American leaders to “invite” them to Islamic peace and 
justice.  
 
i. Conservatism and the West  
 In political and party politics terms, Conservatism emphasises on maintaining and 
preserving the status quo and traditional institutions while resisting great and sudden 
changes in a society. In fact, Conservatism, which was brought into being in 1970 by 
Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, believes that society should 
change as little as possible. In the Iranian politics after the 1979 Islamic revolution, 
however, Conservatism is not only related to maintaining traditional institutes such as 
religious entities (mosques, Hosseiniyehs, seminary schools, mausoleums) and politico-
Islamic bodies (the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Islamic Culture and 
Communications Organisation, Hajj and Endowments Organisation and so on) but also 
preserving “Osoul” or “principles or fundamentals” on which the Islamic revolution was 
based. These principles were framed by the founder of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah 
Imam Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Imam Khamenei1.   
 Conservatism as a mainstream political wing (under the title of “Osoul Geraei” or 
literally translated as “Principlisim”) came into spotlight when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
became president in 2005 and ended eight years of Reformist executive rule.  
The Conservatives were active during the Reformism period (1997-2005) in the 
form of several right-wing political parties and circles such as the Islamic Coalition Party, 
the Islamic Society of Engineers, the Islamic Society of University Scholars and Ansar-e 
Hezbollah as well as the powerful Society of Combatant Clergy whose foundation was 
based by Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Motahhari and other prominent clerics including 
Ayatollah Khamenei in 1979 and the Qom Seminary Teachers Society to which Ayatollah 
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely believed to be Ahmadinejad’s spiritual 
teacher and leader, is affiliated. However, they were not as organised and strong as they 
grew after the election of Ahmadinejad as president.   
The Conservatives’ hold of power was further strengthened when the next 
                                                           
1 These basic principles were outlined by Ayatollah Khomeini as the foundation stone of Iran’s domestic and 
foreign policies. The most important principle in domestic politics is adherence to the rule by jurisprudent 
(Velayat-e Faqih) and the fight against monarchism (Taghout). In foreign policy, the most fundamental 
principle is spreading Islamic values (through, for example, defending the Palestinian cause) and the fight 
against global arrogance (anti-imperialism).   
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parliament was formed with the majority of Conservative MPs backed by the Conservative-
ruled Judiciary and the Guardian Council. The support given by the Supreme Leader to 
President Ahmadinejad on different occasions including during government disputes with 
the parliament over the laws and most prominently in the aftermath of 2009 presidential 
elections was unique and unrivalled. On one occasion, Ayatollah Khamenei described 
Ahmadinejad’s government as a “very great blessing” elected “with Osouli (principled) 
slogans” to “make Osouli (principled) slogans” (Khamenei, 2006)1. 
 In an important meeting with the newly-elected government of President 
Ahmadinejad on 19 June 2006, Ayatollah Khamenei outlined the yardsticks through which 
Osoul Gerayan (Principlists or Conservatives) were to be recognised. He in fact defined 
Osoul Geraei (Principlism or Conservatism) as not a “political school of thought” but a 
“basic Islamic thought” to manage the state of affairs. 
Osoul Geraei is not in words. Osoul Geraei is not also against the 
current political schools of thought. This is wrong that we divide the 
country or political activists to Osoul Gera [Conservative] and Eslah 
Talab [Reformist]...Osoul Geraei belongs to all those who are 
committed to the principles of [1979 Islamic] revolution and adore 
them. Now whatever you call them [Conservative or Reformist] 
(excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2006) [brackets added].    
 But what are these principles? In the same meeting, the leader outlined eight of 
them in the following order:  
1- To have Islamic and revolutionary faith and identity and commitment to 
them  
2- To administer justice in all the state of affairs  
3- To maintain political independence from West  
4- To reinforce national self-confidence  
5- To promote scientific Jihad and initiate a movement of science production  
6- To stabilise and secure freedom and free thought  
7- To reform and revise methods based on principles (principled reforms)  
8- To  promote economic prosperity  
These principles have been outlined by Ayatollah Khamenei as the basics by which 
political parties and not necessarily Conservatives should abide. An analysis of the 
statements of the Conservatives’ leaders and manifestos of political parties affiliated with 
                                                           
1 In the same address, he called for the formation of an “Osouli” (principled) Parliament and Judiciary.  
 114 
Conservatism indicates that the principles to which Conservatives adhere include:  
1- Adherence to the path of Ayatollah Khomeini and his attitudes particularly his 
legacy of Velayat-e Faqih and the belief that politics is intertwined with religion   
2- Adherence to the Constitution  
3- Adherence to Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader1  
 
 
 
Although principles outlined by Ayatollah Khamenei appear to have been set out for 
the Conservatives, they were widely respected and followed by Reformists as well during 
1997 and 2005. The main difference between Khamenei-defined principles for 
Ahmadinejad’s government and those observed by Khatami-led Reformist administration 
might be about the nature and the mechanisms through which these principles were to be 
materialised. Ayatollah Khamenei instructed the Conservatives, who have strong supporters 
among clerics, to implement these principles through “principled” Islamic and 
indigenously-defined mechanisms “independently from the West”, while Khatami’s 
administration were intent on incorporating “Western concepts and mechanisms” but in 
Islamic styles into their programmes.  
To put it differently, while Conservatives seek inward-looking programming, 
Reformists rely on outward-looking planning. As Khatami reiterated in an interview on 9 
February 2010:  
In our Reformism, we have not pinned our hopes on the foreigner 
[the West]; nor have we believed that foreigners [Westerners] 
basically want to benefit us (Khatami, 2010) [brackets added].  
                                                           
1 The intersection of these three fundamental principles of Conservatism is commitment to Velayat-e Faqih as 
the rule by jurisprudent is the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which has been stipulated legally in the Iranian 
Constitution according to which the Supreme Leader is the (spiritual and non-spiritual) ruler of the country.  
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 One of the other main differences between Conservatives and Reformists is related 
to their interpretation of the basic laws of the country. Whereas Conservatives believe that 
the Supreme Leader is above the law (because of his capacity as a qualified jurisprudent 
and the representative of the Hidden Imam), the Reformists argue that Iran’s Constitution 
should be the base of the state while believing in the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the 
jurisprudent)1.           
 Our base in this movement [Reformism] is the Constitution. 
Although it is a human innovation, the Constitution is the base of our 
Reform movement. Therefore, any manipulation, misinterpretation or 
deviation in contradiction to the Constitution or anything hindering 
the implementation of the Constitution should be reformed (Khatami, 
2010) [brackets added].  
 The incorporation of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih into the agenda of the 
Conservatives, according to Vahdat (2003), was an initiative influenced by Reza Davari-
Ardakani--a prominent Iranian philosopher and member of the Supreme Cultural 
Revolution Council. Vahdat (2003:599) believes Davari-Ardakani, alongside Ahmad 
Fardid (who proposed Westoxication), is “the central figure” and intellectual patron of 
Conservatism, who unlike his reformist counterpart Abdolkarim Soroush, believes in the 
maintenance of this concept.  
 Even though Davari-Ardakani is not considered a political figure in Iran, his 
thoughts directly or indirectly influenced Conservatives. He believes that the Islamic 
revolution was a reaction to Westoxication and heralds the end of the Western hegemony 
and what he describes as the “holocaust of Westoxication”:     
…in Davari’s discourse, there is very little space for reconciliation 
between Islam and modernity. Such a reconciliation for Davari would 
entail becoming accomplices with imperialists of the East (i.e., the 
                                                           
1Allegiance to Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent) is the most important benchmark for Conservatives 
to distinguish between “true” Osoul Gerayan and Reformists. It is remarkable to mention that the concept of 
Velayat-e Faqih has been stipulated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Article 5 
“During the Occultation of the Hidden Imam (May God Hasten His Reappearance), in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran the rule of order and the leadership of the nation devolve upon a just and pious, aware of the 
circumstances of the age, courageous, resourceful and wise faqih [jurisprudent] who is responsible for it in 
accordance with Article 107”. Iran’s Constitution was primarily drawn up by 3 December 1979. It was 
however reviewed in 28 July 1989 during which major changes were made. One such major change was the 
revision of Article 5 which necessitated that the faqih who is going to lead the nation should “have been 
known and acknowledged by the majority of people”. The old-version Article 5 also stipulated that “if a faqih 
cannot secure such a majority, the leader or the Leadership Council consisting of faqihs with above-
mentioned qualifications will devolve it in accordance with Article 107”.  
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former Soviet Union and its allies) and the West who have expropriated 
and dominated everything in the world (Vahdat, 2003: 608). 
 Davari-Ardakani, however, like Al-e Ahmad, was not opposed to “all” aspects of 
the West. He even called for the embrace of modern sciences and technologies, although he 
insisted that the West should conform to Islam and not the other way around. He maintains 
that: 
Iran needs the modern positivist sciences and technology to survive, but 
these must be confined to the achievement of evil, but necessary, this-
worldly needs, otherwise technology’s dominance will be established 
again (as cited in Vahdat, 2003: 609).  
Based on the main priority of the Conservatives i.e. following whatever is dictated 
by the Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent), the government of President Ahmadinejad 
formulated its domestic and foreign policies according to the thoughts and stipulations of 
Ayatollah Khamenei as the present Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic (and former 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini)1. In sum, Conservatives are against the 
accommodation of West while promoting anti-imperialist and anti-arrogance sentiments 
among allies.  
Main Conservative parties are the United Conservative Front also known as Group 
7+8, Paydari (Endurance) Front and Istadegi (Resistance) Front. They were formed in 2011 
before the parliamentary elections in order to coordinate policies for the elections.  
The United Conservative Front or the Group 7+8, inspired by Mohammad Reza 
Mahdavi-Kani (the head of the Assembly of Experts who oversee the Leader) consists of a 
15-person committee of Conservatives. Prominent figures of Group 7+8 are also members 
of Conservative groups such as the Society of Combatant Clergy, Followers of the Line of 
Imam and Leadership Front, Qom Seminary School Teachers Society, Islamic Revolution 
Isargaran Campaign, Rahpouyan Campaign and Reformist Conservatives. Parliament 
Speaker Ali Larijani and the Mayor of Tehran Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf have introduced 
representatives to the Group 7+8.     
The Paydari (Endurance) Front is inspired by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-
Yazdi—a prominent pro-Conservative cleric. It consists of key figures of the Conservative 
wing close to the Ahmadinejad government such as Sadeq Mahsouli, Gholamhossein 
Elham, Hamid Rasaei and Mehdi Kouchakzadeh. Jebhey-e Vola (Qarargah-e Ammar) is a 
                                                           
1This of course is in line with the Constitution; however, when compared with Reformists, observers level 
criticisms on Ahmadinejad for being too obedient to the leader. For more on Ayatollah Khomeini’s and 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s attitude and thoughts towards the West, please refer to previous related sections. 
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subsidiary of this group.   
The Istadegi (Resistance) Front, under the leadership of Mohsen Rezaei, former 
presidential candidate and IRGC commander, is the third pro-Conservative group which 
consists of less known figures and subsidiaries. They include Velayat Supporters Front, 
Islamic Iran Justice and Development Party, Islamic Revolution Youth Campaign, Hazrat 
Zeinab Followers Society, Green Party, Islamic Assembly of the Cause of the Iranian 
Nation and International Association for the Anti-Zionist Movement.     
The Group 7+8 is critical of the Paydari Front because it believes the Paydari Front 
does not clearly and publically reject the thoughts and attitudes of the so-called Jariyan-e 
Enherafi (the Deviant Current1). Likewise, the Paydari Front accuses the Group 7+8 of 
adopting silence towards the so-called Jariyan-e Fetneh (the Fitna Current2). The Istadegi 
Front mainly adopts critical stances towards the government while rejecting the ideas and 
approaches of both the Jariyan-e Enherafi (the Deviant Current) and Jariyan-e Fetneh (the 
Fitna Current). 
 
 
ii. Reformism and the West  
 Reformism, according to Western liberal discourses, is putting in place reforms to 
stabilise the standing political system by avoiding a revolution. It is a political current 
which promotes change in a society through peaceful reforms in various sections rather 
than bloody revolutions.  
 The concept of reform in the contemporary history of Iran could be traced back to 
the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty—Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941). He introduced a 
series of reforms in numerous aspects of the Iranian life to change the country into a 
“modern” state.  
 The Shah’s reforms programme was in fact a series of serious changes to modernise 
different sectors of the Iranian society and primarily aimed at making Iran “a more 
respectable society” in the world community (Bill, 1970: 30s). However it failed and 
resulted in the White Revolution of 1963 by his son Mohammad Reza who adopted a more 
                                                           
1 The Deviant Current is a term used to refer to the supporters and followers of Esfandyar Rahim-Mashaei—
the Chief of Staff and the closest ally of President Ahmadinejad. Conservatives accuse Rahim-Mashaei of 
deviating from the path of the revolution and Velayat-e Faqih by making controversial comments on Islam 
and relations of Iran with other countries such as the US and Israel.  
2 The Fitna Current is used to refer to the supporters and followers of defeated presidential candidates 
Mirhossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrobi. The government blames them for the riots and controversies in the 
aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections.  
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Conservative approach to return Iranians to the “traditional” system and patterns of life1.  
 These reforms were not as effective as the reforms proposed by clerics during the 
1960s and 1970s which finally led to the Islamic revolution of 1979. Karimi-Hakkak 
(1991) likens the movement of Iranian reformists during the early 1900s to a famous 
Iranian poem-story “the myth of Kaveh the Ironsmith” by Abolqasem Ferdosi—the tenth-
century Iranian poet—in which people, led by Kaveh an ironsmith, revolt against a 
tyrannical ruler, Zahhak.   
Popular revolt against tyrannical rule, restitution of legitimacy, and 
progress toward social justice, all the elements present in the myth, had 
been thematised in the hands of a generation of Iranian reformers, 
modernisers, and revolutionaries in such a way as to serve the ideals of 
liberal democracy, individual freedom, and social justice (Karimi-
Hakkak, 1991:525-526). 
 Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994:66) observes that the changes proposed by “reformist 
clerics” in the 1960s aimed at setting up an “Islamic-style constitutional” rather than a 
“monarchical” government. These reforms were of course not consistent with the motives 
of secular intellectuals and politicians who sought a Western model of government to 
reverse what they called the “backwardness” of Iranian society. Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994) 
believes these reformists were more concerned with reforming Shiism than conforming to 
the values and practices of early Islamic history or to the Prophet’s traditions. 
Thus, it is more accurate to describe the movement as a reformist 
political movement trying to come to terms with modernity rather than 
as a “traditionalist” effort to restore Islamic values in Iranian society 
(Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994:72). 
 After the victory of the 1979 revolution, there was no call for reforms for nearly a 
                                                           
1 Mohammad Reza Shah’s 12-point “white-revolutionary” programme included reforms in the following 
areas (Bill, 1970: 31-32):  
1- Land reform  
2- Nationalisation of forests and pastures  
3- Public sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform  
4- Profit-sharing in industry  
5- Reform of electoral law to include women  
6- Literacy campaign (Sepah-e Danesh)  
7- Health campaign (Sepah-e Behdasht) 
8- Reconstruction and development campaign    
9- Rural Courts of Justice  
10- Nationalisation of the waterways  
11- National reconstruction  
12- Educational and administrative revolution  
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decade until the establishment of the Association of Combatant Clerics in 1987 partly due 
to the eight-year war. This association was formed by a number of clerics who later set up 
the new reform movement (Second of Khordad Movement) in 1997 when Mohammad 
Khatami, an influential member of the association, won the presidential elections.  
 Two main pro-reform political parties were also formed within the Reformist Wing: 
The Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Republic of Iran Mojahedin 
Organisation. Members of these two parties were later elected to the Parliament and City 
Councils across the country1.   
 The reform movement in post-revolution Iran was different from the reform 
movement in decades to the 1979 revolution. In fact, the nature of reforms was different. 
Whereas the reforms before the revolution revolved around governance and the system of 
government issues, the reform movement after the revolution called for major reforms 
including the incorporation of Western liberal concepts of civil society and political 
participation (development). Top on the agenda of the reform movement of 1997 was 
“religious democracy”—Islamic-style democracy. This implied that Reformists seek a 
“more open and democratic” civil society (Vahdat, 2003:599)2. Such a trend could be only 
materialised through “accommodation” with the modern world particularly its democratic 
principles3. In sum, Reformists adopted a detente policy with regards to the West and 
sought wider relations. 
With the virulent anti-Westernism of the early and mid-1980s having 
subsided considerably, Iranian authors and academics appear more 
willing to critically examine concepts and phenomena prevalent in 
the West. In addition to the works and the authors cited so far, books 
and articles on such singularly Western phenomena as modernity and 
post-modernity have become highly popular in recent years 
(Kamrava, 2008:177). 
 Main beliefs and agenda of the Reformists are to follow up reforms in different 
sectors of the regime, to develop civil freedom and public participation, to heed citizenship 
rights and to improve the status of Iran at the global level in view of dialogue and 
                                                           
1 After the controversial elections of June 2009 and its subsequent street violence, the Interior Ministry 
annulled the permits of these two parties whose senior members were either in prison or under strict 
government control. Since then their activities were regarded illegal by the government.  
2 Kamrava (2001: 171) observes that under such circumstances, the print media started to break “taboos” and 
published subjects which were previously forbidden. This resulted in a number of pro-reform newspapers 
being banned by the Judiciary.  
3 This approach, Niva (1998:27) believes, led the US to adopt a “less confrontational” policy towards Iran 
during Khatami (Reformism) period. 
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avoidance of direct confrontation with great powers. 
 Analysing a number of books, articles and statements by Reformist officials during 
the Kharami period, Kamrava (2001:167) concludes that Iranian reformists perceived the 
notion of civil society “through a substantial process of indigenisation” in which they 
underlined the need for the “rule of law” within an Islamic framework.  
…even Iran’s secular theorists have not been able to fully evade the 
gravitational pull of Islam and its overwhelming role in Iranian 
culture and society. At a minimum, they maintain that civil society is 
possible only after a “proper” interpretation of Islam gains popular 
acceptance (Kamrava, 2001: 167).  
 Examining Khatami’s speeches and writings, Merat (1999:34) identifies central 
issues top on the agenda of the Reformist government: the need for greater freedom of 
opinion and association, political parties’ right to publicise their views, a serious effort to 
meet the multifaceted needs of Iranian youth, a re-evaluation of women’s status, a 
condemnation of violence and the institutionalisation of tolerance and dialogue.  
 According to Vahdat (2003:603), the Reformism raised such Western concepts as 
civil society under the intellectual leadership of Abdolkarim Soroush1.  Soroush believed in 
human “inter-subjectivity and its political embodiment as universal citizenship”. In this 
line, he urged Khatami’s government not to resist against the Western achievements 
particularly those in the field of thought (“Andisheh”) and human sciences2:  
[W]e do not wish to deprive ourselves from the achievements of 
others...[W]e believe that the [fruits of] humanity’s thought are 
valuable and needed by all of humanity, although through critique 
some of these [thoughts] may be falsified. Therefore, the rule should 
not be to close the doors upon ourselves, not using other’s thoughts. 
On the contrary, the principle is to not deprive ourselves of others’ 
thoughts (Soroush as cited in Vahdat, 2003:617).  
 The introduction of such Western concepts to the Iranian society was implied by the 
Conservatives as a threat to the Islamic system and a betrayal to the 1979 revolution values 
                                                           
1 His real name is Hossein Haj Faraj Dabbagh (b. 1963). Abdulkarim Sorush is only a pen name.  
2 The reformists’ call for the accommodation of Western thoughts in human sciences was harshly criticised 
by Ayatollah Khamenei who emphasices on an Iranian-Islamic (Quranic) pattern rather than Western models. 
When Conservatives took power, he instructed them to incorporate “Islamic ideologies” into the curriculum 
of human sciences at universities. He said “many human sciences currently being taught in out universities are 
based on materialistic and non-Islamic philosophies. Teaching them in our universities will result in the 
disappearance of Islamic and divine tenets while creating a sense of doubt in religious and ideological beliefs 
(of our students) (Khamenei, 30 August 2009)”.   
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and principles1. This was explained in a newspaper article in the early months after 
Khatami took office:  
After years of trial and error…finally someone has come to power 
who promises the realisation of civil society. But there are those who 
say it is not consistent with our national character and is not good for 
us (as cited in Kamrava, 2001:170).   
 The opposition (Conservatives) accused the Reformists of trying to theorise the 
basics of a non-religious and secular system based on liberalist ideas in Iran through 
pursuing reforms2. Conservatives also labeled reformists as “Westoxicated”—a move 
Khatami said is a result of “our historical ignorance” and lack of “adequate understanding 
of Western political thought”. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei also criticised 
Reformists for bringing what he described “American reforms”:  
Preserving principles and reforming methods is the [real] meaning of 
Reformism. We should reform methods [and not principles]. 
However, from the American point of view, reform means opposition 
to the Islamic republic system. Reza Khan [Pahlavi dynasty Shah] 
came and brought reforms. So did Mohammad Reza [son of Reza 
Shah]. This is what I call American reforms. These reforms are 
worthless. The Iranian nation will undertake reforms based on its 
principles (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2005).  
 In another speech a year later, the Supreme Leader repeated that any reform should 
be Conservative and any Conservatism should be based on reformism:  
Reforms under American criteria in our country are like the same 
Reza Khan reforms. You know that Reza Khan based his monarchy 
on the slogan of reforms. All these crimes and murders during his 
time were committed in the name and under the flag of 
reforms…Reforms under the Reza Khan and American criteria and 
Western culture are not reforms (Eslahat) but corruption (Efsadat) 
(Ayatollah Khamenei, 2006).     
 He said reforms should be regulated and based on “Islamic and Iranian values, 
criteria and boundaries”. Ayatollah Khamenei later reiterated that those who are opposed to 
the principles and basics of the Islamic system in Iran should not be allowed to govern.  
                                                           
1 At the heart of these principles was the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and the relationship between politics and 
religion.  
2 Reformists categorically reject these accusations.  
 122 
They accuse us of trying to “unify” the system. No, this is not 
true…Two wings for the country are like the two wings of a bird; the 
country can fly [and flourish] with two wings. Two opposing wings 
can exist in the system…provided that they abide by the 
Constitution…Nowhere else in the world are those who do not 
believe in the Constitution and principles allowed to be involved in 
different sectors of governance…Of course it is clear that we will not 
allow, either. Those who do not accept the Constitution and the 
fundamental of the Islamic Republic, should they be allowed at the 
top? Is this called Reformism? (excerpts from Ayatollah Khamenei 
speech, 2005).  
 Elsewhere in his remarks in the second day of the new Iranian year in 2004, 
Ayatollah Khamenei defined Reformism as any measure to “change negative points to 
positive”. He said the revolution in Iran was the “first long step” towards reformism. 
Ayatollah Khamenei in fact believes in a form of reformism which is of “Islamic” and 
“revolutionary” nature.  
 Main pro-Reform parties and groups are the Association of Combatant Clerics 
under the leadership of Mehdi Karrobi and Mohammad Khatami, the Construction 
Executives Party under the leadership of former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi, 
the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organisation under the leadership of Mohammad Reza 
Khatami and Mohsen Mirdamadi, and the Islamic Iran Participation Front led by Behzad 
Nabavi. The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organisation and the Islamic Iran Participation 
Front were outlawed in 2010 because of what the government described as “legal offences” 
during and after the 2009 presidential elections.  
 At the beginning of 2012 and two months before parliamentary elections, a new 
pro-Reform wing was born. The Mardomsalari Wing, comprised of 14 groups led by 
Mostafa Kavakebian and Majid Mohtashami, published its charter on 01 January 2012. The 
charter said the new wing, whose founders are well-known Reformists, believes in 
“religious values and Islamic principles, the line of Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] based on 
the Revolution’s foundations and the preservation of the heritage of Imam and the martyrs, 
national interests at the international level and the Constitution in particular the right of free 
expression and economic and political security and rights of nations”. Prominent groups 
belonging to the Mardomsalari Wing include the Mardomsalari Party, the Freedom Party, 
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the Iran National Unity Party, Islamic Mihan, Independent Iran Farzandan.  
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Part 4: Media landscape in Iran  
i. Media and politics in Iran   
A historical review of the past centuries indicates that the media played a great role 
in creating major political and social developments, such as the French Revolution, 
America’s civil war and more recently Iran’s constructional and Islamic revolutions. These 
are only some examples of the role-playing of media in creating big revolutions.   
 Various forms of media throughout the history have served different purposes in 
social, political, economic and cultural areas. Harold Lasswell has defined several functions 
for the media to be later developed by scholars such as Wilbur Schramm. The main 
functions of the media can be divided into four parts: the surveillance of the environment 
(“watcher” function), transmission of the social heritage (“teacher” function), the 
correlation of society’s response (“forum” function) and the creation of entertainment 
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(“recreational” function).  
Therefore, every media equipped with these functions could perform a crucial role 
in advancing major developments. Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) argue 
that these functions coupled with other “dynamics” of the media use could mark a regime 
and ideology change and be used as either “strong weapons of opposition” or “tools in the 
hands of authoritarian states”.  In their case study of the Iranian revolution, Srebenry-
Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) discuss that some media (radio and television) were 
used as state institutions to promote the modernisation programme of the Shah and Western 
culture while other media (cassettes and leaflets) were used to mobilise public opinion 
against the suppressor regime.  
In a similar valuable study of the Iranian media, Kia (2001:53) has explained the 
“enduring strength” of the traditional channels of communication in Iran. In particular, Kia 
(2001) has studied the role of “menbar” (pulpit) or mosque and the clergy as spiritual and 
political leaders in the revolutionary mobilisation of Iranians during the past century.        
The history of the print media in Iran is full of highs and lows as they were directly 
engaged in two big developments, namely the constitutional and Islamic revolutions, 
happened respectively in 1906 and 1979. A glance at the 175-year history of the Iranian 
press indicates that the pendulum of the press has swung back and forth in two opposite 
directions of “freedom” and “restriction”. Such a status has been described by many Iranian 
scholars of communication studies as the most important characteristic of the Iranian media 
system since its establishment (Beheshtipour, 1990; Forqani, 2008; Afkhami, 2009; 
Norouzi, 2009; Bahrampour, 2007; Hekmat, 2009). In fact, a 30-year assessment of the 
Iranian media proves that the impacts of the revolution are still prevalent on the media. In 
other words, like the Iranian politics, the Iranian media are part of a pendulum with 
“freedom” and “restriction” as its two extremes which are affected by revolutionary 
principles and values. On some occasions (for example Iraq-imposed war), the media were 
close to the “restriction” axis of the pendulum while on other occasions (as in during the 
reform period) they enjoyed a great degree of freedom. The study of the significant periods 
after the revolution indicates that Iran has episodically enjoyed a lively press, most of them 
asking for the rule of law, but were confronted with suppression.  
For the ease of analysis, the researcher divides the history of media developments in 
Iran into six significant periods: pre-revolution, post-revolution (1979-1980), Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988), post-war reconstruction and economic liberalisation (1989-1996), reform 
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movement (1997-2005) and the post-reform (2005-2009) periods. Each of these periods are 
characterised by a dominant feature affecting the Iranian media.  
Before getting into the subject, it is worth mentioning that a glance at the 
development of media in the three decades after the Iranian revolution indicates that the 
media movement has never been independent from the political atmosphere of the country. 
As explained earlier, each significant period after the revolution had its own specifications, 
requiring the media to adapt themselves with the conditions of the time. For example, 
during the war period and early years after the revolution when a shaky cabinet was in 
charge, the media had to move in line with preserving the national interests. During the 
reconstruction era, the media were encouraged to fulfill their developmental functions 
while during the reform period they were given the mission of forging political and cultural 
reforms proposed by the government. In the post-reform period the media became restricted 
again to preserving national security and interests. Therefore, as indicated above, the media 
have been a function of political movements in Iran after the revolution.  
 
ii. Iranian media before the revolution  
The first Iranian magazine was published in Tehran in 1837 but only continued to exist for 
three years. “Kaghaz-e Akhbar” (“Paper of News”) monthly was shut down in a state of 
turmoil which led the Shah to think the paper was helping freedom-fighters to topple his 
monarchy. No other newspaper was published inside Iran under the stringent regulations of 
the authoritarian system of governance during the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
Due to the strangulation of cultural practices and unpleasant political situation, the Iranian 
press did not take the opportunity to develop. There was no space for the freedom of 
expression and information. There were only a few “newspapers in exile” published from 
abroad as opposition (Kia, 2001). This era of “press suppression” continued until Iran’s 
Constitutional Revolution in 1906 which created an atmosphere of freedom for the press 
(Forqani, 2008; Kia, 2001).  
              Until the early years of the 1970s, many newspapers found their way on news 
stands. According to figures published by the Revolution Council in 1979, there were 120 
newspapers across the country (Norouzi, 2009). Most of these newspapers were daily 
“yellow press” which, under state-imposed restrictions, were forced to publish soft news in 
particular entertainment and keep their distance from deep political and social news and 
analysis. There were also several “regulatory guidelines” circulated by the State 
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Intelligence and Security Organisation (SAVAK) among the press, while the radio and 
television were under the full control of the Shah regime. One of SAVAK censorship 
regulations instructed the press to avoid using specific words, names and phrases. The same 
rules applied for radio and television. Many journalists were banned from writing in 1976 
by SAVAK (Forqani, 2008).      
State-run television and radio, the country’s only news agency, cinemas and newspapers 
were all under the tight control of the government in the years before the revolution. 
Vreeland et al (1957) observed that each paper presented the views of its backer and that all 
were “vulnerable to suppression” and control which were given the “colour of legality” by 
the interpretation of the Constitution and the Press Law.  
There is no direct newspaper censorship at present, but all newspaper 
publishers must obtain licenses from the High Education Council, which 
is a board composed of educators as well as government officials 
(Vreeland et al, 1957:116).  
Many newspapers later turned to revolutionary media; however, the National Radio 
and Television Organisation, Pars News Agency and the cinemas were under the direct 
supervision of the Shah regime until the very days of its overthrow. Revolutionaries had 
little access to radio, television, news agency and mainstream newspapers. However, they 
did have access to “traditional methods of communication” which included audio cassettes, 
leaflets and most importantly religious channels of communication such as mosques and 
Islamic altars.        
Toffler (1980) believes that traditional methods of communication among people 
from different walks of life in the late 1970s in Iran were inspired by the statements and 
comments of the late founder of Islamic Revolution Ayatollah or Imam Khomeini. Toffler 
(1980) describes Imam Khomeini as an influential figure who combined the “first wave” 
media in the form of verbal and face-to-face sermons by the clergy with the “third wave” 
technology of cassettes and photocopying machines to mark the Islamic revolution of Iran 
with reliance to traditional media.  
 Rogers (1986) reports that the Shah regime, in spite of controlling mainstream 
electronic and print media, could not resist against the strongly-manned traditional network 
of communication of the revolutionaries. Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) 
later highlighted the importance of such “small media” in creating a “big revolution”:  
The mobilisation was coordinated by the religious leaders using 
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traditional networks of social communication which were enhanced and 
extended by an innovative use of various contemporary “small media,” 
including photocopied leaflets and audiocassette tapes (Srebenry-
Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994: 11).    
Such a role has been also underlined by Kia (2001). According to him, Iranian media in 
different forms such as cassette tapes and leaflets acted as important political tools in the 
hands of religious leaders during the revolution.   
 
iii. The revolution effect  
Under circumstances where the Shah, government and their foreign supporters 
underestimated the power of traditional channels of communication, revolutionaries 
continued to develop their network of sermons, leaflets and messages of Ayatollah 
Khomeini and other religious scholars which gradually opened their way to newspapers. As 
people approached the revolution, newspapers allocated some space to publishing some of 
the leaflets. After the bloody day of 4 November 1978, which was later labeled the 
“Students’ Day”, newspapers ran out of the control of civilian surveillance bodies of the 
Shah who then ordered “military” figures to exert strict control on the media. Such a 
decision was seen as a tool to restrict the freedom of the press. Newspapers, now at the 
service of the revolution, went in protest of the Shah’s decision and prior-to-publication 
censorships by army generals into a second-time two-month strike which was called off by 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s decree. In it, the founder of the revolution urged journalists to end 
their strike and continue reporting news which in the absence of the newspapers was in the 
monopoly of the National Radio and Television Organisation.     
            In his review of the role of traditional communication in conducting the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, Forqani (2008) points out the significance of traditional networks of 
communication and particularly mosques in motivating and mobilising the public opinion 
against corruption, repression and dictatorship of the Shah regime:  
The Iranian revolution could not have happened in the absence of the 
covert and overt operations of such a communication network...which 
spread messages, protests, oppositions and revelations immediately 
throughout the country to raise public outcry against the Shah regime 
(Forqani, 2008:121).  
The 1979 revolution greatly strengthened the link between the people and the press. 
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Hossein Elhami, a veteran Iranian journalist who was an editorial staff of “Ettelaat” 
newspaper at the threshold of the revolution, said the people and the press were 
interconnected at the time of revolution; people were more incited to throng the streets 
when newspapers published more revolutionary materials (Abbasi, 2009): 
 We reached a point where the circulation of Ettelaat exceeded 1.4 
million per day. The technical staff warned that printing machines will 
go out of order should the current trend (of large circulation) continues. 
People were so excited that, on some special occasions, we had to 
publish our paper four times a day. People queued up for buying 
newspapers and were ready to buy them even in higher prices. In some 
cases, when there were no copies of the newspaper, people would 
borrow them (Elhami, 2009).         
The radio and television were entirely dependent on the Shah regime and reflected 
the views of the Pahlavi government. People had the least level of confidence in radio and 
television news and preferred to follow the news of revolution through traditional media 
such as leaflets, night letters, audiotapes and newspaper news as well as foreign sources 
such as the BBC.   
Compared with the radio and television, the press were under less restriction until 
the military cabinet of Azhari came into office. Two colonels were sent to “Kayhan” and 
“Ettelaat”, two major newspapers of the time, to impose prior-to-publication censorship 
which later led to the second strike of the press corps. Coordination among newspapers in 
the final weeks of the Shah regime was so great that “Kayhan” and “Ettelaat” were turned 
into a countdown of revolution, while other journalists focused their attention on reflecting 
revolution events. Forqani (2008) describes the days of revolution as “the press explosion 
era” in which hundreds of magazines with different political inclinations were published on 
the eve of the revolution without taking any license from the government. The mushroom 
development of the press continued to the early years after the revolution.    
 
iv. Post-revolution media 
            The early years after the revolution were the “spring of the press” as they 
experienced a very high level of freedom. Many journalists who were repressed by security 
apparatus of the Shah regime now were given the opportunity by the revolution to openly 
express their ideas and mark the beginning of the “spring of freedom”, without any 
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restriction by the government.   
The first newspaper which was published after the revolution was “Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami”. Several other weekly and daily newspapers were also published in the aftermath 
of the revolution where there were no restrictions for newspapers. Nearly a year after the 
revolution, 200 new newspapers and magazines opened their way to newsstands across the 
country, with party newspapers having the highest frequency followed by independent 
newspapers (Afkhami, 2009). Such a progressive trend continued until 1981 when the then-
prosecutor ordered a temporary ban on several newspapers, mainly run by parties, on 
charges of publishing “provocative materials against Islamic tenets and public rights of the 
new and revolutionary society of Iran”1 (Rajaei, 2009). Since then a 10-article document 
was drawn by the prosecutor to control the press which was later ratified by the Revolution 
Council. According to this document, which formed the basis of the first press law of the 
Islamic Iran, everybody who abided by its terms and conditions was permitted to open a 
newspaper legally. Several newspapers were then shut down due to failure to obtain a 
permit by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. However, a remarkable number of 
newspapers were being published until the Iraq-imposed war started in the summer of 1980. 
   
v. Iraq-Iran war coverage  
             The most evident feature of every war is destruction and destitution. The Iranian 
media were no exception to that rule. The start of the war was a shock to the newly-formed 
Islamic republic and its media which experienced only a short period of freedom.  
As the war continued, several newspapers affiliated with some leftist political 
organisations were closed down due to national security reasons. Six newspapers were 
banned due to affiliation with specific political organisations whose allegation was 
spreading anti-revolution values. In 1982, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
issued a statement urging media managers to re-submit their application for the permit of 
publication. Publishing houses were ordered not to publish those newspapers which lacked 
this permit. A Press Arbitration Council was set up in the same year to resolve differences 
of opinion between media managers and revolutionary government departments which 
were busy with the war.  
The number of newspapers which had exceeded 200 during the “spring of the press” 
period in 1979-80 reduced to 62 in the chaotic troubled times after the revolution. In 
Tehran, according to the Media Studies and Development Office, only four newspapers 
                                                           
1 A similar incident also happened 19 years later when 12 newspapers were closed down overnight.           
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(Kayhan, Ettelaat, Jomhouriy-e Eslami and Sobh-e Azadegan) were published and in low 
circulations.  The circulation of “Kayhan” and “Ettelaat”, which reached more than one 
million during the heat of the revolution, declined sharply by one fifth. Such a slump in the 
press section was mainly attributed to competitions during the war among political groups, 
and their violent confrontations with the ruling establishment including the assassination of 
political and religious leaders in the summer of 1981.  
  
vi. Post-war reconstruction coverage  
            After the end of the war in 1988, a new era began in the Islamic Republic. In the 
“reconstruction” period under the then-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1996), a 
better politico-cultural atmosphere was created for the Iranian media to develop. As 
suggested by Mohammadi (2003), the arena for open political discussion and cultural 
relaxation gradually opened up under the initiatives of Rafsanjani during the second decade 
of the post-revolution Iran. During the first term of Rafsanjani in office, a selected group of 
voices outside the immediate ruling establishment was given permission to voice their 
views in the Iranian press. According to Momayesi (2002), the Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance approved some 80 licenses for “non-conformist” personalities and 
political groupings.  
            New instructions and guidelines were circulated among the press by the newly-
formed Department of Press and Promotion of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance in 1989. The guidelines aimed at reviving the press movement and helping them 
fulfill their duties in line with communication development policies of the government. 
State restrictions were eased and the press were even provided with financial assistance and 
subsidised paper and printing facilities.  
The content of the press during this period were focused on the “reconstruction” and 
“economic liberalisation” efforts of Rafsanjani’s government. According to the Media 
Studies and Development Office, the number of periodical magazines increased 
significantly to 550 during 1992-94, from 100 during 1980-88 (war period).    
In a joint research project with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1998, Professor Kazem Motamednejad, the father of 
Iran’s communication science, studied the development of the press after the war. 
According to this study titled “The Development of Independent and Pluralistic Press in 
Iran”, the total press circulation during the post-war period did not exceed 1.5 million per 
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day, while the global standard index defined by the UNESCO was six million copies per 
day.  
Motamednejad (1998) believes the post-war period (1989-1996) introduced an 
appropriate political and cultural environment for the development of press in Iran while 
creating new hopes for their independence, freedom and pluralism. The establishment of 
the Department of Press and Promotion, according to Motamednejad, was a positive move 
which led to the relaxation of former restrictions and strict regulations and the formation of 
the Media Studies and Research Centre1 which focused its attention on assessing the press 
and training journalists. The first specialised journal, the “Media”, was also set up in 1990, 
when Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was in charge of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance.  
The suitable political and cultural conditions created in the post-war period (1989-
1996) were a good opportunity for the print media to develop. The number of the periodical 
press was remarkably increased to 550 during 1992-94. Several important daily newspapers 
such as “Resalat”, “Salam”, “Hamshahri” (Iran's first full-colour newspaper), and state-
owned “Iran” were also launched in this period.      
       
vii. Reformist period and newspapers  
             The “reform period” after the 1979 revolution began in 1997 when Seyyed 
Mohammad Khatami was elected as the new Iranian president in a landslide victory on the 
“Second of Khordad” (second day of the third Iranian calendar month). Having passed the 
“reconstruction” period with economic development as its top priority, preceded by the 
chaotic years after the revolution and Saddam-imposed war, the Iranian society voted in a 
historical election for Khatami to become the “architect” of the “reforms movement” in the 
political and cultural sectors. Khatami was the minister of culture during Rafsanjani. This 
boosted considerable hope among the press to enjoy more freedom and privileges. Parfitt 
and Egorova (2003) point out that the presidential elections of May 1997 provided the 
groundwork for the new administration to support the campaign of the Iranian press for 
freedom of expression.  
As reiterated by Bahrampour (2005), the press experienced an “explosive growth” in 
quantity and quality during the reform period under Khatami (1997-2004). Forqani (2008) 
believes that the period between 1997 and 2001 marked a new era for the press in terms of 
diversity and variety, although many newspapers were closed down and replaced by other 
                                                           
1 The centre later changed its name to the Media Studies and Development Office.  
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publications after 2001. Motamednejad and Badii (2002) describe the situation that more 
than 10 years after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, there was a “turning point” with respect to 
the improvement of the press freedom while prospects for a free, independent, and 
pluralistic press were brighter than ever.  
According to the figures published by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
in 1998, the number of published newspapers and magazines exceeded 850 (five times 
greater than the number of the press in the pre-revolution era), while the total circulation of 
daily newspapers reached a record number of two million for the first time after the “spring 
of freedom” and the early years after the revolution. Notwithstanding, several changes were 
made in the Press Law in 2000 by the Iranian parliament. Afkhami (2009) describes this 
period as a “turning point” in the history of the Iranian press. According to him, the most 
significant specification of this period was the emphasis of the Khatami administration on 
the “freedom of speech” as a tool for political development. During this period, many 
newspapers emerged; the first journalism courses were developed and a mob of enthusiasts 
and amateur journalists registered for academic learning of journalism. The first college 
specifically devoted to teaching journalism after the 1979 revolution was set up by the 
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) in 1997. The School of Media Studies trained 
journalists in English and Persian in six different specialties, while Allameh Tabatabaei 
University had already launched similar “social communication” courses in 1989. The first 
Press Jury was also set up during the reform period. The impacts of the reform movement 
of Khatami were so great that Motamednejad (1998) describes the public space provided 
for the development of press as “unprecedented”:  
The press freedom has developed…We presently have 32 newspapers in 
Tehran and 12 in other provinces. According to my brief historical 
studies, I suppose we never had such a number of newspapers in 
Iran…This is a unique opportunity for us to develop the press in 
different areas (Motamednejad, 1998: 11).  
Mohammadi (2003) looks at the reform period as a “very different” era driven by 
the technological changes in the modes of message delivery, specifically satellite and cable 
systems, and by global media deregulation. He however believes that the rapidly changing 
media environment of the 1990s aimed at changing “non-Western cultures more radically 
that ever before” (Mohammadi, 2003:24).  
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viii. Post-reform landscape  
The Islamic revolution of Iran had great social and cultural impacts on the 
population. The literacy rate increased from 5.47 per cent in 1976 to 86 per cent in 2008. 
The number of Iranians with higher education studies has increased by 35 times 30 years 
after the revolution, with the figure increasing from around 150,000 in 1976 to more than 
5.2 million in 2008. In the telecommunications sector, the number of landline phones 
skyrocketed from 1.17 in 1978 to 29 million in 2008 while 41 million mobile phone lines 
were registered in Iran by the end of 2008 (Government Information Dissemination 
Council, 2008). According to the country’s long-term macro policymaking document 
known as the Vision 2025, Iran should emerge as the top economic and scientific power in 
Southwest Asia by 2025. This means science and technology in different sectors including 
the communication and information technology (ICT) have remarkably progressed in the 
past three decades, laying the ground for the better development of media and increasing 
public demand for quality press products, accordingly.   
The Iranian media in the last three decades have experienced many positive and 
negative occasions. In different periods after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the media were 
witness to both qualitative and quantitative growth, pluralism, popularity and different 
degrees of freedom and restriction. The high number of print media in Iran is well-
suggestive of the rapid and extensive development of the media. In 2010, the Press 
Supervisory Board announced it was processing more than 3,000 applications.    
According to the latest national census conducted by the Ministry of Culture’s Media 
Studies and Development Office in 2007, there are 2,877 newspapers, magazines and news 
agencies across Iran, of which 70 are Iranian-based foreign media (Table 1). According to 
tables 2 and 3, there are 94 daily newspapers and 392 weekly newspapers across the 
country. Of the total number of the press in Iran, 616 are published at the local, 1,072 
national and 225 international levels. While the Iranian radio and television are state-run, 
the majority of the Iranian press which are published in five different languages1 are owned 
by the non-government sector.      
 
 
                                                           
1 The languages include Persian, English, Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish (arranged in the order of having the 
highest frequency). 
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Table 2 Number of Iranian press and news agencies in 20071 
News agencies                    
                   Type of media 
 
Total 
Print Media 
(newspapers & magazines) 
 
Main 
headquarters 
Provincial 
bureaus 
Foreign 
media 
bureaus 
Total 
2,877 2,500 10 297 70 377 
 
Table 3 Number of Iranian press based on their publication period 
              Type of print media 
 
Total 
Daily newspapers Weekly newspapers Monthly magazines Quarterlies Others 
 1,913   94 392 521 528 378 
 
Table 4 Number of Iranian press based on their distribution range 
              Distribution range 
 
Total 
National  Local  International 
 1,913  1,072  616 225 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate that of the total 30,960 people employed in the print media and 
news agencies, about 23,000 are male, while female employees account for more than 26 
per cent. Also, less than 50 per cent of the employees in Iran’s print media and news 
agencies have passed higher education courses at universities. 
 
Table 5 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies 
             Occupation  
Total 
Press 
people 
News agencies & 
news bureaus people 
Press vendors and 
distributors  
Newsstands 
  30,960 18,446 2,719 3,166 6,629 
 
Table 6 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on gender 
                    Gender  
Total 
Male  Female  No answer  
  30,960 22,769 8,191 1 
 
Table 7 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on level of education 
                  Educational level  
 
Total 
PhD Master’s Bachelor’s Associate 
degree 
High school 
graduate   
Theological school 
graduates  
Others 
  30,960 1,416  1,970 7,865 2,195 10,800 341 6,373 
 
According to Table 7, around three fourth (75 per cent) of the Iranian media people are full 
time employees. Table 8 suggests that more than 90 percent of those engaged and 
employed in Iran’s print media and news agency industries have less than 30 years of 
experience; this means that more than 90 per cent of the Iranian journalists are young and 
have gained their experience after the 1979 revolution.  
 
                                                           
1 Figures of all the tables were obtained from the comprehensive census of Iranian press and news agencies 
conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 2007. This research has not yet been updated 
(at the time of the publication of this thesis).    
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Table 8 Number of employees in the Iranian press 
and news agencies based on type of contract 
                    Type of contract  
Total 
Full time   Part time 
  30,960 22,207 8,753 
 
 
Table 9 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on job experience 
            Job experience  
 
Total 
1-9 years 10-19 years 20-29 years More than 30 years No answer 
  30,960 18,489 6,833 2,772 530 2,336 
 
The above figures indicate that there is great potential for the development of media 
in Iran as most media people including journalists are young with high ambitions. The 
blogsphere has also provided a unique platform for journalists to publish their personal and 
public views. According to Deutsch Karlekar (2007), the internet at the forefront of new 
communication technologies has played a great role in providing independent news to 
Iranians. Thirty years after the revolution, the third generation of Iranian youth is taking the 
most out of the electronic media via internet and satellite, although these services are 
occasionally suspended by the government. 
The potential created by the Iranian blogsphere is “an index of an emerging public 
sphere” and the “space where both religious and secular voices are articulated” (Sreberny, 
2008:16). There are estimated to be at least 75,000 active blogs in Persian which is one of 
the most common languages on the internet, after English and Chinese (Deutsch Karlekar, 
2007). “Blogfa”, one of the most popular hosts of Persian weblogs, estimates two million 
blogs have been registered in the blogsphere in Iran since 2001—the time the first Persian 
blog went online.   
Moreover, Iran stands top in the Middle East in terms of having the highest number 
of internet users. According to the Internet World Stats, an international website featuring 
up to date world internet usage1, there are presently more than 36.5 million internet users in 
Iran, indicating a 600-per cent growth in a decade (Table 9). In fact, almost half of the 
population of Iran is using the internet. Such a great number of users with the penetration 
rate of 46.9 per cent is significant when compared to other Middle Eastern countries.     
 
 
 
                                                           
1 http://www.internetworldstats.com 
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Middle East Internet Users, Population and Facebook Statistics 
MIDDLE EAST 
Population 
( 2011 Est. ) 
Users, in 
Dec/2000 
Internet Usage 
31-Dec-2011 
% Population 
(Penetration) 
Users 
% Region 
Facebook 
31-Mar-
2012 
Bahrain 1,214,705 40,000 694,009 57.1 % 0.9 % 346,220 
Iran 77,891,220 250,000 36,500,000 46.9 % 47.4 % n/a 
Iraq 30,399,572 12,500 1,303,760 4.3 % 1.7 % 1,550,840 
Israel
1
 7,473,052 1,270,000 5,263,146 70.4 % 6.8 % 3,469,020 
Jordan 6,508,271 127,300 1,987,400 30.5 % 2.6 % 2,226,220 
Kuwait 2,595,628 150,000 1,100,000 42.4 % 1.4 % 898,560 
Lebanon 4,143,101 300,000 1,367,220 33.0 % 1.8 % 1,444,200 
Oman 3,027,959 90,000 1,741,804 57.5 % 2.3 % 422,180 
Palestine (West 
Bk.) 
2,568,555 35,000 1,512,273 58.9 % 2.0 % 914,660 
Qatar 848,016 30,000 563,800 66.5 % 0.8 % 481,400 
Saudi Arabia 26,131,703 200,000 11,400,000 43.6 % 14.8 % 5,148,240 
Syria 22,517,750 30,000 4,469,000 19.8 % 5.8 % n/a 
United Arab 
Emirates 
5,148,664 735,000 3,555,100 69.0 % 4.9 % 2,909,860 
Yemen 24,133,492 15,000 2,609,698 10.8 % 3.4 % 436,500 
Gaza Strip 1,657,155 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TOTAL Middle 
East 
216,258,843 3,284,800 77,020,995 35.6 % 100.0 % 20,247,900 
Copyright © 2012, Miniwatts Marketing Group. Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm  
 
 
                                                           
1 Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) 
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In the radio and television sector which attracts more than 80 per cent of the 
audience for news (Deutsch Karlekar), the IRIB’s World Services have developed 
remarkably with services broadcast in more than 20 languages. The state-run organisation 
launched the first 24/7 English-Language news channel “Press TV” in 2007, taking the lead 
in “exporting” the views and values of the Islamic Republic beyond the Iranian borders. A 
similar Spanish-speaking news channel, called “Hispan TV”, was launched in 2012 for the 
Spanish-speaking population of the world.     
Almost all Iranian media scholars agree that the number of newspapers and 
magazines has drastically increased since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, 
Motamednejad and Badii (2000) believe that there remain obstacles on the way of 
independent and free activities of the press in Iran, particularly in the post-reform period. 
They classify these obstacles into four categories which include the need to obtain 
permission from the government for the establishment of a newspaper; the absence of a 
desirable ground for the press to defend the public against the government; self-censorship 
and unbalanced distribution of government subsidies among the press.  
 There are some other challenges as well. From the financial point of view, most 
Iranian newspapers are in short of funding and rely only on the commercials. Apart from 
some newspapers which attract government-funded advertisements, the majority of the 
Iranian press are in desperate need of financial assistance. The high price of paper as the 
result of the global sanctions against Iran is a more recent challenge for the press. Two 
newspapers voluntarily stopped publication in October 2012 for financial reasons.  
 Technical difficulties such as poor internet connection and dilapidated printing 
machines have posed a serious challenge for the press as they do not have individual 
internet service providing facilities and rely on private ISPs which filter many news 
websites on the basis that they spread anti-Islamic and anti-revolution ideas aiming to 
topple the government. This situation is rather different in the IRIB which attracts a great 
share of government budget while reaping a huge amount of income by selling the air time 
to private companies to broadcast TV and radio commercials. The IRIB studios are well-
equipped with the state-of-the-art broadcast technologies such as SNG vans, live broadcast 
facilities, broadband internet connection and advanced telecommunication satellite 
equipment.  
The most serious challenge for the Iranian media in the post-refrm era is perhaps the 
shortage of skilful and educated staff and journalists. The crux of the problem lies with the 
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English-language media whose managers are not familiar with the English language and 
lack the required knowledge of news writing and reporting in English, which is very 
different from Persian linguistically. In many other sections of the media, the personnel and 
even the managers do not hold a journalism-related university degree, posing a serious 
managerial challenge to the development of media, qualitatively and quantitatively.        
  
ix. Press freedom and supervision   
             The first Iranian Press Law was ratified 65 years after the first Iranian newspaper 
was published. In 1905 and one year before the Constitutional Revolution, representatives 
of the parliament ratified the first and most comprehensive Press Law—a duplicate of the 
France’s Press Freedom Charter. According to this law, everybody could publish a 
newspaper without obtaining any special permit or license. However, this law was later 
revised in 1952 during Mohammad Mosaddeq who instructed the press managers to obtain 
a license before publishing their newspapers. The next amendment took place in 1955 with 
no major change.  
After the revolution, a new Press Law was passed in 1979 and the last version was 
drafted in 1985 based on which the Press Supervision Board was erected. The fifth and the 
last amendment to the Iranian Press Law was introduced in 2000 when parliamentarians 
imposed more restrictions on the press. Then a new parliament was sworn in and tried to 
revise the Press Law but was confronted with a “governmental decree”. The struggle for 
amending the Press Law continued to the last days of the reformist parliament which finally 
managed to pass a separate law concerning the composition of the Press Jury.          
The freedom of press in Iran is a complicated phenomenon. There are four periods in the 
contemporary history of Iran in which the press enjoyed freedom. Norouzi (2009) divides 
these periods into the Constitutional Revolution (1906), the second period (1940s), the 
Islamic Revolution (1979) and the fourth period (since 1990s).  
According to Norouzi, Iranian press enjoyed a high degree of freedom during the 
first three periods mainly due to the collapse of the security and control mechanisms of the 
government. In other words, the anarchic situation in the aftermath of major developments 
in the contemporary history of Iran provided the opportunity for the press to exercise a high 
degree of freedom. However, the fourth period beginning from 1991 is significant in the 
sense that the level of freedom provided for the press was not created in the absence of 
security and control systems. During the fourth period, there existed press supervisory 
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mechanisms; however, significant changes in the political, social and power structures of 
the government gradually paved the way for the press to enjoy a high level of freedom. 
Norouzi (2009) believes the Iranian press in the past 175 years have been enjoying six 
different freedom right indexes: the right of publication, the right of the continuity of 
publication, the right of gathering news, the right of releasing news, the right of job security 
and the right of legal hearing. According to Article 168 of the Constitution, an open Public 
Court session should be held in the presence of the Press Jury if a complaint is filed against 
a newspaper.  
If we consider these six rights as our benchmark, we reach to this 
conclusion that we are witness to a declining trend in the press freedom 
which means the development of the press freedom and rights curve is 
in decline. However in sum the status quo is still a high peak when 
compared to various periods in the history of the Iranian press (Norouzi, 
2009).  
The most recent case of closing down of a newspaper in Iran is when the famous 
Sharq newspaper published a cartoon interpreted by critics as a humiliation of the Sacred 
Defense and Iranian soldiers. The Press Supervisory Board ordered the Sharq newspaper 
to shut down in October 2012. Less than a week, the Board closed down “Kayhan 
Caricature” (an affiliate of the famous Kayhan newspaper) for publishing a cartoon 
depicting Joseph the Prophet. Such closing of the press is perceived by some as examples 
of the state clampdown on the press.    
 
x. Coverage of the West  
 There is rarely a case in which the print media have not played a crucial role since 
1837, when the first newspaper was published in Iran. Iranian press have been always 
involved in major developments throughout their existence: the 1905 Constitutional 
Revolution, the 1953 coup and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to name a few.  
 The first instance of the role of Iranian media in politics might date back to the 
1910s when the Iranian press were used for political purposes by the British and Iranian 
officials to persuade the public opinion that the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 was in 
the interests of Iran.  
According to Katouzian (1998: 9), a translated version of a letter by Sir Percy Cox 
(the interim British envoy to Tehran responsible for negotiating the Anglo-Iranian 
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Agreement of 1919) to Vosouq (the then-head of the Iranian government) was published in 
the Iranian press to restore public confidence in the agreement. Cox wrote in his letter that: 
[The] essential objects of this agreement ... are: the complete internal 
and external independence of the Persian State, the preparation of means 
of strengthening the power of the Persian Government to enable them to 
maintain internal order and guard against frontier dangers; and finally to 
devise means for the development and progress the country. In no way 
has it been the aim of the British Government by this agreement to limit 
the independence and authority of Persia, on the contrary, it is their 
desire that this ancient kingdom that has so long been in jeopardy and 
discord should be made capable of preserving its independence, and 
(having regard to the important geographical position of Persia) that the 
mutual interests of the two States should be better respected and 
safeguarded (as cited in Katouzian, 1998: 8-9).    
 This letter was translated in Persian and published in the country’s newspapers to 
persuade the public that the 1919 Agreement is not aimed at turning Iran into a British 
protectorate. But according to Katouzian (1998: 9), “it did not work” in favour of the 
English. 
The Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 attracted opposition expressed in the form of 
pamphlets in Iran1. For example, a long pamphlet entitled Ebtal al-Batel (Annulling the 
Invalid) by Abdollah Mostofi—a high-ranking Ministry of Finance official—addressed 
Vosouq:  
                                                           
1 The agreement could not even escape criticism from Iranian poets whose poems were published mainly in 
the newspapers. One such poems (by Aref)  maintained that (as cited in Katouzian, 1998:10):  
God condemn to everlasting shame  
He who betrayed the land of Sassan 
Tell the zealous Artaxerexes The Long-armed  
The enemy annexed your kingdom to England 
 
Another (by Eshqi) read:  
It is the story of cat and mouse, our pact with Britain,  
Once it catches the mouse, how would the cat let it go?  
Even if we be lion, she is the fox of our time,  
The fox famously deceives the lion 
 
Or this one (by Farrokhi Yazdi):  
Nosrat al-Dawleh is busy in Europe Annihilating the motherland-look and see ...  
Like a dealer for the sale of the motherland  
Constantly finding customers-look and see ... 
To deliver the motherland to Britain  
He is even keener than her-look and see 
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You may have imagined that Iran has other things too, which you have 
not given as a gift to the British...Do not worry. The present level of 
service which you have rendered to the British has made them the 
owners of everything in Iran, and you can rest assured that-as a satirical 
magazine in Paris has put it-you have sold this country to the British for 
fifty centimes (as cited in Katouzian, 1998:9).    
Elsewhere in the pamphlet, Mostofi accused Vosouq of taking the “British money” 
to spend on “propagandists and producers of false public opinion”.  
 In his analysis of political cartoons in two newspapers in the 1940s, Amin 
(2001:335) explains how the Iranian press engaged themselves in politics and tried to 
influence the decision-making of the state1.  
These traces suggest that, despite the highly-politicised environment 
of Iran in the 1940s, the most dramatic forces of change in this period 
were not, strictly speaking, political but economic and social: the 
meaning and value of the press had changed (Amin, 2001:354).  
 Amin’s study focused on Mard-e Emrouz (Today’s Man) and Atash (The Fire)--two 
weeklies published in the 1940s the decade when the Iranian government was keen on 
employing foreign (and particularly American and British) consultants2.   
 In his study, Amin (2001) analysed Iranian press reaction to two major events: the 
failed American Financial Mission under Arthur Chester Millspaugh and the Azerbaijan 
Crisis of 19463. The Iranian press in fact took the opportunity to criticise the Allied 
occupation of Iran and the presence of Western consultants in the country as both events 
were somehow related to the West. According to Amin (2001:347), L. P. Elwell-Sutton, an 
employee of the British Embassy in the 1940s observed that the Iranian press were 
“strongly nationalist and hostile to Allies and Axis alike”. Elwell-Sutton’s view was 
supported in 1945 by American press attaché T. Culyer Young who invited Iranian 
journalists to the US to “improve America’s tarnished image in the wake of the failed 
                                                           
1 Amin (2001:344) concluded in his study that the “sensational and sexually explicit nature of political 
expression of the 1940s had its roots in Iranian press culture in the 1920s and 1930s”. Amin (2001:345) also 
argues that since the 1890s, the Iranian newspaper industry has never been a “business”. Neither has it 
produced profits for their owners as a means of livelihood. Notwithstanding, they have tried to influence the 
decision-making process of the state.  
2 According to Amin (2001:348), there were approximately 40 Persian-language periodicals from 1890 to 
1900 while approximately 330 periodicals were produced between 1906 and 1911 and 582 were produced 
from 1941 to 1948.  
3 Arthur Chester Millspaugh was an American financial expert who headed up two Financial Missions to 
Iran: the first from 1922 to 1927 and the second from January 1943 to January 1945. Both times, the 
American Financial Missions were terminated early--the first time due to the ambitions of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
and the second time due to the opposition of Parliament and the press (Amin, 2001:336).  
 143 
Millspaugh mission” (Amin, 2001: 347).   
 The two weekly newspapers, according to Amin (2001:335), “raised questions about 
Iran’s sovereignty over its territory, its finances, and its minorities” and finally made it 
impossible for the pro-America officials of Iran to prevent the antagonisation of the public 
against America (Financial Mission). The press in other words highlighted Iranian 
historical pessimism towards Westerners: That Westerners want to exploit rather than 
benefit us.    
 In one cartoon which was published in “Today’s Man” in 1944, Millspaugh is 
depicted as a “towering Reza Shah-like figure, terrorising tiny, top-hatted politicians” 
(Figure 1). The cartoon is accompanied with two articles one describing Millspaugh as a 
“foreign dictator” and the other against the presence of “American consultants” in Iran1.  
 Amin (2001) opines:  
Though intended as a critique of Millspaugh, the cartoon was also a 
critique of Reza Shah, not merely for being a dictator but for relying 
on foreign support despite his nationalist pretensions. It was during 
this time that the accusations of British support for Reza Shah’s 1921 
coup and 1925 accession to the throne were in wide circulation, 
fueled by the publication of Husayn Makki’s chronicle of Reza 
Shah’s “Twenty Years” (Amin, 2001:337-338).  
  
                                                           
1 Moreover, Amin (2001:351) observes that articles published in the “Today’s Man” tended to “mock Euro-
American fashions”.  
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Figure 1 Front page of “Today’s Man” Weekly newspaper (7 April 1944), depicting Milispaugh in the 
form of a Reza Shah as a towering male tyrant (Source: Amin, 2001:337). 
 
In another cartoon in “The Fire” in 1944, Milispaugh is portrayed as a “drunken 
womaniser wasting the Iranian public’s money” (Figure 2).  
 
 145 
 
Figure 2 A cartoon from “The Fire” weekly newspaper, 22 April, 1944, criticising the presence of 
Milispaugh as an American consultant in Iran. The cartoonist believes that Milispaugh is exploiting 
Iran’s resources by spending his time with women instead of dealing with Iran’s problems. 
 
 These cartoons might have had little impact on Reza Shah’s decision to welcome 
foreigners into the country warmly. However, the assassination of the editor of “Today’s 
Man” weekly newspaper, Mohammad Masoud, following the publication of the anti-
American cartoon might be suggestive of the influence of the press in the politics. 
Moreover, the rapid development of cultural and political activities including the 500-per-
cent increase in the number of press in the post-Reza Shah period (1941-1953) is a proof 
that newspapers were being suppressed during Reza Shah’s reign due to their influence.  
 Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994) observes that the 1940s and early 1950s, the years of 
people’s suppression, were a “rare historical” opportunity for the Iranian press to flourish.    
Soon after the fall of Reza Shah (1940), workers’ unions were 
formed, new political parties were organized, and 
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Parliament…became involved in influencing the state of affairs of 
the country…Print media were revitalised. The number of presses in 
publication increased to 582 (only ninety-eight had published 
before). By comparison, during Reza Shah’s period, only forty-one 
newspapers and magazines were published (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 
1994:52).  
The press had a decisive role to play in three significant turning points during the 
1950s and 1970s1. The first event was in 1948 when the US government launched a 
propaganda operation codenamed BEDAMN with an annual budget of one million dollars 
to counter the Soviet Union and Tudeh Party influence2. Under the propaganda arm of 
BEDAMN, anti-communist articles and cartoons were planted in Iranian newspapers; 
books and leaflets critical of the Soviet and the Tudeh were written and distributed and 
rumors were spread against the USSR.  
The second event in which the Iranian press played a role was during the 1953 coup 
in which newspapers were influenced by domestic and foreign elements affiliated with the 
CIA to promulgate fabricated materials aimed at weakening the government. This tool-like 
use of the press was orchestrated by Americans who revived BEDAMN to publish 
materials against Mosaddeq. Gasiorowski (1987) describes the role of the press as pivotal.   
…the anti-Mosaddeq actions undertaken by the United States through 
BEDAMN in the year before the coup had played a key role in preparing 
the groundwork for it by undermining Mosaddeq’s base of support 
(Gasiorowski, 1987: 277).  
The third important event in which the press played a role after Reza Shah was 
deposed was during the Iranian revolution in which newspapers were exploited by the Shah 
to attack opposition forces and especially Ayatollah Khomeini3. An editorial published in 
prestigious Ettelaat newspaper on 7 January 1978 accused Khomeini of being a foreign 
agent. The newspaper article raised the outcry of Khomeini supporters who staged 
demonstrations in response two days after the publication of the article, eventually leading 
                                                           
1 For example, the role of the media was so significant during the 1953 coup, that a pro-Zahedi army 
detachment seized Iran’s radio station and began to broadcast pro-Zahedi bulletins.   
2 Gasiorowski (1987: 272) observes that as with the anti-Mosaddeq BEDAMN activities, it is impossible to 
gauge how effective these actions really were; but it seems safe to assume that they were significant. 
3 It is remarkable to mention that the media during the last years of the 1970s were used by both the 
government and anti-government forces as a means of propaganda. In their case study of the Iranian 
revolution, Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) discuss that some media (radio and television) 
were used as state institutions to promote the modernisation program of the Shah and Western culture while 
other media (cassettes and leaflets) were used to mobilise public opinion against the suppressor regime.       
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to the overthrow of Shah about a year later (Beeman, 2005).  
The role of the media in different significant periods during the contemporary 
history of Iran is not limited to the domestic press. In fact, the foreign media also played a 
part in developments leading to the 1953 coup. For example, the BBC Persian radio 
broadcast the exact wording required by the Shah in a mid-night news bulletin to make sure 
the coup was being supported by Britain. The other example includes CIA-sponsored 
reports published by New York Times days before the 1953 coup to publicise the Shah’s 
dismissal of Mosaddeq and appointment of Zahedi (Gasiorowski, 1987: 273). Another 
example is the support by American and European (French, Swiss and Belgian) press and 
their opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919. As observed by Katouzian 
(1998:16-19), the “European press campaigned against the agreement” and published 
materials which implied that Iran was being “sold out” to Britain. Such reports were also 
given coverage in the Iranian press:  
The French press, on the other hand, felt no restraint in attacking the 
Agreement. Le Figaro was quoted in Tehran as having gone so far as to 
say that ‘the half-a-centimeter tall Shah had sold his country for one 
centime’. To give only one important example, in a long article on 17 
August, the influential Paris daily, Temps, wrote that the Agreement was 
prejudicial-‘porte alliente’-to the independence of Iran (as cited in 
Katouzian, 1998: 17).    
In the early years after the 1979 revolution when Iran was pre-occupied by the war 
with Iraq, the role of the press was limited to war reporting and exciting. The press were 
used as a strong machine to mobilise the Iranian people and encourage them to join the 
frontlines of the war of “Haq” (good) against “Batel” (evil).  
In the period after the end of the war in 1988, the arena for open political discussion 
and cultural relaxation gradually opened up under the initiatives of former president 
Rafsanjani (1989-1996) who wanted to “reconstruct” the country after a devastative war 
(Mohammadi, 2003)1.  
The most flourishing period for the Iranian press after the 1979 revolution might 
have been materialised in 1997 when Khatami was elected president and architect of the 
                                                           
1The content of the press during this period were focused on the “reconstruction” and “economic 
liberalisation” efforts of Rafsanjani’s government. According to the Media Studies and Development Office, 
the number of periodical magazines increased significantly to 550 during 1992-94, from 100 during 1980-88 
(war period). Motamednejad (1998) believes the post-war period (1989-1996) introduced an appropriate 
political and cultural environment for the development of press in Iran while creating new hopes for their 
independence, freedom and pluralism.     
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Reforms Movement and initiated his civil society campaign.  
The role of the press in advancing the reformist agenda in the domestic areas has 
been described as “crucial” by Ramin and Bahrampour (1999)1.  
Following the initial wave of attacks on the reformist press...a second 
crop of independent dailies appeared in late 1998. These papers 
exposed Intelligence Ministry agents’ involvement in the [chain] 
political assassinations of reformist intellectual and activists in late 
1998 (Ramin and Bahrampour, 1999:38-39)2.  
Hooglund (1992:20) observes that in this period the Iranian press appeared to be 
“more free of government control” than their counterparts in the Arab countries of the 
Persian Gulf—a phenomenon Merat (1995:35) describes as “Khatami’s miracle”. He 
explains that Tehran’s daily papers, for example, provide a “broad diversity of views on 
domestic and foreign policies, and certain newspapers consistently and harshly criticise the 
government”. “Salam”, for example, was a Reformist government with a circulation of 
70,000 which was “at the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle” of the Iranian 
government (Merat, 1999:35). “Khordad” and “Sobh-e Emrooz”, two other pro-Reform 
newspapers, also forced the government to admit that Intelligence Ministry agents were 
involved in the so-called “serial killings” of 1998 (Ibid).   
The multiplicity of newspapers and diversity of views and criticisms presented by 
them reached a new peak in 1999. Menashri (2001:325) observes “at no other time before 
in Iran (nor elsewhere in the Middle East) had there been so many new papers and journals, 
enjoying such a degree of freedom and expressing such a diversity of viewpoints with such 
fervor and sense of mission”. Such “intervals of openness” were only observed in the early 
1940s (following the abdication of Reza Shah), the early 1950s (under the opposition 
movement led by Mosaddeq) and early 1980s when the revolution happened.  
As of 2000, the power of Conservatives strengthened. They moved to crush the pro-
Reform newspapers with the assistance of the Judiciary. “Salam”, “Khordad” and “Sobh-e 
Emrouz” were banned and many journalists including the ex-interior minister Abdollah 
Nouri (Editor of Khordad and Fat’h) were imprisoned (Granmayer: 2003:65).  Another 
                                                           
1 According to the figures published by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1998, the number of 
published newspapers and magazines exceeded 850 (five times greater than the number of the press in the 
pre-revolution era), while the total circulation of daily newspapers reached a record number of two million for 
the first time after the “spring of freedom” and the early years after the revolution. 
2 Ramin and Bahrampour (1999) argue that the Conservatives reactivated the Press Court through the 
Judiciary to try to close down reformist newspapers by accusing them of “plotting against Islam and the 
revolution”.  Conservative MPs also managed to impeach the Culture Minister on the grounds he was too 
lenient with the press.  
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daily “Jameeh” which was the first pro-reform newspaper appeared in 1998 was also 
banned. Its publishers immediately launched a new daily “Tous” on the same day “Jameeh” 
was banned. The new paper was nearly identical to its predecessor. One week later, “Tous” 
was also banned and its publishers were beaten up by a violent pressure group. Undaunted, 
the publishers introduced a third daily, “Aftab-e Emrooz”. This led to the creation of a 
phenomenon named “chain newspapers”.  
In the early 2000s, according to Menashri (2001:325), “almost all the taboos” 
including the relations between Iran and the US were removed and discussed widely in the 
pro-reform newspapers until April 2000 when over 20 newspapers and journals were 
banned from publication by Conservative organs of the state.  
…with the banning of newspapers they were replaced by others, often 
with the same line and editorial staff. Newspapers were discontinued and 
then reappeared, sometimes under the same title, at other times with a 
new name (Menashri, 2001:326). 
With the election of Conservative president Ahmadinejad, pro-reform newspapers 
began experiencing tough times as almost all of them were confronted with government-
imposed bans. From the 17 newspapers with reformist inclinations1, which were present 
during Reformism (1997-2005), only five were publishing in 2010.   
 No organised and fully-scholarly research has been done with regards to the 
portrayal of the West in the Iranian press during Reformism and Conservatism as the area 
remains understudied2. There are however regular quantitative content analysis studies of 
the press undertaken by the Media Studies and Planning Office affiliated with the Ministry 
of Culture3. According to the results of two studies (summerised below), Iranian 
                                                           
1 They include: Aftab-e Yazd, Sharq, Etemad, Etemad-e Melli, Ham-Mihan, Hayat-e No, Sarmayeh, 
Jameeh,Tous, Neshat, Asre Azadegan, Salam, Mardomsalari, Hambastegi, Kargozaran, Seday-e Edalat and 
Tehran-e Emrouz. From amongst these, five survived during Conservatism: Aftab-e Yazd, Ham-Mihan, 
Sharq, Mardomsalari and Tehran-e Emrouz. From among all of these pro-reform newspapers, only Aftab-e 
Yaz (if identified as a reformist newspaper) has been immune from “publication ban” while all the others 
have experienced at least one period of ban. Also, seven of them including Salam, Jameeh,Tous, Neshat, Asre 
Azadegan, Ham-Mihan and Hayat-e No, were banned during Reformism.  
2 Notwithstanding, there is widespread belief that the press have followed the line of the government in 
covering the West during Reformism and Conservatism. The present research, in fact, hypothesises that the 
press toed the foreign policy line of Reformist government in detente with the West whereas they followed 
the Conservative policy of confrontation with the West. When analysing the image of the West in the Iranian 
press, one cannot ignore the hypothesis that most of Iranian newspapers reflect the official lines of policy vis-
à-vis the West which are affected by ideological and politico-cultural factors such as the historical pessimism 
towards the West, Westoxication and Vision 2025 strategy.      
3 This office was primarily established by former president Khatami in 1990 under the tile of the “Media 
Studies and Research Centre” to conduct researches on the media. It has since undertaken two series of 
changes in mission and name. During the first period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2009), the centre 
changed its name to the “Media Studies and Development Office” which was again re-named to the “Media 
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mainstream newspaper reporting of foreign news has decreased during Conservatism. This 
implies international relations were more important for the press to cover during 
Reformism than Conservatism, empowering the hypothesis that the Reformist government 
based his foreign policy on cooperation with the West while the Conservative government 
sought confrontation1.   
Whereas 18.8 per cent of the front page headlines were about foreign policy issues 
in 2005 (during Reformism), it was decreased to 13.8 per cent in 2007 (during 
Conservatism). Likewise, editorials about foreign policy issues dropped from 19 per cent in 
2005 (during Reformism) to 13.3 per cent in 2007 (during Conservatism).  
This is while wars and conflicts covered in the foreign policy pages of Iran’s 
mainstream newspapers increased from 37 per cent in 2005 (during Reformism) to 52.8 per 
cent in 2007 (during Conservatism). The coverage of US-related news also increased from 
six per cent in 2005 (during Reformism) to near eight per cent in 2007 (during 
Conservatism).  
 
 2005 (Reformism)  
(January-February-March) 
2007 (Conservatism)  
(January-February-March) 
Iran’s nuclear issue   N/A 16.9 
Foreign policy issues  18.8  13.8 
Domestic politics issues (highest 
percentage)  
22 21.3 
Front page headline issues in major Iranian press 
 
 
  2005 (Reformism)  
(January-February-March) 
2007 (Conservatism)  
(January-February-March) 
Foreign policy issues  19 13.3 
Iran’s nuclear issue   N/A 10.7 
Domestic politics issues (highest 
percentage)  
43 16.9 
Editorial issues in major Iranian press 
 
 
 2005 (Reformism)  2007 (Conservatism)  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Studies and Planning Office”. These names might be well suggestive of the missions of the centre.   
1 This does not necessarily mean that the Conservative government was in a confrontational track with the 
West. As indicated in the figures, the coverage of US-related news in the newspapers increased during 
Conservatism. This suggests that the Conservative government indeed wanted cooperation with the West. 
More on this issue will be discussed in the conclusion section.  
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(January-February-March) (January-February-March) 
Wars and conflicts  37 52.8 
Foreign policy issues  36 25.1 
Foreign news issues in major Iranian press 
 
 
 2005 (Reformism)  
(January-February-March) 
2007 (Conservatism)  
(January-February-March) 
Iran  68.5 69.2 
United States  6 7.9 
Place of the event covered in the news in major Iranian press 
  
While there are several academic works on the representation of the West in other 
countries (Wasburn, 2002; Yang, 2003; Park, 2003; Kuisel, 2004; Pauels and Fox, 2004; 
d’Haenens, 2005; King, 2007; Mohamed, 2007; Bow, 2008; Ojebode, 2009), there are very 
few researches on the portrayal of the West in Iran and vice versa (Peh and Melkote, 1991; 
Tabaar, 2006; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007, Sharifi, 2008). In fact, no organised and 
comprehensive research has been published, to date, to study the role of the media in 
creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments among the Iranian public opinion.  
As mentioned earlier, there is little academic research on the image of the West in 
the Iranian newspapers. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991) studied the “news of the outside world” 
published during 1979 and 1988 in “Ettelaat” daily—a leading Iranian newspaper1. He 
studied the reliance of Ettelaat on “Western news agencies, the extent and emphasis of 
international coverage and the treatment of news about the superpowers”.  
The findings of Shoar-Ghaffari’s content analysis of Ettelaat indicated that 61 per 
cent of the “foreign news” published in the newspaper during the 10-year period was 
supplied by four major Western news agencies (AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters)2. He also 
demonstrated that Ettelaat placed a great emphasis on covering the news of the Islamic 
world and promoted opposition to superpower influence around the world. Shoar-
Ghaffari’s research also concluded that Ettelaat portrayed the West and in particular the 
United States negatively in Iran while it gave “special attention” to the Palestinian struggle 
and “liberation movements” in the Middle East 3.  
                                                           
1 Results of Shoar-Ghaffari’s research were earlier presented in 1989 to a conference in Toronto, Canada.  
2 More specifically, this content analysis showed the coverage of the West in Ettelaat increased by two per 
cent during the first and second five-year period. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991:8) suggests this was because during 
that period “the internal affairs of the country were perceived as more important than the events outside Iran”.    
3 He also argued that although the four major Western news disseminators dominate the international news 
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Given the fact that news is conventionally defined in negative terms 
by the Western agencies and also the fact that Iranian media still rely 
heavily on these news agencies for the news of the outside world, 
these findings come as no surprise. What is surprising though, is the 
fact that Iranian gatekeepers who controlled the inflow of the world 
news, still defined newsworthiness in the same fashion that the Third 
World leaders and especially the leaders of the Islamic Republic 
have always objected to (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991:14).   
According to Shoar-Ghaffari’s study, the United States received the highest amount 
of coverage in Ettelaat followed by Lebanon, France and Britain. Germany came in the 
ninth place. In terms of topics most covered in Ettelaat during 1979-1989, politics ranked 
first while Iran’s foreign relations ranked 17th preceded by US international affairs in the 
14th rank.    
Sharifi (2008) researched Iran-US relations by examining the image of the US in 
Iran. He concluded that both Iran and the US “reproduce each other as enemy”. He further 
argued that “representational practices” are to blame for the construction of such mutual 
animosity. According to Sharifi (2008:5), for some Iranians, the best way to deal with the 
US is to contain its “inherent menace by not provoking it”. For others, America is imaged 
as a “belligerent power that aims to exploit, corrupt, dominate and destroy Islam” (Sharifi, 
2008:5).  
Another study by Tabaar in 2006 focused on the US representation in Iran after the 
9/11 attacks and the conspiracy theories surrounding it. He studied newspapers from both 
the Reformist and Conservative camps.  
On Conservative press portrayal of the US, Tabaar (2006) studied the representation 
of the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, worldwide hatred towards America and what 
he calls America as a “Paper Tiger” against Iran. He concluded that Conservative media 
tried to promote the “inevitability of the fall of the US…and… Western 
civilisation…followed by the resurgence of Islamic civilisation and its golden era” (Tabaar, 
2006:23-24).     
According to Tabaar (2006:24), the Conservative media use “fringe Western 
sources” and “quotations out of context” (among others) to promote the idea that 9-11 
attacks were orchestrated by the American government itself. In conclusion, Tabaar 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
flow, “they have no direct control over the construction of world images” (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991:1). 
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(2006:34-35) argues that the conservative media “ties America’s “moral corruption” to its 
decreasing global stature (both soft and hard power)”.  
  On Reformist media representation of the US, Tabaar (2006:38) concluded that 
reformist media had a “markedly more positive approach toward the US” than the 
Conservative media. He also noted that the Reformist media “emphasise the US threat 
against Iran to advance their own domestic agenda” Tabaar (2006:35). 
Each side attempts to portray the US in a way that undermines the 
other side in order to maximise its own influence and popularity 
among the people… In the context of this fluid boundary between 
politics and journalism, the US will continue to be an important 
instrument used by the two sides for political gain (Tabaar, 2006:41-
42).   
While there is little research on the representation of the West in Iran, there are 
several researches on how the Islamic Republic is portrayed in America. Most of the 
research in the field concerns the coverage of the hostage crisis (Said 1981, Dowling 1989; 
Larson 1986; Malek 1988/1989; Shoar-Ghaffari 1991). For example, Said (1981) indicated 
that the US press, in their coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis, tended to simplify complex 
cultural-political issues by resorting to a “pre-conceived superficial” formula of Islam and 
its values. While the hostage crisis captured considerable attention, much of the coverage 
was given to the actual event and the various personalities involved; there was limited 
analysis of the politics, history, or society in Iran which had led to the revolution and the 
hostage situation. 
According to a study by Brewer et al (2003), the American public opinion tends to 
associate Iran with terrorism under the influence of the media and exposure to news.  They 
explained that the American public opinion has been exposed to “a steady stream of 
stories” linking Iran (and Libya) to terrorism (Brewer et al, 2003:497). They concluded that 
the association of terrorism with Iran (and Libya) among the Americans is related to being 
exposed with news which linked terrorism with the countries1. In other words, participants 
who read stories framing Iran (and Libya) as “sponsors of terrorism” were more likely to 
draw “negative associations between anti-terrorist efforts and these nations” (Brewer et al,  
2003:501).  
                                                           
1 Brewer et al (2003), however, rejected any link between the association of terrorism with Iran (and Libya) 
and being exposed to news about domestic terrorism. According to the findings of their studies, “exposure to 
the stories about domestic terrorism did not alter the impact of attitudes about terrorism on either attitudes 
toward Libya or attitudes toward Iran” Brewer et al (2003:501).  
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Entman (1991) studied the US downing of an Iran Air Flight 655 in the Persian Gulf 
and suggested that frames used in the news coverage of this event were influenced by US 
government policies. A similar study was done by Peh and Melkote in 1991 in which they 
examined if three prestigious US newspapers biased in their reportage of shooting of Iran 
Air Flight 655. They found that US newspapers almost under-reported the shooting of Iran 
Air flight compared to that of the Korean Airliner Flight 007. According to this study, US 
newspapers depicted Iran Air Flight 655 positively (i.e. not objectively) which means they 
were not critical of the incident (compared to the Korean incident in which they portrayed it 
negatively (i.e. objectively)). For example, US newspapers did not reflect the Iranian views 
of the incident by refusing to publish any press releases or press conferences by Iranians.  
Peh and Melkote (1991) suggested that the US press would report international 
crises differently if the nationality of the perpetrators were different “especially if the 
foreign countries involved were not allies of the US” (Peh and Melkote, 1991: 59).    
The hostile US/USSR, and US/Iran relationships were predicted to have 
been reflected in the coverage of the two incidents. The Soviets would 
suffer condemnation, and the Iranians, held responsible for their plane 
being shot (Peh and Melkote, 199163).  
Roushanzamir (2004:9) explored how American newspapers construct a “specific 
commodified version and vision” of Iran through representing Iranian women. Analysing 
news reports from 1995 to 1998, she found that news stories published in US newspapers 
on Iran “whatever their actual content, are anchored by the graphic illustrations of Iranian 
women, veiled in the apparently impenetrable black chador.” Roushanzamir (2004:24) 
concluded that US media construct Iranian women for American audiences as “outside and 
other, first to “our” society but also to “theirs””. She also suggested that “images of Iranian 
women are the tool through which US media signify Iran” (Roushanzamir, 2004:9).    
Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) presented a discourse analysis of elite American 
newspaper editorials on Iran’s nuclear case. Employing Said’s concept of Orientalism and 
van Dijk’s concept of the ideological square, they found that “the Wall Street Journal and 
The Washington Post more predominantly drew on Orientalist arguments than did The 
New York Times” when portraying Iran (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 140). They 
concluded that “Orientalist depictions of Muslim countries and their political issues 
concentrate around the idea that Islam is a source of threat” (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 
161). They also revealed that American newspapers “selectively framed the issues 
 155 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear dispute by employing linguistic, stylistic, and 
argumentative maneuvers” (Ibid).  
There are also previous researches on the image of the West in such countries as 
Indonesia, Canada, France, Russia, Nigeria and Egypt.  
Wasburn (2002) studied the image of the US in Indonesian newspapers. Doing a 
content analysis of the news about the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), he concluded that the 
press in Indonesia portray the US as a “world military power”. He also suggested that 
Indonesian press tend to support the policies of the government when reporting the Persian 
Gulf War in ways that helped legitimise the stances of the Indonesian government.   
Bow (2008) presented a history of the evolution of anti-Americanism in Canada. He 
proposed that anti-Americanism has a “long and colorful history in Canada” and that the 
United States is imaged as an “overbearing, expansionist power, waiting (more or less 
patiently) at the border for its chance to take advantage of Canadian disunity and 
weakness”. Bow (2008) also argued that the Iraq war provided Canadians with ample 
reason to “disagree with American policy and to dislike and distrust the Bush 
administration” and gain negative feelings”.  
Kuisel (2004) studied the representation of the US before the French public opinion. 
He argued that the image of the US in France is “deteriorating”. Kuisel (2004) studied 
surveys on the US image in France and discussed that Bush’s policies and unfair trade by 
the US imposed on other countries (during 2000-2004) are to be blamed. He concluded that 
the French think of the US as a “domineering, self-interested nation that uses its inordinate 
power to establish global hegemony”.    
  Another study was conducted to examine the image of the US in English-as-a-
Foreign- Language textbooks in Russia. Pauels and Fox (2004) suggested while the US is 
portrayed as a “strong military forces” and is associated with “rudeness”, there is a 
generally positive portrayal of the US holidays.   
  Ojebode (2009) content analysed foreign news published in Nigerian newspapers. 
He found that the majority of the news about the West was negative and taken from 
Western news agencies. 
A similar finding was recorded by Mohamed. Mohamed (2007) analysed Egyptian 
newspaper portrayal of the United States as a case to generalise it to the whole Arab media. 
He found that the overwhelming news published in major Egyptian newspapers on the 
West was negative. On the reason for portraying the West negatively, he argues that the 
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dominance of “nationalist, Islamist and leftist ideologies among a large number of 
Egyptians writers and journalists” led them to select negative news about the West. He also 
found that American foreign policy issues were the “most important sources in forming the 
US image in the Egyptian press” which portrayed the US as an “invading, hostile state that 
has lost its credibility”.   
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: Theories of media and 
communication  
iv. Agenda-setting theory and media portrayal   
v. Theory of framing  
vi. Theory of priming  
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Theoretical framework: Theories of media and communication 
For some people, the media are the only source of gaining information and news 
about international relations. Therefore, the media can play a significant role in shaping the 
perceptions either of actors or of other nations among their audience. Many researches have 
studied the link between media exposure and their influence on public opinion (Albritton 
and Manheim, 1983, 1985; Perry, 1987). According to other scholars such as Brewer et al 
(2003), Wanta et al (2004), Choi (2009) and Yang (2003), exposure to news increases 
knowledge about other countries and can significantly influence the audience towards 
foreign nations.  
More specifically on the relation between media and anti-Americanism, Nisbet et al 
(2004:32) have demonstrated that TV news coverage of the United States in predominantly 
Muslim countries leads to the rise of anti-Americanism. They argue that while Arab 
regional news coverage of the US tends to “amplify” anti-American perceptions, watching 
the same news in Western TV networks such as the BBC and CNN will “buffer” the 
negative coverage of the US in Muslim countries (Nisbet et al, 2004:22).  
Previous research on the role of news in policy making indicates that although the 
media are not officially part of the foreign-policy establishment, they have been an 
influential participant in the foreign-policy making.  In the United States, for example, 
news media have played a “significant role in setting the political agenda” for 
administrations, particularly in times of crisis (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005:83) and 
post-conflict (Mishra, 2008). Gerges (2003:82) notifies that the US media coverage of 
Islam is an indispensible part of the making of the US policy.   
In this view, a number of factors contribute to the situation, 
including the media’s overwhelming dependence on government 
sources for their news stories; the lack of public contestation of 
government propaganda campaigns; and the government’s use of 
ideological weapons like anti-communism, a demonised enemy, or 
potential national-security threats. (Gerges, 2003: 81-82).  
 The influence of media on foreign policy is a well-established and well-researched 
notion (el-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Nisbet et al, 2004; Chan, 1994; Gerges, 2003). Such 
influence is so great that some governments monopolise media (particularly radio and 
television) to “mobilise their citizens politically” (Nisbet et al, 2004:17) and use media as 
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“a vehicle for their propaganda” (El-Affendi 1993: 165). However, it is not clear whether it 
is the media which influences the government or it is the government policy which 
influences the media. While Gerges (2003) believes the media play a significant role in 
making policies (in the US), Chan argues that the media are affected by government 
policies in covering news. Citing previous research by Shaheen (1985), Entman (1991) and 
Shoemaker (1991), Chan indicates:  
 ...research on the relationship between media coverage of 
international affairs and government foreign policy often showed 
that media tend to cover international affairs from government’s 
point of view, and that if the home government is involved, media 
would adopt a “pro-government” stance (Chan, 2004: 135)1.  
  This view has been supported by Ryan (2004) who studied 10 US newspaper 
editorials and concluded that US newspapers followed the line of the government in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks which was to encourage military intervention2. Peh and 
Melkote (1991:76) studied the shooting of civilian airliners of Iran and Korea respectively 
by the US and former USSR and concluded that US newspapers “served as a medium 
through which the government transmitted its attitudes to the people”.  
In the case of the KAL downing, Reagan re-affirmed his view of the 
Soviet Union as an evil empire to the public, and in the Iran Air 
incident, that his Persian Gulf policies were good, and the Khomeini 
regime, irresponsible (Peh and Melkote, 1991:76). 
This supports the findings of previous studies which suggested that American 
newspaper coverage of international issues is, quite often, a reflection of official policy and 
not reality.  
The issue of news and its influences or effects has been always at the heart of 
communication studies. Since the late 1920s and early 1930s when the issue of media 
influence became one of the main preoccupations of governments after the First World 
War, the questions of “do the media influence society?” and “who influences the media?” 
came to the spotlight of communication studies. In 1927, Harold Lasswell pointed out such 
influences by studying propaganda techniques in Nazi films during the world war. Ten 
                                                           
1 Chan (2004:  142) however concludes in his own research that the “press did not always cover 
international news from the government’s point of view, even at times when its government is directly 
involved in an international issue”. 
2 Ryan (2004:308) criticised US newspapers for failing to “explore, analyse, evaluate and publicise 
alternative strategies and ideas” concerning the 9/11 attacks. 
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years later, Harold Gosnell studied the influence of newspapers on readers’ choice of 
candidates in Chicago elections, which resulted in the development of one-step model of 
mass media influence; In another study in 1944, Paul Lazarsfeld et al researched the extent 
to which mass media influenced voting behaviour, introducing the two-step flow of 
communication. Later in 1947, Kurt Lewin introduced the gatekeeping process which was 
further developed in 1972 by McCombs and Shaw in their agenda-setting model.  
In general, as explained by Hjarvard (2002:91), there are two dominant perspectives 
through which communication scholars study the effects of news: those of “selection” and 
“construction”. While researches during the 1930s and 1960s focused on what influences 
the “selection” of news (or the “production of image”), studies since the 1970s have been 
conducted to see how the news is “constructed” (or the image is “represented” or 
“reproduced”).  
Followers of the first perspective in media influence research have centred their 
studies on “agenda-setting” while proponents of the second perspective formulated their 
researches with the framework of the theories of “framing and priming”1.  
The present research, therefore, is employing the agenda-setting, framing and 
priming as its main framework of analysis. among other media influence theories of the 
hypodermic needle theory (magic bullet theory), cultivation theory, diffusion of innovations 
theory and the two-step flow of communication theory, to name a few. As mentioned 
above, the two dominant media effects perspectives i.e “selection” and “construction” are 
usually applied through agenda-setting, framing and priming. The three well-known and 
largely-used theories seem to be appropriate for studying the question of how the West is 
portrayed in the Iranian press. In other words, the media representation of the West in Iran 
is closely tied to agenda setting, framing and priming processes employed by Iranian 
journalists to reflect the news of the West. In addition, as reiterated by Park (2003), 
“integrating frame analysis and agenda-setting research will provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the potential impact of international news coverage”. The present research 
is a study of the “selectors” and “producers” of news stories and not the “consumers” of 
news. Therefore, media audience theories are not applied in this research. Audience studies 
are related to the way audiences use the media, the extent to which the audiences engage 
                                                           
1 McCombs and Shaw (1972) combine the two inter-connected perspectives in one and discuss that 
“choosing” (selecting) and “displaying” (presenting) the news are the main functions of the agenda-setting 
theory. They actually do not differentiate between selecting the news (agenda-setting) and presenting the 
news (framing and priming). This has been also emphasised by McQuail (2000:456) who regards priming as 
“a more specific aspect of agenda-setting”.  
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with media and their “cognitive and affective reactions to media content” and “the short- 
and longer-term effects media can have on audiences” (Gunter, 2000:54). While it is 
beyond the boundary of this research to study the audience of news, it could be potentially 
the subject of another PhD research to study how the Iranian people are influenced by the 
media in terms of views towards the West. In order to study how the Iranian audience shape 
their views towards the West through exposure to the media, a survey should be conducted 
through questionnaires. I am not considering audience studies in my thesis because I am not 
basically studying the audience in my research. In other words, I am studying the 
newspaper coverage of the West in Iran and not the audience. Similar studies on the 
newspaper coverage or representation have employed agenda-setting, framing and priming 
as their theoretical framework to study the coverage of news. For example, D’Haenens and 
Verelst (2002) studied the portrayal of Indonesia’s reform in the Dutch print media, using 
frames in news reporting. They proposed that news frames influence public opinion even 
though some believe that “news framing of political subjects has no visible effect on the 
perceptions of the public with regard to the government or the media” (D’Haenens and 
Verelst: 2002: 187). Parker (2003) studied the coverage of Korea and Japan by American 
television networks. She concluded that the portrayal of Korea and Japan in US television 
is influenced by the foreign policy of the US. Spencer (2004) studied the impact of 
television news on the Northern Ireland peace negotiations. He discussed how television 
news writers impacted on the politics and momentum of the Northern Ireland peace process 
through the process of agenda-setting. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) studied the 2003 
Iraq war coverage in elite newspapers in Sweden and the US. Employing framing and 
agenda-setting, they concluded the American newspapers “relied more heavily on official 
government and military sources” to report the Iraq war (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 
2005:399). In a similar study, Horvit (2006) discussed the portrayal of the Iraq war in the 
six major news agencies. He also used agenda-setting to study how different news agencies, 
from the West and non-West, covered the Iraq war based on their own agenda. D’Haenens 
and Bink (2007) studied the image of Islam in the Dutch press. Employing agenda-setting 
and framing theories, they discussed the role of media in shaping the public opinion and 
hypothesised that “the media alone are not able to impose their opinion on the public” 
(D’Haenens and Bink, 2007: 136). In all such researches and many other similar ones on 
media effects (Yanovitzky, 2002; Yang, 2003; Trivundza, 2004; Auerbach and Bloch-
Elkon, 2005; D’Haenens, 2005; Gan et al, 2005; Fahmy and Kim, 2008), the coverage of 
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news of events has been studied using the agenda-setting and framing theories.  
 
i. Agenda-setting theory and media portrayal   
As defined by Rogers and Dearing (1988: 565), the word “agenda” is defined as “a 
list of issues and events that are viewed at a point in time and ranked in a hierarchy of 
importance”. McCombs and Shaw (1972) proposed the idea of agenda-setting. Studying the 
role of media in the 1968 presidential election campaigns in the US, they concluded that 
news people “play an important role in shaping political reality” through selecting and 
presenting the news to the public (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 176)1.  
Not only did McCombs and Shaw (1972:176) hypothesised that the media set the 
agenda for the people what issue to read, but also they discussed that the readers learn 
through the agenda set by the media “how much importance to attach to that issue from the 
amount of information in a news story and its position”.  
Loaning a quotation from Berelson (1961) who said “on any single subject many 
‘hear’ but few ‘listen’”, McCombs and Shaw (1972) distinguished between minority 
politically-educated and majority politically-under-educated consumers of news in that the 
former “seek” information by visiting various sources of news and the latter “acquire” it 
under the influence of the media (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 176-177). 
The media are the major primary sources of national political 
information; for most, mass media provide the best-and only-easily 
available approximation of ever-changing political realities 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 185). 
Such an agenda-setting function of the media has been emphasised by Lang and 
Lang (1966), Cohen (1963) and Said (1997) and many other scholars who believed the 
media tell people what to read and what to think about by giving salience to subjects2. 
McCombs and Shaw’s theory were later expanded by Dearing and Rogers (1996) 
who defined three types of agendas in the process of media influence. They include media, 
                                                           
1 They asked voters to name the most important issues of the day (prior to elections). The voters’ responses 
reflected the pattern on the news coverage during the previous month in the mix of newspapers, network 
television news, and news magazines available to them. 
2 The term “agenda-building” has been used by communication scholars to define a process through which 
policy agendas of political elites become influenced (Rogers and Dearing, 1978). While the “agenda-setting” 
tradition has been used to study the influence of media on public, “agenda-building” has been employed to 
explain how public issues influence policy agendas. Christie (1993) has also studied, through the spiral of 
silence theory and agenda-building, the model of “agenda-opinion congruence” to see how the media and 
policy agendas are related to the dominant public policy (opinion) at certain conditions (such as war).  He 
used the model of agenda–opinion congruence to view the high degree of public support for the initial phase 
of the Iraq war and the resulting interaction between mass media and public policy.   
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public and polity agendas1. 
According to Dearing and Rogers’s model, the agenda set by the media influences 
the public agenda which in turn has impacts upon the policy agenda2. This model, which is 
based on the three agendas and interrelationships among them, has been displayed in the 
following figure: 
  
Based on this model, Dearing and Rogers (1996) defined agenda-setting as a 
process of “social construction” used in the media to prioritise one issue over the others to 
be published for the public. They argued that the media have either a direct or indirect 
influence on setting the agenda in society.  
In some cases, the media agenda has a direct effect in the policy 
agenda-setting process, although more often, the media agenda 
has an indirect effect thorough the public agenda…(Dearing and 
Rogers, 1996:87). 
 Scheufele (2000) argued that agenda-setting has to be viewed on two levels of 
                                                           
1 To measure the media and public agendas, communication researchers regularly calculate the correlation 
between the ranking of issues on the media agenda and the ranking accorded those same issues on the 
subsequent public agenda. On such a basis, Dearing and Rogers (1996), explain three research traditions in 
the field of media agenda-setting. Content analysis is used to measure the media agenda while surveys are 
employed to measure what is on the agenda of public; the policy agenda could be also measures through 
policy-making actions as the introduction of new laws about and issue (agenda), budget appropriations and by 
the amount of time given to debate the issue (agenda) in the parliament.  
2 Lang and Lang (1983) emphasised the relationship between media and public agenda by investigating the 
Watergate scandal. They noted that the Watergate became a public agenda item after months of intensive 
media coverage of it.    
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analysis which are the agendas of media and audience. He called the formation of a media 
agenda as “agenda-building while describing the formation of an audience agenda as 
“agenda-setting.” Elsewhere, McCombs and Shaw (1993) describe agenda-building as the 
“fourth phase” of agenda-setting research while Lang and Lang (1983) studied it as “a 
complex process” and suggested that it comprises several steps. Rogers & Dearing (1988) 
also indicated that agenda-building influences the policy agendas of elite political 
establishments.  
 McQuail (2000:461) describes agenda-setting as a way of representing “the reality 
of society” and constructing a “frame of reference for viewing the world”, thus significantly 
influencing the pictures in people’s minds about the outside world. In other words, which 
aspects of an issue are covered or highlighted in the news makes a considerable difference 
in how people view that issue. More specifically, in the first stage, the public learns what 
the media consider important and to which they give more coverage. In the next stage, the 
public forms its images portrayed by the media.  
Becker and McCombs (1978) found significant evidence of media influence in the 
voters’ choice of presidential nominees. In a similar study on Spanish elections, McCombs 
et al (2000) found that there is a considerable correlation between the voters’ description of 
the three major party leaders and the representation of them in the media. Studying visual 
representation of news, Domke et al. (2002) and Perlmutter (1998) found evidence to 
suggest that visual news images influence the image the public gains about social and 
political events as well as the formation of public opinion particularly on wars and 
conflicts.  
Rinnawi (2007) studied the role of media in “de-legitimising” the Palestinian 
uprising. Through a content analysis of Israeli newspapers, he concluded that the Israeli 
media play a central role, during the times of conflicts, in de-legitimising the Palestinian 
protest through news production processes.Through a content analysis of White House 
briefings and newspaper and television coverage of the Iraq war, Christie (2006) studied the 
interaction between mass media and public policy statements at the start of Iraq war and 
revealed a significant relationship between the public policy and media agendas during a 
period of “high” but not “law” public support for the war.  
On the relation between the media and public opinion, Noelle-Neumann (1974) 
maintained that the mass media express the dominant view and that the dominant opinion is 
often defined by mass media. She went further to propose that the media may form the 
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dominant opinion and thus influence public opinion. 
In a related agenda-setting study of President Carter’s State of the Union address 
found that the press set the agenda for the president’s speech, rather than vice versa 
(Gilberg et al, 1980). Thus, studies have found the mass media to be one of many elements 
involved in a reciprocal process including public opinion and public policy. D’Haenens and 
Verelst (2002) studied the portrayal of Indonesia’s reform in the Dutch print media. They 
concluded that the media agenda can determine the public agenda, and influence how the 
public thinks and acts through the way in which the news is presented.  
Downs (1972) emphasised the role of media coverage in what he termed as “issue-
attention cycle” in reinforcing the drawing of public attention to environmental and climate 
change issues. Also, McComas and Shanahan (1999) hypothesised that climate change 
dangers were given special attention by the public in periods when newspapers gave more 
coverage to global warming. Doing a content analysis of the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, they investigated the ways media constructed narratives about global 
warming and how these narratives influenced the public attention to climate change.    
Wal et al (2005:937) expanded on the “influential” role of media in portraying 
ethnic minorities. They explained that the media use “generalisations” to negatively portray 
minorities and emphasised on the importance of news selection mechanisms and minority-
related media and public agendas. According to their study, negative portrayal in the press 
was not by itself determined by ethnicity, but by the “frequent association of minorities 
with particularly negative news contexts” such as religious fundamentalism and illegal 
immigration (Wal et al, 2005:948). In a similar research, Dixen and Linz (2000) explored 
the “misrepresentation” of victims belonging to minority groups in US television news and 
concluded that Whites are overrepresented and Latinos are underrepresented in US news 
while Blacks and Latinos are more likely than Whites to be portrayed as perpetrators on TV 
news. Covert and Dixon (2008) made a similar study on the representation of the women of 
colour in mainstream US magazines. The findings of their study suggested that white 
women were “overrepresented” and Black and Latina women were “underrepresented” in 
mainstream women’s magazine articles. Covert and Dixon (2008) also examined whether a 
greater representation of women of colour in mainstream women’s magazines, might affect 
readers’ endorsement of stereotypes of them. And their hypothesis was approved.  
It was mentioned earlier that foreign news plays an important role in the shape of 
views about other nations. Such a role has been underlined by studies of foreign news 
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(Brewer et al, 2003; Choi, 2009; Wanta et al, 2004; Kiousis and Wu, 2008; Auerbach and 
Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Gan et al, 2005).  
Brewer et al (2003:493-6) found evidence of a link between a news story frame and 
the representation of a foreign nation in another country. They indicated that news frames 
are “a route by which the media could influence attitudes toward foreign countries” and 
“may shape how audience members judge that nation”.  
The findings…show that the media can influence the standards by which 
people evaluate foreign nations. At the same time, the data also suggest 
that there are limits to this influence. When members of our audience 
read stories that offered a direct link between an issue and a nation that 
carried a specific evaluative implication, they tended to adopt this frame 
of reference in their own thinking…[however] when participants read 
about issues on the domestic front, they did not carry their thoughts over 
to the international realm (Brewer et al, 2003:504-505).  
Brewer et al (2003:496) further stated that news stories could “frame a particular 
country as a supporter of terrorism, thereby suggesting that if one supports a ‘war on 
terrorism’ then one should evaluate that nation negatively”. 
Choi (2009:526) emphasised the “vital function” of foreign news in shaping the 
audience’s views of the world. Citing Beaudoin and Thorson’s study in 2001 who revealed 
that the majority of foreign news headlines in Los Angeles Times were “negative”, Choi 
(2009:525) noted that “foreign news in the US media has long been accused of inaccuracy 
and incompleteness, and that its manner of reporting tends to the so-called coups and 
earthquakes approach.” 
Wanta et al (2004) examined how people are influenced by foreign news. They 
found that negative coverage of a nation results in negative public opinion about it. The 
finding of their research also indicated that with an increase in the importance of a nation 
for the US, the media’s coverage about that nation also increases. Particularly, Wanta et al 
(2004) highlighted the importance of foreign news and concluded that the negative 
depiction of a nation by the media (in US) is closely related to negative perceptions about 
that nation. 
Kiousis and Wu (2008:67) did a similar study and found evidence that “media 
content portraying foreign countries in a negative light is positively associated with public 
salience of those countries.” They stated that “increased salience of negative news content 
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is also linked to increased negative views of foreign nations on thermometer scales” 
Kiousis and Wu (2008:68)1.  
To borrow Walter Lippmann’s phrase, “the pictures in our heads,” the agenda 
presented by the news media influence what the pictures in our heads are about. The agenda 
of attributes presented for each of these agendas, public figures, or other objects literally 
influences the pictures themselves that we hold in mind. 
 
ii. Theory of framing    
When news happens, journalists then decide which news to publish. This has been 
described by communication scholars as “gate-keeping” (McQuail, 2000:496). When the 
news is selected, the agenda is automatically set. The agenda-setting function of the media 
was discussed in the previous section. According to the literature on agenda-setting, the 
more people see or hear about an issue or subject, the more they will talk about it and this 
will increase the chance that issue ends up on the public and policy agenda. But how do the 
media do this and help increase the chance? The answer is through the use of frames and 
primes in the news.   
The media impact upon the audience in two ways. Audiences acquire news and 
information from the media and also learn how much importance to attach to a subject-
matter on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news. Newspapers often highlight a 
story by displaying it on the front page or by using large headlines. Television news 
attaches more importance on stories by cueing them at the opening of the news bulletin (as 
headlines) and giving them more time of broadcast. In fact, when media dedicate more 
attention on an item, this may in time result in the audience also finding this news item 
important. In this way, the news is framed and primed for the audiences.      
The term frame was first defined academically by Entman in 1991 and developed in 
1993. “Frames are information-processing schemata” (Entman, 1991:7) that are created to 
influence the audience by “selecting and highlighting some features of reality while 
omitting others” (Entman, 1993: 53). 
As cited in Park (2003:148-9), DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) believe that like 
agenda-setting, the theory of framing explains people’s “perception of reality” and 
“meaning construction”. According to McCombs et al. (1997), framing and agenda-setting 
                                                           
1 Kiousis and Wu (2008:68) emphasised the role of public relations. They stated that it “plays an essential 
role in public perceptions of foreign nations by decreasing the impact of negative news on the perceived 
salience of those countries”.  
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are related in a way that framing is an extension of agenda-setting or the “second-level 
agenda-setting”. d’Haenens (2005:422-3) notes that framing “goes beyond agenda-setting, 
assuming that the media not only put certain issues on the agenda, but are also able to 
‘frame’ a certain issue: that is, they suggest how the issue or the problem should be 
conceptualised”. Gamson (1989:157) explains that “facts...take on their meaning by being 
embedded in a frame or story line that organises them and gives them coherence, selecting 
certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others”. 
 According to Entman (1993: 52), “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” 1. In other words, the process of framing consists 
of “selection” and “salience” or “selecting” and “highlighting” a particular subject-matter 
in order to create a targeted sense in the audience2. Thus, the process of framing is a 
mixture of and related to the processes of gate-keeping (presence or absence of an issue), 
agenda-setting (emphasis on one aspect at the expense of others) and influencing3. In other 
words, while agenda-setting deals with “what” people exposed to media should think about, 
framing instructs people “how” to think about it. On such a basis, Smith et al (2001) refer 
to two media coverage biases: selection bias and description bias. It could therefore be 
argued that the selection bias concerns agenda-setting while the description bias is about 
framing (and priming) as it is believed that the media “set” the agenda by selecting events 
while they “frame” the agenda by describing it. Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:404-405) 
explains such a process on influence as follows:  
Framing can construct reality, impact interpretations and influence 
audience responses and opinions toward a particular event after the 
event enters the public agenda. In other words, framing affects the 
perceptions of the event, not just its salience (Dimitrova and 
Stromback, 2005:405). 
Journalists use framing in the news to “optimise audience accessibility” 
(Valkenburg et al, 1999) and influence interpretations that enable individuals to perceive, 
                                                           
1 According to Entman (1993: 52), “an increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will 
perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory.”  
2 Referring to researches done by Ghanem (1997), Lopez-Escobar et al (1998) and Wanta and Hu (1993), 
Kiousis and Wu (2008:60) explain that the news media can influence “how” people think about a topic “by 
selecting and placing emphasis on certain attributes and ignoring others”. 
3 Some researchers refer to the process of framing as the “second-level agenda-setting” which suggests that 
media coverage may move beyond “what” issues audiences think about to influencing “how” audiences think 
about the issue.  
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organise and make sense of information (Pan and Kosicki, 1993 as cited in Yang (2003))1. 
According to McQuail (2000:495), framing is used in two levels in media influencing 
theories. At the first level, journalists use framing to “shape and contextualise” news 
according to their own (or their organisation’s) frame of reference while at the second level, 
framing is used by the audience to “adopt” those frames of reference offered by journalists. 
In other words, McQuail (2000:495) believes that that the end result of the framing process 
is that the audience “see the world in a similar way” as journalists do. Therefore, there are 
two types of frames which operate based on the following model: media frames and 
individual frames2. Individual frames are sometimes described as mental schemas, 
heuristics or scripts (Entman, 2004). They help an individual perceive, interpret and discuss 
public events. Media frames, on the other hand, are contained in journalistic stories across 
different media. Entman (1991: 7) explains that media frames are usually embodied in the 
“keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images” in news narratives. By 
repeatedly using them under the theory of priming, the news narratives reference some 
ideas but not others, which is exactly how frames work to highlight certain ideas. 
  
When framing news stories, journalists frequently tend to use five general frames of 
reference defined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000:95) as “conflict”, “human interest”, 
“economic”, “morality” and “responsibility” frames.   
 The “conflict” frame is used to highlight conflicts between parties and countries3; 
the “human interest” frame occurs when attention or emotion is paid to an individual4; the 
                                                           
1 Pan and Kosicki (1993) refer to framing as a “cognitive device” which is used to “encode, interpret and 
retrieve” information (as cited in Yang, 2003:232).  
2 According to Ryan (2004:365), “media frames help individuals create personal frames as they provide 
pertinent bits of information or news, thus making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or 
memorable to audiences”. Entman (1993: 53) notes that an “increase in salience enhances the probability that 
receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory”.  
3 This frame is mostly used mostly during election campaigns (for example between Conservatives and 
Reformists) or tense political relations between countries (for example, between Iran and the US). The so-
called “horse race frame” is an instance. Winning and losing in this frame is of central importance.  
4 For example, during natural disasters or wars, this frame is used frequently to “personalise, dramatise and 
give emotional content to the news” d'Haenens and Verelst (2002: 186). The human interest frame puts 
emphasis on the personal, emotional side of an event, issue, or problem to capture the audience’s attention.  
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“economic” frame is emphasising the economic consequences of an issue for the public1; 
the “morality” frame is when the news is presented from a religious or moral point of 
view2; and the “responsibility” happens when journalists put the blame on parties, 
politicians or individuals.  
  It was earlier mentioned that “the media can influence the standards by which 
people evaluate foreign nations” (Brewer et al, 2003:501). Other researchers have also 
confirmed that using frames influence the way in which the public thinks about subjects 
and how these subjects are recalled and reflected upon.  
Brewer et al (2003:496) studied the concept of framing from a psychological point 
of view. Arguing about previous research on the psychological aspects of framing done by 
Cappella and Jamieson (1997), Iyengar (1991) and Nelson et al. (1997), they offered two 
“psychological mechanisms” on the effects of framing. They proposed that framing works 
through an “accessibility-driven process”. They also concluded that framing works by 
telling people which associations should receive greater weight and which should matter 
less.  
The authors’ experiments showed that issue frames affect 
importance judgments and that these importance judgments mediate 
the effects of frames on opinion, whereas accessibility does not. 
Both accounts, however, conclude that exposure to frames can shape 
which standards of judgments people use to evaluate the subject of 
the frame (Brewer et al, 2003:496). 
Cappella and Jamieson (1997) argue that the use of the “conflict” frame will lead to 
increasing public cynicism and mistrust. Patterson (1993) also argues that the “conflict” 
frame is used to divert public attention from political processes. Semetko and Valkenburg 
(2000) believe news frames are employed to “shape public perceptions” of political 
realities, while Rhee (1997) indicates news frames set “evaluative criteria” for the audience 
to judge the importance of political agendas (as cited in Gan et al, 2005:443). D’Haenens 
and Verelst (2002: 187) conclude that the public mind can be influenced by the media 
“through the way in which the news is presented”. Such a finding has been emphasised by 
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:413) who showed how people in one country may develop 
                                                           
1 When the economic impact of an event on an individual, group, institution, region, or country is 
highlighted, the economic frame is used to make the potential economic impact of an event clear to the public. 
The economic impact has an important news value and it is often suggested that news producers use this 
frame to “make an issue relevant to their audiences” d'Haenens and Verelst (2002: 186). 
2 Journalists use this frame to add a religious or moral charge to an event, problem, or subject. It is often used 
indirectly in the news and through a third person.  
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quite different beliefs and attitudes toward an event than people in another country 
depending on how they have been exposed to media coverage.   
Studying the 2003 Iraq war coverage in Swedish and US newspapers, Dimitrova 
and Stromback (2005:413) further confirmed the link between framing and the construction 
of reality, particularly in times of “international conflict where national media may 
engender different interpretations for the national audience”1.     
We showed that the elite newspapers in each country framed the 
war in different ways, favouring some aspects of the war and 
disregarding other aspects... By selecting some aspects of war 
reality–such as military success–and ignoring other aspects–such as 
anti-war protest – the media text constrains audience interpretations 
(Dimitrova and Stromback, 2005:413).  
On factors which influence how journalists frame the news, almost all researchers 
have consensus on the Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model to be 
responsible. According to this model, the media content is influenced by five factors: 
individual factors, media routines, the organisation, extra-media factors, and ideology 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996)2.  
The link between ideology and framing has been also studied by other scholars such 
as Tuchman in 1978, Edelman in 1993, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad in 1998, Massey 
in 2000 and Reta in 20003. They studied how power relations and political forces influence 
media frames4. Doing a content analysis of newspaper stories in France and Singapore, 
Gan et al (2005) identified the dominant frames in newspapers’ reporting of the 2000 US 
presidential elections. They concluded that “which frames journalists use is determined, in 
part, by their professional socialisation and the journalistic ideology of the newspaper for 
                                                           
1 Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:413) suggested that people who are not exposed much to reporting about 
war protests and war victims may ultimately be supportive of war. In another study of the Iraq war coverage, 
Choi (2009) explored how US newspapers’ coverage of foreign news was affected by the war. He concluded 
that after the start of the Iraq war, US newspapers preferred to use “government” sources for their coverage. 
This may suggest that newspapers rely on official sources at the periods of conflict. 
2 Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model was developed by Scheufele (1999) who introduced 
five factors influencing the journalists’ framing of news. They include: social norms and values, 
organizational pressures and constraints, pressure of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or 
political orientations of journalists. 
3 According Yang (2003:232), Edelman (1993: 232) has asserted the news frame is “driven by ideology and 
prejudice rather than by rigorous analysis or the aspiration to solve social problems”. Akhavan-Majid and 
Ramaprasad (2000) did find that the dominant ideology of a nation was a major source of frame in their 
analysis of US press coverage of the Fourth UN Conference and the NGO Forum in Beijing. Reta (2000) 
reached the same conclusion in his analysis of the 1994 South Africa elections in US media. 
4 Gerbner (1964) as cited in Yang (2003:232) pointed out there is “no fundamentally non-ideological, 
apolitical, non-partisan news gathering and reporting system”.  Yang (2003:232) believes “it is from this line 
of reasoning that the concept of framing is derived”.  
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which they write (Gan et al, 2005:442).”  
  Another research by van Dijk (1985) indicated that the way news is framed in the 
media is a result of social and professional routines of journalists. This was supported by 
Scheufele in 1999 who listed five main factors which influence the way journalists frame 
the news: social norms and values, organisational pressures and constraints, pressures of 
interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists 
(Scheufele, 1999: 109). 
According to Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:404), framing of news could be either 
“intentional” or “subconscious”. However, they also highlight the impact of “national 
political elite” institutes such as the president’s office and the parliament upon journalists’ 
framing of news. Other researches have attributed news framing (in the US media) to being 
influenced by government policies (Entman, 1991), American democratic values (Reta, 
2000), patriotism (Reese and Bucklaw, 1995), political ideology (Wang, 1992; Pan et al., 
1999), diplomatic sensitivity (Wang, 1992), history and organisational resources (Pan et al., 
1999) and national interest (Lee and Yang, 1995).   
The combination of all the influences makes a significant 
contribution to the final product of news and eventually defines the 
landscape of media content. As is well known, it is impossible to 
make news without going through the framing process (Yang, 
2003:232).  
In a study of America’s 10 largest newspapers, Ryan (2004:374) concluded that 
journalists “relied heavily on official government sources” to construct frames for the news 
of the war on terror. Yang (2003) argues that “national interest” (which he distinguishes 
from ideology) is another factor which influences the framing process particularly with 
regards to foreign news1. Studying the representation of NATO air strikes on Kosovo in 
Chinese and American newspaper, Yang (2003:231) highlighted the “considerable 
influence of national interest on media frames in newspapers”. He concluded that the 
national interest factor often “outweighs” other factors in framing international news 
reportage. Ryan (2004:364) refers to “personal prejudices, past experiences, religious 
feelings, values, educations” as main factors contributing to the framing of social reality.  
 
                                                           
1 Yang (2003:233) points out, on the difference between ideology and national interest, that while “ideology 
concerns a person’s, an organisation’s or a nation’s value or belief system, national interest is more closely 
related to a nation’s standing in dealing with international affairs.  
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iii. Theory of priming    
The final product of news media is presented to the public under a rather complex 
process, depending on the resources of the newsroom: Gate-keepers select the news; 
journalists are assigned; translators produce the news; editors edit the first draft; chief 
editors apply editorial policies and the news is finally broken. This process could be more 
complicated and sophisticated should technology allows. It consists of gate-keeping, 
agenda-setting, framing and priming, each of which could be done by gate-keepers, 
journalists, translators, editors and editors in chief.   
A typical example of such a news-making process could be located at the time of 
elections. Suppose that polls have been closed. The winner has been announced but the 
loser is accusing the winner of vote rigging. The news department at the state television is 
instructed to report on the elections. The agenda, therefore, has been set i.e. “elections” 
(stage 1: agenda-setting). Now, the story should be filed and the set agenda should be 
expanded on. In most cases, the editor in chief advises the journalist that the story should be 
framed in a way, for example, that the audience is understood that elections were “free and 
fair”. The frame, therefore, is set i.e. free and fair elections (stage 2: framing). The story is 
filed. In the next stage, editors who now have the agenda and frame of the news, try to 
“prime” one aspect of the story. They, for example, give prime (or salience) to the “high 
participation rate” in the elections as an indication that elections were free and fair. This 
process continues for several days after the elections (stage 3: priming).   
Priming in fact is the “third-level” agenda-setting which is employed by the media 
or politicians in the long run (at intervals), particularly during election campaigns, to exert 
influence on public opinion and voters.  
Because priming can alter the criteria citizens use to evaluate 
political issues, leaders, and events, priming effects can have 
important consequences for the outcomes of elections, the 
emergence of public support for policy initiatives, and the 
approval ratings of political leaders (Althuas and Kim, 
2006:960).  
Priming is based on the fact that the more prominence media attach to an issue, the 
more the chance of influence on the public opinion about that issue. McQuail (2000:456) 
refers to priming as “a more specific aspect” of agenda-setting which shows that issues 
highest on the political agenda will be given more public prominence when they receive 
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most media attention. Priming is employed in some cases by officials to “divert attention 
from domestic failure by some foreign policy success, or even military adventure” 
(McQuail, 2000:456) and “help them achieve their political and ideological objectives” 
(Ryan, 2004:364).  
 The idea of priming was promoted in the 1980s by Iyengar and Kinder who, by 
conducting a series of experiments, studied the priming effect of television news on the 
public opinion about the performance of the government. They proved that news coverage 
of an issue can “prime” the audiences to pay more attention to that issue in their decision-
making about government officials and candidates.  
Most literature on priming is mainly focused on the “cognitive psychological” 
aspects of it. In other words, priming is mostly researched as a “psychological” concept, as 
it aims at having long-term influence on the public and voters’ opinion. According to 
Althaus and Kim (2006:961), priming is the “activation of knowledge stored in long-term 
memory following exposure to a stimulus”.  
Based on this definition, the public use stored knowledge in memory potentially for 
making a judgement in future. For example, Nisbet et al (2004:31) demonstrated that the 
media bombard viewers with a “torrent of information” while they are “unlikely to be able 
to spend a great deal of time weighing, assessing, and deliberating the content of the news, 
arriving at carefully considered judgments” about policies. Brewer et al (2003:494) further 
argue that ordinary people do not base their judgements on complex information processing 
but rather on a “shortcut strategy” which helps them retrieve the knowledge and pieces of 
information stored in their memory. This function is also known as “accessibility effect”. 
Using the concept of accessibility effect defined by Higgins (1996), Althaus and Kim 
(2006:962) argue that not only does priming produce “accessibility effects” (i.e. activating 
stored knowledge), but it also produces “applicability effects” (i.e. generating associations 
between the primed construct and other constructs). Applicability effect means news 
coverage irrelevant to a specific issue does not tend to influence opinions regarding that. 
According to them, this whole process is dependent on several factors such as the “framing 
of the task...the degree of attention to stimuli...the motivations...predispositions...prior value 
commitments and social norms” used by individuals to process information (Althaus and 
Kim, 2006:962).   
Seen in this way, the social psychological literature envisions 
priming as something like a two-stage process: the priming 
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stimuli should influence the accessibility of some knowledge 
constructs more than others, but whether people use those primed 
constructs as evaluative criteria depends on the degree to which 
they are perceived as applicable to the judgmental task (Althaus 
and Kim, 2006:962).     
As explained earlier, the priming process helps activate previously-learned 
cognitive structures in the public mind to influence their judgment on an issue. This process 
works when a node is “activated” or “primed” in one’s memory and consequently affects 
his or her evaluation on a subject matter (Brewer et al, 2003:494). The accessibility of a 
subject matter in the memory depends on the “frequency” and “recency” with which it has 
been used in the past (ibid). In fact, the basis of the priming is that the public relies rely on 
the agenda set and framed by the mass media to make a decision when casting a vote or 
simply to discuss about issues in the public sphere. For example, Iyengar and Simon (1997) 
studied the coverage of the American invasion of Saddam during the first Persian Gulf War 
and concluded that extensive television coverage of the war put it high on the American 
public agenda as the most important issue of their country. Another priming effect was 
studied by Brosius and Kepplinger in 1992. They found that party preferences during the 
1986 elections in Germany were vastly influenced by the public reaction to the agenda set 
by the media. For example, if the news media covered poor economic performance of the 
government over a period during elections, then the public is “primed” to think critically of 
the government.   
The whole process of media influence on the public opinion consists of the three 
stages of “agenda-setting”, “framing” and “priming” the news. A typical example is this: 
The media choose to manoeuvre, for instance, on the “rising unemployment” during 
elections. Suddenly, the number of stories and lead stories on unemployment soars (agenda-
setting); Then the media tell the public how to think about unemployment (framing); After 
some period when this process continues, unemployment is primed for the public opinion 
and people will judge about the government based on the knowledge the media spread and 
stored in their mind (priming). Therefore, during this period, the media have dictated to the 
public what is important for them to think, how to think about it and how to use it to make a 
judgment. In our example, the media tell people that the issue of unemployment is 
important for you to think about; then they tell people that unemployment is one of the 
decisive factors to evaluate a government or party performance; and finally and during a 
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specific period (usually weeks before elections), the media create an atmosphere under 
which there is little room for the people to resist against the agenda the media had set and 
framed for them. And the media in this way force people, through news exposure, to “use 
the dominant agenda carried in the news as an evaluative criterion” in their political and 
even non-political decision-making (Althaus and Kim, 2006:963).  
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i. Research questions  
The main aim of the present research is to study how the West is portrayed 
(qualitatively and quantitatively) in mainstream Iranian newspapers during the two different 
political periods. For this purpose, two independent variables were defined: the political 
affiliation (ideology) of newspaper and the political period (discourse) it was published. 
The dependent variable, the representation of the West, was also defined in terms of story 
layout/story page, method of story produced, primary Western country involved, dominant 
political theme, dominant stereotype, story direction towards Western relations and image 
of the West. All variables are at nominal level of measurement1.  
This research seeks to study the impact of political affiliation of newspapers (as the 
first independent variable) and the political period in which the newspapers were published 
(as the second independent variable) on the representation of the West (as the dependent 
variable).  
Therefore, the researcher has defined three types of research questions: Descriptive, 
analytical and main research questions. Descriptive research questions study the 
representation of the West from the quantitative point of view. Figures and statistics related 
to the representation of the West in terms of features such as the story layout or political 
theme are described in the form of frequency tables in the Descriptive Research Questions 
(DRQ) section2. Analytical research questions investigate the impact of the political 
affiliation of newspapers on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). It also 
investigates the impact of the political periods on the representation of the West (in terms 
of relationship). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the 
Analytical Research Questions (ARQ) sections. Main research questions include the 
investigation of the impact of political period/affiliation on the representation of the West 
in Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami newspapers (in terms of difference). 
Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Main Research 
Questions (MRQ) sections. A summary has been provided below: 
Descriptive question (Frequency):  
Frequency tables about representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspaper 
 
                                                           
1 The lowest level of measurement is called nominal. It consists of a set of categories that are distinct from 
one another. The use of numbers in nominal scale is for labeling only and the order of the categories is not 
important which means reordering the categories makes no difference in the meaning of the scale. The 
nominal scale categories can therefore be merged or changed.   
2 Due to space constraints, descriptive tables have been appended (see Appendix 2).  
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Analytical question (Relationship):  
Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and 
newspaper affiliation (ideology)?  
 
Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and 
the political period (discourse)?  
 
Main question (Difference):  
Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation or framing of the 
West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Reformism and the 
representation of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during 
Conservatism? In other words, did media from two different political systems differ 
significantly in their coverage of issues related to the West? 
 
ii. Research hypotheses  
One of the other main goals of the present research is to investigate if newspaper 
affiliation and political period in which newspapers were published have had any impact 
upon the portrayal of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers. In other words, the 
current study seeks to understand if mainstream Iranian newspapers are affected in 
portraying the West by the dominant discourse and ideology. For this, the following 
hypotheses were formulated:     
  
RH1. Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
 
RH2. Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
 
RH3. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during 
Reformism while trying to defuse tension (détente) and highlight cooperation between Iran 
and the West during the same period.  
 
RH4. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during 
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Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during 
the same period.  
 
iii. Research methods  
There are various methodologies when it comes to media and communication 
research. Some of the most prominent research methods include content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004), semiotic analysis (Chandler, 2007), cultural analysis (McQuail, 
1987), frame analysis (Miller, 1997) and discourse analysis (Potter, 1996). Since the current 
research aims to study different aspects of Iranian Occidentalism and how the Occident 
(West) is portrayed in mainstream Iranian newspapers, the researcher decided to examine 
the content of the Iranian press through (comparative, qualitative and quantitative) content 
analysis and critical discourse analysis during two different political periods.  
 
a. Content Analysis  
Content analysis is a research method used widely in communication and media 
studies. It has been used in many researches for more than six decades. It uses a set of 
procedures “to make valid inferences from text” about the sender of the message, the 
message itself or even the audience of the message (Weber, 1990:9) to study social and 
economic trends such as the press coverage of social and political issues and the survey of 
public opinion on a variety of topics (Gunter, 2000:56). Since 1940s, according to Gunter 
(2000), researchers have been using content analysis as an academic tool to study 
communication and media.  
Content analysis has been defined as “a research technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications” (Berelson, 
1952:18). This is a definition over which almost all communication scholars have 
consensus1. Notwithstanding, Berelson’s definition has been criticised for being descriptive 
(Krippendorf, 1980), limited to quantitative analysis (Huber, 1989, Kracauer, 1952, 
Lasswell, 1949), and manifest content of communication only (Gunter, 2000). Because of 
such limitations, researchers usually employ more qualitative methods alongside content 
                                                           
1 Many other scholars have provided definitions of content analysis. For example, Stone et al (1966:5) 
defines content analysis as “any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics within text”. Krippendorff’s definition of content analysis is “a research 
technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980:21). 
Neuendorf (2002:1) defines content analysis as the “systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message 
characteristics”.  
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analysis. The present research also followed a similar manner. In fact, researchers believe 
content analysis could be employed as a secondary instrument for recoding social reality 
“when used in tandem with interviewing or observational analysis” (Gunter, 2000:58)1.  
In spite of such limitations, a rather great number of studies have been conducted 
with content analysis as their methodology to explore specific categories of content in the 
media particularly the portrayal or depiction social groups and minorities. Ter Wal et al 
(2005) used quantitative content analysis to study the representation of ethnicity in EU and 
Dutch domestic news. They used content analysis to to study how news outlets select news 
topics and sources to portray ethnic minorities in the media. Covert and Dixon (2008) 
employed content analysis to investigate the portrayal of women of colour in mainstream 
women’s magazines in the US. Dixon and Linz (2000) content analysed random sample of 
television news in the US to assess representations of Whites, Blacks and Latinos as crime 
victims. Baym (2004) studies structures of form in US network news coverage of 
Watergate and the Clinton impeachment through content analysis. Many more similar 
researches can be found which have employed content analysis in their study of media texts 
(Benson and Hallin, 2007; Blakely and Bumphus, 2005; Gan et al, 2005; Dimitrova and 
Stromback, 2005; King, 2007; Stromback et al, 2008).  
Neuendorf (2002:52) believes content analysis is a “tool for testing relationships 
within a basic communication model”. According to him, Berelson (1952) proposed four 
functions for content analysis based on the Shannon-Weaver’s basic model of 
communication in 1998 of “source, message, channel and receiver”. The four purposes of 
content analysis are (Neuendorf, 2002:52):  
i. to describe substance characteristics of message content  
ii. to describe form characteristics of message content  
iii. to make inferences to producers of content  
iv. to determine the effects of content on audience.  
     Although Berelson (1952) believes it is possible to make conclusions about source 
or receiver on the basis of an analysis of the message content alone, some scholars are of 
the opinion that content analysis cannot be used for inference. For example, Carney (1971) 
and Neuendorf (2002) believe content analysis only “facilitates” inference, while it is used 
for descriptive and hypothesis-testing functions as well as identifying relationships among 
message characteristics. Based on this, Neuendorf (2002) has defined four types of content 
                                                           
1 Interviewing was not used for present research for two reasons: first, authorities were not interested in 
having an interview, and second, the staff of some newspapers especially pro-Reform press were not available 
for interview.  
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analysis, which are: descriptive, inferential, psychometric and predictive. Such 
categorisation relies on the fact that the goals of every science including content analysis 
are typically presented as description, prediction, control and explanation. However, in 
practice two types of content analysis are used widely by researchers: conceptual and 
relational. The former is descriptive while the latter is inferential.  
In conceptual analysis, the number of occurrences of a “concept” within a text is 
recorded and described in the form of frequency tables. Once a sample is chosen, the text 
should be coded into desired categories based on research questions. By breaking down the 
contents of materials into meaningful and pertinent units of information, certain 
characteristics of the message may be analysed and interpreted. Conceptual analysis is in 
fact a “quantitative” content analysis. In this approach, a text is coded for the existence of 
certain words which could be negative, positive or neutral. The researcher is interested only 
in quantifying these words, not in examining how they are related, which is a function of 
relational analysis. In conceptual analysis, the researcher simply wants to examine presence 
with respect to research questions. 
In relational analysis, relationships between concepts in a text are studies. As in 
conceptual analysis, a coding scheme is necessary in relational analysis. The main 
difference between relational analysis and conceptual analysis is that the former could be 
“qualitative” whereas the latter is “quantitative”. Both the conceptual and relational content 
analysis have been used in the present research to answer research questions.    
As a technique and scientific tool, content analysis involves specialised procedures. 
In other words, in order to do a content analysis, the desired text should be first coded or 
broken down into the so-called “manageable categories”. Categories are then identified and 
defined. The coding takes place next and results are analysed. A similar procedure was 
followed for the purpose of the present research, which will be explained hereafter.   
 
b.  Critical Discourse Analysis  
As explained above, content analysis is used to study the manifest content of media 
texts objectively, systematically and quantitatively. Content analysis is widely used in 
media and communication research. Notwithstanding, as mentioned above, this research 
method has been criticised by some scholars1. More importantly, content analysis studies a 
                                                           
1 In order to do a more in-depth research and gain more and new information about the variables of the 
research, the researcher decided to use CDA as the second method of research for the present study. 
Moreover, findings of the CDA are more reliable and valid than the CA. In other words, while the CA is 
usually used to make “generalisation”, the CDA is exploited for “particularisation”. 
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“fixed meaning of media texts that can be repeatedly identified by different readers using 
the same analytical frameworks” while discourse analysis procedures study the “capacity of 
texts to convey multiple meanings, depending upon the receiver” (Gunter, 2000:82).  
Due to shortages in the content analysis method (such as it being quantitative rather 
than qualitative; it studying the manifest rather than covert content of commutation; it 
examining the what and not the how question of research; it studying the content rather than 
the context of communication), the researcher decided to apply the critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) method in order to investigate how ideological differences between 
mainstream Iranian newspapers manifest themselves in the discourse of the selected texts. 
In fact, discourse analysis is related to the study of the linguistic components of the 
language use especially in the news as news is perceived to be a representation of events in 
the language. Fairclough (2003) describes such ways of representing the world as 
“discourse”. A discourse may represent a particular aspect of the world in a text; likewise, 
texts can “articulate different discourses together” which can be identified through semantic 
and syntactic relations between the words, such as collocations and presuppositions as well 
as grammatical features (Fairclough, 2003:133). Discourses may differ in the representation 
of social events and how these events are represented concretely or abstractly.  
According to Fowler (1991), ideological distinctions manifest themselves in 
differences of expression of an idea or news as there are always many and definitely 
different ways of transferring a meaning or concept. And such differences in expression 
may not be accidental. Therefore, discourse analysis can investigate the “ideological 
practice of representation” in the news through language (Fowler, 1991:5). Discourse 
analysis, in fact, as reiterated by van Dijk (1993), studies the underlying ideological 
positions and relations of power in a text. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of 
discourse analysis which is restricted to “critical social research”, as defined by Fairclough 
(2003:202). The aim of CDA, according to him, is to better understand “how societies work 
and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects, and of how the detrimental effects can 
be mitigated if not eliminated” (Fairclough, 2003:203). The CDA studies the dialectical 
relationships between discourse and other elements of social practicies such as language.  
As explained by van Dijk (1993) and Wodak (2001), the CDA discusses the role of 
discourse in the reproduction of social inequality through uncovering ideologies implicit in 
language. The CDA critically analyses the relationship between language and social 
meanings. It is in fact used in social research to study how realities construct discourse 
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through ideology, language and power and how the representation of reality is used in texts 
to maintain socio-cultural practices and relationships (Richardson, 2007).  
Generally, there are three approaches to CDA: Discourse as a social practice, 
developed by Norman Fairlough; Discourse as a socio-cognitive model, developed by Teun 
van Dijk; and discourse as sociological and historical, developed by Ruth Wodak. The 
present research uses a Faircloughian method of doing CDA developed by Richardson 
(2007). According to this approach, “there is a dialectical relationship between the 
consumption of journalistic texts and social practices: readers decode the meanings of texts 
using knowledge and beliefs of the world, and these texts go on to shape (through their 
transformation or reproduction) these same readers’ knowledge and beliefs” (Richardson, 
2007:45).  
Richardson (2007) uses micro and macro textual analysis scales to do CDA. They 
include: naming and referencing1, predication2, transitivity3, modality4, presupposition5, 
rhetorical tropes6 (hyperbole, metaphor, metonym, neologism, puns) and narrative7. To 
apply this CDA approach in the present research, I use these concepts and tools, where 
appropriate, to try to investigate how ideological differences between mainstream Iranian 
newspapers from different political camps (pro-Reform and pro-Conservative) manifest 
themselves in the discourse of a text.  
                                                           
1 The way elements in the news are referred to and named can greatly influence the way the audience read 
and perceive the news. These “referential strategies” can have psychological, social and political purposes. As 
stated by Richardson (2007:50), not only do referential strategies “project meaning and social values onto the 
referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and 
represented. Van Dijk’s “ideological square”, which is characterised by a Positive Self-Presentation and a 
simultaneous Negative Other-Presentation, is another tool to explain referential strategies used in the news 
(Richardson, 2007).   
2 Apart from the referential strategies used in the news, Reisigal and Wodak (as cited in Richardson, 2007:65) 
introduce “predicational strategies” which are defined as “the very basic process and result of linguistically 
assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena.”  
3 Transitivity is one of the main features of discourse analysis of news texts as journalists’ freedom in 
choosing words and phrases bear social or ideological significance. According to Richardson (2007: 54), 
transitivity “describes the relationships participants and the roles they play in the processes described in 
reporting.” It forms the very basis of representation and is about the “participants”, “processes” and 
“circumstances” associated with them. Any syntactic transformation in sentence clauses (verb, noun, adverb) 
are regarded as important in analysing the news.  
4 Modality is the “counterpart” of transitivity, pointing out the journalist’s judgments, comment and attitude 
(Richardson, 2007:59). It is usually useful in analysing editorials in which authors freely express their views. 
Modality is expressed usually via the use of modal verbs.  
5 As the name suggests, presupposition is a “taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit 
meaning of a text or utterance” (Richardson, 2007:63). It is in fact the hidden or presupposed meanings in the 
news text.  
6 Corbett (as cited in Richardson, 2007:65) defines a trope as “deviation from the ordinary and principal 
signification of a word”. Examples include: hyperbole (exaggeration), metaphor (perceiving one thing in 
terms of another), metonym (substitution), neologism (creating new words) and puns (forms of word play 
such as homography, ideography and homophony).  
7 Narrative is the sequence of events as they occurred in the actual story of news and the sequence in which 
events are presented to the audience (Richardson, 2007:71).  
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To this end, I selected six editorials1 (under two subjets of Iran-US talks and Iran’s 
nuclear issue): Three from pro-Reform newspapers (Salam, Hambastegi and Mardomsalari) 
and three from pro-Conservative newspapers (Kayhan, Resalat and Qods). These 
newspapers are regarded as purely supporting and promoting the ambitions and principles 
of their respective political affiliation. The unit of analysis was individual paragraph.  
The editorials are about resolutions imposed by the UN Security Council on Iran as 
the result of the nuclear activities in 2006 and issues related to Iran-US relations including 
former president Khatami’s historic interview with the CNN in 1998 and President 
Obama’s monumental New Year (Norouz) message to Iranians in 2009. The reason for 
selecting similar editorials is because they reflect the views of their respective political 
wing regarding two significant issues on relations between Iran and the West, namely Iran-
US confrontation and the nuclear case of Iran2. They also reflect on the views of Iranian 
leaders on establishing relations with the West. Moreover, these two topics are somehow 
interconnected ie with the settlement of one, the other will be also settled automatically.  
 
iv. Data collection and sampling    
As explained above, in doing content analysis, texts should be coded. However, 
before coding the text, a “unit of analysis” should be selected for identifying the population 
and drawing a sample from it. According to Neuendorf (2002:71), units can be “words, 
characters, themes, time periods, interactions” or any other bits of written or spoken 
communication such as paragraph, sentence or the whole story. For the purpose of this 
research, each “paragraph” of the news was selected as the unit of analysis.  
The data required for the present study were taken from four mainstream Iranian 
newspapers. They include Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Jomhouriy-e Eslami and Iran. At the 
beginning, the researcher wanted to content analyse newspapers identified as fully 
                                                           
1 Editorial by definition is an opinion article which reflects the official position of a newspaper with regards 
to a specific topic. Editorials are written by a member of the Editorial Board or publisher of a newspaper.  
According to van Dijk (1992), editorials usually provide a “summary” of the news event, an evaluation of 
“actions and actors” and a conclusion in the form of “expectations, recommendations, advice, and warnings” 
(as cited in Izadi, 2007:148). Editorials are usually analysed by researchers of media studies to decode their 
“underlying ideological visions” (Gunter, 2000:88). Please note that there is not a unified framework for the 
publication of editorials in the Iranian press. In some newspapers, editorials are usually by-lined. In the other 
press, opinions are published in the form of an editorial which reflect the official policy of the respective 
newspaper.    
2 It is remarkable to mention here that the nuclear issue came to the spotlight of the Iranian media in 2006 
when the United Nations Security Council imposed its first resolution (Resolution 1696) on Iran, demanding 
that it suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities or face sanctions. The reason the researcher 
selected only two editorials on the nuclear issue is because the nuclear issue was brought into the limelight of 
Iranian newspapers during Conservatism when President Ahmadinejad was in power.   
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supportive of Iran’s two main political wings: Reformists and Conservatives. However, due 
to the absence or shortage of the archives of pro-Reform newspapers, the researcher 
ultimately decided to select Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami1. These 
newspapers are considered “mainstream” and have large circulations. “Iran” is owned and 
funded by the government. The other three are owned and funded by organs not affiliated 
with the government. Like some other countries in the Middle East, newspapers in Iran are 
under the strict regulation and control of the government and are monitored constantly by 
the Ministry of Culture for any probable breach of related laws and regulations including 
the Press Law. As per the law, newspapers in Iran should apply for a publication permit 
with the government. Like the Defence Advisory (DA) Notice system in Britain, Iranian 
newspapers are also required to follow the notices of the government on different occasions 
to publish or not publish a news story especially when it comes to foreign policy issues.  
Ettelaat is more than 70 years old. In fact, it is the oldest Iranian newspaper being 
published to date. It was first published in 11 July 1926 in Tehran. It is a daily newspaper 
which was first published in two pages and 500 issues.  It is currently affiliated with the 
Leader’s Office and the Foundation for the Needy People (Bonyad-e Mostazafan). As a 
mainstream Iranian newspaper, Ettelaat currently publishes 20 pages. It has an international 
edition called “Ettelaat International” which is published in London. Ettelaat is in fact a 
multi-purpose publishing house which also publishes books and journals. It digitally 
archives its newspaper issues, which is a strong point when compared with other Iranian 
newspapers. Ettelaat is among the very few Iranian newspapers with a stable managerial 
structure and human resources. Ettelaat has never been closed down by the government. In 
a research done in 1991 by Shoar-Ghaffari, the content analysis of Ettelaat indicated that 61 
per cent of the “foreign news” published in the newspaper during a 10-year period was 
supplied by four major Western news agencies (AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters)2. It was also 
                                                           
1 A great deal of effort was made to access the archived copies of pro-Reform newspapers. However, due to 
logistic or political reasons, no archived copies of many pro-Reform newspapers were available. Many such 
papers had been closed down completely. Some others were temporarily shut down for months or even years, 
resulting in disruption in publication. Officials or owners of the pro-Reform press were either not available for 
interview or declined to comment. The researcher contacted the offices of pro-Reform newspapers. They were 
either closed or had not kept an archive of past issues. The researcher was referred to the National Library of 
Iran which kept most issues of past newspapers including those of pro-Reform press. However, access was 
extremely restricted to the archive of pro-Reform newspapers. Not all the copies of pro-Reform newspapers 
were available. According to the library rules, only six pages of each newspaper per day were accessible to 
the members. No photography or photocopy was allowed. It could take months to collect the required data 
from the library. Therefore, considering into account such limitations, the researcher decided in consultation 
with supervisors to drop pro-Reform newspapers.   
2 More specifically, this content analysis showed the coverage of the West in Ettelaat increased by two per 
cent during the first and second five-year period. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991:8) suggests this was because during 
that period “the internal affairs of the country were perceived as more important than the events outside Iran”.    
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demonstrated that Ettelaat placed a great emphasis on covering the news of the Islamic 
world and promoted opposition to superpower influence around the world. The research 
concluded that Ettelaat, during 1979-1988, depicted a negative image of the US. Ettelaat 
usually publishes a variety of news in its international page. Although Ettelaat is affiliated 
with the Leader’s Office and is usually described as a non-aligned paper, it was pro-
Conservative during 1997-2002 and pro-Reform during 2005-2008.   
Hamshahri is the largest circulated newspaper in Iran and is the first newspaper 
published in colour. It was first published on 15 December 1992. It is affiliated with the 
Municipality of Tehran. Its circulation in 2009 was about 500,000 issues. As a mainstream 
newspaper, Hamshahri publishes 18 “supplements” and magazines. Its “Zamimeh” 
(supplement) is the most popular advertisement supplement which is published, usually in 
more than 120 pages, every day in Tehran. Hamshahri publishes books and periodicals. 
Hamshahri was among the pioneers of publishing online versions. It has a digital archive 
which is sold out every three months. No research has been conducted to study how 
Hamshahri portrays the West. It has an international news page which usually publishes 
news in brief and analysis on the issues of the day. The main focus of Hamshahri 
newspaper is on the news of urban development and municipal issues. Hamshahri tries to 
portray itself as siding with no group and party; However, on some occasions, especially 
during Conservatism when there was differences between the government and Tehran 
Municipality over the former’s budget (subsidies), it has published articles against the 
government. Hamshahri was pro-Reform during 1997-2002 and pro-Conservative during 
2005-2008.  
“Iran” is the first colour Iranian newspaper with Arabic and English versions.. It is 
the only Iranian newspaper which is officially owned by the government and is published 
by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, “Iran” 
publishes several other publications including an Arabic and an English language 
newspaper as well as a sports-specific daily paper. “Iran”, like its licence holder “IRNA”, 
has been pregnant with developments (particularly sudden changes of managers) which 
have affected its work, employees and policy as the result of the power struggle inside the 
government. For example, this newspaper was closed down for more than six months under 
the pretext of publishing a cartoon believed to have insulted Azaris. Like IRNA, “Iran” was 
a “tool for retaliation” in the hands of the government ministers. In the latest example of 
this struggle for power, the managing director of IRNA and “Iran” (who was also the Press 
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Advisor to the President) was imprisoned in 2012 while at home watching Ahmadinejad’s 
speech at the UN General Assembly. “Iran” has archived some of its issues digitally on 
DVD. “Iran”adopted a pro-Reform policy during 1997-2002, and a pro-Conservative 
approach during 2005-2008.  
Jomhouriy-e Eslami is the first Iranian newspaper published after the 1979 
revolution. Jomhouriy-e Eslami was first published in 30 May 1979. It is the first 
newspaper which was published immediately after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. 
“Preserving the causes of the Muslim and revolutionary people of Iran” has been declared 
as the main aim of this mainstream Iranian newspaper. Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
is the licence holder of Jomhouriy-e Eslami. It was primarily the mouthpiece of the Islamic 
Republic Party, which was later dissolved. It is a daily newspaper in 16 pages, with a 
circulation of about 100,000 issues. No research has been conducted to study how it depicts 
the West. It digitally archives its past issues. Jomhouriy-e Eslami is the only Iranian 
newspaper which has all its issues right from the beginning of its publication available on 
CD. It has been having a one-time cleric managing director since 1981. Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami says its political direction is to “raise public awareness in areas of society and 
politics and promote the culture of the Iranian nation”. Jomhouriy-e Eslami adopted a non-
aligned policy during 2005-2008. However, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002.   
These four newspapers have published almost continually since their first 
publication. They are also among the oldest Iranian newspapers which have good 
publication and editorial facilities including a large number of staffers and several 
subsidiary publications. All the four newspapers had their past copies digitally archived. 
The archive of the copies published during the period of study was bought in the form of 
CD or DVD from the newspapers’ headquarters in Tehran. There were gaps in the sample 
which were filled from other sources including the National Library of Iran and the Library 
of the Iranian parliament.   
The data for this research included the sampling of news stories about the West 
published in the four mainstream newspapers during the two different four-year political 
periods: Reformism (1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001) and Conservatism (2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008)1. The Reformist Period corresponds to the period when pro-Reform Mohammad 
Khatami was president. The Conservative Period is when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a pro-
Conservative hardliner, was president.      
                                                           
1 The year 1998 was excluded from the Reformist period because no major development happened between 
Iran and the West in that period.   
 189 
The sampling statistical population included the entire newspapers published in 
1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. However, since content analysing 
such a great number of newspapers and news items (big population) requires a great deal of 
time and effort and is almost impossible to implement, the researcher had to draw a smaller 
representative sample from the population which could also be generalised to the whole 
population. For content analysis to be generalisable to the population, the sample should be 
randomly selected. This means “every element (unit) in the population must have an equal 
chance of being selected” (Neuendorf, 2002:83).  
For this purpose, “systematic random sampling” was chosen as the sampling 
method for this research. It consists of selecting every Nth unit. For systematic sampling to 
be random, it should start with a random start, for example, between 1 and N. Therefore, a 
random day in a week was chosen. A random start number was also chosen: 6. Since 
Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and public holidays including bank holidays, 
such days were excluded from the sample. If the counting had fallen on Friday or a public 
holiday, the immediate next day would have been sampled and the counting would have 
continued as normal (with a 6-unit distance). Regarding the dates to be sampled in this way, 
the researcher identified the dates in which the most important developments happened 
between Iran and the West. When the date was identified, the whole corresponding month 
was chosen and then samples were drawn from it. A total of 26 months were chosen. Some 
of the most important developments between Iran and the West during the period of study 
included: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; developments related to Iran’s nuclear issue 
such as resolutions and sanctions; rallies and demos on specific occasions such as the 
anniversary of the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution or the National Day of the Fight 
Against Arrogance (anniversary of the hostage-taking crisis); developments related to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; major speeches and statements by the leaders of Iran and the US 
such as the axis-of-evil speech by George Bush or the letter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to 
Bush or Barack Obama.       
 
 
v. Data analysis technique   
I explained earlier that as a technique and scientific tool, content analysis involves 
specialised procedures. In other words, in order to do a content analysis, the desired text 
should be first coded or broken down into the so-called “manageable categories”. 
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Categories are then identified and defined. The coding takes place next and results are 
analysed.  
A similar procedure was adopted for the purpose of the present research. Having drawn the 
statistical sample, the researcher devised the coding scheme which consists of a codebook 
and a coding sheet (form). Codebook consists of the “theoretical” (conceptual) and 
“operational” definitions. After defining the categories in the codebook, the researcher 
developed the coding sheet. It consists of categories of variables to be examined. After 
several revisions and consultation with supervisors, a total of 29 categories were defined 
based on variables and research questions. The final version of categories was then defined 
and entered in SPSS. Five main Wes-related news themes were also selected for analysis: 
“Iran nuclear case”, “terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and 
colonialism”. 
A total of 2,138 news items in 365 newspaper issues were coded in SPSS. Related 
frequency tables and test of significance (Chi-Square) were taken from and applied in 
SPSS1.  The Chi-square test was conducted to address the research questions and test the 
hypotheses. The Chi-square test is used to compare the observed frequencies of cases found 
in one variable in two or more unrelated samples or categories of another variable. It is also 
used to compare the observed frequencies of cases with those expected in a variable which 
has more than two categories2.  
In SPSS, in order to take the Chi-Square test and find relationships between pairs of 
variables, crosstabulation is used. Crosstabulation is one of the most frequently used ways 
of demonstrating the presence or absence of a relationship. It is also used to show the level 
of statistical significance in a relationship. If the p value or the significance level or 
probability (Asymptotic Significance) is bigger than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected (and the research hypothesis proved) and therefore there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variables, meaning that there is more than a 5 per cent 
chance that there is no relationship in the population3. It also indicates that we are more 
                                                           
1 Chi-Square test is used to test the significance. The Chi-Square test is based on differences between the 
Observed Frequency (counts for each cell in the table) and the Expected Frequency (which is calculated by 
the null of “no association” between the two variables). 
2 There is a restriction on using the Chi-Square test when expected frequencies are small. The Chi-Square test 
should not be used when any expected frequency is smaller than 1 or when more than 20 per cent of the 
expected frequencies are smaller than 5. In other words, if the expected frequencies are less than five, the 
researcher has to either combine or merge related categories or use binominal test should be used instead.  
3 The significance level relates to the probability that the researcher might be making a false inference. For 
example, if we say that the computed Chi-Square values is significant that the 0.05 level, we are saying that 
we would expect that a maximum of 5 in every 100 possible randomly selected samples that could be drawn 
from a population might appear to yield a relationship between two variables when in fact there is no 
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than 95 per cent confident in generalising the finding to all the population. If it is smaller or 
equal to the conventional cut-off level of 0.05, then it fails to reject the null hypothesis (and 
the research hypothesis is rejected) and therefore the relationship between the variables is 
not statistically significant. The larger the Chi-Square value, the more significant the 
relationship1. 
 
vi. Test of reliability  
The reliability test is conducted to see to what degree our measure is consistent over 
time. In other words, reliability is calculated to understand the extent a “measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Neuendorf, 2002:112) In content 
analysis, reliability test is performed to measure the amount of agreement or 
correspondence among two or more coders when doing the coding on variables (which is 
called “intercoder reliability”).   
Test of reliability is usually carried out for variables which are hard to measure 
during the coding procedure. For example, variables which require the coder’s judgement 
in coding should be tested for reliability. There is little consensus among scholars as to 
what constitutes an acceptable level of intercoder reliability for each variable. A general 
rule, according to Ellis (1994, as cited in Neuendorf, 2002:143), is that a reliability degree 
of more than 75 per cent (0.75) is acceptable and shows that the measure has been reliable.        
There are several ways to test reliability. The most popular coefficients are Scott’s 
pi, Cohen’s kappa, Krippendorff’s alpha, Spearman rho and Pearson r. The researcher for 
this thesis adopted the Scott’s pi formula:  
Scott’s pi= PAO-PAE/1-PAO  
where, PAO is proportion agreement observed,  
 PAE is proportion agreement expected  
To do the reliability test, the researcher selected three variables which require some 
sort of judgement by coders while measuring them: Dominant stereotype of the West; Story 
direction towards Iran-West relations; Image of the West in the story.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between them in that population.      
1 The most frequently used conventional levels of significance include:  
- Less than 0.001: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.001, or 1 in 
1000, or 0.1 per cent  
- Less than .01: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.01, or 1 in 100, 
or 1 per cent  
- Less than 0.05: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.05, or 1 in 20, 
or 5 per cent  
SPSS uses the 5 per cent significance level as its default.  
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Fifteen per cent of the total number of items was sampled randomly for the 
reliability test (Total number of items content analysed: 2138 news items; Total number of 
items sampled randomly for reliability test: 320 news items). They were given to an 
independent analyser for re-analysis. She was given the coding sheet and instructions on 
how to do the coding.  
The primary frequency tables of the three variables (RQs 16, 18 and 23) were taken 
in the SPSS. The Expected agreement percentage (PAE) was calculated for each variable:   
 
RQ16: 
Pe: (0.082)*2 + (0.071)*2 + (0.046)*2 + (0.80)*2= 0.006724+ 0.005041+ 0.002116 + 
0.64= 0.653881  
 
RQ18:  
Pe: (0.091)*2 + (0.12)*2 + (0.055)*2 + (0.73)*2= 0.008281 + 0.0144 + 0.003025 + 
0.5329= 0.5585  
 
RQ23:  
Pe: (0.036)*2 + (0.43)*2 + (0.34)*2 + (0.005)*2 + (0.17)*2 + (0.005)*2 = 0.001296 + 
0.1849 + 0.1156 + 0.000025 + 0.0289 + 0.000025= 0.330746  
 
Then the observer agreement percentage (PAO) was also calculated based on the 
number of agreements between the two coders:   
 
RQ16:  
315 AGREEMENTS 
PAO =315*100/320=0.98  
 
RQ18:  
313 AGREEMENTS 
PAO =313*100/320=0.97  
 
RQ23:  
306 AGREEMENTS 
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PAO =306*100/320=0.95  
 
The intercoder reliability test was conducted based on the Scott’s Pi formula:  
 
RQ16:  
Scott’s Pi: 0.98-0.65/1-0.65=0.94  
 
RQ18:  
Scott’s Pi: 0.97-0.55/1-0.55=0.93  
 
RQ23:  
Scott’s Pi: 0.95-0.33/1-0.33=0.92  
 
Results of the reliability test indicate a reliability coefficient of more than 75 per 
cent, which could be concluded as being highly reliable.  
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Chapter 5: Results and findings  
iii. Content analysis  
a. Main Research Questions tables   
iv. Critical discourse analysis  
a. Iran-US talks: Contextualisation   
1. Text 1: Iran-US relations ; Confrontation of negotiation 
2. Text 2: Iran-US relation 
3. Text 3: Clear and frank!  
4. Text 4: An introduction to dialogue among civilisations  
b. Iran’s nuclear issue: Contextualisation  
1. Text 5: Active diplomacy; the better option 
2.   Text 6: What is the end of Iran’s nuclear case?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195 
Chapter 5: Results and findings 
As explained in Chapter 4, three types of research questions were defined: 
Descriptive, analytical and main research questions. In this chapter, related SPSS tables, 
results and findings are presented based on the five main themes: “Iran nuclear case”, 
“terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and colonialism”1.  
 
Main Research Questions tables   
Main research questions include the investigation of the impact of political period 
on the representation of the West in Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
newspapers (in terms of difference). Related results are described in the form of statistical 
tables in the Main Research Questions (MRQ) sections2.  
 
Main question (Difference):  
Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation or framing 
of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Reformism and the 
representation of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during 
Conservatism? In other words, did media from two different political systems differ 
significantly in their coverage of issues related to the West? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 Questions asked for each theme include the following:  
- What is the position of the four newspapers regarding the Western confrontation with this theme? 
- Does this position differ in the two periods?  
- Does this position differ in newspapers with different affiliations?  
- What phrases/concepts are used to describe the Western confrontation with this theme?  
- What are the reasons behind such a representation? What factors are involved? What is the analysis? How 
does this theme affect the representation of the West?  
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Overall Result  
Representation of the West=In terms of story layout/story page/method of story produced/primary Western 
country involved/dominant political theme/dominant stereotype/story direction towards Western 
relations/image of the West  
 
Is there a significant statistical difference between the representation of the West in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism? 
 
 
significant statistical difference   
Representation 
Yes No  
 Name of newspaper*  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4  
1 story layout  √  √ √  √  
2 story page √ √  √   √  
3 method of story production √ √  √   √  
4 primary Western country involved √   √  √ √  
5 dominant political theme √ √  √   √  
6 dominant stereotype    √ √ √ √  
7 story direction towards Western relations  √ √  √   √ 
8 image of the West √ √ √ √     
 Total 5 6 2 7 3 2 6 1 
 
*Name of newspaper: 1= Ettelaat, 2=Iran, 3=Hamshahri, 4=Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
 
According to the above table, the representation of the West was significantly different during Reformism and 
Conservatism in Jomhouriy-e Eslami, Iran and Ettelaat. However the representation of the West did not have 
any statistically-significant difference during Reformism and Conservatism in Hamshahri.    
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i. Content Analysis  
 
a. Main research questions tables:  
 
MRQA1: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story layout in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami?  
 
RQ4 Story Layout * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 12 33 45 Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 10.7% 11.7% 11.4% 
Count 70 180 250 Top half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 62.5% 63.6% 63.3% 
Count 30 70 100 
RQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Bottom half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 26.8% 24.7% 25.3% 
Count 112 283 395 
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 27 37 64 Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 18.6% 11.5% 13.7% 
Count 93 197 290 Top half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 64.1% 61.4% 62.2% 
Count 25 87 112 
RQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Bottom half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 17.2% 27.1% 24.0% 
Count 145 321 466 
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 20 42 62 Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 15.9% 14.3% 14.8% 
Count 61 152 213 Top half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 48.4% 51.9% 50.8% 
Count 45 99 144 
RQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Bottom half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 35.7% 33.8% 34.4% 
Count 126 293 419 
Hamshahri 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 30 58 88 Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.1% 11.9% 10.3% 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami RQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Top half page Count 212 303 515 
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 57.3% 62.1% 60.0% 
Count 128 127 255 Bottom half page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 34.6% 26.0% 29.7% 
Count 370 488 858 Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .212(a) 2 .899 
Likelihood Ratio .211 2 .900 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.207 1 .649 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 7.824(b) 2 .020 
Likelihood Ratio 7.892 2 .019 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.806 1 .005 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
.444(c) 2 .801 
Likelihood Ratio .443 2 .801 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.003 1 .957 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 8.933(d) 2 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 
8.954 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
8.855 1 .003 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.76. 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.91. 
c  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.64. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.95. 
 
According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation 
of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story layout in Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
newspapers, there is no such a statistically-significant difference in Ettelaat and Hamshahri newspapers. In 
Iran newspaper, story layouts “main headline” and “top half page” have been used less in Conservatism rather 
than Reformism, while story layout “bottom half page” has been used more in Conservatism. This means that 
the West has been given less prominent coverage in Iran newspaper during Conservatism in comparison to 
Reformism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, the opposite prevails. News of the West has been given more prominence 
(as the main headline or the top half page story) during Conservatism in comparison to Reformism. Ettelaat 
and Hamshahri did not show any statistically-significant difference during the two political periods.      
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MRQA2: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ5 Story Page * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 27 52 79 Domestic news/politics 
page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 24.1% 18.4% 20.0% 
Count 55 179 234 Foreign 
news/diplomacy page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 49.1% 63.3% 59.2% 
Count 30 52 82 
RQ5 
Story 
Page 
Front page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 26.8% 18.4% 20.8% 
Count 112 283 395 
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 23 111 134 Domestic news/politics 
page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 15.9% 34.6% 28.8% 
Count 96 161 257 Foreign 
news/diplomacy page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 66.2% 50.2% 55.2% 
Count 26 49 75 
RQ5 
Story 
Page 
Front page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 17.9% 15.3% 16.1% 
Count 145 321 466 
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 27 75 102 Domestic news/politics 
page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 21.4% 25.6% 24.3% 
Count 77 187 264 Foreign 
news/diplomacy page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 61.1% 63.8% 63.0% 
Count 22 31 53 
RQ5 
Story 
Page 
Front page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 17.5% 10.6% 12.6% 
Count 126 293 419 
Hamshahri 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 102 106 208 Domestic news/politics 
page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 27.6% 21.7% 24.2% 
Count 185 231 416 Foreign 
news/diplomacy page % within RQ2 
Publication Period 50.0% 47.3% 48.5% 
Count 83 151 234 
RQ5 
Story 
Page 
Front page 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 22.4% 30.9% 27.3% 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
Total Count 370 488 858 
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.763(a) 2 .034 
Likelihood Ratio 6.685 2 .035 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.141 1 .707 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 17.276(b) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 18.529 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.538 1 .001 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
4.029(c) 2 .133 
Likelihood Ratio 3.857 2 .145 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.012 1 .083 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 8.863(d) 2 .012 
Likelihood Ratio 
8.943 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
8.425 1 .004 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.40. 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.34. 
c  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.94. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 89.70. 
 
According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. 
This is while no statistically-significant difference was found between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Hamshahri. This means that news of the West 
appeared less in the front page of Hamshahri in Conservatism when compared with Reformism. The same 
situation applies with regards to Ettelaat and Iran, while front page stories about the West increased in 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Conservatism. Regarding Iran, the news of the West appeared in the domestic 
page doubled in Conservatism compared to Reformism.   
 
MRQA3: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of method of story production in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ6 Story Production Method * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 3 2 5Pure Translation 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.7% .7% 1.3%
Count 54 107 161Transcreation (translation 
and creation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 48.2% 37.8% 40.8%
Ettelaat RQ6 Story 
Production 
Method 
Staff Writers Count 55 174 229
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 49.1% 61.5% 58.0%
Count 112 283 395Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 53 5 58Pure Translation 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 36.6% 1.6% 12.4%
Count 43 136 179Transcreation (translation 
and creation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 29.7% 42.4% 38.4%
Count 49 180 229
RQ6 Story 
Production 
Method 
Staff Writers 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 33.8% 56.1% 49.1%
Count 145 321 466
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 12 27 39Pure Translation 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.5% 9.2% 9.3%
Count 54 149 203Transcreation (translation 
and creation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 42.9% 50.9% 48.4%
Count 60 117 177
RQ6 Story 
Production 
Method 
Staff Writers 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 47.6% 39.9% 42.2%
Count 126 293 419
Hamshahri 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 24 13 37Pure Translation 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 2.7% 4.3%
Count 173 291 464Transcreation (translation 
and creation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 46.8% 59.6% 54.1%
Count 173 184 357
RQ6 Story 
Production 
Method 
Staff Writers 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 46.8% 37.7% 41.6%
Count 370 488 858
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.717(a) 2 .035 
Likelihood Ratio 6.420 2 .040 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.085 1 .014 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 112.566(b) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 108.636 2 .000 
Iran 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
67.943 1 .000 
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N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
2.404(c) 2 .301 
Likelihood Ratio 2.404 2 .301 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.176 1 .278 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 17.725(d) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
17.720 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.796 1 .180 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  1 cells (15.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.42. 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.05. 
c  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.73. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.96. 
 
According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation 
of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of method of story production in Ettelaat, Iran and 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami, there is no such difference in Hamshahri. This means transcreation has increased in 
Hamshahri during Conservatism while staff writing decreased in the same period. In Ettelaat and Iran, staff 
writing increased during Conservatism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, while staff writing decreased during 
Conservatism while transcreation increased in the same period. In Iran, pure translation has remarkably 
decreased from 36.6 per cent in Reformism to 1.6 percent during Conservatism.  
 
 
MRQA4: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of primary Western country/countries involved in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
  
RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper 
Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 80 182 262 US 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 71.4% 64.3% 66.3% 
Count 9 19 28 UK 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.0% 6.7% 7.1% 
Count 10 13 23 France 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.9% 4.6% 5.8% 
Count 4 13 17 Germany 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 4.6% 4.3% 
Count 5 28 33 Group 5+1 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.5% 9.9% 8.4% 
Count 4 28 32 
RQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Not mentioned 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 9.9% 8.1% 
Count 112 283 395 
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Count 72 216 288 US 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 49.7% 67.3% 61.8% 
Count 18 41 59 UK 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 12.4% 12.8% 12.7% 
Count 5 21 26 France 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.4% 6.5% 5.6% 
Count 5 8 13 Germany 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.4% 2.5% 2.8% 
Count 4 17 21 Group 5+1 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.8% 5.3% 4.5% 
Count 41 18 59 
RQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Not mentioned 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 28.3% 5.6% 12.7% 
Count 145 321 466 
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 99 199 298 US 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 78.6% 67.9% 71.1% 
Count 5 32 37 UK 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.0% 10.9% 8.8% 
Count 5 24 29 France 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.0% 8.2% 6.9% 
Count 4 13 17 Germany 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 4.4% 4.1% 
Count 4 11 15 Group 5+1 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 3.8% 3.6% 
Count 9 14 23 
RQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Not mentioned 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.1% 4.8% 5.5% 
Count 126 293 419 
Hamshahri 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 265 322 587 US 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 71.6% 66.0% 68.4% 
Count 24 51 75 UK 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 10.5% 8.7% 
Count 24 27 51 France 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 5.5% 5.9% 
Count 17 12 29 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami RQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Germany 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.6% 2.5% 3.4% 
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Count 5 18 23 Group 5+1 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.4% 3.7% 2.7% 
Count 35 58 93 Not mentioned 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.5% 11.9% 10.8% 
Count 370 488 858 Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.386(a) 5 .065 
Likelihood Ratio 11.231 5 .047 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.866 1 .015 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 49.042(b) 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 45.561 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
30.859 1 .000 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
9.826(c) 5 .080 
Likelihood Ratio 10.808 5 .055 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.394 1 .530 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 13.354(d) 5 .020 
Likelihood Ratio 
13.796 5 .017 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.162 1 .141 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.82. 
b  1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.05. 
c  1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.51. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.92. 
 
According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation 
of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of primary Western country/countries involved in 
Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami, there is not such a difference in Ettelaat and Hamshahri. This means in Ettelaat 
the news about the West almost doubled during Conservatism compared to Reformism. In Hamshahri, while 
the news about EU3 almost doubled in Conservatism, the news about the West (not mentioned) decreased by 
half during the same period. In Iran, the news about the US, increased by about 20 per cent during 
Conservatism while the news about the West (not mentioned) decreased dramatically from 28.3 per cent 
during Reformism to 5.6 per cent during Conservatism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, the news about the West (not 
mentioned) and the UK increased in Conservatism.  
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MRQA5: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant political theme of stories related to West in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper 
Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 11 41 52Cooperation with West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.8% 14.5% 13.2%
Count 7 20 27Opposition to West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.3% 7.1% 6.8%
Count 9 28 37Violation of law/rules and 
Western threats % within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.0% 9.9% 9.4%
Count 31 53 84Terrorism, war and 
violence % within RQ2 
Publication Period 27.7% 18.7% 21.3%
Count 4 8 12Interference of West in 
domestic affairs % within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 2.8% 3.0%
Count 11 5 16Western support for Israel 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.8% 1.8% 4.1%
Count 33 122 155Else (bilateral relations 
between West and non-
Iran) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 29.5% 43.1% 39.2%
Count 6 6 12
RQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.4% 2.1% 3.0%
Count 112 283 395
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 17 31 48Cooperation with West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 11.7% 9.7% 10.3%
Count 7 28 35Opposition to West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.8% 8.7% 7.5%
Count 3 54 57Violation of law/rules and 
Western threats % within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.1% 16.8% 12.2%
Count 23 55 78Terrorism, war and 
violence % within RQ2 
Publication Period 15.9% 17.1% 16.7%
Count 1 7 8Interference of West in 
domestic affairs % within RQ2 
Publication Period .7% 2.2% 1.7%
Count 7 5 12
Iran RQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Western support for Israel 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.8% 1.6% 2.6%
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Count 75 137 212Else (bilateral relations 
between West and mom-
Iran) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 51.7% 42.7% 45.5%
Count 12 4 16Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.3% 1.2% 3.4%
Count 145 321 466Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 4 13 17Cooperation with West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 4.4% 4.1%
Count 7 18 25Opposition to West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.6% 6.1% 6.0%
Count 9 35 44Violation of law/rules and 
Western threats % within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.1% 11.9% 10.5%
Count 36 76 112Terrorism, war and 
violence % within RQ2 
Publication Period 28.6% 25.9% 26.7%
Count 3 6 9Interference of West in 
domestic affairs % within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.4% 2.0% 2.1%
Count 8 16 24Western support for Israel 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.3% 5.5% 5.7%
Count 55 127 182Else (bilateral relations 
between West and mom-
Iran) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 43.7% 43.3% 43.4%
Count 4 2 6
RQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% .7% 1.4%
Count 126 293 419
Hamshahri 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 21 15 36Cooperation with West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.7% 3.1% 4.2%
Count 87 58 145Opposition to West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 23.5% 11.9% 16.9%
Count 24 57 81Violation of law/rules and 
Western threats % within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 11.7% 9.4%
Count 83 144 227Terrorism, war and 
violence % within RQ2 
Publication Period 22.4% 29.5% 26.5%
Count 25 16 41Interference of West in 
domestic affairs % within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.8% 3.3% 4.8%
Count 33 29 62
Jomhouriy-e Eslami RQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Western support for Israel 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.9% 5.9% 7.2%
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Count 38 96 134Else (bilateral relations 
between West and mom-
Iran) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 10.3% 19.7% 15.6%
Count 59 73 132Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 15.9% 15.0% 15.4%
Count 370 488 858Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
 
Chi-Square Tests1 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.298(a) 7 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 22.516 7 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.002 1 .966 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 41.915(b) 7 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 46.505 7 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.886 1 .002 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
6.551(c) 7 .477 
Likelihood Ratio 6.294 7 .506 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.000 1 .317 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 50.180(d) 7 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
50.694 7 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.159 1 .001 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.40. 
b  3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.49. 
c  3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.80. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.52. 
 
 
According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant political theme of stories related to West in 
Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. There is no such a difference in Hamshahri during Reformism and 
Conservatism. This means Western support for Israel was less used as the political theme of stories in 
Conservatism than Reformism. This is while the political theme “opposition to West” was used more during 
Conservatism than Reformism in all the newspapers except for Jomhouriy-e Eslami. So is the situation with 
the political theme “cooperation with the West”. In Ettelaat, the political theme of “terrorism, war and 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) regarding Ettelaat, 5 cells (27.8%) regarding Iran and 4 cells 
(22.2%) regarding Hamshahri had expected count less than 5, two categories of “Denial of the Western 
pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025)” and 
“Opposition to West” as well as “Violation of law/rules” and “Western threats” were respectively merged into 
two categories of “Opposition to West” and “Violation of law/rules and Western threats” to avoid this 
statistical problem.   
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violence” was used less during Conservatism. In Iran, the political theme “Violation of law/rules and Western 
threats” was eight times more in Conservatism than Reformism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, all political themes 
were used less in Conservatism except for the political theme of “terrorism, war and violence” which was 
used more in Conservatism than Reformism.  
 
 
MRQA6: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant stereotypes of the West in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper 
Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 10 15 25Arrogance and 
colonialism % within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.9% 5.3% 6.3%
Count 3 5 Interventionism 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.7% 1.8% 2.0%
Count 2 10 12Suspicion toward West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.8% 3.5%      3.0%
Count 97 253 350
RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 86.6% 89.4% 88.6%
Count 112 283 395
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 4 6 10Arrogance and 
colonialism % within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.8% 1.9% 2.1%
Count 6 16 22Interventionism 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.1% 5.0%   4.7%
Count 6 9 15Suspicion toward West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.1% 2.8% 3.2%
Count 129 290 419
RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 89.0% 90.3% 89.9%
Count 145 321 466
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 9 13 22Arrogance and 
colonialism % within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.1% 4.4% 5.3%
Count 7 10 17Interventionism 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.6% 3.4% 4.1%
Count 7 7 14Suspicion toward West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.6% 2.4% 3.3%
Hamshahri RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype Count 103 263 366
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 81.7% 89.8% 87.4%
Count 126 293 419Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 67 51 118Arrogance and 
colonialism % within RQ2 
Publication Period 18.1% 10.5% 13.8%
Count 41 64 105Interventionism 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 11.1% 13.1% 12.2%
Count 34 23 57Suspicion toward West 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.2% 4.7% 6.6%
Count 228 350 578
RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 61.6% 71.7% 67.4%
Count 370 488 858
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.876(a) 3 .411 
Likelihood Ratio 2.840 3 .417 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.913 1 .339 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 1.093(b) 3 .779 
Likelihood Ratio 1.057 3 .787 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.193 1 .660 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
5.518(c) 3 .138 
Likelihood Ratio 5.181 3 .159 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.747 1 .029 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 19.216(d) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
19.057 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.855 1 .002 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.27. 
b  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.11. 
c  1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.21. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.58. 
According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant stereotypes of the West in Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami. There is no such a difference in Ettelaat, Iran and Hamshahri. This means in Ettelaat, while 
stereotypes “Arrogance and colonialism” and “Interventionism” were used less in Conservatism, stereotype 
“Suspicion toward West” was used more in Conservatism than Reformism. In Iran, while stereotypes 
“Arrogance and colonialism” and “Suspicion toward West” were used less in Conservatism, stereotype 
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“Interventionism” was used more in Conservatism than Reformism. The same situation applies with regards 
to Jomhouriy-e Eslami. In Hamshahri, all the stereotypes were used less in Conservatism than Reformism.  
 
MRQA7: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story direction towards Iran-West relations in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper 
Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 17 42 In favour of (détente-
cooperation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 15.2% 14.8% 14.9%
Count 13 32 Against (tension-conflict) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 11.6% 11.3% 11.4%
Count 7 22 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.3% 7.8% 7.3%
Count 75 187 262
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 67.0% 66.1% 66.3%
Count 112 283 395
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 19 30 In favour of (détente-
cooperation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 13.1% 9.3% 10.5%
Count 8 55 Against (tension-conflict) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.5% 17.1% 13.5%
Count 8 23 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.5% 7.2% 6.7%
Count 110 213 323
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 75.9% 66.4% 69.3%
Count 145 321 466
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 11 13 In favour of (détente-
cooperation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 8.7% 4.4% 5.7%
Count 9 38 Against (tension-conflict) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.1% 13.0% 11.2%
Count 4 27 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 9.2% 7.4%
Count 102 215 317
Hamshahri RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 81.0% 73.4% 75.7%
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Count 126 293 419Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 24 39 In favour of (détente-
cooperation) % within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 8.0% 7.3%
Count 52 53 105Against (tension-conflict) 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 14.1% 10.9% 12.2%
Count 8 18 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.2% 3.7% 3.0%
Count 286 378 664
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 77.3% 77.5% 77.4%
Count 370 488 858
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .276(a) 3 .965 
Likelihood Ratio .284 3 .963 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.000 1 .994 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Pearson Chi-Square 13.021(b) 3 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 14.717 3 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.636 1 .201 
Iran 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
10.515(c) 3 .015 
Likelihood Ratio 11.284 3 .010 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.249 1 .618 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 4.022(d) 3 .259 
Likelihood Ratio 
4.071 3 .254 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.003 1 .959 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.22. 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.65. 
c  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.22. 
d  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.21. 
According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation 
of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story direction towards Iran-West relations in 
Iran and Hamshahri, there is no such a difference in Ettelaat and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. This means that while 
the majority of the news published in Iran during Reformism and Conservatism were not about Iran-West 
relations, Iran tended to highlight tension between Iran and the West during Conservatism almost three times 
more than Reformism. The same situation applies with regards to Hamshahri.  
 
 
 212 
MRQA8: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism in terms of image portrayal of the West in 
Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?  
 
RQ23 Image of the West in the story * RQ2 Publication Period * RQ1 Name of Newspaper 
Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper     
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 12 8 20 Positive 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 10.7% 2.8% 5.1% 
Count 45 126 171 Negative 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 40.2% 44.5% 43.3% 
Count 39 118 157 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 34.8% 41.7% 39.7% 
Count 15 30 45 Negative stereotypical 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 
13.4% 10.6% 11.4% 
Count 1 1 2 
RQ23 Image 
of the West 
in the story 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .9% .4% .5% 
Count 112 283 395 
Ettelaat 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 8 5 13 Positive 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.5% 1.6% 2.8% 
Count 53 185 238 Negative 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 36.6% 57.6% 51.1% 
Count 72 102 174 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 49.7% 31.8% 37.3% 
Count 4 29 33 Negative stereotypical 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.8% 9.0% 7.1% 
Count 8 0 8 
RQ23 Image 
of the West 
in the story 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 
5.5% .0% 1.7% 
Count 145 321 466 
Iran 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 13 6 19 Positive 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 10.3% 2.0% 4.5% 
Count 27 152 179 Negative 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 21.4% 51.9% 42.7% 
Count 69 107 176 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 54.8% 36.5% 42.0% 
Hamshahri RQ23 Image 
of the West 
in the story 
Negative stereotypical Count 16 28 44 
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 12.7% 9.6% 10.5% 
Count 1 0 1 Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .8% .0% .2% 
Count 126 293 419 Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 12 13 25 Positive 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 2.7% 2.9% 
Count 123 228 351 Negative 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 33.2% 46.7% 40.9% 
Count 104 121 225 Neutral 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 28.1% 24.8% 26.2% 
Count 1 9 10 Stereotypical 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .3% 1.8% 1.2% 
Count 130 117 247 
RQ23 Image 
of the West 
in the story 
Negative stereotypical 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 35.1% 24.0% 28.8% 
Count 370 488 858 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
RQ1 Name of Newspaper  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.174(a) 4 .016 
Likelihood Ratio 10.946 4 .027 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.004 1 .951 
Ettelaat 
N of Valid Cases 
395   
Iran Pearson Chi-Square 46.121(b) 4 .000 
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Likelihood Ratio 47.729 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.846 1 .174 
N of Valid Cases 466   
Pearson Chi-Square 
42.544(c) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 43.463 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.974 1 .046 
Hamshahri 
N of Valid Cases 419   
Pearson Chi-Square 24.045(d) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
24.988 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
13.880 1 .000 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
N of Valid Cases 858   
a  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .57. 
b  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.49. 
c  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30. 
d  1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.31. 
 
According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of image portrayal of the West in all the four mainstream 
Iranian newspapers. This means mainstream Iranian newspapers portrayed a less positive image of the West 
during Conservatism than Reformism, while the negative image of the West exacerbated during 
Conservatism.     
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ii.    Critical discourse analysis  
Critical discourse analysis is usually used as a research method to study hidden 
aspects of the text. It is a methodology for examining texts and the communicative process 
that gives rise to them. Its primary purpose is to enable researchers to ‘gain a deeper 
understanding and appreciation of texts’ (Chimombo and Roseberry, 1998:9-10).  
Due to the shortfalls of the content analysis as a qualitative method of analysing 
media texts, and in order to enable the researcher to investigate how ideological differences 
between mainstream Iranian newspapers from different political camps (pro-Reform and 
pro-Conservative) manifest themselves in the discourse of a journalistic text, six editorials 
were selected from six newspapers with opposite political affiliations. The editorials are 
about different aspects of relations between Iran and the West.  
The discourse analysis of the six newspaper editorials suggests that they define the 
West in terms of Occidental themes such as “arrogant” and “colonial” more than non-
Occidental themes such as “plunderer”, “murderer” or “heinous”. In fact, the Occidental 
nature of the West is described through such phrases. This portrayal of the West is most 
offered in pro-Conservative newspapers such as Kayhan which describes the West as 
“imperialist”. Kayhan uses Van Dijk’s concept of ideological square to define the 
relationship between Iran and the West as two opposite poles. Kayhan writes in an editorial 
(12 April 2009):  
Our confrontation with the US is the conflict between two opposite 
identities. Until the US views the Islamic Republic of Iran with a 
superior, one-sided and unilateral eye, and does not abandon its 
imperialist nature and does not change its policy and attitudes 
regarding Iran in action, this gap will not be filled.     
Unlike pro-Conservative newspapers, pro-Reform press tend to represent the West 
more leniently with a softer tone. Mardomsalari, for example, uses phrases such as “the 
White House”, “the superpower US” and “system of the US” (instead of the “regime of the 
US” to describe the US. In an editorial, Mardomsalari encourages Iran and the US to 
reconcile (07 April 2009):  
The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] 
and alternative to one another. However, the two governments are 
aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do 
not help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting 
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differences, steps can be taken in line with mutual understanding and 
creating security and … in order to stabilise the situation and reduce 
costs. 
In general, the West as “global arrogant” was the most repeated theme in pro-
Conservative press while their pro-Reform counterparts refused to portray the West 
stereotypically or even negatively.   
The discourse analysis also suggests that the Iranian press, from both political 
camps, are not oblivious to the pains inflicted by the West (US) on them. Grievances such 
as the “Saddam-imposed war, economic sanctions, soft war, cultural assault, espionage and 
overthrow efforts” are described as “hostile” by the Iranian press. The only difference is 
that pro-Reform press refer to such grievances indirectly. In an editorial, the Kayhan 
newspaper wrote (12 April 2009):  
US antagonistic policies in previous administrations in that 
country—particularly during the Bushs—? colonising?  global 
security has imposed huge costs on the international community and 
the America itself. 
In its editorial on Khatami’s historical interview with the CNN, the pro-
Conservative Resalat newspaper wrote (08 January 1998):  
Our president used a rare opportunity for talks with the people of 
America and exposed the crimes and murders of American statesmen 
in the past 50 years. 
 The pro-Reform Mardomsalari, however, tends not to highlight Iran’s grievances 
with the West in this piece (07 April 2009):  
The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] 
and alternative to one another. However, the two governments are 
aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do 
not help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting 
differences, steps can be taken in line with mutual understanding and 
creating security and … in order to stabilise the situation and reduce 
costs.   
In the discourse of the newspaper editorials, the concept of “cooperation” or 
“confrontation” is strongly under the influence of the policies of the respective 
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governments (as hypothesised in this research)1. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, 
reflects the détente policy of the pro-Reform government (07 April 2009):  
The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the 
peaceful co-existence of two different systems is the less costly, more 
efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security 
and economic crises. We should wait with patience and effort and 
work for more vigilance in the White House regarding the necessity 
of understanding the central role of Iran…The Iranian society is 
seeking in its various rhetoric to reject arrogance [domination] and 
by averting sensational moves, and by turning mottos to reason and 
ideology to idea and thought and culture, to negotiate within the 
framework of its national interest and thousands-years civil 
traditions, with an America which has been liberalised from the 
ambitions of its neo-conservative faction but is pursuing its national 
interest. 
Like the pro-Reform press, pro-Conservative newspapers also tend to reflect the 
policies of Conservatives when it comes to foreign relations. Kayhan writes (12 April 
2009):  
…it should not be supposed that these days when Americans have 
extended their hand to Iran, it means they regret their previous 
doings and have changed their policy and attitude towards Iran. 
Given the oppression imposed on our nation for several decades by 
America, the new Obama administration has adopted a policy to 
come close to Iran while continuing past US expansionist policies, 
unilateralism and colonial interests.    
In connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and the 
US, the pro-Reform newspaper’s editorials highly welcomed Obama’s Norouz message 
with optimism although they heeded differences between the two. Mardomsalari 
highlighted that a “new language, respect and will” has arisen from the US side which 
should result in “mutual understanding”. It also stressed the “necessity of [creating] change 
and adaptation with new global and national conditions” for Iran, and the “necessity of 
understanding the central role of Iran” for the White House.   
                                                           
1 That “presupposition” is the most frequently used technique to describe the West is another proof that the 
Iranian press are influenced by their ideology.  
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The use of the terms and phrases such as “the two sides as global and regional 
superpowers”, “peaceful coexistence”, “vigilance” and “rational” as well as the call of the 
editorial to “replace confrontation with negotiation” is suggestive of the détente nature of 
the policies supported by pro-Reformists in Iran in confrontation with the West. In fact, 
pro-Reform newspapers use the power of Iran as a positive tool to call for reconciliation 
with the US. Mardomsalari writes:  
The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the 
peaceful co-existence of two different systems is the less costly, more 
efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security 
and economic crises.  
Similarly, the pro-Reform Salam newspaper, writes in an editorial titled “An 
introduction of dialogue among civilisations” (11 January 1998):  
Dialogue among civilisations is a strategy with win for all. We have 
proposed to replace “clash” with “dialogue”. In fact we have 
challenged the Western world in terms of negotiations with America 
(although rumors about establishing relations with the US are now 
being exploited by some to castigate senior officials of the country)… 
Talks with the West on behalf of the powerful owner of Islamic 
values will create no concern for us.    
Conversely, the discourse prevalent in pro-Conservative press indicates that even 
though they highlight the role of Iran as a “great regional power” or even “superpower”, 
they use this analogy as a lever of power to confront the West. Kayhan, a pro-Conservative 
newspaper, writes in its editorial (12 April 2009):  
The US, while admitting this reality that today’s Iran is a great 
regional power and plays a determining role in Middle East 
developments and in the international arena, and while admitting the 
failure of Iran isolation policy, is seeking to change its language –
and not behaviour— regarding the Islamic Republic…The noticeable 
point is that we do not need to establish ties with the US but it is 
America which needs to establish relations with us in order to 
prevent Iran’s enmity with that country and its weakening in the 
Middle East, as well as saving it from the self-made quagmire in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  
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A similar approach was followed by Resalat, another pro-Conservative press. It 
wrote in an editorial about relations between Iran and the US (08 January 1998):  
Mr. Khatami, in response to the gullible view that “establishing 
relations with the US will resolve our problems”, and also in 
response to greedy American statesmen said: Now, we do not have 
any feeling of need to establish relations with America… “In Iran, 
there is no interest in the West and especially communication and 
negotiation with the US”.  
The newspaper editorials analysed here define Iran’s nuclear issue in terms of 
cooperation with the West. In fact, newspapers from both political wings argue that Iran 
should continue cooperation and negotiations, out of the fear of being referred to the 
Security Council or attacked by the US or Israel, with the West, although Qods, a pro-
Conservative newspaper, believes talks should be without pre-conditions. In an editorial, 
the pro-Reform Hambastegi newspaper writes (28 August 2006):  
On the other hand, choosing a diplomatic solution for resolving 
Iran’s nuclear crisis and the start of a new round of negotiations is a 
less costly option for both parties.   
Newspapers from both parties try to highlight the achievements of Iran in the 
nuclear area. Qods writes in an editorial (14 September 2006):  
Iran’s access to the heavy water project in Arak is another example 
of the success of our scientists who are struggling to bring dignity 
and progress for the Islamic Republic. 
Apart from highlighting Iranian nuclear achievements, newspapers also spotlight the 
“inalienable right” of the Iranian nation to have access to the nuclear technology:  
Attaining this important success indicates the true will of the Islamic 
system to guarantee the inalienable and national rights of the 
citizens of the Islamic Iran, which heralds independence and will 
introduce the independent and strong Iran in different sectors on a 
par with other regional and international players to the global 
public opinion (Qods newspaper, 14 September 2006). 
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a. Text 1: Iran-US relations: Contextualisation  
 Iran has been always in the spotlight of the international relations in the Middle 
East. So has been the United States. Therefore, there should be common interests for the 
two countries in the region. Relations between Iran and America date back to the late 1800s 
when Nasseroddin Shah Qajar, ruler of the Persian Empire, appointed the first ambassador 
to the US in 1856 on the advice of his wise minister Amir Kabir (Lesch, 2003). In 1911, the 
new constitutional government of Iran invited American merchant Morgan Shuster to lead a 
team of economists and financial experts to revise the country’s ailing financial system but 
he was forced to resign under the pressure of Britain and Russia (Ansari, 2006).  The two 
countries shared common views in many sectors until the post-World War II era in 1953 
when the democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was 
toppled in a coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency which brought 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into power to establish the Pahlavi Dynasty. “Operation Ajax” 
was the beginning of the US intervention in the Iranian affairs--a move the impacts of 
which are continuing to be felt in relations between the two countries to the present time. 
Having been brought to the throne by Americans, Mohammad Reza Shah and his 
successors toed the line of the US to the level that Iran was turned into the strongest ally of 
the US and Israel in the Middle East, particularly in energy and military sectors.     
 However, the cordial relations between Iran and the US turned sour after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution when US President Jimmy Carter unilaterally ceased all diplomatic 
relations with Iran on 7 April 1980--six months after students occupied the American 
Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 (Dey, 2006). Carter also ordered 12 billion dollars 
worth of Iranian assets frozen. Since then, relations between Iran and America were 
coordinated by a third party, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran and Pakistan Embassy in 
Washington. Later in compliance with the “Algiers Declaration” of 20 January 1981, 
brokered by the Algerian government between Iran and the US to resolve the hostage crisis, 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was set up to deal with claims of American nationals against 
Iran and Iranian nationals against America.  
 Many other developments happened between the two countries. However, the 
overview of Iran-US relations since the post-revolution period (1979) does indicate that 
Iran’s revolutionary ideology and its resistance against pressures and sanctions have moved 
the country towards a major confrontation with America.  
 The United States imposed its first sanctions against Islamic Iran in 1979 by 
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freezing the assets of Iran including bank deposits, gold and other properties. In 1984, when 
Iran was in the middle of a bloody war with Iraq, the American government approved 
another set of sanctions. In 1995, President Bill Clinton prohibited all commercial and 
financial dealings with Iran. Clinton’s anti-Iran sanctions have been continuously extended 
by his successors, including George Bush and Barack Obama1. 
 In spite of such sanctions, President Khatami decided to engage with the US. On 
several occasions including his historic interview with the CNN, Khatami said Iran was 
ready for a new beginning with the US2. He talked about breaking the “wall of mistrust” 
between the two nations. In response to Khatami’s “olive branch”, the US State Department 
welcomed the call for “direct” and “official” talks with Iran. However, while it said it 
expected Iran to “raise issues of concern to it”, the US State Department accused Iran of 
supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and favouring violent 
opposition to the Middle East peace process.  
 Views of the both sides were welcomed in general; however, obstacles remained on 
the way of improving relations. The American president was a captive of the US Congress 
which had already instructed him to adopt a tougher stance against Iran; And the Iranian 
president was hostage to the Conservative Iranian leader who had the final say on such 
sensitive issues. Westerners knew that Khatami was not speaking with full authority on 
behalf of Ayatollah Khamenei. And Khatami was too optimistic of the American will for 
engagement.  
Khatami even offered a “grand bargain” to help the US in the war against terrorism 
and cooperate in the nuclear issue. However, his proposals of cooperation were rejected by 
the Bush administration only to face the harliner President Ahmadinejad.  
 Several months after the beginning of his presidency, Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to 
President Bush inviting him to monotheism, justice, reconciliation and respect. He wrote 
similar letters to other Western leaders such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
However, he was ignored by them. In November 2006, Ahmadinejad wrote an open letter 
to the American people, calling for dialogue.  
 Hopes for ameliorating relations with the US boosted when Iran and the US agreed 
                                                           
1 In a move described by political analysts as “unanticipated”, Obama extended sanctions against Iran on 13 
March 2009. 
2 Due to the significance of Khatami’s interview, the researcher decided to select this occasion for discourse 
analysis. Therefore, two editorials were selected from two newspapers with different political affiliation. The 
editorials were published immediately after Khatami’s interview. The Resalat newspaper is believed to be 
representing the stances of Conservatism. The Salam newspaper was a real representative of Reformism. It 
published for a short period and was forced to shut down by pro-Conservative Judiciary.   
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to hold formal talks on Iraq. These talks which were held in Baghdad were the first official 
direct bilateral negotiations (with the presence of Iraqi representatives) after the 1979 
revolution. However, these talks were halted and hopes were dashed again until the victory 
of Barack Obama in 2009 US presidential elections.  
 Two days after Obama’s election, President Ahmadinejad congratulated him and 
welcomed any “basic and fair change” in the US foreign policy.  
On 20 March 2009, the US president for the first time in history sent a televised 
happy-new-year (Norouz) message to Iran1. In it, Obama clearly called for a new chapter in 
Iran-US relations. He highlighted “a moment of renewal”, “promise of a new day”, “season 
of new beginnings”, “renewed exchanges”, “new season” and “new beginning”.   
For the first time, a US president referred to Iran as “the Islamic Republic of Iran”. 
He also emphasised the “great and celebrated culture”, “contributions of Iranian 
Americans”, “great civilization”, “common humanity” and “greatness of the Iranian people 
and civilization”. But he also urged against “threats” and the use of “terror or arms” while 
also referring to “strained” relations between Iran and the US as well as “serious 
differences that have grown over time”.  
President Obama called for “greater security and greater peace” and promised that 
he seeks “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect”—a demand requested 
by President Ahmadinejad. 
Obama’s Norouz message was viewed both in Iran and the US as a goodwill 
gesture. It was described as an “olive branch” offered by the US to Iran. People from both 
sides were delighted and hoped ties would be resumed. All awaited Iran’s response.    
One day after Obama’s message, leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei responded 
during a public address on the occasion of the new Iranian year. He welcomed the message 
but outlined the list of Iranian grievances from the US.  
Ayatollah Khamenei called for a “real change” in “hostile” US policies. He urged 
against the use of “the language of threat and intimidation” as well as “pressure”. He also 
referred to the extended hand of Obama to Iran and said: “If the hand that has been 
extended to us is iron hands covered with a velvet glove, it does not have any positive 
meaning. They congratulated the Iranian nation on Norouz, but in the same message they 
accused the Iranian nation of supporting terrorism, seeking nuclear weapons, and things 
like that.”  
In the end, Ayatollah Khamenei said he will “observe and then judge” the new US 
                                                           
1 Full text of Obama’s message can be found in the appendix section.   
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president: “If you change, our behavior will change too. If you do not change, our nation 
will not change”.  
Many Iranian newspapers published editorials about Obama’s message and the 
leader’s response. Kayhan and Mardomsalari newspapers were selected as the real 
representative of the Conservative and Reformist wings, respectively1.  
 
1. Text 1: Iran-US; Confrontation of negotiation 
TEXT 1 
Iran-US; Confrontation of negotiation2 
By: Amir Madani 
Mardomsalari newspaper, 07 April 2009 
The “unprecedented” Norouz message by the US president, which had been prepared in view of the 
encouragement by peace lovers of the human society, was conveyed to the “people and leaders” of Iran as 
the “first step” amid opposition from the extremists and some Arab governments. This message, although 
repeats some allegations, is based on a new language, respect and will.  
Mardomsalari is a pro-Reform newspaper. The title of this editorial suggests that Iran and the US are in fact 
negotiating, but in opposite directions. In other words the author presupposes that negotiation is already 
underway between the two sides (presupposition). In the above paragraph, the author tries to highlight 
some points (hyperbole). Using parentheses, the author underlines that it is the first time that a US 
president is sending a message of congratulation to Iran. The author seems to have a positive view towards 
Obama’s initiative as he uses phrases as “encouragement”, “peace lovers” and “first step” which all 
connote optimism. Such positivity is stressed in the last sentence which implies new US policy through 
concepts as “new language”. It is also implied from the above paragraph that the author, while mentioning 
the opposition from extremists and Arab states, has welcomed and appreciated Obama’s initiative as the 
first step of ameliorating Iran-US relations. Furthermore, the author implies that even though allegations 
are repeated against Iran, the opportunity should be used to start a new era with the West as Obama is 
determined and shows respect and uses a different good language as opposed to that of the Bush 
(presupposition). The use of “extremists” here connotes Conservatives who have traditionally been 
opposing US ties.  
The detailed response by senior officials of the system to the brief message by the US president, indicates 
that despite the probable existence of the will to normalise relations and create a change in the 30-year 
situation based on mistrust, often interests and attitudes remain different and sometimes in contradiction. If 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, policies of the two countries are close with different targets, stances are in 
contradiction in the atomic issue and terrorism.  
Referring to Ayatollah Khamenei as a “senior official” (referencing), the author suggests his opposition to 
the hostile attitude of Conservatives towards establishing ties with the US. It is one of the rare cases in 
which Ayatollah Khamenei, leader of the Islamic revolution, is referred to as a “senior official”. He is 
always described as “the supreme leader” in newspaper texts. In the second paragraph, the author again 
brings into limelight his optimism regarding the establishment of relations with America. He again reminds 
the reader of the will of both sides to resume ties. The use of opposite phrases as “brief” and “detailed” 
denotes the significance of the Obama’s initiative as it has entailed a long response by Iran.  It also suggests 
that it is important for Iran to enter into a dialogue with the United States. The author also refers to the 
atmosphere of mistrust governing Iran-US relations which has created differences of opinion between the 
two. He lists the main points of contention but also presupposes that the two countries can reach agreement 
over Iraq and Afghanistan as they are pursuing close policies (presupposition).  
The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] and alternative to one another. 
However, the two governments are aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do not 
help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting differences, steps can be taken in line with 
mutual understanding and creating security and … in order to stabilise the situation and reduce costs.   
                                                           
1 Kayhan is known as the mouthpiece of Conservatives and Mardomsalari is regarded as a genuine pro-
Reform newspaper.  
2 In translation of the texts from Persian to English, it has been tried to render the “exact” translation of the 
Persian words and phrases so that analysis would be more precise. Wherever needed, additional words are 
described in brackets.   
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The author in this paragraph underlines impediments which he believes have created a deadlock in the 
resumption of relations. On the American side, the author refers to allegations (developing nuclear weapons 
and exporting terrorism), while in the Iranian side, he blames the language Iranian officials use against the 
US. The author also presupposes that “differences” (and not animosity) exist between Iran and the US 
(presupposition). The use of the word “difference” instead of animosity indicates that the author believes 
contention between the two countries can be easily removed.  
The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the peaceful co-existence of two different 
systems is the less costly, more efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security and 
economic crises. We should wait with patience and effort and work for more vigilance in the White House 
regarding the necessity of understanding the central role of Iran.   
The author presupposes that the US does not understand the central role of Iran in regional and global 
affairs (presupposition). He also blames the US president (referencing) for the lack of vigilance which has 
resulted in the status quo in bilateral relations (presupposition). Furthermore, the author envisages a 
security crisis for Iran and an economic crisis for the US.     
In this connection, in the governmental society of Iran, activities are being formed that are suggestive of 
understanding the necessity of [creating] change and adaptation with new global and national 
conditions—a change for which layers of Iran’s civil society and “structural reformists” have been seeking 
since many years speedily through seeking rights and demanding normalisation of relations with all.  
In this paragraph, the author suggests that the Iranian system of governance is based on decrees issued by 
the top leader. The author also portrays the Reformists’ manifesto of establishing relations will all and 
demanding more freedom. This paragraph also implies, by Referring to Reformists as “structural” and not 
“revolutionary”, that Reformists are still seeking to change the system of governance in Iran (referencing).  
Some believe that the announcement by the supreme leader about having one vote, and his overt referring 
to not favouring a special candidate in the [upcoming] presidential elections, mean that a different 
approach could be taken out of the ballot box, and it should be respected. Giving the more powerful 
majority to the moderate and pragmatist head (who has belief in negotiation) of the Assembly of Experts by 
its members who are the most considerate section of the state is a clear indication of understanding the 
new global situation and determines a new [policy] line. Correctional efforts of conservatives who support 
(nominating only one candidate and that candidate is the) incumbent president and correctional efforts of 
conservatives who do not support the incumbent president (and support nominating several candidates) are 
steps taken in this regard. 
The author here refers to the presidential elections in Iran and implies that the leader will not support 
Ahmadinejad in the elections (presupposition). The author in fact presupposes that Ahmadinejad’s main 
rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi (a Reformist), could be elected president (modality) as the leader will not 
favour Ahmadinejad. The reason for such optimism by the author is the response by Ayatollah Khamenei to 
Obama and the election of Ayatollah Rafsanjani as the head of the Assembly of Experts—a body which 
selects and supervises the leader. The other reason is the author presupposes that Rafsanjani is in favour of 
negotiating with the US as a pragmatist (referencing). In general, the whole idea the author is trying to 
imply in this paragraph is that the leadership and the Conservatives are willing to establish relations with 
the US.    
The refusal of the former president and founder of reforms from candidature with a view towards more 
reforms in the future, which should be institutionalised at the senior levels (under the directorship and 
support of the head of the Assembly of Experts) to lead the [Iranian] traditional society to a modern law-
giving society, is another indication of a change which was potential and now is being operationalised. The 
insistence of the former Reformist speaker of the parliament in defending the rights of the victims, and 
making efforts to agree on nominating a one candidate should be assessed in this line. 
Such optimism is being reiterated in this paragraph which also outlines the aspirations of the Reformists. 
The author also suggests Reformists’ principles should prevail at the senior levels through Ayatollah 
Rafsanjani (modality). 
This more rational-making puzzle, which is eyeing [to attract] 20 million undecided voters (almost half of 
Iranian voters) and trying to replace confrontation with negotiation, is being solved with the entry of the 
last Iranian prime minister to the presidential contest.  
The author in this paragraph presumes that the current policy of “not establishing relations with the US” is 
not rational (presupposition). He also indicates his optimism that a pro-Reform candidate (referencing) 
will be elected president and that he would favour negotiation with the US with reliance on the vote of 20 
million people.   
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In the belief of analysts, the last prime minister [of Iran who is] close to Reformists [and] who is supported 
by defense and ideological circles will enter the stage as a civil and non-military candidate of some parts 
of the system and Reformists, with the vote of the voters and in a national move following a power 
engineering in the horizontal domain. He is entering the stage so that to manage the heavy economic crisis, 
overcome inabilities and fight against poverty and corruption and develop stability at the summit of power 
to create social security and détente in foreign relations and negotiate with the world and America in a 
stabilised atmosphere.  
The author presumes that this pro-Reform candidate is being supported by the influential defence and 
ideological circles (presupposition) and if elected, he would revive the détente policy of Reformists in 
international relations. The author again expresses his optimism that relations would be set up with the US.  
The Iranian society is seeking in its various rhetoric to reject arrogance [domination] and by averting 
sensational moves, and by turning mottos to reason and ideology to idea and thought and culture, to 
negotiate within the framework of its national interest and thousands-years civil traditions, with an 
America which has been liberalised from the ambitions of its neo-conservative faction but is pursuing its 
national interest.  
In the last paragraph, the author indicates his optimism about establishing relations with the US. He 
recounts that the US is not being ruled by the neo-Cons who were against relations with Iran. Furthermore, 
the author suggests that Iran should abandon its “anti-Western” ideology while maintaining its fight against 
arrogance.   
 
Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the 
thesis:  
RH2. Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH4. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during 
Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during 
the same period. 
 
2. Text 2: Iran-US relation 
TEXT 2 
Iran-US relation1 
By Hamid Omidi 
Kayhan newspaper, 12 April 2009 
The US president’s Norouz congratulation, the decisive, careful and powerful response by the revolution 
leader to Obama, and Iran’s participation in the Afghanistan Conference, which all happened at the 
beginning of the new [Iranian] year, are events which have once again brought the issue of “US-Iran 
relation” to the limelight.  
Kayhan is purepy pro-Conservative. The author here relates the issue of Iran-US relations to Obama’s 
message and the Afghan war. Using transitivity, the author states that Iran has given a decisive response to 
Obama, confirming the Conservative approach towards Iran-US relations.     
These days—8 April—coincide with the anniversary of the severance of relation between the US and Iran. 
Close to thirty years ago, following the seizure of the US espionage den in Tehran and the hostage taking 
event, that country cut unilaterally its political relations with Iran and the late Imam [Khomeini] (PBUH) 
said in a message to the Iranian nation after the news of the severance of US ties: “Relation between a 
nation, who has awakened to be free from the claw of international plunderers, with a world plunderer is 
always to the disadvantage of the oppressed nation and to the benefit of the plunderer. We welcome this 
severance of relations because it is a reason that America has lost hope in Iran…I have reiterated 
                                                           
1 In translation of the texts from Persian to English, it has been tried to render the “exact” 
translation of the Persian words and phrases so that analysis would be more precise. 
Wherever needed, additional words are described in brackets.   
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repeatedly that our relation with countries like America, is a relation between the oppressed nation and 
world plunderers.”    
The author’s reference to the former US embassy in Iran as the “espionage den” signifies the 
presupposition that Americans are spies. The US is depicted negatively in this paragraph as a “plunderer” 
(naming), using a quote from the founder of Islamic Iran.   
At a time when political groupings of great powers had divided countries to two parts namely the Eastern 
block led by the former Soviet and the Western block under the leadership of the US, and political systems 
had to accept the domination of one of these blocks for survival, the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
changed the power calculations and the passage of the years after the revolution, a third block emerged in 
global political relations as the block of Muslim countries in the Middle East centered in the Islamic Iran. 
This paragraph tries to depict Iran as a power and emerging superpower capable of disrupting international 
equations (presupposition).  
It did not take a long time that Imam Khomeini’s prediction about the collapse of communism and the 
former USSR materialised and the Eastern block broke. The US which regarded itself as the master in the 
unipolar world, did not tolerate the block of Muslim states with Islamic Iran as its centre. The US did 
whatever it could to overthrow the Islamic governance and the Islamic Republic regime. The imposed war, 
encouraging opposition, supporting separatist and terrorist movements, economic sanctions and blocking 
billions of dollars of the Iranian nation assets, cultural assault, soft war and … all are hostile measures 
taken by the US to bring Islamic Iran to its knees but finally failed.  
This paragraph again stresses the increasing power of Iran, blaming the US for regime change attempts 
after the 1979 (presupposition). The author also recounts historical Iranian grievances towards the US and 
accuses it of trying to overthrow the Islamic regime.    
US antagonistic policies in previous administrations in that country—particularly during the Bushs—
? colonising?  global security has imposed huge costs on the international community and the America 
itself. In addition to the Islamic countries block, non-Muslim and free nations across the world such as in 
Africa and Latin America moved towards multilateralism in international relations. However, leaders of 
the White House are preoccupied with imposing unilateralism and colonising other nations through threats 
and intimidation.  
The US is portrayed as an enemy and coloniser (referencing) whose animosity with Iran has imposed costs. 
The author here again stresses the formation of a Muslim block against the US, suggesting that it is 
pursuing unilateralism through intimidation (presupposition).  
The end of the Bush era should be considered as the failure of the US unilateralism—a plan which turned 
the Bush administration in the world’s most hated government and caused Obama to become victorious in 
the presidential contest with the slogan of change. But has this slogan of change gone further than an 
election campaign? Have we seen something more than a change in rhetoric and literature?   
As against Text I, which depicted Obama’s message as a new start and promising, this paragraph tries to 
portray former US government policies as a failure (modality). The author also presupposes that Obama’s 
change of policy has also failed (presupposition).    
Supreme leader of the revolution referred to this in his Norouz address: If indeed anything other than your 
literature towards us has changed, let us know. Has your enmity towards the Iranian nation changed? 
Have you released the assets of the Iranian nation? Have you lifted the sanctions? Have you stopped 
slandering and negative propaganda? Have you given up your unconditional support for the Zionist 
regime?...Change should not be in words only and with unhealthy intention and if you want to change your 
policies and tactics while keeping your previous goals, this is deception not change and if you are thinking 
of real change, it should be seen in action.” 
Quoting Ayatollah Khamenei, the author recounts Iranian grievances with the US in response to Obama’s 
message. Notwithstanding, he also instructs the US on what measures should be taken in order for Iran to 
believe that US policy is changing.   
The US, while admitting this reality that today’s Iran is a great regional power and plays a determining 
role in Middle East developments and in the international arena, and while admitting the failure of Iran 
isolation policy, is seeking to change its language –and not behaviour—regarding the Islamic Republic.   
The author portrays Iran as a great regional power and stresses the role of Iran, while suggesting that US 
policy has failed (naming and presupposition).  
The noticeable point is that we do not need to establish ties with the US but it is America which needs to 
establish relations with us in order to prevent Iran’s enmity with that country and its weakening in the 
Middle East, as well as saving it from the self-made quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The author here tries to suggest that Iran is stronger than the US in the Middle East, confirming the 
Conservative policy of rejecting US hegemony (transitivity). He brings the war in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
examples of weakening US policy.  
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Obama is trying to throw the ball in the court of Iran through a gentle language and removing for example 
the pre-conditions for negotiation—which are regarded in his view as a concession—and convoying 
Norouz message—which contained unfounded and ridiculous allegations—and he wants to pretend under a 
reconciliatory gesture that he has proposed to negotiate and establish relations and it is now Iran which 
should decide about it.  
Allegations in the Obama message are referred to here as ridiculous (transitivity), while it is sought in the 
paragraph to imply that this message is only a deception.     
However, Hazrat Ayatollah Khamenei, in a vigilant and powerful speech said change should be seen in 
deeds. As reported by Fox News, Hazrat Ayatollah Khamenei rejected Obama’s olive branch and throw the 
ball to the US court.  
Referring to Ayatollah Khamenei as “Hazrat” suggests that the author is a pro-Con loyalist (referencing). 
This paragraph also portrays Iran as stronger than the US.  
Political decision makers of the country would naturally monitor developments in the US and US reactions. 
However, it should not be supposed that these days when Americans have extended their hand to Iran, it 
means they regret their previous doings and have changed their policy and attitude towards Iran. Given the 
oppression imposed on our nation for several decades by America, the new Obama administration has 
adopted a policy to come close to Iran while continuing past US expansionist policies, unilateralism and 
colonial interests.  
The author presupposes that the US administration will not change its policy towards Iran. Nor will it 
apologise for its previous policies—a request Iran has been long demanding from the US should it want to 
resume relations (presupposition). It is also implied that the US is oppressing Iran (presupposition). The 
US is represented stereotypically as expansionist and colonialist (naming).    
A few days before the Obama’s Norouz message! he extended one of the presidential sanctions orders 
issued in 1995 for another year. This order, which according to Washington aims at eradicating the 
connection of Tehran with terrorism! and the policy to access weapons of mass destruction!, has been in 
effect since Clinton presidency. In his message to the Congress, Obama considered actions and policies of 
the Iranian government in contravention to the interests of the US in the region as well as an extraordinary 
and non-conventional threat! for the security and economy of America.  
In this paragraph, the author reviews what he describes as “hostile” policies of the US against Iran. 
However, he uses exclamation marks wherever he disagrees with the statement made (rhetorical trope). 
Based on this, the author connotes that Obama’s Norouz message was in fact not a congratulatory message 
as he extends anti-Iran sanctions. The author also shows his opposition with Washington over its claim that 
Tehran is exporting terrorism and has access to WMDs and is a threat to the US.  
So how could one speak of America’s good intention while that country extends sanctions against Iran and 
encourages others to pursue this policy of encouragement and promotion?  
Here, the author believes there is a contradiction in the US policy regarding Iran. Imposing sanctions and at 
the same time trying to reach out to Iran is the same carrot and stick policy pursed by the West vis-à-vis 
Iran’s nuclear issue—a policy vehemently rejected by Iran.  
In his visit to Turkey a few days ago, Obama did not stop accusing Iran. In his address to the Turkish 
parliament, Obama did not consider the statements by Iranian officials that nuclear weapons do not have a 
place in our policy. He did not also consider IAEA reports and pointed the finger of allegation to Iran and 
said: Now, Iranian officials should decide between producing nuclear weapons! or creating a better future 
for their people!. Are such statements and the like not the same iron hands in a velvet glove?! We should 
remember that US national security charter for the 21st century regards Iran as a main threat to the 
security and survival of the US.  
The author in this paragraph again outlines US allegations against Iran. The author uses exclamation marks 
wherever a US allegation is made. He also refers to the expression “iron hand in velvet gloves” used by 
Ayatollah Khamenei in response to Obama’s olive branch. Once again, the author repeats the US allegation 
that Iran is a threat to the US.  
Our confrontation with the US is the conflict between two opposite identities. Until the US views the 
Islamic Republic of Iran with a superior, one-sided and unilateral eye, and does not abandon its imperialist 
nature and does not change its policy and attitudes regarding Iran in action, this gap will not be filled.     
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The author presupposes that there is a confrontation between Iran and the US (presupposition) and that the 
two sides are poles apart. In this last paragraph, the author falls short of naming the US as “arrogant” 
(although he stereotypes US as imperial). Instead he describes it as superior and one-sided which are the 
two main features of arrogance (rhetorical trope). As explained earlier, Iranians, thriving on their age-old 
civilisation and political culture, detest to be viewed as inferiors. Further, the author suggests that Iran and 
the US could resume relations should Americans stop their “arrogance” and “imperialism”. On many 
occasions, Iranian officials have urged American counterparts to apologise to the Iranian nation and release 
Iranian assets and deposits in the US. Only in this way can America demonstrate it is changing its policy 
“in action”.  
 
Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the 
thesis:  
RH1. Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH3. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during 
Reformism while trying to defuse tension (détente) and highlight cooperation between Iran 
and the West during the same period.  
 
3. Text 3: Clear and frank!  
 
Clear and frank! 
By Mohammad Kazem Anbarlouei 
Resalat newspaper, 08 January 1998 
The clear and frank talk by the President with the American reporter of the CNN ended 24 days of waiting. 
The Western media hastily talked of a u-turn in the foreign policy of the Iranian government and its 
inclination towards West and especially negotiation and relation between Iran and the United States! The 
Western media published such an analysis three weeks ago, after Mr. Khatami told reporters: Soon I have 
a message for the American nation.  
As mentioned earlier, Resalat newspaper is a follower of the line of Conservatives. Mohammad Kazem 
Anbarlouei, the author of this editorial, is the editor-in-chief of Resalat who is the leading author of its 
editorials. In the lead paragraph, he uses exclamation marks in order to indicate that the long-awaited 
wishes of the “Western media” for a change in the Iranian foreign policy towards the West were not 
fulfilled after the Khatami’s interview. In this paragraph, he hints that there will be not u-turn in Iran’s 
foreign policy towards the US. In fact, he signals the will of the Conservatives that no relationship should 
be established with the US. And that signal is “clear and frank” for all even for the Reformists. 
Based on such a lie [by the Western media], they promoted the thesis of differences of opinion between our 
officials regarding sever or minor confrontation with the West. If we want to present a summary of the one-
hour talk of the president, we should say that Americans not only did not take any benefit, but also they to a 
large extent had to give concession.  
Likewise, he tries to hide the conflict between Khatami and the leader over establishing ties with the US, 
and to confiscate the interview in favour of the Conservatives (modality). He explains this more in the 
following paragraph.  
Our president used a rare opportunity for talks with the people of America and exposed the crimes and 
murders of American statesmen in the past 50 years. He also removed the doubts in the minds of the people 
of America regarding the “death to America” slogan and neutralised the interpretation published by 
Zionist horns [media] about it. He said: the “death to America” is in response to the heinous act of the 
former American defense secretary who said the roots of the Iranian nation should be dried. Or it is a 
response to the downing of the Iranian civilian plane with about 300 women and men passengers who were 
destroyed by the commander of the US navy commander (1). 
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Here, the author uses referential strategies (naming and referencing) to hyperbole the experience of Iran 
with the US. He also presupposes that such experience is full of crimes and murders. He refers to the 
Western media as Zionist horns. He highlights two of the Iranian grievances with the US ie the insulting 
statement by the ex-secretary of defense and the downing of the Iranian civilian plane by the US in the 
Persian Gulf.    
Mr. Khatami, in response to the gullible view that “establishing relations with the US will resolve our 
problems”, and also in response to greedy American statesmen said: Now, we do not have any feeling of 
need to establish relations with America. We are doing our own work and there is a tall wall of distrust 
between us and American administrations as the result of the inappropriate behaviour of the US 
administration (2).  
In this paragraph, the author promotes the pro-Conservative approach that establishing relations with the 
US will not resolve our problems (presupposition). And he uses naming to describe such an attitude (that 
establishing relations with the US will resolve our problems), which at that time was being pursued by 
reformists, as gullible. The author also blames the absence of relations between Iran and the US on the 
American administrations and their bad behaviour (presupposition).  
Having listened to our president last night, the White House spokesman said with disappointment that: 
statements by Mr. Khatami are insufficient for the improvement of relations between the two countries. 
James Rouin again set ridiculous pre-conditions for talks between Iran and the US! This means a hue and 
cry for nothing!  
Here, the author again shows his political inclinations (ie opposition to the West) by describing the 
Khatami interview as a “hue and cry for nothing”. The author promotes this idea through rhetorical tropes 
by the use of words such as “disappointment” or “pre-conditions” or “ridiculous”.  
The president in this frank talk reminded the American nation about defending values such as freedom and 
independence in the US administration when it was first formed 200 years ago. He invited the American 
nation to fairness and justice in their judgment about the struggles of the Iranian nation. He in fact raised 
this historical question for the American nation: If freedom and independence are good things, why only 
for you! And not for the Iranian nation? 
The author in this paragraph explains how Iranians perceive the judgment of the US about them: unfair and 
unjust. Fairness and justice are two concepts occasionally called for by Iranians when it comes to 
establishing relations with the US. This can be clearly seen in the statements of the Iranian leaders.    
The president of our country clearly defended the struggles of Palestinians and declared Islamic Iran’s 
opposition to the so-called peace process and said clearly that: Supporting people who are fighting for the 
liberalisation of their lands is not terrorism but a support for those who are fighting against state 
terrorism” (3).  
The author here considers President Khatami’s statement on terrorism as a sign of his support for 
Palestinians and his opposition to the peace process. This is while the real reference by Khatami to the fight 
for liberalisaiton in this statement is the issue of terrorism and US accusation that Iran is sponsoring 
terrorism. Therefore, the author wants to presuppose that Khatami is opposed to the peace process. The 
reason Khatami mentioned this issue was that the US is accusing Iran of supporting terrorists. Khatami 
himself did not refer directly to the Israeli-Palestinian issue in his statement.   
It is interesting that the CNN censored two parts of the president’s statements: In one part, Mr. Khatami 
defended the rights of the Palestinian nation. In the other part, he denounces the violent acts of the Zionist 
regime! And this indicates that to what extent they are satisfied with the interview! The CNN also deleted 
another part of the statements by Mr. Khatami who said the US administration had allocated 20 million 
dollars to overthrow the Iranian government.  
In this paragraph, the author once again indicates his opposition to Khatami’s interview. He blames this on 
the satisfaction of the CNN with Khatami’s statements. True or false, the author claims that the CNN has 
“censored” some parts of Khatami’s interview regarding Israel. The reference to Israel as “Zionist regime” 
(accompanied with an exclamation mark) and the claim that Khatami’s defense of Palestinians has been 
deleted imply that the author regards this interview as a ploy by the “Zionist regime”.  
The claim proposed in this editorial (censorship of Khatami’s statements on Israel and the 20 million 
dollars allocated to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran) was not confirmed neither by President 
Khatami’s Office nor by the CNN. Therefore, the author tries to tell the readers that Khatami should have 
raised these issues in his interview. It is in fact a sarcasm to Khatami that “you should have talked about 
these two issues”.    
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The other point in the president’s interview was the neutralisation of this big lie that he faces obstacles 
inside Iran to fulfill his responsibilities! Foreign media and some of their agents in Iran were constantly 
promoting that the president is being resisted against fulfilling his duties and materialising his promises. 
They were instructed to intensify differences and add fuel to the fire of disagreement. In response to a 
question in this regard, Mr. Khatami said: the supreme leader sets the general policies but the government 
executes them and I think there is no impediment on the way of the government’s imposition of sovereignty 
(4).  
In this paragraph, the author highlights another issue of conflict between the pro-Reform government and 
the leader of Islamic Revolution. He proposes that Khatami has removed any doubts that he faces obstacles 
in fulfilling his responsibilities. The reference to “obstacle” is related to the opposition of the Iranian 
leadership to Khatami’s proposed reforms such as his détente foreign policy.      
The last point in the president’s interview was that he neutralised the third axis of the enemy’s propaganda 
against our nation—that they want our nation separated and divided into moderates, traditional and 
conservatives or in the words of some who have been deceived inside of the country “leftists, rightists and 
modern and traditional rightists and modern and traditional leftists! Mr. Khatami said: moderates, 
traditional and the like are concepts which are more meaningful in the West. Let’s allow such 
categorisations happen at the right time and right place. 
The author regards Khatami’s interview as an enemy propaganda. Once again such a reference indicates 
that the author, his pro-Conservative newspaper and political affiliates, are opposed to the interview of a 
pro-Reform president with an American media which is described here as a “Zionist horn”.   
If we wanted to have a fair conclusion about the president’s interview, we should say that he properly 
neutralised three axes of the enemy’s propaganda which were described by the Supreme Leader of the 
Islamic Revolution in last week’s Friday Prayers. The president was able to make the government and 
nation of America understood that “in Iran, there is no interest in the West and especially communication 
and negotiation with the US”, and that “there is no division among the Iranian officials” and “the vigilant 
people of Iran have abided by their promises to defend divine values”. 
In conclusion, the author once again brings his political inclinations in his analysis. He belongs to the 
Conservative camp and promotes its slogans in this editorial: that there is no interest in the West and 
particularly the US in Iran. He also tries to tell the reader that that there is difference of opinion in Iran, 
which is of course not true at the time. The author’s reference to “divine values” implies the ideology of 
the Islamic revolution is Occidentalisation of the West and anti-Americanism.   
 
Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the 
thesis:  
RH1. Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH2. Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH4. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during 
Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during 
the same period.  
 
4. Text 4: An introduction to dialogue among civilisations 
 
An introduction to dialogue among civilisations 
By Soroush Jenabi 
Salam newspaper, 11 January 1998 
With a strong logic and wise thought, as promised earlier, the president of our country gave an interview to 
the CNN in America. As against the prediction of some circles including the press before the interview, it 
did not violate the values of the system. Instead it brought the positive reaction of people across the world 
and in fact it was an introduction to a new chapter of the encounter of thoughts—a chapter which has been 
named by H.E. Mr. Khatami as the “dialogue among civilisations”.  
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This editorial was published in a purely pro-Reform newspaper which was only tolerated by Conservatives 
for a few months. Right from the beginning, the author of this editorial indicates his support to the pro-
Reform president. Through rhetorical tropes, the author praises Khatami’s historical interview as logical 
and wise. He continues to highlight this interview by telling the reader that it didn’t harm the interests of 
the Islamic regime and indeed helped to promote it across the world. The editorial also reflects the stances 
of the pro-Reform camp to promote Khatami’s thesis of dialogue among civilisations in view of the 
opposition by the pro-Conservative circles and press.  
The president is following up the concept of dialogue among civilisations under circumstances where the 
influence of thoughts such as the “clash of civilisations” by Samuel Huntington on the world is evident. 
According to this theory, the next century is the period of confrontation between the Western civilisations 
and the Islamic and Confessiosi civilisations. Such an approach should be studied more. However, it can 
deceive the Western mind. Notwithstanding, it has provided the opportunity to replace the “green danger” 
with the “red danger”. So, on such a basis, whatever allegations such as terrorism, access to nuclear 
weapons and … are leveled against countries as Iran, even if unfounded, will be accompanied by 
aggressive or the so-called containment policies. Dialogue among civilisations will foil the public 
justification for such policies in the world given the fact that influential media are in the hegemony of the 
world powers. 
In this paragraph, the author presupposes that Khatami’s taboo-breaking interview is more than an attempt 
to reconcile Iran with the US but a project to reconcile Islam with the Western world—something opposed 
to the Huntington’s theory. The author explains that Khatami’s interview neutralised accusations leveled by 
the US against Iran. Moreover, the author presupposes that the US will attack Iran in future and that 
Khatami’s interview would contain such a threat.    
Dialogue among civilisations is a strategy with win for all. We have proposed to replace “clash” with 
“dialogue”. In fact we have challenged the Western world in terms of negotiations with America (although 
rumors about establishing relations with the US are now being exploited by some to castigate senior 
officials of the country). The importance of this issue is summarised in this question: Are “we” as the 
representative of the Islamic civilisation going to talk to the West or the “others”? The next question is: 
When and under what circumstances?  
The author further highlights Khatami’s theory as a win-win strategy (hyperbole). He exaggerates about 
such a theory but also takes into consideration the opposition of Conservatives to this theory. He indicates 
that Conservatives are lashing out at Khatami because he wants to establish relations with the US.      
Now the conditions of our country are different from the past. The Islamic Republic of Iran has sovereignty 
over every inch of its soil. There are no threats from inside or outside for the foundation of the regime. 
Elements of the civil society have strongly rooted in our territory. Iran’s policies have been operationalised 
in view of the efforts of the officials. Heads of state from tens of Islamic countries gather in Tehran and 
discuss the future policies of the Islamic world. And Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami assumes the chair of 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for the next three years. Who is more competent than the 
chair of the OIC to talk to the Western civilication as the representative of the Islamic civilication? Talks 
with the West on behalf of the powerful owner of Islamic values will create no concern for us. Should not 
we believe in our accomplishments in the past two decades instead of creating illusion and difference 
among the people? 
In the last paragraph, the author once again promotes the policy of the pro-Reform government of Khatami: 
to remove tensions with the West and establish relations with the US. The author believes conditions in 
Iran are ripe for such a relationship. This is in fact the core of the détente policy of the pro-Reform 
government: that conditions have changed against the past; that the “death to America” slogan was 
something for the past; that the anti-American ideology belonged to the past.  
As in the previous paragraph, the author in fact suggests that such a policy by Khatami is overarching and 
will benefit the whole Muslim world. The author regards such a policy (establishing relations with the US) 
as an opportunity for Iran to lead the Muslim Ummah and represent them in the West.  
And finally, the author criticises the Conservatives for their opposition to such a policy by creating illusion 
and difference among the people about Khatami as a traitor to the values of Islam and principles of the 
revolution.   
 
Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the 
thesis:  
RH1. Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
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RH2. Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH3. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during 
Reformism while trying to defuse tension (détente) and highlight cooperation between Iran 
and the West during the same period.  
 
b. Iran’s nuclear issue: Contextualisation  
Iran’s nuclear activities turned into an international issue in 2002 when an anti-Iran 
opposition group exposed Iran’s nuclear activities in two important sites of Natanz (where 
the uranium enrichment is taking place) and Arak (where the heavy water reactor is being 
developed). Consequently, the West and particularly the United States accused Iran of 
developing nuclear weapons—an allegations vehemently denied by Iran. The International 
Atomic Energy Organisation was then assigned the task of verifying the militarisation of 
Iran’s nuclear programme. This coincided with the presidency of pro-Reform president, 
Mohammad Khatami.  
Khatami had adopted a détente policy in international relations and particularly with 
the West. The nuclear issue was a major obstacle. Therefore, he formulated a policy of 
cooperation with the West in the nuclear issue. He even proposed the so-called “grand 
bargain” to the US, expressing readiness to cooperate in various areas including the nuclear 
issue and terrorism with the West. Although the US administration did not respond to 
Khatami’s proposals, two rounds of talks were held between Iran and the so-called EU3 
over the nuclear issue. For the first time in the history of relations between the Islamic 
Republic and the West, three European foreign ministers travelled to Tehran in 2003. They 
issued the Tehran Declaration. And for the first time, Iran’s foreign minister visited 
London. Under the Tehran Declaration, the two sides finally agreed that Iran suspends 
uranium enrichment activities and accept the Additional Protocol to the NPT so that the 
issue be resolved through negotiations. In the second round of negotiations in Paris in 2004, 
Iran agreed under the Paris Agreement to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily and 
implement the Additional Protocol.  The two sides exchanged packages of proposal. Such a 
policy was only pursued for a short time (less than a yea) as Khatami’s tenure ended and 
pro-Conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. 
Unlike Khatami, he believed that Iran should continue its nuclear activities 
including uranium enrichment. He broke the IAEA seals and ordered the resumption of 
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uranium enrichment--a critical dual-use component which can be used for both generating 
electricity and building a nuclear bomb. He even reinforced the number of centrifuges in 
the Iranian nuclear sites and started developing a second facility for uranium enrichment 
this time under the ground. Iran stepped up uranium enrichment. In April 2006, President 
Ahmadinejad announced that Iran has officially joined the club of countries with nuclear 
technology. At the same time, he agreed to continue negotiations with the West.  
Such measures were perceived by the West as belligerent. Iran’s nuclear case was 
referred to the United Nations Security Council in February 2006 by the IAEA and the US, 
Russia and China (and later Germany) entered into Iran’s nuclear issue. The Security 
Council adopted the first resolution against Iran in July 2006. This marked the start of a 
long-term confrontation between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue (and that’s why 
two editorials were selected here in this period after the passage of Resolution 1696 from 
two newspapers with different political affiliation for the discourse analysis).     
Iran’s insistence that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes was 
“upgraded” to a more nationalistic and broader sense when President Ahmadinejad took the 
reins of the country’s top foreign policymaking body, the Supreme National Security 
Council, in 2005. He turned Iran’s quest for nuclear power to a “national will” and 
“national self-reliance” of the Iranians and always exaggerated about the “inalienable right” 
of Iran to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The perception of “having the right 
to nuclear power” per se is higher and stronger than the perception of using the nuclear 
energy for “peaceful purposes” as the former also includes the latter.  
Ahmadinejad’s zeal for developing Iran’s nuclear programme was heightened with 
the country’s gradual command of the nuclear and missile technologies and the support 
given by Iran’s leader as well as the Iranian nation on various occasions, such as the 
revolution victory rallies and provincial visits by President Ahmadinejad1.  
Iran believes that using nuclear energy for producing electricity and research 
purposes is the right of every nation. Ahmadinejad is also of the opinion that the West, 
including the United States, is opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme because it is portrayed 
                                                           
1 Some believe that the ultimate power in Iran’s politics (including the foreign policy) rest with Ayatollah 
Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad does not have the final say. This is partly true as this responsibility has 
been bestowed on the Leader by Iran’s Constitution which regards the Leader’s power above the President’s. 
However, in the case of Ahmadinejad, there is such a great similarity of attitudes between Ayatollah 
Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad that one can say Ahmadinejad is in the same line as the leader and his 
policies are automatically endorsed. In one of his key speeches, Ayatollah Khamenei said Ahmadinejad’s 
views are closer to his than previous presidents including Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad 
Khatami.     
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by Israel as an “existential threat”. The conflict between Iran and the West over the nuclear 
issue is continuing to this date.  
 
1. Text 5: Active diplomacy; the better option 
Active diplomacy; the better option 
Qods newspaper, 14 September 2006 
Two rounds of negotiations have already been conducted between Iran and Europe. Under circumstances 
in which these negotiations are due to continue next week, news analyses by the Western media indicate 
that Tehran and Brussels (headquarters of the European Union) are likely to reach common agreement in 
line with the diplomatic settlement of the nuclear case. At the present juncture, it seems that the 
continuation of negotiations without pre-conditions has been guaranteed and the necessity of suspending 
enrichment activities by Iran has partly reduced tensions; otherwise, with the insistence of Tehran, 
reaching agreement will become difficult and will endanger the continuation of talks.  
Qods has been a pro-Conservative newspaper. In the nuclear issue, however, it did not act conservatively 
and followed the official line of state. As the title of this editorial suggests, Qods believes in diplomacy 
rather than military action in dealing with the nuclear case of Iran. In the first paragraph, the author 
emphasises on the necessity of continuing negotiations and the suspension of enrichment activities. The 
author also indicates that he is opposing any measure or decision by the government to stand against the 
West in the nuclear issue. He indicates this by saying that if Tehran insists on continuing enrichment 
activities, talks will stall and difficulties will arise.   
In this line, it seems that the continuation of negotiations with the Europeans should be conducted in a 
manner that Iran’s nuclear issue be returned to the Agency—the only decision maker on nuclear issue—
and be discussed away from political discussions. Iran’s nuclear policies which are rooted in dignity, 
wisdom and expedience of the state, have more influence on the European Union that the isolationist 
America.   
The author here presupposes that the Western confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue is politically-
motivated. He proposes that the nuclear case of Iran be returned to the IAEA from the Security Council. 
Moreover, the author warns about entering the US in the nuclear talks because he believes the situation will 
get more complex, difficult and dangerous for Iran should the US influences the talks, given the difficulties 
Americans had created for Iran in the three decades after the revolution. The author believes that the policy 
of continuing talks is in accordance with the three pillars of Iran’s foreign policy: dignity, wisdom and 
expedience.  
Iran’s access to the heavy water project in Arak is another example of the success of our scientists who are 
struggling to bring dignity and progress for the Islamic Republic. Attaining this important success indicates 
the true will of the Islamic system to guarantee the inalienable and national rights of the citizens of the 
Islamic Iran, which heralds independence and will introduce the independent and strong Iran in different 
sectors on a par with other regional and international players to the global public opinion.  
On such a basis, the author in this paragraph suggests that if negotiations succeed, Iran will be represented 
as a powerful nation on a par with other regional and international players.  
At the present time and in pursuit of the negotiation diplomacy, the gap among the permanent members of 
the Security Council has gone deeper, as the cautious stances of China and Russia and the soft tone of 
France and its positive attitude towards China and Russia have turned Iran’s nuclear case into a major 
challenge in the relations between the US and Europe—a challenge which has kept the nuclear case in 
tangle between Vienna and New York. Koffi Annan told Financial Times that: the government of Iran is 
very confident either true or false. This country will not bow and has been prepared for the worst. On the 
other hand, no diversion has been reported in Iran’s nuclear activities by the Agency inspectors and 
ElBaradie. Amr Musa, the secretary general of the Arab League, has said that Iran’s nuclear case is not a 
threat for the Middle East, therefore, it is evident that Iran’s efforts and defending its nuclear performance 
is within the legal framework of the Agency. 
In this paragraph, the author talks about the prospects of the settlement of the nuclear case of Iran in view 
of several reasons: 1- the drift in the EU3 and the US, 2- Iran’s confidence not to bow to the pressures, 3- 
and the approval by the IAEA and the Arab League that nuclear activities of Iran are not a threat. In fact, 
the author tries to tell the reader that Iran’s nuclear activities are legal and therefore Iran can defend its 
rights.   
The unavoidable welcome by the US of the recent negotiations between Iran and the EU and the cautious 
statement by the latter indicate that preliminary progress in Tehran-Brussels talks has increased hopes that 
Iran’s nuclear issue would be resolved fairly and upon the agreement of both sides.  
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The author highlights the importance of continuing negotiations so that Iran’s nuclear case be resolved 
fairly.  
Presently, it is the US which is insisting on the necessity of suspending enrichment activities and is still 
speaking of its “trigger” strategy in the nuclear issue in order to reach its political goals. In contrast, 
Europeans who have been pushed back as the result of the isolationist policies of Washington, are calling 
for the continuation of diplomacy and talks with Iran. Agreement between Iran and EU to continue talks 
within the next weeks or days has increased hopes that a consensus will be reached and the current 
deadlock will be broken. 
Here the author again raises concerns with regards to the stronger US engagement in the nuclear issue of 
Iran. He warns about this and once again spotlights the significance of the continuation of diplomacy.  
In their proposal, Europeans have clearly guaranteed the right of Iran to continue nuclear activities and 
support Iran against the political pressures of the US for further sanctions in the Security Council.  
In this paragraph, the author again warns about stronger US involvement in the nuclear case of Iran and 
cautions about the US pressures and sanctions while calling for the continuation of negotiations.  
The continuation of talks between Iran and the EU will portray a peaceful and tolerant image of Iran as a 
country which is seeking interaction with the global community within international frameworks in order to 
address national demands. What is encouraging our diplomacy apparatus to continue talks with the EU is 
the transparent and unambiguous performance of our country in the nuclear energy sector which leads our 
officials to the negotiating table without any concern.  
In the last paragraph, the author once again highlights the importance of continuing nuclear negotiations. 
He believes that Iran’s rights can be secured only through diplomacy. He also presupposes that Iran’s 
nuclear activities have been transparent and unambiguous.  
 
Overall, the analysis of this editorial suggests that when it comes to issues of national 
interest and security including the nuclear issue of Iran, pro-Conservative press are 
more lenient in portraying the West.  
 
 
2. Text 6: What is the end of Iran’s nuclear case? 
What is the end of Iran’s nuclear case? 
By Foad Sadeqi 
Hambastegi newspaper, 28 August 2006 
The end of August made the nuclear case of the Islamic Republic of Iran one step closer to its end. The 
Security Council resolution and Iran’s response to the EU proposal has put this case in a dilemma which 
will either go to the Security Council or a new round of negotiations—each of which has a different 
perspective.  
Hambastegi is a pro-Reform newspaper. Like its pro-Conservative counterparts, Hambastegi in this 
editorial stresses the significance of continuing negotiations. The author warns against any more 
involvement by the Security Council in Iran’s nuclear issue.  
On one hand, the referral of Iran’s nuclear case to the Security Council and the imposition of sanctions 
calling for the suspension of enrichment activities would enter the Islamic Republic into a serious 
challenge with the West—a challenge whose minor consequence will be the suspension of cooperation 
between Iran and the IAEA and the start of industrial enrichment. On the other hand, choosing a 
diplomatic solution for resolving Iran’s nuclear crisis and the start of a new round of negotiations is a less 
costly option for both parties. Notwithstanding the outbreak of the Lebanon war and the relative victory of 
the Shiite Hezbollah against the Israeli army have partly overshadowed equations regarding the nuclear 
case. This event has seriously reduced the possibility of the success of a military action against Iran and 
has simultaneously strengthened the position of anti-war currents in the public opinion and the world 
governments.  
The author sees the enrichment of uranium at the industrial scale as a serious challenge for Iran with the 
West. This is in fact a reflection of the policy of the pro-Reform government who suspended enrichment as 
against the policy of the incumbent pro-Conservative government which insists on the continuation of 
enrichment. Again, the author calls for the continuation of negotiations under circumstances in which the 
success of a military option against Iran seems partially limited.  
Moreover, it has encouraged the West to accept that the key to resolving the Middle East crisis should be 
found in Tehran. In response, Iran has actively encountered with the EU package and its proposals have 
been perceived positively and based on national interests in Iran. Even the issue of suspension within the 
framework of negotiations which can make confidence-building possible for the parties has been taken into 
consideration. And even its possibility has not been completely rejected by the officials of the system.  
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Here the author once again calls on the pro-Conservative government to suspend enrichment activities. He 
is in fact hopeful that high-ranking officials would do so in line with national interests.  
In sum, it can be stated that the present atmosphere governing the Security Council and the stances of 
influential countries in this council indicate that there are three options with regards to the performance of 
the council about Iran. The first option, with the publication of the report by the IAEA secretary general in 
a few weeks time about the non-suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities and the start of new activities in the 
heavy water reactor in Arak, the Security Council in accordance with Resolution 1696 will ratify the 
implementation of sanctions against Iran. These sanctions will be growing and will gradually spread from 
the political domain to industrial and economic sectors. The second option, given the response of Iran’s 
proposals and the announcement of preparedness for comprehensive negotiations, the Security Council 
would suspend making decisions against Iran for a short while until after another round of negotiations or 
pre-negotiations are held and the goodwill and preparedness of the Islamic Republic in resolving the 
nuclear crisis are proved. Third option, the Security Council concurrent with the process of confrontation 
with Iran, start a new round of talks and prepare the grounds for more talks with the imposition of new 
punishment against the Islamic Republic which will be enforced after a period of one or two months. Under 
such circumstances, grounds will be paved for new talks with Iran and agreement on the conditions of 
suspension of nuclear activities. 
In this paragraph, the author studies options Iran has to continue its nuclear programme. The first option, 
according to him, is to adopt a policy which will put Iran on the path of conflict with the West. The author 
warns about the consequences of such an option: growing sanctions.  
The second and third options will depend on Iran’s preparedness in continuing or stopping negotiations 
with the West. The author believes punishments will be imposed within the framework of the so-called 
“dual track” strategy on Iran if it fails to continue negotiations with the West. It seems one of the biggest 
impediments for confrontation with Iran, which has so far disappointed Israel and the US, is the reluctance 
of other world countries and in particular energy-hungry countries such as France, Germany, Japan, Italy 
and China to adopt a military option against Iran. Therefore, any measure considered to be ignoring 
opportunities for negotiations, will be naturally resisted. Therefore, it seems choosing a middle way option 
which will not discredit the Security Council which has clearly called in a statement and resolution in the 
current year for the suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities and will provide another opportunity for 
negations is more likely.   
Here again, the author reiterates the importance of continuing negotiations and urges the pro-Conservative 
government to keep on talks with the West after suspending enrichment activities—a measure considered 
by Conservatives as treason.  
  
Overall, the analysis of this editorial suggests that Iranian newspapers believe in 
diplomacy (cooperation) rather than confrontation with the West when it comes to the 
nuclear issue.   
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a. Analysis of main findings  
 This study was conducted to outline how mainstream Iranian newspapers 
conceptualise the West in the minds of the Iranians. Two independent variables (period 
under publication and political affiliation of the press) were analysed. Findings of this 
research were presented in detail in Chapter 5. Here, possible reasons behind the findings 
are discussed and an analysis of the main findings is provided based on the five main 
themes of “Iran nuclear case”, “terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and 
colonialism”.  
These themes were selected after a careful analysis and review of the bulk of the 
news published in mainstream Iranian newspapers about the West. Relations between Iran 
and the West throughout the history have been full of highs and lows, forming an important 
element of the study of such relations. Iran and the West had a close cooperation before 
1979. Such cooperation turned into conflict in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran. In recent years, the two sides have had cooperated in various areas such as Iran’s 
nuclear issue and the fight against terrorism. Paradoxically, the two sides have been at 
loggerheads over the same issues of Iran’s nuclear programme and terrorism. Iran’s nuclear 
issue is currently at the top of the list of disagreements between Iran and the West. The 
West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear weapon and imposes tough sanctions on the 
Islamic regime. Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes including for generating power. Iran’s nuclear case has been one of the main 
subjects of news in the Iranian and Western media since 2003. Terrorism (war and 
violence) is another important factor in relations between Iran and the West as the latter 
accuses the former of exporting terrorism and posing a great threat to the world’s stability. 
Such accusations and conflicts between the two sides have resulted in the formation of 
stereotypes such as “hypocrite”, “enemy” and “arrogant and colonial” to describe the West.  
Therefore, the researcher selected the five broad categories mentioned above in 
order to provide a better analysis of the results. The selection of the five themes is also in 
accordance with the main research question which investigates the representation of the 
West in mainstream Iranian press.  
Below are the main findings of the research before I analyse the main themes.  
 One of the main findings of this study is that “the representation of the West in 
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mainstream Iranian newspapers is influenced by the affiliation (ideology) of the 
newspapers and the political period (discourse) in which they are published”1. The findings 
also suggest that political period has more influence on the representation of West than 
political affiliation2.  
 From the communication point of view, such a finding suggests that the anti-
Western ideology of the regime in Iran influences the process of news production including 
the agenda-setting, framing and priming of the news about the West in the Iranian press. 
That one cannot find mainstream Iranian newspapers ignoring any piece of news about the 
West in their morning issue (agenda-setting function), that mainstream Iranian newspapers 
frame the news based on (valid or invalid) stereotypes about the West (framing function), 
that mainstream Iranian newspapers highlight stories about the West in their front pages 
(priming function) indicate that the processes of agenda-setting, framing and priming are 
influenced by the Occidental ideology of the Iranian system.  
Furthermore, this finding is not only in compliance with the media influence 
hierarchical model presented by Shoemaker and Reese in 19913, but also contributes to it 
in the following manner.  
According to Shoemaker and Reese model, the media content is under the influence 
of five factors: individual level, media routines level, organisation level, extramedia level 
and ideological level. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) explain the theoretical perspectives on 
influences on media content previously presented by Gans (1979) and Giltin (1980). They 
discuss that the content of media is influenced by the personal attitudes and professional 
roles of journalists. They also argue that constraints on newsgathering and news writing 
affect the presentation of news. They also investigate the influence of media organizations 
(such as political endorsements and corporate policies) on content. Moreover, they study 
what they call “extramedia factors” such as economy, circulation, competition and 
profitability which influence the media content. And finally, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) 
believe ideology also influences the way media content is produced.  
 Findings of the present research suggest that two more factors could be added to this 
                                                           
1 Such a hypothesis was supported by a set of data and statistics presented in Chapter 5. They demonstrated 
that there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West in the three (Ettelaat, 
Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami) of the four mainstream newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism. 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami was pro-Conservative which turned non-aligned and Ettelaat was pro-Conservative and 
turned pro-Reformist. Both newspapers were under the influence of the political period and their affiliation.  
2 “Iran” and Hamshahri were both Reformist-turned-Conservative. The representation of the West in “Iran” 
was statistically significant while Hamshahri’s portrayal of the West was not. Therefore, political period had 
more impact upon the representation of the West than political affiliation.   
3 Other authors have proposed media influence models which are worth studying. They include Donsbach, 
1987; Kepplinger, 1989; Schudson, 1991; Weischenberg, 1992; Donsbach and Gattwinkel, 1998.  
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model of media content influence1: the affiliation of newspapers and the political period in 
which they are published. These two factors may not fit the sort of media structure in the 
West, which is independent in most cases from government and is usually driven by the 
economy factor. However, they fit the media structure in developing countries such as Iran 
where the media are usually owned by the government and are under stringent regulation 
and supervision directed by politics2.  
As explained earlier, one of the most conspicuous features of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution was its anti-Western inclinations (in the form of anti-imperialism, anti-
arrogance, anti-bullying) which later turned into an “ideology” for the Islamic state, 
influencing its foreign policy. This ideology itself was influenced, on some occasions, by 
the “dominant discourse” of the time. Findings of this research suggest that the anti-
Westernism ideology of the Islamic regime was influenced by the Reformist and Conservative discourses 
(unique to each political wing) during 1997-2001 and 2005-2009, respectively.  
The influence was related to the Reformist (to “accommodate” 
the West) and Conservative (to “face up to” the West3) discourses regarding the West. 
However, there seems to be a paradox when it comes to the Conservative tendency in 
favour of or against relations with the West. In other words, while the data (from ARQ6) 
indicates that pro-Conservative press are against relations with the West, the same data 
(from ARQ20) suggests that “cooperation with the West” is the main political theme of the 
news. Such a contradiction is explicable. In fact, similar to the so-called “dual-track” 
approach of the West (regarding the nuclear issue), the policy of President Ahmadinejad’s 
government (particularly regarding the nuclear issue) is to “accommodate” the West while 
at the same time “reject” it. Such a policy is reflected in the actions of the Ahmadinejad’s 
government. While he continued uranium enrichment activities against the wishes of the 
West, at the same time he called for negotiations to continue. It is actually a dual-track 
policy of cooperation and conflict with the West which is reflected in the news carried by 
                                                           
1 Some may argue that the two factors presented here have already been described by Gans and Giltin and 
developed by Shoemaker and Reese in their media influence model. However, the model presented by Gans 
(1979) and Giltin (1980) is specific to Western media structure which is different from that of Iran. There are 
structural and political differences between the media systems of the West and Iran. For example, most of the 
media in Iran are somehow related to government and are under control. Moreover, whereas “economy” is the 
most determining factor for media in the West, in Iran “politics” determines who owns and runs the media.  
2 The element of control over the media has been the subject of much discussion and attention. McQuail 
(1984) for example has defined five functions of the media for those who control them: “First, the media can 
attract and direct attention to problems, solutions or people in a way which can favour those in power and 
correlatively divert attention from rival individuals or groups. Second, the mass media can confer status and 
confirm legitimacy. Third, in some circumstances, the media can be a channel for persuasion and 
mobilisation. Fourth, the mass media can help to bring certain kinds of publics into being and maintain them. 
Fifth, the media are a vehicle for offering psychic rewards and gratification (McQuail, 1984:50).” 
3 Each of these discourses influences Iranian Occidentalism according to features unique to them.   
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pro-Conservative press. For example, when President Ahmadinejad announces a 
breakthrough in the nuclear technology, it is perceived by the Iranian press as a move 
against the Western wishes. However, when Ahmadinejad calls for negotiations with the 
West, the press reflect on that as a gesture of cooperation with the West.  
It is noteworthy to mention here that even though it may be suggested that both the 
pro-Reform and pro-Conservative governments of Iran in the two periods under study tried 
to “engage” with the West, the spirit and nature of “cooperation” is different in each 
government. In other words, the cooperation sought by the Reformist government is 
unequal to the cooperation sought by the Conservative government. The former was 
seeking to engage with the West in a “two-way” channel of communication so that both 
sides could benefit mutually. It was a win-win game for the two sides. The latter however 
tried to reach out to the West in a “one-way” communication which could only benefit the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in a win-lose game1. To put it differently, the pro-Reform 
government proposed the theory of “dialogue among civilisations” in order to cooperate 
with the West in true terms; whereas, the latter proposed the concept of “global 
management” in order to influence the West and impose Islamic-style conditions on it. 
Such a policy is clearly manifested in examples of the interaction of the pro-Con 
government with the West and in particular with the US. President Ahmadinejad wrote 
letters to the heads of some Western states including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
President George Bush and President Obama, urging them to join the Islamic Iranian-
proposed “global management” initiative to “prevail justice and equality” in the world 
affairs. The continued demand by Iran to “reform the standing unjust order” dominating the 
United Nations/Security Council is another manifestation of the win-lose approach of the 
pro-Con government in Iran.        
 Overall the data of this research seem to suggest that the West is more of an “issue” 
and “pre-occupation” for Conservatives than the Reformists2. A pro-Conservative 
newspaper provided the largest volume of news coverage of the West. Moreover, the 
widest coverage of the West was recorded during Conservatism. Also, the coverage of the 
West increased during Conservatism3. This could have happened because of two reasons. 
First, during Conservatism, there were more developments in relations between Iran and the 
West than during Reformism; second, a change of policy could have happened during 
                                                           
1 President Ahmadinejad believes that this is a “win-win game for all” as in view of his global management 
initiative, justice will prevail for all humans.  
2 On the basis of the data taken from DRQs 1,2,3 and 4.  
3 This rise may be attributed to the increase in coverage devoted to the nuclear issue and related subjects.  
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Conservatism so that both sides reach out to one another. Continued letter writing between 
Iran and the West and unconfirmed behind-the-scene talks between the two during 
Conservatism are also an indication1.     
 Generally speaking, on the basis of data from DRQs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 
23, mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to highlight “negative” but not “stereotypical” 
news and image of the West in the “headline”2. Interestingly, the news of the West also 
appeared in the “domestic” news page in addition to the “foreign” news page and news 
about natural disasters in the West was exceptionally covered3. While the press projected a 
neutral image of the West (UK and France in particular) during Reformism, they 
represented the West negatively during Conservatism and during the whole period of study, 
according to data from DRQs 23 to 29 and the CDA findings4. The projection of a neutral 
image of the West during Reformism is an indication of the “accommodation” policy of 
Reformists vis-à-vis the West.    
This finding that the West is not imaged by Iranian newspapers “stereotypically” in 
the majority of news is very significant and interesting. In fact, it is a proof of this thesis 
that Iranian Occidentalism is not Orientalism-in-reverse even though the former projects a 
negative image. Orientalism has been criticised for untruly representing the East through 
stereotypes such as “terrorist,” “backward,” “inferior”, “irrational” and so on. However, 
Iranian Occidentalism does not portray the West stereotypically in the same way 
Orientalism does. Iranian Occidentalism is a product of colonialism and the ensuing 
response to modernity mixed with a sense of nativism and sometimes nationalism. As it 
will be explained in the next section, Iranian newspapers are a component of the Iranian 
Occidentalism under the influence of the state and its ideology. Therefore, it is not 
Orientalism-in-reverse5.  
 The bulk of the coverage of the West (particularly during Conservatism) focuses on 
the “foreign policy”, with the dominant political theme of stories being “relations between 
the West and other countries rather than Iran”, followed by stories of “terrorism, war and 
                                                           
1 President Ahmadinejad wrote several letters to the heads of Western governments including Obama. 
Similarly, President Obama corresponded with Ayatollah Khamenei. There are also unconfirmed reports that 
representatives of President Ahmadinejad (led by his chief of staff Esfandyar Rahim-Mashaei) have met 
Americans to discuss possible ways of settling down differences.  
2 Moreover, pro-Conservative newspapers during Conservatism underscored negative political points about 
the West. For example, they tend to draw the attention of readers to natural disasters in the West and the way 
Western governments handle them. That Iranian newspapers project a negative image of the West is 
suggestive of the influence of the Iranian government on newspapers.  
3 Notwithstanding, news of scientific/technological developments in the West was also covered.  
4 However, the visual representation of the West in the Iranian press does not reflect such a finding, as in both 
periods they depicted a neutral direction in photos accompanying stories about the West.   
5 More discussion on Iranian Occidentalism and Orientalism in reverse will follow.  
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violence”1. Such a finding could be interpreted in the absence of diplomatic relations 
between Iran and the US2. Since the two countries do not have embassies and direct 
diplomatic ties, news stories of relations between the West and other countries (not Iran) 
are being highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers. One other possible reason behind 
the coverage of relations between other countries and the West is the propaganda function 
of the Iranian newspapers which want to highlight negative news of the West, even in its 
relations with other countries, especially the Arab states.    
Moreover, the news of developments between the West and countries other than 
Iran received a great deal of coverage in comparison to the news of Iran-West 
developments. In fact, Iranian newspapers used other countries as a scapegoat for 
lambasting the West in the absence of official diplomatic relations between Iran and the 
West.  
 The data also suggest that the West is being represented mainly by the US in the 
Iranian press. In fact, relations between Iran and the US account for the highest volume of 
coverage given to Iran-West relations3. The reason may be that most interaction (either in 
the form of cooperation or conflict) between Iran and the West occurs through the US. In 
other words, the West is being represented by the US in Iran. When Iranian leaders make 
statements about the West, their reference is mainly to the US. It can therefore be inferred 
that in the Iranian political parlance, the West equals the US.      
Moreover, the United States remained the primary Western country involved in the 
news in the both periods. Notwithstanding, the focus of newspapers shifted from stories of 
the United States during Reformism to stories of Britain during Conservatism. This could 
have happened because of a tougher line of policy adopted by Britain against Iran (which 
also led to the assault by Iranian students on the UK embassy in Tehran in 2011). Iranians 
blame Britain for the economic hardship of their country. For example, Iranians believe it 
was first Britain which restricted financial transactions with Iranian banks including the 
Central Bank of Iran. They accuse Britain of “being more catholic than the pope” in 
pressurising Iran.   
 On the nature of relations between Iran and the West, the Iranian press tried to 
release stories of “conflict” nature during both periods. This trend was also observed in the 
                                                           
1Regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, the majority of the news highlighted the “right of Iran to access nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes”. 
2 Although Iran has formal and diplomatic relations with other Western countries, such relations are at the 
lowest level. Iran broke relations with the UK late in 2011 when Britain closed its embassy in Tehran and 
expelled Iranian diplomats.  
3 On the basis of data taken from DRQs 10 and 17.  
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relations between Iran and the US (and the UK) as well as relations between the West and 
countries other than Iran. However, the press promoted “cooperation” when reporting 
relations between Iran and the EU31. This explains the fact that Iran and the West are on a 
collision course. As explained earlier, confrontation is more serious between Iran and the 
US in comparison to the confrontation between Iran and the EU3, considering the history of 
anti-Americanism in Iran. It is also an indication of the conflicting nature of the Iranian 
foreign policy against the West.   
 In terms of techniques used to portray the West, Iranian press tend to give more 
prominence to stories about the West by highlighting them in the “top half-page” section of 
the “domestic” and “foreign news” pages as well as the “front page” of the newspaper2.  
This indicates that the West is of utmost significance, under the influence of the anti-
Western ideology of the regime, for the Iranian press to report on3. This also suggests that 
the agenda-setting and priming functions of the press in Iran is greatly under the influence 
of the state.  
 Moreover, the data on DRQs 6, 7, 8 and 9 suggest that the Iranian press do not 
mainly rely on “foreign sources” of news to report on the West. Even though Iranian press 
do not have correspondents based in other countries, they rely heavily on their own staff 
writers to “compile” (other than “translate”) the news, and gather it not from major 
international sources of news but from less-known international newspapers and local 
agencies. Indirectly, however, Iranian newspapers rely on the official Iranian News Agency 
(IRNA) to portray the West, as IRNA has bureaus in major Western capitals.  
It is discussable why the Iranian press do not rely on “major” foreign sources. The 
fact that the press rely on “minor” sources of news could be related to the publication of 
negative news of the West by such minor or “alternative” agencies and particularly the 
Arab media. In other words, less-known sources of news tend to cover stories which are not 
published by the Big Four; such news mostly highlight negative points about the West and 
are therefore covered heavily by the Iranian press.  
One other key finding of the study suggests that newspapers which are controlled 
directly by the government follow the official line and policies of the same government. In 
fact, they tend to construct the news of the West in accordance with the foreign policy 
interests of their respective government4. For example, the “Iran” newspaper (a 
                                                           
1 On the basis of data taken from DRQs 18 to 22.   
2 Nearly half of the West-related stories appear on the “domestic” and “foreign” pages of newspapers. 
3 On the basis of data taken from DRQs 4 and 5.  
4 Such a trend was not observed in newspapers with no affiliation to the government.  
 245 
government-owned and –controlled newspaper) promoted cooperation between Iran and the 
West during Reformism in line with the détente policy of the government in international 
relations. However, the same “Iran” newspaper promoted conflict between Iran and the 
West during Conservatism when the government policy was to face up to the West.  
The critical discourse analysis also demonstrated that pro-Conservative newspapers 
portray the US “negatively and stereotypically” while pro-Reform media refuse to do so. 
The foreign policy approach of Conservatives (rejection of the West) and Reformists 
(accommodation of the West) are well promoted in the affiliate press. Newspapers from 
both the political camps have consensus over representing Iran as a “regional power” and 
stressing its role in international relations, while ruling out US allegations against Iran. The 
use of the “presupposition” technique in newspaper editorials of both political wings 
implies that tensions between Iran and the West are only “presuppositions” or 
“assumptions” which the press deem true while in practice they may be untrue. This 
reflects the sort of “suspicion” existing in relations between Iran and the West. Overall, the 
analysis of this editorial on the nuclear issue suggests that Iranian newspapers, regardless of 
their affiliation, believe in diplomacy (cooperation) rather than confrontation with the West 
when it comes to the nuclear issue.   
 
b. Analysis of main themes   
As explained earlier, five main themes were selected in order to provide a better 
analysis of the results. Here, I analyse these main themes.  
- Iran’s nuclear issue and the Western confrontation  
Iran’s nuclear issue is the case of nuclear activities of Iran which came to the 
spotlight of the International Atomic Energy Agency and respective UN bodies in 2002. It 
continues to be on the limelight. The West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear weapon. 
Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful purposes 
including for power generation and medical purposes. Iran’s nuclear issue has been one of 
the main subjects of news in the Iranian and Western media since 2003. The researcher 
decided to select this theme for analysis as it constitutes a main bone of contention between 
Iran and the West.  
Although the nuclear issue is considered to be one of the main points of difference 
between Iran and the West, findings of this research demonstrate that mainstream Iranian 
newspapers have a different opinion. They highlighted stories (such as the relations 
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between the West and other countries) other than the nuclear issue of Iran. And this 
happened during Conservatism when the official policy of the government was to ignore 
the West when it comes to the nuclear issue. On several occasions, President Ahmadinejad 
declared that the nuclear case is closed and “we will not negotiate over the nuclear issue”. 
On negotiations with the Group 5+1, the Iranian side is insisting that it will only negotiate 
with the West on a broad range of issues including nuclear disarmament and the right of 
Iran to enrich uranium. Moreover, the majority of the news about the nuclear issue 
highlighted cooperation (than conflict) with the West over Iran’s nuclear activities. Again, 
such coverage is consistent with the official policy of the Ahmadinejad government to 
accommodate the West while at the same time rejecting it. Qods newspaper, a pro-Con, 
wrote in an editorial: At the present juncture, it seems that the continuation of negotiations 
without pre-conditions has been guaranteed and the necessity of suspending enrichment 
activities by Iran has partly reduced tensions; otherwise, with the insistence of Tehran, 
reaching agreement will become difficult and will endanger the continuation of talks (Qods 
newspaper, 14 September 2006). 
Another feature of newspaper reporting of the nuclear case of Iran during the period 
under this study was that the majority of the news published in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers highlighted the right of Iran to access nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes. Jomhouriy-e Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, writes in an editorial on the 
occasion of the National Day of Nuclear Technology: Now, Iran has access to the peaceful 
nuclear technology with the aim of supplying energy. The world has reached this belief that 
in spite of all the obstacles created for Iran, its access to the nuclear energy is a work 
bigger than the industrialisation of oil. Officials and people of Iran are trying their best not 
to withdraw an inch from their right to access nuclear energy as according to the leader of 
Islamic Revolution, it is a need and necessity as part of the scientific advancement of Iran 
(Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 09 April 2011).  
Iranian newspapers also highlighted the achievements of the country in the nuclear 
area. Jam-e Jam, a pro-Conservative newspaper, wrote in an article about Iran’s nuclear 
achievements: The long steps of Iran in the nuclear technology have embarrassed the West, 
Zionist regime and its long-term allies. President Ahmadinejad has unveiled Iran-made 20-
per cent fuel rods. This indicates the inefficiency of the Western sanctions. In spite of unjust 
economic pressures by the West and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists by Mosad, 
Iran continues its nuclear achievements without interruption (Jam-e Jam, 19 February 
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2012)   In a similar piece, Jam-e Jam wrote: New nuclear achievements indicated that 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities have passed the “threshold” and is now in the “deep and 
stable” stage (Jam-e Jam, 18 February 2012)    
In general, findings indicate that Iran’s nuclear issue is not a major player in the 
negative portrayal of the West in the Iranian press. Notwithstanding, Iranian newspapers 
use the nuclear issue to stress the fact that “we need to engage with the West”. At the same 
time, the nuclear issue is also exploited by the press to highlight the nuclear achievements 
of the country and boost national spirit.     
- Terrorism and the West  
Terrorism in its various forms is another problem between Iran and the West. Both 
sides accuse each other of sponsoring terrorism. The United States accuses Iran of 
sponsoring terrorist groups. The US regards Hamas and Hezbollah, the two main anti-Israel 
movements mainly bankrolled by Iran, as terrorist organisations. This is while Iran 
describes them as “freedom fighters”. The pro-Conservative Resalat newspaper wrote in a 
newspaper editorial : The president of our country clearly defended the struggles of 
Palestinians and declared Islamic Iran’s opposition to the so-called peace process and said 
clearly that: Supporting people who are fighting for the liberalisation of their lands is not 
terrorism but a support for those who are fighting against state terrorism” (Resalat, 08 
January 1998).   
On the other side, Iran accuses the US of creating terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda 
and Jondollah which have created insecurity inside Iran by terrorising, bombing and 
assassinating. Iran also accuses the US of backing the MKO which it describes as 
“hypocrite terrorist”. Furthermore, Iranians believe the “military intervention and 
occupation” by Western soldiers of the neighboring countries of Iran is akin to terrorism. 
Iran attributes any sort of violence in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Syria to “foreign 
occupants”.   
The present research indicates that issues related to terrorism (such as war, violence 
and intervention) are the dominant theme of stories published in the Iranian press about the 
West regardless of their affiliation and the period in which they publish1. Newspapers from 
                                                           
1 Table 27 suggests that while 31.9 per cent of stories were about relations between West and other countries 
than Iran (except for Iraq and Afghanistan), their dominant political theme was bilateral relations between the 
West and those countries. Out of stories related to relations between Iran and West (including stories about 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), 23.4 per cent were about terrorism, war and violence. Opposition to West 
was the theme of 10.7 per cent of the stories. 
 248 
both political parties describe US support for MKO and Israel as examples of “state-
sponsored terrorism”. For example, Mardomsalari- a pro-Reform newspaper, blamed the 
US for the “terrorist acts by the Monafeqin”: The US administration finally after years of 
hiding its support for the MKO terrorist grouplet, proscribed this hated group from the list 
of terrorist organisations of that country. By this act, the US added to its long list of anti-
Iran measures (Mardomsalari, 30 September 2012) 
The newspaper reporting of issues related to terrorism and the West demonstrates 
that Iranian newspapers, like the Iranian government, do believe that the West is behind any 
act of terrorism in the region and especially inside Iran. Explosions in holy Iraqi cities of 
Karbala, Najaf and Samara—main destinations for Iranian pilgrims—are extensively 
covered by Iranian newspapers who blame them on the “US military occupation”. 
Exposures by the Ministry of Intelligence of assassination attempts and bombings in 
different Iranian cities blamed on the “America, Britain and the Zionist regime and their 
hypocrite collaborators” are constantly covered by the Iranian press. For example the news 
of the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists appeared on the front page of almost all 
Iranian newspapers. The Ebtekar newspaper described the assassination of one Iranian 
nuclear scientist in the following manner: Assassinating Iranian [nuclear] scientists is 
fruitless…and will not cause any delay in the progress of Iran’s nuclear 
activities…(Ebtekar, 08 March 2012).   
Conservatives also used “interventionist” as a stereotype to refer to the West, 
possibly under the influence of the war factor. They were in fact fearful of an Iraq-style 
invasion by the US and its allies. Similarly the Conservatives had an interest in introducing 
the West as an “interventionist” and “warmonger” in Iraq and Afghanistan and later in 
Libya, Yemen, Egypt and most recently in Syria. Ebtekar, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote 
in an editorial: The people of Iraq are right in having no good memorial from the 
Americans despite the fact that the US saved them from the vice of Saddam. The people of 
Iraq are right in counting the days impatiently for the exit of the last soldier of the occupier 
American army from their soil (Ebtekar, 09 October 2011 ). Similarly, Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, used this headline to report on an anti-war protest 
rally in the US: Protest in the US against the White House warmongering (Jomhouriy-e 
Eslami, 11 April 2011).  
 Kayhan, a pro-Conservative newspaper, attributes terrorism in Syria to the US: The 
Tehran Meeting was held in an atmosphere in which the Syrian Army operations are 
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continuing in Aleppo against terrorist groups which are supported by the US and its 
regional allies. Also, this meeting was held under circumstances in which the West is using 
force as a tool to dominate Syria and change its regime. Such efforts by the West have 
reached a deadlock (Kayhan, 12 August 2012).  
- The West as “enemy”  
The West is stereotyped as an “enemy” by the mainstream Iranian newspapers1. 
According to the data of this research, “animosity” is in fact the third mostly-used 
stereotype in mainstream Iranian newspapers to describe the West. The data also indicates 
that the Iranian press used this stereotype more during Reformism than Conservatism. One 
possible reason behind such a difference in the two periods under study is related to the 
foreign policy of the pro-Reform government vis-à-vis the official policy of the Islamic 
regime. The Khatami administration’s policy, in contradiction to the official policy of the 
regime (stipulated by Ayatollah Khamenei), was to accommodate the West. Such an 
accommodation policy was confronted by Conservative hardliner supporters of Ayatollah 
Khamenei and even himself. On difference occasions, they openly talked about their 
opposition to the normalisation of relations with the United States on the basis that 
“America is our biggest foe and number one enemy”. They demonised the West among the 
public opinion in order to put pressure on the pro-Reform government to abandon its policy 
to accommodate the West. Such public statements were indispensably carried by the 
                                                           
1 The term stereotype was first coined by Walter Lippmann in 1992 when he used the term in his book 
“Public Opinion” to describe the uniform pictures and preconceptions that group members hold in their minds 
to simplify their views of the world and for reaching common agreement regarding events in their 
environment. He argued that people interact directly not with objective reality but with the representations 
they have created about that reality. The term stereotype was further developed in 1933 by Daniel Katz and 
Kenneth Braly who presented an operational definition of stereotype. In their study, believed to be the first 
organised and influential study on stereotype, Katz and Braly defined stereotypes as “pictures” of national and 
ethnic groups which reflect attitudes toward them. Decades later, researchers argued that members of a group 
act toward other groups on the basis of shared stereotypes (attitudes, feelings and ideas). This theory was 
developed in the 1980s by Henry Tajfel who suggested that when members form a group and social identity, 
they tend to derogate and even discriminate other groups in order to raise their own self-esteem and status. 
Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005:3) went further and defined stereotype as “repertoire (i.e. beliefs) that people 
have about the characteristics of other groups”. According to them, at first stereotype was believed to be the 
“product of faulty, rigid, and irrational thinking” which was used interchangeably with “prejudice” (Bar-Tal 
and Teichman, 2005:3). However, later most researchers began to consider stereotype as an “expression of 
normal and universal cognitive functioning”. Technically, stereotype is a “text cast is rigid form for the 
purpose of repetitive use” in printing (Pickering, 2001:9). The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines 
stereotype as a “fixed general image or set of characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular 
type of person or thing”. Putnam (1975:34) defines stereotype as “a typical feature of a kind”. Stereotype has 
been defined by Allport (1954: 191) as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to 
justify our conduct in relation to that category”. Franklin et al (2005:254) have identified three features of 
stereotypes: First, stereotypes are “exaggerated beliefs” which involve either an “inflation of characteristic” or 
“over-generalisation from part…to whole”…Second, stereotypes contain “a kernel of truth” and “resonate 
with what we (and others) think to be true. And third, stereotypes function to “rationalise our conduct and 
justify our actions”. Fowler (1991:16) adds a fourth feature to stereotypes: meaningfulness. He defines 
meaningfulness as “an ideology of ethnocentrism…or homocentrism: a pre-occupation with countries…”.  
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newspapers. The pro-Conservative Khorasan newspaper published an interview with a 
Friday prayers leader about the controversial 2009 presidential elections: Mashhad Friday 
prayers leader…said “I have said that they [fitna leaders] are the grounds of fitna. They 
are not real fitna. The real fitna is America and the English. Referring to the statements by 
the leader of Islamic Revolution who said “you have to know the enemy”, Ayatollah 
Alamolhoda said “the main enemy are they [US and Britain] because the issue of Mousavi 
and Karrobi is finished; however the issue of America and the English is not 
finished…American and the English are the planner of fitna (Khorasan, 31 December 
2012).  
In their reasoning against the West (the US) and stereotyping it as “enemy”, 
Conservatives cited “violent incidents orchestrated by the West against the noble people of 
Iran”. Among the most cited events was the 1953 coup against the Iranian government, the 
botched attempt to rescue American hostages in 1980, downing of a civilian plane with 290 
passengers onboard by American navy in the Persian Gulf in 1988, and the logistic and 
political support given to Saddam in his eight-year war against Iran (1980-88). Kayhan, a 
pro-Conservative newspaper, describes the relationship between Iran and the US as a 
“reality of the animosity of the US administration with Iran” and writes in a report: Some 
people and particularly modernist thinkers believe that the existence of enemy and threats 
by foreign enemies are only a fantasy and hyperbole by the state officials. They believe that 
in action there is no threat by the US and Western countries against the Iranian nation and 
this [demonisation of the US and the West] is only a fantasy. This claim is made under 
circumstances in which such people for a long time were hiding the fact that foreigners 
wanted to stage a colour revolution and fitna [in the 2009 presidential elections]. However, 
the confessions by those related to foreign currents and in particular the agents of the 
English and America disproved this claim. Moreover, recent statements by the Western 
rulers and in particular the recent confession by Hillary Clinton in the TV demonstrated 
that they [the West] supported the fitna movement of 2009… (Kayhan,  04 March 2012).    
Each of the above-mentioned incidents, described by some hardliners as “terrorist 
acts”, has now turned into a “national event” in the Iranian calendar celebrated by marches 
and anti-Aemrican demonstrations. Such gatherings are usually accompanied with speeches 
by high-ranking officials which are also covered extensively by the mainstream media. In 
his historical interview with the CNN, president Khatami replied to a question about the 
“death to America” slogan in Iran. He stated: the “death to America” is in response to the 
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heinous act of the former American defense secretary who said the roots of the Iranian 
nation should be dried. Or it is a response to the downing of the Iranian civilian plane with 
about 300 women and men passengers who were destroyed by the commander of the US 
navy commander.     
- The West as “hypocrite”  
Another stereotype used widely by the Iranian press to portray the West is the 
“West as hypocrite”. After “animosity”, “hypocrisy” is the mostly-used stereotype to 
describe the Western attitude towards Iran. A careful analysis of the news about the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers suggests that “hypocrisy” is usually collocated with 
“double standards”.  
 The use of such phrases to describe the West is mainly attributed, by mainstream 
Iranian newspapers, to the policy of the West and in particular the United States vis-à-vis 
developments related to Iran. The good example is perhaps the approach of the West 
towards Iran’s nuclear programme on one side and Israel’s atomic activities on the other. It 
has widely been reported that Israel holds at least 200 nuclear warheads. The IAEA has not 
been able to verify that Iran has a single nuclear weapon. However, Iran is under constant 
pressure and severe sanctions by the West to drop its nuclear programme, while Israel is 
continuing its nuclear activities without any pressure. Moreover, as one newspaper editorial 
said, “Iran’s nuclear facilities are under the 24-hour monitor by the IAEA, while this 
international organisation is ignoring the atomic bombs of the Zionist regime”. Such an 
approach by the West is described by the mainstream Iranian press as “double standards 
and hypocrisy”. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote in a report that: the Iranian 
nation cannot accept the West double standards towards the nuclear technology 
(Mardomsalari 14 November 2012).   
 Another frequently-cited instance of “the Western double standards and hypocrisy” 
promoted by the Iranian press is regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Palestine as well as the blockade of Gaza are matters of the 
“Western double standards”, Iranian newspapers accuse the West of “adopting silence 
towards the atrocities of the Zionist regime”. They also accuse the West of supporting 
terrorism. Such stories are repeatedly covered by mainstream Iranian newspapers, mostly in 
their front pages. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote: The US 
administration…demonstrated that it still regards terrorism as a tool. The US 
administration is using double standards towards the phenomenon of terrorism. Terrorism 
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from the viewpoint of the US government is divided into good terrorism and bad terrorism 
(Mardomsalari,  30 September 2012).  
 Human rights issues are another area which is claimed by Iran to be an example of 
the Western hypocrisy. This is also reflected in the news about the West in the Iranian 
press, particularly when it comes to the Western reaction to the uprising in Bahrain, the 
massacre of Muslims in Myanmar or the killing of children in Gaza and most recently the 
alleged support given by the US to armed groups in Syria which has resulted in the killing 
of thousands of people.  For example, Hamshahri described the US reaction to the situation 
in Bahrain as a “double standard by the global arrogance” (Hamshahri, 02 January 2013).   
- The West as “global arrogant and colonial power”  
While more than 80 per cent of stories related to the West did not reflect any 
stereotype to portray the West, the majority of the stereotypes in the stories described the 
West as “arrogant and colonial”.   
“Arrogance” is the literal translation of the Persian (and originally Arabic) word 
“Estekbar”, which means the behaviour of a person when they feel that they are more 
important than other people, so that they are rude to them or do not consider them 
important. Arrogance is “having megalomaniac behaviour” or “having excessive pride”. 
Buruma and Margalit (2005:127) explain that arrogance manifests itself in Western 
imperialism and is seen as an “infringement of the rule of God”. In speeches by Iranian 
leader, “arrogance” is usually collocated with (adjective) “global”. Likewise, the “fight 
against the global arrogance”1 is a popular phrase used by top Iranian officials to refer to 
the main principle of the revolutionary ideology of Iran’s foreign policy2. “Arrogance” is 
usually an indirect reference to the United States. In the parlance of the Iranian leaders, the 
United States is the “symbol of arrogance” and global power which seeks to broaden its 
influence in other regions including the Middle East and dominate it.  
Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Iran, employed concepts such as 
“imperialism”, “bullying behaviour”, “domineering manner” and “global arrogance” to 
denounce or “demonise” the West. Such concepts were later turned into stereotypes by 
Iranians to describe the West. Ayatollah Khamenei, the incumbent leader of Iran, uses 
“global arrogance” to reject the Western liberal democracy and the Western “domination 
and arrogance” in imposing its own way of democracy and governance.  
                                                           
1 “Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e Jahani” 
2 In addition, Ayatollah Beheshti, an influential Iranian cleric killed after the revolution, has been quoted as 
saying that “the line of the revolution is anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and anti-feudalism” (Moaddel, 
1992:307).  
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The phrase “global arrogance” was used during Conservatism by government 
officials to gain more support from the leader and the right wing. For example, President 
Ahmadinejad said in a radio speech on 7 December 2009 that the “global arrogance is the 
major impediment to the administration of justice in the world”. In response to his 
American counterpart who called for negotiations with Iran, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar 
Salehi said in an interview on 29 October 2011 that “Iran is not a country to which one can 
speak from the stance of arrogance”.  
A similar attitude prevails in mainstream Iranian press. Hamshahri uses the phrase 
“global arrogance” in a piece of news: The president referred to the history of the 
savageness of the arrogant [powers] and said: the heads of arrogant [a reference to the US 
abd UK] have agreed that they should spread war and bloodshed, which was prevalent in 
the past and in particular during the Second World War and the killing of about 60 million 
people in Europe, to the whole world so that they could plunder other countries and divide 
the booty among themselves (Hamshahri, 02 January 2013).   
The use of this stereotype to portray the West could be attributed to the history of 
relations between Iran and the West and in particular the way Americans treat Iranians. In 
fact, it may be attributed to consequence of the use of Orientalist theme which describes the 
Easterners as “inferior” to the Westerners. The continued call for direct talks between Iran 
and the US is hampered by what the Iranian side describes as the “lack of respect” and the 
“absence of a just and fair environment” for negotiation. And this is echoed in the Iranian 
press portrayal of the West. In an editorial on the relations between Iran and the US, the 
pro-Conservative Kayhan newspaper describes the US as an “enemy” and “arrogant power” 
and concludes that “America has reached concensus over confrontation with Iran. America 
for the past 33 years has targeted the independence, territorial integrity and identity of Iran 
and Islam…If our resistance is increased, definitely we will have an Islamic region minus 
the West within the next two decades” (Kayhan, 07 August 2012).  
 
c. Discussion of the thesis  
As discussed at the beginning of this thesis, Iranian people have an unfavourable 
view towards the West and in particular the United States and more recently Britain. This 
“hatred” could have been a result of the Iranian press portrayal of the West, which is the 
subject of the present research. The researcher views the rising “negative” perception of the 
West in the Islamic Republic of Iran as possibly a by-product of the portrayal of the West 
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in the country’s press, although other factors are definitely involved1.  
A number of reasons have been previously formulated with regards to the rise of 
anti-Westernism in Iran (albeit before the 1979 revolution). Researchers have attributed it 
mainly to the impacts of imperialism and colonialism (Keddie, 1983, 1994; Makdisi, 2002; 
Moaddel, 1992; Vahdat, 2003; Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994), which could be regarded as two 
main factors leading to the Iranian “Occidentalisation” of the West2. Furthermore, the bitter 
experiences of Iran with the West throughout the history and particularly the reaction by the 
Iranian kings and people to the Western concept of modernity, the Islamic nature of the 
Iranian regime, and misguided policies of the United States in the Middle East could be 
blamed for the rise of anti-Westernism in Iran.    
Findings of this research demonstrate that while imperialism and colonialism should 
be blamed for the hatred towards the West in Iran “before” the revolution, the hostile 
approach of the West towards Iranian people (and particularly with regards to the nuclear 
issue and subsequent “crippling sanctions”) are to blame for this “after” the revolution. In 
fact Occidentalising the West before the Iranian public opinion has created obstacles on the 
way of strategic interactions between the West and Iran, jeopardising the global interests of 
both sides and particularly the West in the region.   
One key finding of the study suggests that newspapers which are controlled directly 
by the government follow the official line and policies of the same government. In fact, 
they tend to construct the news of the West in accordance with the foreign policy interests 
                                                           
1 For example, unfavourable image of the West in Iran and the wider Middle East could be attributed to the 
exercise of power and influence on oil-rich Muslim and Arab countries which hold a heavy geostrategic 
weight in global politics and economy. Since the end of the World War II, the United States has made 
extensive efforts to become the dominant political and military power in the Middle East. However, these 
efforts have culminated in the rise of anti-Americanism as the result of the “relative weakness” of America 
(Mitchell, 2004:100). American involvement with the Middle East began in 1784 when a series of 
confrontations between Arabs and Americans led to Barbary wars. The element of “war” and “military 
intervention” in the Middle East has remained strong since the 1800s, ultimately resulting in the current 
negative image of the West in the Muslim world which was amplified in the nineteenth century with the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and later the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Makdisi, 2002:539-540). Moreover, 
there is historical tendency in the Middle East to portray America as an “interventionist and occupier” power. 
This tendency which started by the CIA-engineered coup in 1953 in Iran came into light after the Cold War in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the Western promise to pull out troops from Afghanistan by 2014 has not 
improved the image of the West. It has even exacerbated as the result of burning copies of Quran in a US base 
followed shortly by a shooting spree by an American soldier who killed dozens of women and children in 
March 2012, fueling the flames of anti-American sentiments and mass protests and demonstrations not only in 
Afghanistan but also in other Muslim nations including Iran. Anti-Americanism is not pervasive in the Middle 
East only. According to Nolan (2005:88), anti-Americanism has been a “pervasive feature” of the post-9/11 
global landscape which is widespread within Europe not only in France but also in Britain and even in 
Germany long regarded as the most Americanised and pro-American Western European nation.  
2 One limitation with this explanation is, however, that it fails to study the role of the media inter alia in 
creating anti-Western sentiments among the Iranians. 
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of their respective government1. This may explain the propaganda function of the Iranian 
newspapers in highlighting negative news of the West, even in its relations with other 
countries, especially the Arab states.    
The use of the “presupposition” technique in newspaper editorials of both political 
wings implies that tensions between Iran and the West are only “presuppositions” or 
“assumptions” which the press deem true, while in practice they may be untrue. This 
reflects the sort of “suspicion” existing in relations between Iran and the West and explains 
the fact that Iran and the West are on a collision course. As explained earlier, confrontation 
is more serious between Iran and the US in comparison to the confrontation between Iran 
and the EU3, considering the history of anti-Americanism in Iran. It is also an indication of 
the conflicting nature of the Iranian foreign policy against the West.   
To look at Iranian Occidentalism in more details, one should study events during 
the 1950s and 1970s which led to the formation of an anti-Western “discourse” which was 
later changed into an anti-Western (and particularly anti-American) “revolutionary 
ideology” after the Islamic revolution continuing to this date. Results of the present study 
suggest that such a discourse and ideology have influenced the press representation of the 
West in Iran.  
By examining the press narratives on Occidentalism, this research indicated how the 
media representation strategies are carried out in reality and how journalists use them to 
lead/mislead the public opinion in favour or against the Occident.  
The results and findings of the present study are yet another contribution to the 
study of the West, particularly in the Iranian context. In fact, the representation of the West 
in the Iranian newspapers in the way discussed above signifies the creation of a new type of 
Occidentalism in the Orient, which I describe here as “Iranoccidentalism”. 
Iranoccidentalism has several defining characteristics: It is an ideological concept, which is 
under the influence of the prevailing discourse; It projects the West, through media, as 
“arrogant/imperial and interventionist”2; It is coupled with anti-Americanism and 
opposition to the West, and is linked to the history of colonialism and imperialism in Iran; 
It is a reaction to Orientalism; It seeks to spread the Islamic ideology of governance and 
awakening within the framework of the Shiite ideology; In fact, Iranian Occidentalism is a 
tool to materialise the Shiite ideology of “standing against the evil and the oppressor”. 
Moreover, Iranoccidentalism pursues a “nativistic” and “nationalistic” approach which 
                                                           
1 Such a trend was not observed in newspapers with no affiliation to the government.  
2 Such stereotyped images of the West are dehumanising, hateful and antagonistic.  
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manifests itself in the Iranians’ national resolve to develop indigenous technologies such as 
the nuclear, aerospace and missile technologies as well as biotechnology and 
nanotechnology. As discussed by Boroujerdi (1996), the discourse of nativism, which was 
prevalent in the Iranian society from the 1950s onward, led Iranian intellectuals to call for 
“the resurgence, reinstatement or continuance of native or indigenous” Iranian values, 
customs and beliefs, in reaction to the Western modernity. This nativism, which according 
to Arbus (2009:9) was accompanied with Iranian nationalism “to assert the power of the 
nation state in the face of the encroaching West”, led to the formation of a type of 
Occidentalism and an authentic Iranian identity aimed at reclaiming “a native, pure and 
untainted Iranian heritage in opposition to that of the modernising, capitalist, and tyrannical 
West”1.  
Such an Occidentalist function has been also reiterated by Michel Foucault who 
praised the role anti-Westernism and Occidentalism played in boosting the Iranian resolve 
to alternative forms of non-Western modernity and counter-discourse to the hegemonic 
West (as cited in Afary and Anderson, 2005).  
As indicated earlier in the research, Occidentalism by definition, is the science of 
knowing the Occident. Academically and in the general sense, it constitutes a system of 
Occidental quality, style, character, or spirit as well as Western policies, customs, 
institutions and characteristics.  
In special terms, Occidentalism goes far beyond geography and academics. It may 
become ideological. Occidentalism denotes the image of the Occident (West) in the Orient 
(East). Or it could be the image of the West “constructed” (by the state) and/or “portrayed” 
(by the media) in the East. In fact, one of the functions of Occidentalism is to study the 
Occident, either in the East or in the West, by either Easterners or Westerners2.  
Said believes the “relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of 
power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said, 1979:5). The 
same applies in Occidentalism and the relationship between the Orient and Occident. While 
Said’s Orientalism is a strategy of Western world domination, Occidentalism in the Iranian 
context is a model of relationship between East and West. Findings of the present research 
                                                           
1 Borrowing from the concept of Occidentalism developed by critic Sadiq Jalal al- Azm (1981), Boroujerdi 
(1996: 11-12) defines Occidentalism as a counter-narrative of Orientalism and “a discourse used by ‘oriental’ 
intellectuals and political elites to lay claim to, recapture, and finally impropriate their ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ 
identity”. Boroujerdi (1996: 14) attributes Occidentalism in Iran to the “seductive lure of nativism," which is 
defined as “the doctrine that calls for the resurgence, reinstatement, or continuance of native or indigenous 
cultural customs, beliefs, and values”. 
2 Such a study might consist of the investigation of the “image”, “understanding” and “manifestation” of the 
West in the East as well as the knowledge of the East about the West.    
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suggest Iranoccidentalism could be a mode of “ideological representation” which might 
paradoxically have both positive and negative orientations. It is mainly about the political, 
philosophical, ideological and religious differences between the (Islamic) East and 
(Western) West1.   
In a sense, Occidentalism in the Iranian context is not Said’s “Orientalism in 
reverse” as the latter was created as the result of the exploitation and victimisation of the 
East by the West for imperialistic purposes, while the former could not basically be created 
for imperialistic purposes because the East (and Iran) is obviously economically and 
politically incapable of exploiting the West2. And Said himself has confirmed such a view. 
Two times in his book on Orientalism, Said (1978:50) reiterates that “…no one is likely to 
imagine a field symmetrical to it [Orienalism] called Occidentalism”. Elsewhere at the end 
of his book, he emphasises that “…I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to 
Orientalism is not Occidentalism” (Said, 1979: 328). These two statements indicate that 
Said himself was not imagining that Occidentalism is Orientalism-in-reverse and that a 
concept similar to Orientalism can be invented.  
As explained by Santos (2009) and Buruma and Margalit (2005), Occidentalism is a 
“reciprocity trap”, as victims of the Western stereotypes have the same power to construct 
stereotypes of the West in order to criticise Western superiority (arrogance) as opposed to 
Eastern inferiority. In other words, Occidentalism is a product of Orientalism. In Said’s 
view, hegemony (power) is one of the two main elements of Said’s Orientalism3. He 
believes that the West Orientalised (or more precisely “hegemonised”) the East in order to 
reach to power; however, the East cannot Occidentalise (or more precisely “hegemonised”) 
the West in the same manner that the West Orientalised the East. In fact, hegemony cannot 
be applied from the East to the West; it flows from the West to the East.     
In fact Occidentalism is an ideological concept which could be of a paradoxical 
nature. While Orientalism could be directly or indirectly related to colonialism, 
imperialism, anti-Islamism (Islamophobia) and Westernisation in the context of Western-
                                                           
1 The adjective “Western” was used here to avoid confusion as the Eastern West could include Eastern 
countries such as Japan or Russia or more recently China. Such a distinction also exists with regards to two 
main Islamic branches. While claiming to be the “true” followers of the “pure Mohammadic” Islam (Islam-e 
Nab-e Mohammadi), Shiites accuse Sunnis of being Westernised or more accurately Westoxicated. Therefore, 
we have Western Islam and Eastern Islam. Followers of Shiite Islam are generally scattered in the Middle 
East while Sunnis are mainly living in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.      
2This could be demonstrated simply by making an analogy between the Occidentalism-Orientalism 
relationship and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians are clearly incapable of launching a proportionate 
attack against Israel because (1) they do not possess any army or sophisticated weaponry and (2) Israel has 
one of the advanced armies and weaponries in the region and is equipped with nuclear and biological 
weapons.      
3 The other element of Said’s Orientalism is “knowledge”.   
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style modernity, Occidentalism (particularly in the Iranian context) is mainly characterised 
with anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Westernisation (anti-Americanism) in the 
context of Islamic-Iranian-style modernity1. In other words, Occidentalism, while being 
interrelated to Orientalism, is a natural “reaction” to Orientalism2.  
Occidentalism in the Iranian context in general could not be a “response” to 
Orientalism because it is not a “considered” or “reciprocal” action. Iranian Occidentalism 
could not be an “attack” but a “defence” as attack denotes a “considered” action while 
defence is usually an “automatic reaction”3. In this sense, Occidentalism could not be a 
“counter-argument” as counter-arguments are “thought” in advance4.  
Indeed, from the twentieth century onward, this type of Occidentalism has been a 
“response” to and an “attack” on Orientalism especially during the World War II when 
Japanese kamikaze pilots crashed into the ships of Western Allies in suicide actions, or 
during the 1910s when Germany’s army launched a series of attacks on the British in 
Flanders. Occidentalism in the modern time could be a response to and an attack on 
Orientalism when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre and Twin Towers 
and committed suicide bombing in Iraq and Afghanistan against Western armies5.      
Occidentalism could also not be a “mirror”, “image”, “reverse”, “obverse”, 
“opposite” or “inversion” of Orientalism, because this group of words (which have been 
used by scholars to define Occidentalism) implies that Occidentalism is exactly the “same” 
as Orientalism, in a reverse order. However, Occidentalism (particularly in the Iranian 
context) could be a “counter-image” and an “opposition” to Orientalism when it comes to 
criticising the West. To put it more accurately, Occidentalism is in “opposition” to 
Orientalism but Orientalism is not in opposition to Occidentalism as Orientalism has come 
first.         
Occidentalism in Iran represents the image of the West among the Iranians portrayed by 
                                                           
1 In addition to these characteristics, Buruma and Margalit (2005: 3-12) identify Occidentalism also with 
Western capitalism, materialism, dehumanism, modernism, globalisation (as a shorthand for US imperialism), 
anti-Americanism as well as Jewish financial power in the West, Western support for Israel and Western 
warmongering (in Iraq and Afghanistan).   
2 This is the only one common denominator among the definitions of Occidentalism presented in this thesis. 
Almost all define Occidentalism as a “reaction” (and not a response) to Orientalism. Since Occidentalism is a 
reaction to Orientalism, it is therefore an “ideological representation”. 
3 Occidentalism could be a counter-attack but only in the form of resistance similar to the type of resistance 
the Palestinians are exercising against Israel. They can only resist but not attack proportionately.    
4Notwithstanding, Occidentalism could also be a “response” when it is promoted by specific extremist 
entities. Buruma and Margalit (2005) refer to this as “murderous Occidentalism” and trace it back to 
eighteenth-century Japan and even in the heart of Europe where Nazi Germany invaded the “Jewified West”.  
5 Al-Qaeda-style Islamism (radical/extremist version of Islam) has been described by Buruma and Margalit 
(2005: 102) as the “main religious source” of Occidentalism in the modern era.   
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the media. This image, as indicated above, could be positive or negative and signifies the 
West as an “arrogant/imperial and interventionist” entity. Such negative representation of 
the West by the Iranian press may not be fabricated, as negative news about the West is 
indeed negative in nature1. In fact, negativity sets value for news.  
The stereotypical representation of the West also has its roots in the history of relations 
between Iran and the West. As explained earlier, this history is full of highs and lows and 
mistrust.  
On one hand, Iranians believe that the West is hypocritical towards them; they accuse 
the West of adopting double standards; they blame the US for “illegally” imposing 
sanctions on them trying to overthrow the Islamic regime; and more importantly, Iranian 
leadership firmly believes that the US is behaving in a proud, unpleasant way with Iran, 
showing no respect and thought for them2. Such stereotyping in fact seems to have been 
heeded by the Obama administration. As discussed in the Critical Discourse Analysis 
section, in his Norouz messages Obama showed respect to the “government and nation” of 
Iran and urged Iranian officials to forget the past.  
On the other side, the West accuses Iran of violating human rights, sponsoring terrorism 
and developing nuclear weapons to destabilise the Middle East—charges which have been 
categorically denied by Iran.  
Moreover, Iranian newspapers use foreign sources of news to report on the West. 
Although the press act selectively in publishing news of the West somehow in the same 
manner that their counterparts are doing in the West, they at least have a foreign and in 
some cases credible source of news for their readers. And this is another proof that Iranian 
Occidentalism is not Orientalism in reverse. Said (1978) argues that the media and cultural 
apparatus of the United States and the West have presented the concept of Islam based on 
ignorance, cultural hostility and racial hatred. This is while mainstream Iranian newspapers 
are not acting based on ignorance, cultural hostility or racial hatred.  
Iranoccidentalism has two rather different aspects:  
i. State Occidentalism:  
                                                           
1 For example, when a hurricane hits parts of the US and the government is not quick to help the victims, the 
unfolding news is definitely negative, even for Americans themselves. 
2 Such “arrogant” behaviour is emphatically rejected in the Iranian political culture. Like many other Middle 
Eastern nations, Iranians, are proud of their history and culture in which “arrogance” and “you-think-you-are-
more-powerful-than-me” have no place. One good example is the reaction by the then-spokesman of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran to President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. Hamid Reza Asefi (as quoted in 
PBS’ FRONTLINE documentary series “Showdown with Iran”, 23 Oct. 2007) said: America is at the centre 
of evils of the world...because where there is a problem...America has got a finger in it...They think they are 
responsible for every event in every part of the world. Nobody has given this responsibility to America.     
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It is the image of the West “constructed by the state” for Iranians.  This image could be 
constructed through government policies and official statements and speeches, also carried 
by the media (through publishing domestic news). The constructed image is perceived to be 
“negative” and “stereotypical”.  
State Occidentalism in Iran could be a reaction to Orientalism and is associated with 
anti-Westernism (in particular anti-Americanism), anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. It 
emanates mainly from the historical track/record of the West in Iran, especially the 
Western-imposed modernity during the past century.  
This type of Occidentalism is mainly related to the political and economic relations 
between Iran and the West. The state Occidentalism could be a product of the non-state 
Occidentalism or it could result in the emergence of non-state Occidentalism. Since there 
are newspapers in Iran which are under the control of the government, it can be implied that 
their production functions (agenda-setting, framing and priming of the news about the 
West) are under the influence of the “state Occidentalism”.   
ii. Non-state (public or media) Occidentalism:  
It is the image of the West “portrayed” among the Iranians by (1) the (public or state-
owned) media through their coverage of news or the publication of opinions/editorials or 
(2) by the intelligentsia who according to Boroujerdi (1996:21), have served as “crucial 
intermediaries and interpreters between their own culture and that of the West”1. This 
image could be “negative” and/or “positive” and sometimes “stereotypical”.  
Non-state Occidentalism could be attributed to West’s policies in the Middle East 
(especially with regards to Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war on terror), Western-
imposed modernity, West’s Islamophobia, West’s confrontation with Iran’s nuclear 
programme on one hand and/or West’s democratic/technological/cultural values on the 
other. The first set of reasons has led to the formation of anti-Westernism (particularly after 
the revolution) while the second set has created Westernism (Westernised inclinations) 
among the Iranians (particularly before the revolution).  
This type of Occidentalism is mainly related to the cultural, scientific and technological 
relations between Iran and the West although political considerations are also engaged.  
The media, as stated above, are one of the essential tools of promoting Iranian 
Occidentalism. The role of the media is so instrumental that the Iranian government has 
launched several international television news channels in different languages in order to 
                                                           
1 Arbus (2009:4) describes Iranian intellectuals as Occidentalists who act as “mediators between Iranian 
society and the West”. 
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influence the target public opinion in the West. Press TV in English, Hispan TV in Spanish, 
Al-Alam in Arabic and Sahar TV in French and five more languages are a few to name.  
What is striking here is the relationship between communication theories (employed in 
this thesis) and the promotion of Iranian Occidentalism, which will be explained below.  
The link between the media exposure and the formation of public perception is 
undeniable. For example, Nisbet et al (2004:32) have demonstrated that TV news coverage 
of the United States in predominantly Muslim countries leads to the rise of anti-
Americanism. On the other hand, the influence of media on foreign policy is a well-
established and well-researched notion (Ajami 2001; el-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Perlez 
and Rutenberg 2003; Nisbet et al, 2004; Chan, 1994; Gerges, 2003). Such influence is so 
great that some governments monopolise media (particularly radio and television) to 
“mobilise their citizens politically” (Nisbet et al, 2004:17) and use media as “a vehicle for 
their propaganda” (El-Affendi 1993: 165). Moreover, it has already been suggested that the 
media help to “establish an order of priorities” in society about its problems and 
objectives1. To do this, media effect theories (agenda-setting, priming and framing) are 
often used by the media to influence the formation of public opinion and the cultivation of 
image.  
Likewise, as the findings of the present research confirmed, Iranian newspapers played 
a role in shaping public perceptions about the West (Occidentalism) by “selecting and 
prioritising” related news and set the agenda for the public (or even the government)2. 
Moreover, Iranian newspapers tried to highlight or “prime” stories of the West by 
displaying them on the front page or the top-half page. In this way, they dedicated more 
attention to an item so that the audience also finds this news item important. In fact, Iranian 
newspapers “framed and primed” West-related sorties for the audiences in the way they 
desired. In other words, Iranian newspapers used framing and priming as a process of 
“selection” and “salience” or “selecting” and “highlighting” a particular subject-matter in 
order to create a targeted sense (Occidentalism) in the audience.  
The whole process is based on the fact that the more prominence media attach to an 
issue, the more the chance of influence on the public opinion about that issue. Therefore, 
Iranian newspapers used the three techniques of media influence (agenda-setting, framing 
                                                           
1 They do this not by “initiating or determining, but by pulicising according to an agreed scale of values 
which is determined elsewhere, usually in the political system” (McQuail, 1984:45). 
2 According to the literature on agenda-setting, the more people see or hear about an issue or subject, the 
more they will talk about it and this will increase the chance that issue ends up on the public and policy 
agenda. 
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and priming of news) to portray the West and promote Occidentalism in the society.  
The classification presented earlier above (state Occidentalism and non-state 
Occidentalism) is well combined with the general perception of Occidentalism in Iran. 
According to Homa Katouzian (2010), two opposite views have been held side by 
side, often by the same persons, since the nineteenth century with regards to Iranian images 
of the West: 
...the one describing the West as a thoroughly immoral [and in Buruma’s 
and Margalit’s word “dehumanising” and “main corrupter of sexual 
morality”] society (especially regarding sexual relations) as well as an 
imperialist power; the other, as a wonder of the world, a perfect society 
and the law-giver of science, art, culture, etc. Both views have persisted 
down to the present day (Personal interview) Brackets added.   
 Saeed Reza Ameli (2012), professor of communications at the University of Tehran, 
presents a similar grouping on views of the West. He proposes “the West of Science and 
Technology” and “the West of Arrogance”—both were observed in the news of the Iranian 
press on the West studied here.  
Moreover, Arbus (2009) who has done a survey of the views of prominent Iranian 
intellectuals makes a similar conclusion about the seemingly paradoxical nature of the 
Iranian confrontation with the West.  
While Shariati and Al-e Ahmad reject some things from the West 
(notably, it’s [sic] cultural and economic exploitation), they are clearly 
willing to adopt other Western ideas into their thought. While Soroush 
does not necessarily advocate the complete separation of church and 
state, he stands as an advocate for equality and democracy in Islamic 
societies (Arbus, 2009: 47-48). 
 Iranian Occidentalism is much like the Chinese Occidentalism through which, 
according to Ning (1997: 63-64) and Chen (1992: 688-690), China could establish its 
position in the World and stand against the Western hegemony1. One important similarity 
between the Iranian and Chinese Occidentalism (revolutionary ideology) is that both are 
opposed to “imperialist Western superpowers” and the “exploitation of the East by the 
West”.  
According to Chen (1992: 688-689), Chinese Occidentalism was influenced by Mao 
                                                           
1 In fact, Ning (1997:62-63) believes that confrontation between Iran and the United States after the 1979 
Islamic revolution is a form of Middle Eastern Occidentalism which manifests itself as a form of antagonism 
and strong opposition to Western “hegemonism”. 
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Tse-tung’s Theory of Three Worlds “in which he asserted that the First World 
superpowers-the Soviet Union and the United States-invariably exploit and oppress the 
Third World countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America”1.  
 In fact, China could be the role model for Iranian Occidentalism and the Iranian 
state has chosen to adopt a policy similar to China as Iranian leaders believe that China is 
well standing successfully against the West (United States) by outperforming economically 
and politically. President Khatami’s “dialogue among civilisations” and President 
Ahmadinejad’s “global management initiative” are within the framework of the Iranian 
Occidentalism following the Chinese Occidentalism. Iran’s efforts to access nuclear 
technology and its continued call for “reforming the UN Security Council structure” could 
be also interpreted as being in line with the Islamic Republic policy to follow China’s track 
of Occidentalism. China is an economic powerhouse and also a nuclear power which has 
given it the privilege of being a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, providing it 
with the opportunity of challenging the US in many sectors of international relations. 
Therefore, China’s great power status could be the result of its Occidentalist policies.  
Based on the Chinese Occidentalism, there are two types of Western images, much 
like the images portrayed by the Iranian Occidentalism. The first image is portrayed by 
those who consider the Occidental culture “superior” to that of the Orient.  
“… [T]o them the Western world is a heaven. They seek an opportunity 
to pay respects to it or enjoy themselves there (Ning, 1997:64).”  
The second type of image is constructed by those Chinese who regard the West, and 
the US in particular, as an “oppressor enemy”.  
To these people, the West is in decline, its outward prosperity merely a 
false mask through which we can see its implied crisis; to them the 
twenty-first century will surely be the century of China or the Orient, 
and Oriental culture is superior to Western culture and is bound to 
dominate the world (Ning, 1997:64). 
 Therefore, the concept of Occidentalism in Iran is much similar to the evolution of 
                                                           
1 This element of “Third Worldism” has been also explained by Keddie (1983:596) who believes that 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Revolution in Iran, and many Iranian intellectuals, saw the world, 
under the influence of this ideology, “as largely divided into the just Muslim oppressed” colonised by an 
imperialist West and the “Western or Western-tied oppressors”. Mirespassi-Ashtiani (1994), Bayat (1990) and 
Hanson (1983) have also stressed that the Third Worldist ideology of the 1960s and 1970s, which was based 
on rejecting dependence on the West, has influenced the Iranian revolutionary ideology. Moreover, according 
to Puchala (1997:131), Third-World writers followers are of the opinion that “relations between the non-West 
and the West are essentially stories about undoing dominance/subordination, gaining self-determination and 
regaining self-respect, reasserting that which has been suppressed, resurrecting that which has been 
submerged and reclaiming that which has been stolen”.  
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Occidentalism in China. There is also a similarity here with the Russian Occidentalism: 
Occidentalism, both in Iran and Russia, has turned into an ideology. However, unlike the 
Russian Occidentalism, which is a mixture of domestic and imported foreign philosophy 
(mainly German), the Iranian Occidentalism is purely a product of the Iranian history which 
was influenced greatly by the West and theology in addition to nativism and nationalism.   
 As Said has restricted Orientalism mainly to the US, Britain and France and the 
Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam1, Occidentalism may be also 
restricted to China, Russia and Iran and the Iranian experience of the West, although traces 
of Occidentalism can be also found in other Asian countries as Pakistan and Indonesia, 
mostly in the form of anti-Americanism.   
 
Conclusion 
This research was conducted to investigate how the West is portrayed in the Iranian 
press and how this representation changes over the time. Findings of the study indicated 
that the West is portrayed as an “arrogant” power which resorts to “terrorism, war and 
violence” to reach its “imperialistic” goals and “dominate the world”. The research also 
observed that such portrayal varies to some extent over the time but only in format (and not 
the content) with the change of the political discourse under the prevailing ideology.  
The present study demonstrated that the representation of the West in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers from different political camps is different between two political periods 
and this difference is statistically significant. Such a difference might be a function of 
political inclinations, ideological tendencies and organisational pressures (as explained by 
Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). The nature of developments in the West and its foreign 
policy may be also engaged.  
While in general, Iranian newspapers were against Iran-West relations, pro-Reform 
newspapers were in favour and pro-Conservatives were against such relations. Pro-Reform 
press stereotyped the West as “interventionist” while pro-Conservatives described it 
stereotypically as “arrogant and imperialist”. While the majority of news about the West 
presented a “negative” image of the West during Conservatism, a “neutral” image of the 
West was presented in the majority of news about the West during Reformism. 
The four hypotheses of the research are proved and can be sustained by the evidence 
of statistics and findings of the present study:  
                                                           
1 Said (1979:17) describes the US, Britain and France as “pioneer nations” and “colonial vanguards” of 
Orientalism.  
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RH1. Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH2. Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.  
RH3. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to portray the West more positively during 
Reformism while trying to defuse tension (détente) and highlight cooperation between Iran 
and the West during the same period.  
RH4. Mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to portray the West more negatively during 
Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during 
the same period.  
Although this research was not conducted to study the “why” question of the Iranian 
Occidentalism, the researcher, having analysed mainstream Iranian newspapers, has 
reached this conclusion that “Iranian Occidentalism, which is a feature of the Iranian 
revolutionary ideology, is a by-product of the Western policies (and in particular the 
Western modernity) throughout history which, in most cases, have been hostile towards 
Iran, coupled with a sense of nativism”.  This study indicated through the content and 
discourse analyses of mainstream Iranian newspapers that Occidentalism is characterised in 
Iran with stereotypes such as “arrogant”, “imperialist”, “colonial”, “warmonger” and 
“terrorist” projected in the Iranian newspapers under the influence of the state.      
A number of reasons could be blamed for the resentment of Iranians against the 
West throughout history1:  
i. Religious differences between Iran and the West: The historical study of the role of 
the West in Iran suggests that religious differences could be blamed for the hatred 
among Iranians of the West. For example, in 1935, the US-supported Iranian king, 
inspired by the Western-style clothing, forced women to abandon their hijab against 
their will and religious obligation. In another incident, Reza Shah beat a cleric in the 
holy city of Qom who had admonished the Shah’s wife to observe the full hijab when 
visiting the holy Shrine. The king also restricted religious mourning days during 
Muharram2 and ordered mosques to use chairs instead of the traditional sitting by 
                                                           
1 As stated earlier, Iranians have also positive attitudes towards the West. For example, they praise the 
Western technology and scientific progress.  
2 In Muharram, the first lunar calendar month, Muslims mourn the martyrdom of the third Shiite Imam 
Hossein (AS). Traditionally, Iranians mourn the first 10 days of Muharram, every night by going to mosques. 
Reza Shah restricted this period to one day.  
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mourners—an apparent imitation of the Western-style mourning. Many other such 
incidents can be recalled.    
ii. Sociocultural influences: Social and cultural factors also have a role in arousing anti-
Western sentiments among Iranians throughout the history. For example, ordinary 
Iranians were not happy that the Shahs “squandered” huge costs from the Public 
Treasury on their foreign trips while many Iranian nomads and peasants were living 
under very harsh conditions. They accused the Shahs and the royal family of 
extravagance and accumulating wealth for themselves. People were critical that the 
royal family was the biggest land owner of the country. Also, majority of Iranians 
could not tolerate wearing Western clothes and hats as forced by the Shahs. In one 
example, government forces beat nomads who refused to settle. The critique of the 
Western concept of modernity is also an important factor. In fact, the anti-
modernisation movements in Iran, which occurred in the 1960s and the 1970s, aimed 
at welcoming modernity but in the context of the native Iranian and later Islamic 
contexts. Another goal of such movements was to neutralise the destructive effects of 
colonialism and imperialism on the Iranian society, such as changes in the Iranian 
traditional lifestyle and cultural patterns, the crisis of urbanisation and shifts in the 
Iranian intellectual paradigm. In fact, as truly reiterated by Mirsepassi (2000:73), 
modernisation occurred in Iran in some “spheres of life…without resulting in 
modernity”. As indicated in the chapter on related literature, the hastily-undertaken 
Western-style modernisation programmes, which were ignorant of the religious nature 
of the Iranian society, could be blamed for the gradual formation (evolution) of the 
discourse of Occidentalism in Iran.  
iii. Political reasons: Much of the resentment of the West by Iranians has been created by 
political differences between Iran and the West, especially after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Iranian clerics were always complaining about the exploitation of Iran’s 
natural resources by the West as well as giving economic, political and military 
concessions by the Shahs to the Westerners. For example, the so-called Tobacco 
Movement of 1891 was inspired by a cleric who protested at the concession of 
Tobacco exploitation offered to the British. The protest at D’Arcy oil concession, the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 based on which Britain and Russia decided to 
divide Iran into two “spheres of influence” without informing the Iranian government, 
the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement under the terms of which Iran could have turned 
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into a British colony are a few to name. These all undoubtedly created mistrust among 
the people. Moreover, hostile acts by the West against the interests of Iran before and 
after the revolution are also a source of Iranian resentment of the West. The CIA-
orchestrated 1953 coup, the British exploitation of the Iranian oil, the failed Tabas 
military operation, unilateral crippling sanctions against Iran, military threats by the 
US, financial restrictions by the West and its support for armed Iranian opposition are 
examples of the political disputes between Iran and the West which have resulted in 
the alienation of the West to Iranians. The two sides have also differences on several 
international issues. The most striking of all is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is 
the main source of hostility between Iran and the West1. Also, Iranian officials blame 
Western containment policies for the continued sufferings of the Iranian people and 
the Muslim world at large. They believe Western policies have caused the country’s 
economic privations.  
With no doubt, successive US governments have become a convenient target, 
according to the polls, for discontent among much of the world’s population, especially in 
the Middle East. In Iran, people’s perception of the US as a “land of milk and honey” has 
long co-existed with another image of “hostility” and “arrogance”.  
There is also a widespread perception across the whole Middle East of the US 
government as an “interventionist”. This perception has exacerbated in view of the invasion 
of Libya and continued call for military action against Syria and Iran. A common 
perception that Western policy is biased toward Israel and regimes with unpopular rulers 
has been a cause of resentment.  
 It is also concluded in this research that Iranian Occidentalism is not premeditated 
as Orientalism might be. In Orientalism, there is an element of “exploitation” or 
“misrepresentation” of the East by the West, whereas in Occidentalism, the majority of the 
East is incapable of exploiting the West and is not misrepresenting but representing it. 
Therefore, Iranian Occidentalism is an ideological representation of a natural reaction and 
opposition to the Western Orientalisation of Iran as the “exporters and sponsor of 
terrorism” which is “developing nuclear weapons” and “violating human rights” 2.  
                                                           
1 On the reason behind Iranian animosity with Israel, Hooglund (1995) blames British imperialism of the 
1940s in Iran. According to Hooglund (1995:89), Iranian views of Israel are influenced by the coincidence of 
the “news about events in British Mandatory Palestine with a period of anti-British sentiment in Iran, causing 
Iranians to identify with Palestinians as fellow victims of British imperialism…The 1948 creation of Israel 
confirmed the pervasive notion of Zionists as British agents sent to Palestine to steal the land from its 
indigenous inhabitants”.  
2 This representation could be either positive or negative and sometimes stereotypical.  
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Most Iranians hate the West not because they are against the Western values and 
want to replace it, but because they have suffered from hostile Western policies and 
conduct towards them. In a Gallup Special Report on the Muslim world published in 2006, 
Mogahed confirmed that in most Gallup surveys Muslims have expressed their desire for 
the West “to respect Islam” and “stop interfering in the internal affairs of predominantly 
Muslim states” (Mogahed, 2006:3). The analysis of about 3,000 news stories provides 
tangible proof for this. As President Ahmadinejad told a rally of supporters in a public 
speech, “the West should stop acting as arrogant and bullying and instead accept the role of 
other countries and show greater thought and respect for other people”.  
This research also found that Occidentalism in Iran (and the wider Middle East) is 
closely tied to anti-Americanism. Some researchers have attributed anti-Americanism in the 
Middle East to mainly cultural (values) and religious differences between the East and the 
West (Huntington 1996; Lewis 2001; Tessler and Nachtwey 1998 as cited in Nisbet et al, 
2004). Others, however, have blamed hatred towards the US on its foreign policy in the 
Middle East (Telhami 2002; Hertsgaard 2003; Monshipouri 2002; Khan 2002 as cited in 
Nisbet et al, 2004). Some others have also identified internal situations of Middle Eastern 
countries (such as their internal politics, lower levels of economic and social development 
and the failure to establish civil society and democracy) as the main factor behind 
discontent with the US among the Muslims (Emmerson 2002; Rubin 2002 as cited in 
Nisbet et al, 2004)1.  
Nisbet et al (2004:12) have added a fourth dimension to the roots of anti-
Americanism in the Middle East: coverage of the US in the target media and what they 
describe as “ineffective information campaign” by the US government2. They believe that 
“macro-level” factors such as differences in economic and social development 
                                                           
1 Other scholars have listed other reasons behind anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Kupchan (1989:587) 
believes that the failure of the “American globalism” has led to the intensification of anti-American 
movements. Nolan (2005:88) supports this in his paper on “contemporary anti-Americanism” in Germany in 
which he discusses that anti-Americanism has its roots in the “uneven Americanisation of twentieth-century 
Germany”. He also believes that anti-Americanism is a “response to what America has done and is doing” US 
withdrawal from or refuse to sign a variety of international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, the anti-
ballistic missile treaty, the test ban treaty, land mine treaty, the convention to end all discrimination against 
women, the International Criminal Court (Nolan, 2005:89-113). Brezezinski (as cited in Vijayalakshmi, 2008) 
argues that US unilateralism in exercising power could result in increasing vulnerability to globally spreading 
“anti-American virus”. A 2006 Pew poll (as cited in Graber, 2009: 736) blamed anti-Americanism among the 
Muslims on the view that Westerners are “greedy, selfish, arrogant, immoral, and violent and fall short on 
generosity, honesty, devoutness, tolerance and respect for women”. 
2 Nisbet et al (2004:12) conclude in their study of the role of media in raising anti-American sentiments in the 
Middle East that “attention to TV news coverage (by the Middle Eastern media of the US) contributes 
significantly to the rise of anti-American perceptions” even though Western news disseminators do “buffer” 
or “moderate” or “attenuate” the negative main effects of TV news viewing. 
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(longevity/health, aggregate education, and standard of living), the degree of Islamisation 
(the percentage of the population that is Muslim), the degree of political freedom within the 
country’s society (ratings of political rights and civil liberties) as well as “micro-level” or 
“individual” factors such as gender, income, education and age influence anti-American 
perceptions in addition to any TV news effects (Nisbet et al, 2004:22)1. The present 
research indicated that anti-Americanism in Iran is influenced by the political discourse and 
ideology of the regime.  
Graber (2009) has conducted another similar study with regards to the role of media 
in crating anti-American sentiments. In his analysis of three American television programs 
(The West Wing, That 70’s Show, and Friends) broadcast across the Middle East including 
Iran, Graber (2009) argues that television entertainment programs such as American 
comedies broadcast throughout the Middle East can be another reason for the “continued 
low regard for Americans and for the United States”2. 
The “vital role” of the media in creating anti-American sentiments in the Middle 
East has been also underlined by Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:172) who, by giving the 
example of Abu Ghraib Prison scandal being carried by local media, emphasise that the 
anti-American perception was heightened in the 2003 invasion of Iraq being covered by 
non-Western media.  
The role of the Arab television...was vital to the public interpretation 
of Washington’s actions. Images of the US military domination of a 
once-proud Arab state were beamed throughout the region...This 
perception of Arab humiliation at the hands of a Western military 
force was further intensified by occasional public relations lapse 
                                                           
1According to the results of their study, people living within the pan-Arab broadcast area have significantly 
higher levels of anti-American sentiment while those in countries with comparatively higher levels of 
socioeconomic development score lower in anti-American attitudes. Also, people in countries with a higher 
percentage of Muslims within their population are less prone to negative perceptions of the United States. In 
contrast, people in countries with a higher degree of political freedom are more likely to have strong anti-
American views. Moreover, women were less negative in their perceptions of the United States than men and 
people with higher levels of education were more negative in perceiving America Nisbet et al (2004:26-28). 
They also found that in terms of general television exposure, time spent watching television promoted 
negative perceptions of the United States. Nisbet et al (2004:28) also reached the conclusion that viewers 
turning to pan-Arab regional networks such as Al-Jazeera and MBC were more negative in their perceptions 
of America, while people who watched Western networks such as CNN or the BBC, were significantly less 
negative in their perceptions of the United States. 
2 Graber (2009: 737-740) further observes that the US State Department has “substantially” stepped up its 
public diplomacy campaign in some Middle Eastern countries since 2001 to stop “growing anti-
Americanism...and improve America’s image” through education and media. One such measures, which 
Franklin (as cited in Graber, 2009:740) believes can “hardly be expected to overcome the impact of the Arab 
media” and the graphic footages of  Palestinians in them, has been monitoring television and news reports in 
Arab media “to detect misinformation and hostile propaganda”. 
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(Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; 171-172).     
 Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008) also highlight the importance of the emergence of 
indigenous media in the Middle East which provided people with the opportunity to 
access information free from the control of governments.    
The evidence from the present research indicates that the media wield tremendous 
influence on anti-American attitudes among Iranians, above and beyond any macro-level or 
socio-demographic factors presented by Nisbet et al. Such a function by the Iranian press is 
influenced by the strategy of the Islamic Republic to materialise the idea of the Islamic 
Ummah or the new Islamic civilisation. This could be implied from the policies of different 
governments ruling Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and particularly after the 1980s.   
Governments of President Rafsanjani, President Khatami and President 
Ahmadinejad have all been following the same strategy: the development of Iran to 
materialilse the greater concept of the Islamic Ummah. This strategy, devised by the leader 
of the Islamic Revolution, was either influenced by the Western policies (especially before 
1979) or itself influenced the Western policies (especially after 1979) towards Iran. Such 
policies in fact helped the evolution of the Iranian Occidentalism with the help of the media 
in the manner explained throughout this thesis.  
This strategy was implemented under different tactics pursued by different 
governments. President Rafsanjani wanted to reconstruct Iran to turn it into a power in the 
Muslim world. He tried to do this by turning Iran into a modern Islamic state. Rafsanjani in 
fact pursued a policy of modernity through reconstructing the country physically.  
President Khatami intended to globalise Iran by developing it into a civil society in 
tandem with global standards of sustainable development. He proposed the idea of dialogue 
among civilisations. Khatami followed a policy of modernisation which originally began 
from the Constitutional Era (1905-1907) but was impeded. He in fact wanted to reconstruct 
the country mentally. This led to the formation of the discourse of Reformism during 1997 
and 2005.  
President Ahmadinejad, however, pursued this strategy by trying to contribute to the 
global governance and proposing the global management initiative to promote the role of 
Iran in international affairs. He wanted to make a balance in power at the global level. He 
helped the strengthening of the discourse of Conservatism during 2005 and 2013.  
 The important note to conclude is that whatever policy or government to rule in 
Iran, it should follow the strategy described by the Leader of Islamic Revolution. This 
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strategy, which has influenced the Iranian Occidentalism, is based at the present time on 
anti-Americanism and resistance against reconciliation with the West (even if it is to be 
done by a close ally to the leader). The state-owned and –controlled media are the tools of 
promoting this strategy.  
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Appendix 1: Coding Scheme  
 
The coding scheme consists of a codebook and a coding sheet (form). The codebook consists of the 
“theoretical” (conceptual) and “operational” definitions and the coding sheet consists of categories of 
variables to be examined as follow.    
 
a. Codebook 
DRQ1- Name of newspaper/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
A newspaper is a body of text which contains news of current events, articles, features and advertisements 
printed on paper regularly. A daily newspaper is a newspaper which published on a daily basis. In Iran, the 
first newspaper was published during the Qajar Era (1785-1925). It was named “Kaqaz-e Akhbar” (Paper of 
News) and was published in 01 May 1837 by Mirza Saleh Shirazi. The second and third Iranian newspapers, 
namely “Zaharirady Bahara” (an Assyrian name) and “Vaqay-e Etefaqiyeh” (Events Happened) were 
published respectively in 1849 and 1861.    
 
1. Ettelaat   
Operational definition:  
Ettelaat is the eldest Iranian newspaper which is still publishing. It was first published in 11 July 1926 in 
Tehran. It is a daily newspaper which was first published in two pages and 500 issues.  It is currently 
affiliated with the Leader’s Office and the Foundation for the Needy People (Bonyad-e Mostazafan). As a 
mainstream Iranian newspaper, Ettelaat currently publishes 20 pages. It has an international edition called 
“Ettelaat International” which is published in London. Although Ettelaat is usually described as a non-aligned 
paper, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002 and pro-Reform during 2005-2008.   
 
2. Iran   
Operational definition:  
Iran was first published in 1995. It is the only Iranian newspaper which is officially owned by the government 
and is published by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, Iran 
publishes several other publications including an Arabic and an English language newspaper as well as a 
sports-specific daily paper. Iran adopted a pro-Reform policy during 1997-2002, and a pro-Conservative 
approach during 2005-2008.  
 
3. Hamshahri   
Operational definition:  
Hamshahri is the first Iranian colour newspaper. It was first published in 15 December 1992. It is affiliated 
with the Municipality of Tehran. Its circulation in 2009 was about 500,000 issues. As a mainstream 
newspaper, Hamshahri publishes 18 “supplements” and magazines.   
Hamshahri was pro-Reform during 1997-2002 and pro-Conservative during 2005-2008.  
 
4. Jomhouriy-e Eslami   
Operational definition:  
Jomhouriy-e Eslami was first published in 30 May 1979. It is the first newspaper which was published 
immediately after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. “Preserving the causes of the Muslim and 
revolutionary people of Iran” has been declared as the main aim of this mainstream Iranian newspaper. Iran’s 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is the licence holder of Jomhouriy-e Eslami. It is a daily newspaper in 16 pages, 
with a circulation of about 100,000 issues. It has been having a one-time cleric managing director since 1981. 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami says its political direction is to “raise public awareness in areas of society and politics 
and promote the culture of the Iranian nation”. Jomhouriy-e Eslami adopted a non-aligned policy during 
2005-2008. However, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002.   
 
 
DRQ2- Publication period under study/nominal 
Theoretical definition:  
Publication period is the political period when the news was published. In other words, it is the time of the 
publication of news stories in newspapers.  
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1. During the Reformist Period    
Operational definition:  
The Reformist Era is when Reformists were in power during the first presidential term of Mohammad 
Khatami. The Reformist Period, for the purpose of this research, spans from 23 May 1997 (when Mohammad 
Khatami, a reformist, was elected president of Iran) to 15 February 2002 (when the first term of Khatami’s 
presidency ends1). 
 
2. During the Conservative Period    
Operational definition:  
The Conservative Period is when Conservatives sealed power. For this research, the first presidential term, 
when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power, was selected. It spans from 22 May 2005 to 18 November 2008.      
 
DRQ3- Political affiliation of newspaper/nominal   
Theoretical definition:  
Political affiliation is the political orientation of the newspaper under study.  
  
1. Pro-Reform 
Operational definition:  
Pro-Reform newspapers are those which support the causes of the Reformists. Pro-Reform newspapers tend to 
highlight stories which are high on the agenda of the pro-Reform government. For this research, pro-Reform 
newspapers include Ettelaat (during Ahmadinejad’s first tenure (2005-2008)), Iran (during Khatami’s first 
tenure (1997-2002)) and Hamshahri (during Khatami’s first tenure (1997-2002)).  
 
2. Pro-Conservative 
Operational definition:  
Pro-Conservative newspapers are those which support the causes of the Conservatives. Pro-Conservative 
newspapers tend to highlight stories which are high on the agenda of the Conservative government. For this 
research, Pro-Conservative newspapers include Ettelaat (during Khatami’s first tenure (1997-2002)), Iran 
(during Ahmadinejad’s first tenure (2005-2008)), Hamshahri (during Ahmadinejad's first tenure (2005-2008)) 
and Jomhoury-e Eslami (during both periods (1997-2008)).  
 
3. Non-aligned  
Operational definition:  
Non-aligned newspapers are those which cannot be attributed to any political wing. None of the newspapers 
in this research is non-aligned, although some believe that Hamshahri, which is owned by the Tehran Mayor, 
could be categorised as non-aligned. However, during Khatami’s first tenure (1997-2002), Hamshahri was in 
the control of a pro-Reform mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbaschi. During Ahmadinejad’s first tenure 
(2005-2008), Hamshahri was presided over by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf—a tough contender of 
Ahmadinejad during 2005 presidential election campaigns.  
 
DRQ4- Story layout/nominal  
Theoretical definition 1:  
A news story is a news article or item published in the newspaper as a factual account. A news story is a piece 
of news which appears in the newspaper, has a headline, lead and body as well as a source. For the purpose of 
this research, all stories which are related somehow to the West are analysed. The story could be related to the 
domestic affairs of Iran or the foreign policy of the West.   
 
Theoretical definition 2:  
Story layout is the arrangement of news stories in a newspaper page. A newspaper story is placed or laid out 
in a newspaper page according to editorial and graphical guidelines and policies of the press. It signifies the 
ordering of news stories. A very important story is laid out at the top of the page while less important news 
stories come in the bottom. The font size of the news story also signifies its importance. The larger the font 
size, the more significant is the story. Main headline of the page is usually the most important news of the 
                                                           
1 In Iran, the presidential term spans for four years and is renewable once. The first term of presidency for 
pro-Reform Mohammad Khatami spans from 1997 to 2001. However, due to the lack of any significant 
development between Iran and the West in 1998 (during the first presidential term), the researcher included 
the year 2002 (which falls in the second presidential term) in the first presidential term of Mohammad 
Khatami.     
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day.   
   
1. Main headline of page (lead story) 
Operational definition:  
Main headline or the lead story of the page is the headline which is the largest in size in a page. The main 
headline of the page usually comes on top of the page, but not always.  
 
2. Top half page  
Operational definition:  
The top half page in a newspaper is the uppermost page. If a newspaper page is vertically divided into two 
equal parts, the top part is called “top half page”.   
 
3. Bottom half page  
Operational definition:  
The bottom half page in a newspaper is the lowest page. If a newspaper page is vertically divided into two 
equal parts, the bottom part is called “bottom half page”.   
 
DRQ5- Story page in the newspaper/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
The newspaper page in which a news story appears is called a story page. It is in fact the place of the news in 
the newspaper.   
 
1. Domestic news/politics page  
Operational definition:  
If a West-related story appears on the “politics”, “domestic”, “domestic politics”, “news” or “domestic news” 
page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.  
 
2. Foreign news/diplomacy page  
Operational definition:  
If a West-related story appears on the “foreign policy”, “foreign”, “foreign news”, “international politics” or 
“international news” page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.  
 
3. Front page  
Operational definition:  
If a West-related story appears front page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.  
 
DRQ6- Method of story produced/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
Newspaper stories which appear in the Iranian press are either produced by their staffers or translators. 
Sometimes, staff writers, reporters or journalists in newspapers receive the news from government sources, 
statements and press releases. Other times, staff writers, reporters or journalists compile the news. In this case, 
they put together or compose from materials gathered from several sources. In other words, they “transcreate” 
the news. The term “transcreate” means media people use both translation and writing techniques in order to 
produce the news.  
  
1. Pure translation  
Operational definition:  
Pure translation happens when stories are published as the exact translation of the source. In pure translation, 
the source of the news is written at the very beginning of the story. No additional sentence is added or reduced 
from the source news. It is usually a translation from English or Arabic. Pure translation stories are usually 
very short.   
 
2. Transcreation (translation and creation)   
Operational definition:  
Stories which are compiled through translation and writing are transcreation. Transcreation stories are not 
only a translation of a piece of news taken from a foreign source, but also the staff writer, reporter or 
journalist adds his or her own comments to it. In other words, there is at least one foreign source of news in 
transcreation.     
 
3. Staff writers 
Operational definition:  
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News stories which have no source of news are written by the staff. Reporters or journalists usually produce 
this type of stories. They are usually published in a column or as “opinion”, “perspective” or “editorial”.  
 
DRQ7- Primary source of news  
Theoretical definition:  
Sources of news are people, places or organisations that supply newspapers (journalists) with ideas and 
general information for potential news stories. For example, organisations such as the police act as primary 
definers in that they supply the media with many of the crime news sotries. International news agencies are 
one of the main sources of news for national (domestic) media organisations. In particular, the international 
news desk of newspapers tends to resort to international news agencies as their main source of news. 
International news agencies gather and distribute news to a range of media clients on a local, regional, 
national or international scale.   
  
1. International news agencies/press   
Operational definition:  
International news agencies or international press are the world’s most well-known media. For this research, 
international news agencies include Reuters, AP (Associated Press) and AFP (Agence France-Presse). 
International press include major British, American and Arabic newspapers or magazines including the 
Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Independent, International 
Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, New Statesman, 
Wall Street Journal, Asharq Alawsat, Al-Qods Al-Arabi, Al-Nahar, Al-Hayat and Al-Safir.  
   
2. National/official news agencies/press   
Operational definition:  
National/official news agencies/press are those Iranian media which are published at the national level and 
have been given official permit for publication. National and official news agencies under study include 
IRNA, ISNA, Fars News Agency, Mehr News Agency, Student News Agency (Basij) and ILNA. National 
and official press include Hamshahri, Iran, Ettelaat, Kayhan, Resalat, Jomhouriy-e Eslami, Donyay-e Eqtesad, 
Abrar, Jaam-e Jam, Tehran-e Emrouz, Sharq, Etemad-e Melli, Etemad, Hayat-e No and Sarmayeh.      
 
3. Unidentifiable/unknown sources 
Operational definition:  
Unidentifiable sources are impossible to identify. Unknown sources are unfamiliar or not widely known 
sources of news.   
 
4. Correspondents (no source)  
Operational definition:  
When the news story has no source or it has been written by the newspaper correspondents.  
 
5. Else 
Operational definition:  
Any other source of news which does not fall in the above categories.  
 
DRQ8- Main international source of news/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
Main international source of news are well known at the international level and have historically been one of 
the most formative influences in the development of news particularly in developing states. Main international 
source of news include main international mainstream news agencies, television stations and newspapers.   
 
1. Reuters 
Operational definition:  
Reuters news agency headquartered in UK, having bureaus in most countries; Reuters 
   
2. AP 
Operational definition:  
Associated Press is based in the US with offices across the world; AP 
 
3. AFP 
Operational definition:  
Agence France-Presse is in France while having bureaus in other countries; AFP 
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4. British media 
Operational definition:  
British media include mainstream newspapers/websites (Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, 
Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Independent, New Stateman) and television channels/websites (BBC, Channel 4, 
ITV News, Sky News).  
  
5. American media 
Operational definition:  
American media include top newspapers (International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Times, 
Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, Wall Street Journal) and television stations (CNN, NBC, Fox News, 
ABC). 
 
6. Arab media  
Operational definition:  
Arab media include mainstream press (Asharq Alawsat, Al-Qods Al-Arabi, Al-Nahar, Al-Hayat and Al-Safir) 
and TV networks (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya). 
 
7. Other international (local/non-Iranian)  
Operational definition:  
Other international sources of news include major news organisations which do not fall in the above 
categories. Other international sources mainly include non-Iranian local newspapers or television networks of 
countries, not mentioned above. For example, Der Spiegel, Azzaman, al-Sabaah.  
 
8. No international source  
Operational definition:  
When the news has no international source.  
 
DRQ9- National source(s) of news/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
National sources of news are sources which are released in Iran. They may include national newspapers, news 
agencies and Iran’s radio and television as well as weblogs, experts and pundits and government organisations 
and ministries.    
 
1. IRNA 
Operational definition:  
Islamic Republic News Agency. It publishes news in several languages and has bureaus in many other 
countries; IRNA 
 
2. IRIB 
Operational definition:  
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting also owns the so-called Central News Unit (CNU) and many radio and 
television news networks. It publishes news in several languages and has bureaus in many other countries; 
CNU; IRIB; Radio and television correspondent.  
 
3. Other pro-Conservative   
Operational definition:  
Pro-Conservative sources of news include Fars news agency (Fars), Mehr news agency (Mehr), Basij news 
agency (Student News Agency), ISNA news agency (during 2005 and 2008).   
 
4. Other pro-Reform     
Operational definition:  
Pro-Reform news sources are ILNA news agency and ISNA news agency (during 1997 and 2001).  
 
5. Non-official news websites  
Operational definition:  
Non-official news websites are those which are being published online unofficially. In other words, they are 
not affiliated with government organisations.   
 
6. Weblogs  
Operational definition:  
Weblogs are a popular type of website presented in the style of an onlie diary or journal by the author. It 
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usually contains personalized commentary and analysis on day subjects and news.  
 
7. Iran’s government sources  
Operational definition:  
Iran’s government sources of news are the Public Relations Departments of government-owned organisations 
and ministries which publish press releases and statements. For example, the Information and Press 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which updates media on developments on a daily basis through 
sending fax messages.  
 
8. Experts/political observers/pundits  
Operational definition:  
Experts, political observers and pundits are those who are contacted by the media in order to produce news. 
They are one of the main sources of news and analysis for Iranian media. Their name usually is by-lined in 
the news.   
 
9. Unidentifiable/unknown  
Operational definition:  
Unidentifiable sources are impossible to identify. Unknown sources are unfamiliar or not widely known 
sources of news.   
 
10. No national source   
Operational definition:  
When the news has no national source.  
 
DRQ10- Primary Western country/countries involved/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
Primary Western country involved is the “first” Western country which has been mentioned in the news story. 
Sometimes, two Western countries are mentioned respectively (immediately after each other), which are also 
regarded as primary countries involved in the news. The West is defined as one or more than one of these 
countries: US, UK, France, Germany or phrases of West, EU3, 5+1 Group, EU 3+3, Europeans.      
  
1. US 
Operational definition:  
The United States of America; the USA; Washington; White House; America; Americans; Great Satan; 
Global Arrogance    
 
2. UK 
Operational definition:  
The United Kingdom; Britain; England; London; the English; the British; Old Colonialist     
 
3. France  
Operational definition:  
France; the French   
 
4. Germany  
Operational definition:  
Germany; the Germans  
 
5. Group 5+1  
Operational definition:  
EU3 (UK, France, Germany); 5+1 Group (US, Russia, China, UK, France plus Germany); EU 3+3 (US, 
Russia, China plus UK, France, Germany); Europeans  
 
6. Not mentioned   
Operational definition:  
When there is no mention of the above categories or when there is no single Western country but there is 
more than one Western country involved; West; more than one Western country; Western countries; 
Westerners; Arrogance; Foreign Powers; Superpowers; Great Powers1. For example, “US, UK fighters 
                                                           
1 These words are in fact a reference to the West and in particular to the US. Therefore, they are coded as 
West. 
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bombard Iraq”; because we have more than one Western country, we code this as “not mentioned”.    
 
DRQ11- Headline direction (line) towards West/ nominal 
Theoretical definition:  
A news headline is a text which comes on the very top of a news story to signify the most important subject of 
the news. As a headline should highlight an important issue (gist), its font size is much bigger than the text’s 
font size so that it could be recognisable and distinguishable to the readers. A headline can be directed, by 
media people under different types of influences, to be positive, negative or neutral towards the West1. It 
could also be stereotypical, positively or negatively.  
 
The term stereotype was first coined by Walter Lippmann in 1992 when he used the term in his book “Public 
Opinion” to describe the uniform pictures and preconceptions that group members hold in their minds to 
simplify their views of the world and for reaching common agreement regarding events in their environment. 
He argued that people interact directly not with objective reality but with the representations they have 
created about that reality2.   
 
The term stereotype was further developed in 1933 by Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly who presented an 
operational definition of stereotype. In their study, believed to be the first organised and influential study on 
stereotype, Katz and Braly defined stereotypes as “pictures” of national and ethnic groups which reflect 
attitudes toward them. Decades later, researchers argued that members of a group act toward other groups on 
the basis of shared stereotypes (attitudes, feelings and ideas). This theory was developed in the 1980s by 
Henry Tajfel who suggested that when members form a group and social identity, they tend to derogate and 
even discriminate other groups in order to raise their own self-esteem and status.  
 
Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005:3) went further and defined stereotype as “repertoire (i.e. beliefs) that people 
have about the characteristics of other groups”. According to them, at first stereotype was believed to be the 
“product of faulty, rigid, and irrational thinking” which was used interchangeably with “prejudice” (Bar-Tal 
and Teichman, 2005:3). However, later most researchers began to consider stereotype as an “expression of 
normal and universal cognitive functioning”.  
 
Technically, stereotype is a “text cast is rigid form for the purpose of repetitive use” in printing (Pickering, 
2001:9). The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines stereotype as a “fixed general image or set of 
characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular type of person or thing”. Putnam (1975:34) 
defines stereotype as “a typical feature of a kind”.  
 
Stereotype has been defined by Allport (1954: 191) as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its 
function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category”. Franklin et al (2005:254) have identified three 
features of stereotypes: First, stereotypes are “exaggerated beliefs” which involve either an “inflation of 
characteristic” or “over-generalisation from part…to whole”…Second, stereotypes contain “a kernel of truth” 
and “resonate with what we (and others) think to be true. And third, stereotypes function to “rationalise our 
conduct and justify our actions”. Fowler (1991:16) adds a fourth feature to stereotypes: meaningfulness. He 
defines meaningfulness as “an ideology of ethnocentrism…or homocentrism: a preoccupation with 
countries…”.  
 
Depending on the kind of (favorable or unfavorable) image it projected or the sense of (order or chaos) it 
conveyed or generally the feeling of (achievement or failure) it aroused, news items were coded as positive, 
negative or neutral.  
1. Positive 
Operational definition:  
 A positive headline towards West is a headline which highlights a positive point about/related to the West. A 
                                                           
1 Positive, neutral, and negative ratings are determined by the content of the text and words used in the story 
in order to prevent the coder from infusing personal opinions or judgment into the analysis. Although it could 
be very hard to rate a story on Positive, neutral, and negative grounds, they can be rated based on the 
combination of context and explicit ratings. Context could be embedded in the text (by analysing the headline, 
body and photo of the news). Explicit ratings can be identified through the use of words of clearly positive or 
negative judgment.  
2 Social psychologists such as Katz and Bradley (1993) and Wilson and Gutierrez (1985) agree that the mass 
media is a powerful mechanism through which stereotypes are disseminated across national and global scales.   
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headline was coded as positive if it conveyed a favorable impression on West. Positive sentences would have 
supported or justified the Western act, or contained quotes by individuals who approved of the action. A 
positive headline about the West is usually one which signifies a medical or scientific breakthrough which has 
been accomplished in the West. An example of a positive headline is: “American scientist produces new 
power generator” (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 17-01-1998).  
 
2. Negative  
Operational definition:  
A headline direction was coded as negative if it had a negative meaning toward, or would have, in all 
probability, caused the reader to form a negative opinion about the West. Negative headline direction would 
have contained unfavorable descriptions of the Western actors, or the acts, condemned the Western action or 
actors involved. A negative headline direction highlights a negative point (such as a problem or challenge) 
about/related to the West or anything which is against the interests of the West. Therefore, a domestic issue of 
Iran (or even a foreign news item) could be against the interests of the West from the viewpoint of Iran1. For 
example, following up the nuclear issue is against the interests of the West from the viewpoint of Iranians. A 
negative headline is not fabricated or manipulated by journalists. It only highlights a negative point. For 
example, “British nurse accused of killing 18 infants” (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997) or “Washington 
sanctions useless against China” (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997) or “Economic recession forecast for 
US” (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997).    
 
3. Neutral  
Operational definition:  
A neutral headline direction highlights neither a negative nor a positive point about/related to the West. A 
headline direction which neither portrayed the West favorably nor unfavorably, neither justified nor 
condemned the Western act or actor, was coded as neutral. A neutral headline direction is impartial and does 
not take sides. Examples of neutral headlines: “Goals of Clinton’s visit to Turkey” or “Next US elections in 
2000” (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997).    
 
4. Stereotypical   
Operational definition:  
A stereotypically-written headline is one which is based on one of the stereotypes attributed to West in Iran. 
They include: colonialism/exploitation; arrogance, misuse of power/domination/unilateralism/criminal 
America/Great Satan; Interventionism/military 
occupation/occupier/aggression/aggressor/warmongering/warmonger/expansionism/ exporter of terrorism 
(state terrorism)/regime change; Double standards and hypocrisy (Tazvir, Nefaq, Dorooee); Mistrust and lack 
of confidence; Enemy/animosity. Therefore, if a headline contains one these phrases and vocabularies, it is 
stereotypical.      
    
5. Positive stereotypical 
Operational definition:  
A positive stereotypical headline is one which highlights a positive stereotype about the West. For example, 
the West as the hotbed of democracy, freedom and human rights. America as the heart of science and 
technology.     
 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
Operational definition:  
A negative stereotypical headline is one which highlights a negative stereotype about the West. Negative 
stereotypes about the West are: colonialism/exploitation; arrogance, misuse of 
power/domination/unilateralism/criminal America/Great Satan; Interventionism/military 
occupation/occupier/aggression/aggressor/warmongering (Lashkarkeshi) /warmonger/expansionism/ exporter 
of terrorism (state terrorism)/regime change; Double standards and hypocrisy (Tazvir, Nefaq, Dorooee); 
                                                           
1 An example of a news story (related to the West) which is negative from the viewpoint of Iran but may be 
positive from the viewpoint of the West:  
Two Holocaust deniers on trial in Germany  
Berlin, IRNA—German news sources announced on Monday that two researchers will go on trial on the 
accusation of denying Holocaust. (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 20-April-2006). 
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Mistrust and lack of confidence; Enemy/animosity. Therefore, if a headline contains one these phrases and 
vocabularies, it is negative stereotypical.       
  
7. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
Non-relevant means not mentioned in the story; Category not related to this story.   
 
DRQ12- Primary subject of story related to West 
Theoretical definition:  
Primary subject of the news is the dominant subject of the story which is related to the West.  
1. Politics   
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story is about politics (domestic or foreign) of the West, it is coded in this category.   
   
2. Economy and energy 
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story is about economy and energy of the West and is published on domestic political 
pages or the front page, it is coded in this category. Since this research does not study news in the “Economy” 
pages of newspapers, only economic news which appear in other pages are analysed. Examples include: 
economic sanctions; economic aspects of the nuclear activities    
 
3. Socio-cultural   
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story is about society or culture of the West, it is coded in this category.   
 
4. Natural disasters and accidents  
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story is about natural disasters or accidents related to the West, it is coded in this 
category.   
 
5. Else 
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story is about none of the above areas, it is coded in this category.  
 
DRQ13- Policy aspects/issues of the West in the story/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
Policy issues highlighted in the story are those which concern either the domestic politics (affairs) of the West 
or its foreign policy (affairs).  
   
1. Domestic politics of the West  
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story concerns domestic affairs or policies of the West, it is coded in this category. For 
example, increasing taxes   
 
2. Foreign policy of the West (such as bilateral relations)   
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story concerns foreign affairs or policies of the West, it is coded in this category. In other 
words, if a foreign country in involved in the story about West or if there are two or more than two countries 
in the story one of which is the West, it is coded in this category. For example, the Iraq war 
 
3. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
If the subject of the story neither concerns foreign affairs nor policies of the West, it is coded in this category.   
 
DRQ29- Iran nuclear issue subject of story  
Theoretical definition:  
Iran’s nuclear issue is the case of nuclear activities of Iran which came to the spotlight of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and respective UN bodies in 2002. The West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear 
weapon. Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful purposes including for 
generating power. Iran’s nuclear case has been one of the main subjects of news in the Iranian and Western 
media since 2003.     
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1. Cooperation (détente)  
Operational definition:  
When the subject of the story is Iran’s nuclear issue, whether it promotes cooperation (détente) and positive 
development between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.   
 
2. Conflict (tension)  
Operational definition:  
When the subject of the story is Iran’s nuclear issue, whether it promotes conflict (tension) and deadlock 
between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.   
 
3. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
When the story is not about Iran’s nuclear issue, it is coded in this category.  
 
4. Else  
Operational definition:  
When the story about Iran’s nuclear issue promotes neither conflict nor cooperation but highlights other 
related issues such as nuclear technology achievements of Iran or its right to access nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes under the NPT.  
 
DRQ14- Dominant political theme of story related to West  
Theoretical definition:  
Stories related to the West and its politics have a theme or angle. In other words, they follow a political 
perspective in order to report the story. The political theme sets the tone of the story and tries to promote a 
political aspect (positive or negative) related to the West. There might be several political themes. The 
dominant political theme is the one which has been highlighted in the headline and the body of the story and 
comes first in the news.     
1. Cooperation with West (such as negotiations on Iraq and the nuclear case)  
Operational definition:  
When the political theme of the story signifies cooperation with the West, it is coded in this category. 
Examples are: Iran’s cooperation with the West in the Afghan war; Iran-US talks on Iraq; Iran-Group 5+1 
negotiations over the nuclear issue.   
 
2. Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern 
of development (Vision 2025)  
Operational definition:  
When the political theme of the story is about the denial of the Western pattern of development and 
promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025), it is coded in this category.  
 
3. Opposition to West  
Operational definition:  
When the story tries to promote the idea of opposition to the West in the form of anti-Americanism and anti-
Westernism, it is coded in this category. For example, anti-US rallies in Iran and other countries   
 
4. Violation of law/rules  
Operational definition:  
When the story highlights violation of international law/rules by the West, it is coded in this category. For 
example, imposing unilateral sanctions on Iran by the US; refusing to supply Iranian civil airliners in Europe 
with fuel     
 
5. Terrorism, war and violence 
Operational definition:  
When the story highlights issues related to terrorism, war and violence, it is coded in this category. It also 
includes torture issues and any subject related to violence and any type of incident which is related to war, 
terrorism and the war on terror. Examples include: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (if it is related to the West); US drone attacks in Pakistan.   
 
6. Interference of West in domestic affairs  
Operational definition:  
When the story highlights the idea that the West is interfering in domestic affairs, it is coded in this category. 
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For example, during elections; statements by Western officials regarding human rights situation in Iran  
 
7. Western support for Israel 
Operational definition:  
When the story brings into spotlight Western support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the peace 
process, it is coded in this category. Examples are: US veto of anti-Israeli resolutions in the UN Security 
Council; Western arms sells to Israel  
 
8. Western threats  
Operational definition:  
When the story is about an issue which contains Western threats, intimidation, obstructionism, allegations, 
pressures, spying and plots, it is coded in this category. For example, nuclear-related allegations; spying 
charges against West; sabotage claims against West; sanctions imposed by the West        
  
9. Else (affairs of other countries than Iran, economic sanctions against other countries, 
domestic issues of West) 
Operational definition:  
When the story is either about the domestic affairs of the West, or relations between the West and other 
countries rather than Iran (except for Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel), or any other political theme not mentioned 
above, it is coded in this category.  
 
10. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
When there is no political theme in the story, it is coded in this category.  
 
DRQ15- Dominant stereotypes of the West/nominal 
Theoretical definition:  
As explained above, a stereotype, in its general meaning, is defined as a “fixed general image or set of 
characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular type of person or thing” (Collins Cobuild 
English Dictionary). If someone is stereotyped as something, people form a fixed general idea or image of 
them, so that it is assumed that they will behave in a particular way. This general image could be either 
positive or negative. However, in the political context, a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated with a 
category…[whose]…function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category” (Allport, 1954: 191, 
brackets added). In this research, a stereotype is defined as an ideologically-driven fixed general image or set 
of characteristics Iranian newspapers have toward West.   
 
1. Colonialism   
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “colonialism”, “neo-colonialism” and “exploitation”, it is coded 
in this category.  
 
2. Arrogance   
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “arrogance”, “neo-arrogance”, “global arrogance”, “misuse of 
power”, “domination”, “domineering”, “unilateralism”, “criminal West” and “Great Satan”, it is coded in this 
category. 
 
3. Colonialism and arrogance 
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “arrogance”, “neo-arrogance”, “global arrogance”, “misuse of 
power”, “domination”, “domineering”, “unilateralism”, “criminal West” and “Great Satan” together with 
“colonialism”, “neo-colonialism” and “exploitation”1, it is coded in this category.  
  
4. Interventionism  
                                                           
1 Some might argue that words and phrases in this category might not be similar. There are two reasons why 
this group of words have been categorised under “Arrogance”. First, the pilot project suggested that in order 
for tackling statistical problems, such categories should be combined. Second, the common denominator 
among all these words and phrases is “arrogance”.     
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Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “interventionism”, “military occupation”, “occupier”, 
“aggression”, “aggressor”, “warmongering”, “warmonger”, “expansionism”, “exporter of terrorism”, “state 
terrorism” and “regime change”, it is coded in this category. 
 
5. Double standards and hypocrisy  
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “double standard” and “hypocrisy”, it is coded in this category.  
 
6. Mistrust and lack of confidence 
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “mistrust” and “lack of confidence”, it is coded in this category.  
 
7. Enemy/animosity   
Operational definition:  
If the story contains words or phrases such as “enemy” and “animosity”, it is coded in this category.  
 
8. Else   
Operational definition:  
If the story contains stereotypical words or phrases not mentioned above, it is coded in this category.   
 
9. No stereotype 
Operational definition:  
If there is no stereotype in the news, it is coded in this category. 
 
DRQ16- Foreign relations subject of story/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
Every story about the West published in the Iranian newspapers is about relations of the West and relations of 
Iran. In other word, stories about the West signify contacts or elements of contact of either the West or Iran.    
1. Iran-West relations 
Operational definition:  
 If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.  
 
2. Iran-US relations 
Operational definition:  
 If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the US, it is coded in this category.  
 
3. Iran-UK relations  
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the UK, it is coded in this category.  
 
4. Iran-France relations 
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and France, it is coded in this category.  
 
5. Iran-Germany relations 
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and Germany, it is coded in this category.  
 
6. Relations between the West and other countries other than Iran  
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between West and other countries other than Iran, it is coded in this 
category.  
 
7. Iran-Int’l Organisations relations   
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and international organisations such as the IAEA or 
Security Council, it is coded in this category.  
 
8. West-Int’l Organisations relations  
Operational definition:  
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If the story is about/pertains to relations between West and international organizations, it is coded in this 
category.  
 
9. None-relevant  
Operational definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to domestic affairs of Iran or the West. And if the subject of the story does not 
contain the element of foreign relations, it is coded in this category.   
 
DRQ17-20 Story direction towards Iran-West relations/nominal 
Theoretical definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the West, it follows a direction towards this. The 
story could promote either cooperation or conflict between Iran and the West. It could also be impartial.    
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes a state of friendly relations and cooperation between Iran and West and favours détente, 
it is coded in this category.   
 
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes a state of anxious relations, disagreement, antagonism, tension and conflict between Iran 
and West, it is coded in this category.   
 
3. Neutral  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes neither détente nor tension in relations between Iran and West, it is coded in this 
category.   
 
4. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
If the story is not about relations between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.  
 
DRQ21- Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran/nominal  
Theoretical definition:  
If the story is about/pertains to relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it follows a direction 
towards this. The story could promote either cooperation or conflict between the West and countries other 
than Iran. It could also be impartial.   
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes a state of friendly relations and cooperation between the West and countries other than 
Iran and favours détente, it is coded in this category.   
 
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes a state of anxious relations, disagreement, antagonism, tension and conflict between the 
West and countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.   
 
3. Neutral  
Operational definition:  
If the story promotes neither détente nor tension in relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it 
is coded in this category.   
 
 
4. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
If the story is not about relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.   
  
DRQ22-27 Image of the West presented in story/ nominal 
Theoretical definition:  
Picture or general idea about the West highlighted in the story. When the West is portrayed in the Iranian 
newspapers, it creates an image of the West for the readers. The image could be positive, negative, neutral or 
stereotypical. Depending on the kind of (favorable or unfavorable) image it projected or the sense of (order or 
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chaos) it conveyed or generally the feeling of (achievement or failure) it aroused, news items were coded as 
positive, negative or neutral.  
1. Positive  
Operational definition:  
A story (image) was coded as positive if it conveyed a favorable impression on West. Positive sentences 
would have supported or justified the Western act, or contained quotes by individuals who approved of the 
action. If the image of the West portrayed in the story is positive, it is coded in this category. If the story 
highlights a positive point related to the West, it is coded in this category.   
 
2. Negative 
Operational definition:  
A story was coded as negative if it had a negative meaning toward, or would have, in all probability, caused 
the reader to form a negative opinion about the West. Negative image of the West would have contained 
unfavorable descriptions of the Western actors, or the acts, condemned the Western action or actors involved. 
If the image of the West portrayed in the story is negative, it is coded in this category. If the story highlights a 
negative point related to the West, it is coded in this category.  
  
3. Neutral 
Operational definition:  
An image which neither portrayed the West favorably nor unfavorably, neither justified nor condemned the 
Western act or actor, was coded as neutral. In other words, if the image of the West portrayed in the story is 
neutral (impartial), it is coded in this category. If the story highlights neither a positive or negative point 
related to the West, it is coded in this category.   
  
4. Stereotypical   
Operational definition:  
If the image of the West portrayed in the story is stereotypical, it is coded in this category.   
 
5. Positive Stereotypical 
Operational definition:  
If the image of the West portrayed in the story is positive stereotypical, it is coded in this category.   
 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
Operational definition:  
If the image of the West portrayed in the story is negative stereotypical, it is coded in this category.   
 
7. Non-relevant  
Operational definition:  
If no image of the West is portrayed in the story, it is coded in this category.  
 
DRQ28- Journalistic photo direction towards the West    
Theoretical definition:  
Journalistic photo is a particular form of photo which is taken to tell a news story. It is taken by photo 
journalists on different news occasions such as press conferences or bilateral meetings between officials. A 
journalistic photo is different from other types of photos in that it is combined with other news elements to 
make the news more tangible and factual for the audience.    
1. Positive  
Operational definition:  
If the photo portrays the signified/person as positive1, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you 
look at that picture, you will have a positive feeling towards it; therefore, it is coded in this category.  
 
                                                           
1 From the viewpoint of Iran.  
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2. Negative 
Operational definition:  
 If the photo portrays the signified as negative, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you look at 
that picture, you will have a negative feeling towards it; therefore, it is coded in this category. Example:  
          
 
3. Neutral  
Operational definition:  
If the photo portrays the signified as neutral, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you look at that 
picture, you will have no feeling towards it; it is coded in this category.  
 
4. No photo 
Operational definition:  
If the story has no photo, it is coded in this category. 
 
 
 
b. Coding Sheet (form)   
 
DATE: The date of publication  
for example: 17-05-1997 
 
DRQ1- Name of newspaper/nominal  
1. Ettelaat   
2. Iran   
3. Hamshahri   
4. Jomhouriy-e Eslami   
 
DRQ2- Publication period under study/nominal 
1. During the Reformist Era   
2. During the Conservative Era   
 
DRQ3- Political affiliation of newspaper /nominal   
1. Pro-Reformist  
2. Pro-Conservative 
3. Non-aligned  
 
DRQ4- Story layout/nominal  
1. Main headline of page (lead story) 
2. Top half page  
3. Bottom half page  
 
DRQ5- Story page in the newspaper/nominal   
1. Domestic news/politics page  
2. Foreign news/diplomacy page  
3. Front page  
 
DRQ6- Method of story produced/nominal  
1. Pure translation  
2. Transcreation (translation and creation)   
3. Staff writers 
 
DRQ7- Primary source of news  
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1. International news agencies/press   
2. National/official news agencies/press   
3. Unidentifiable/unknown sources 
4. Correspondents (no source)  
5. Else 
 
DRQ8- Main international source of news/nominal  
1. Reuters 
2. AP 
3. AFP 
4. British media  
5. American media 
6. Arab media  
7. Other international (local/non-Iranian)  
8. No international source  
 
DRQ9- National source(s) of news/nominal  
1. IRNA 
2. IRIB 
3. Other pro-Conservative (Fars, Mehr2, Basij isna2…) 
4. Other pro-Reform (ILNA, isna1)    
5. Non-official news websites  
6. Weblogs  
7. Iran’s government sources  
8. Experts/political observers/pundits  
9. Unidentifiable/unknown  
10. No national source   
 
DRQ10- Primary Western country/countries involved/nominal  
1. US 
2. UK 
3. France  
4. Germany  
5. EU3  
6. Not mentioned   
 
DRQ11- Headline direction (line) towards West/ nominal 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ12- Primary subject of story related to West1  
1. Politics     
2. Economy and energy  
3. Socio-cultural       
4. Natural disasters and accidents  
5. Else 
 
DRQ13- Policy aspects/issues of the West in the story/nominal  
1. Domestic politics of the West  
2. Foreign policy of the West (such as bilateral relations)   
3. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ14- Iran nuclear issue subject of story 
1. Cooperation (détente)  
                                                           
1MERGED  
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2. Conflict (tension)  
3. Non-relevant  
4. Else  
 
DRQ15- Dominant political theme of story related to West1  
1. Cooperation with West   
2. Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern 
of development (Vision 2025)  
3. Opposition to West  
4. Violation of law/rules  
5. Terrorism, war and violence 
6. Interference of West in domestic affairs  
7. Western support for Israel 
8. Western threats   
9. Else   
10. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ16- Dominant stereotypes of the West/nominal2 
1. Colonialism   
2. Arrogance  
3. Colonialism and arrogance   
4. Interventionism  
5. Double standards and hypocrisy  
6. Mistrust and lack of confidence 
7. Enemy/animosity   
8. Else  
9. No stereotype  
 
DRQ17- Foreign relations subject of story/nominal  
1. Iran-West relations  
2. Iran-US relations  
3. Iran-UK relations  
4. Iran-France relations 
5. Iran-Germany relations 
6. Relations between the West and other countries other than Iran  
7. Iran-Int’l Organisations relations   
8. West-Int’l Organisations relations  
9. Non-relevant 
 
 
DRQ18- Story direction towards Iran-West relations/nominal 
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
3. Neutral  
4. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ19- Story direction towards Iran-US relations/nominal   
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
3. Neutral  
4. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ20- Story direction towards Iran-EU3 relations/nominal  
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
3. Neutral  
4. Non-relevant  
 
                                                           
1 MERGED  
2 MERGED  
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DRQ21- Story direction towards Iran-UK relations/nominal  
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
3. Neutral 
4. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ22- Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran/nominal  
1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)  
2. Against (tension-conflict)  
3. Neutral  
4. Non-relevant  
   
DRQ23- Image of the West presented in story/ nominal1 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
DRQ24- Image of the US government presented in story / nominal2 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ25- Image of the EU3 presented in story / nominal 
Positive  
Negative  
Neutral  
Stereotypical   
Positive Stereotypical 
Negative Stereotypical 
Non-relevant  
 
DRQ26- Image of the UK government presented in story / nominal 3 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ27- Image of French government presented in story / nominal4 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
 
                                                           
1 MERGED 
2 MERGED 
3 MERGED  
4 MERGED 
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DRQ28- Image of German government presented in story / nominal1 
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. Stereotypical   
5. Positive Stereotypical 
6. Negative Stereotypical 
7. Non-relevant  
 
DRQ29- Journalistic photo direction towards the West/nominal     
1. Positive  
2. Negative  
3. Neutral  
4. No photo  
 
TITLE: headline of the news  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 MERGED 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive research questions tables  
 
i. Descriptive Research Questions tables   
Descriptive research questions study the representation of the West from the quantitative point of view. 
Figures and statistics related to the representation of the West in terms of features such as the story layout or 
political theme are described in the form of frequency tables in the Descriptive Research Questions (DRQ) 
section. 
 
Descriptive question (Frequency):  
Frequency tables about representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspaper 
 
Descriptive tables:  
As follows:  
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DRQ1: Which newspaper had the most coverage of the West during the whole period of study?    
DRQ1 Name of Newspaper 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Ettelaat 395 18.5 18.5 18.5 
Iran 466 21.8 21.8 40.3 
Hamshahri 419 19.6 19.6 59.9 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 858 40.1 40.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 10 Frequency table for the name of newspaper 
DRQ1 Name of Newspaper
Jomhouriy-e EslamiHamshahriIranEttelaat
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DRQ1 Name of Newspaper
 
 
Table 1 indicates that Jomhouriy-e Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, had the highest volume of 
coverage of the West (40.1 per cent) during the whole period of the study, followed by “Iran” (21.8 per cent) 
and Hamshahri (19.6 per cent). Ettelaat had the least (18.5 per cent).   
 
 
DRQ2: In which period (Conservative or Reformist), did mainstream Iranian newspapers have the 
most coverage of the West? (Which newspaper had the most coverage of the West during Reformism 
and Conservatism?)   
 
 DRQ1 Name of Newspaper * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
DRQ1 Name of 
Newspaper 
Ettelaat Count 112 283 395 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 14.9% 20.4% 18.5% 
% of Total 5.2% 13.2% 18.5% 
Count 145 321 466 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 19.3% 23.2% 21.8% 
Iran 
% of Total 6.8% 15.0% 21.8% 
Count 126 293 419 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 16.7% 21.2% 19.6% 
Hamshahri 
% of Total 5.9% 13.7% 19.6% 
Count 370 488 858 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 49.1% 35.2% 40.1% 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami 
% of Total 17.3% 22.8% 40.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 11 Newspaper coverage of the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 2, the highest number of stories about the West was recorded in the Reformist period (by 
Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 49.1 per cent). Notwithstanding, mainstream Iranian newspapers had the most coverage 
of the West during the Conservative period.            
 
 
DRQ3: Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West during Reformism and 
Conservatism and the whole period of study?  
a. Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West? 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Pro-Reform 214 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Pro-Conservative 1435 67.1 67.1 77.1 
Non-aligned 489 22.9 22.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 12 Representation of the West and political affiliation of newspapers 
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RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper
Non-alignedPro-Conservative Pro-Reform
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Table 3 suggests that pro-Conservatism had the most representation of the West (67.1 per cent) during the 
period of the study, while pro-Reformism had the least (10 per cent).  
 
 
b. Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West during Reformism and 
Conservatism? 
 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 213 1 214 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 28.3% .1% 10.0% 
Pro-Reform 
% of Total 10.0% .0% 10.0% 
Count 539 896 1435 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 71.6% 64.7% 67.1% 
Pro-Conservative 
% of Total 25.2% 41.9% 67.1% 
Count 1 488 489 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% 35.2% 22.9% 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation 
of Newspaper 
Non-aligned 
% of Total .0% 22.8% 22.9% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 13 Political affiliation of newspapers and the representation of the West in two political periods 
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According to Table 4, pro-Conservatism had the most representation of the West during both the Reformist 
period and the Conservative period, respectively with 71.6 per cent and 64.7 per cent of coverage of stories 
related to the West.  
 
 
DRQ4: Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?    
a. Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West? 
DRQ4 Story Layout 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) 259 12.1 12.1 12.1 
Top half page 1268 59.3 59.3 71.4 
Bottom half page 611 28.6 28.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 14 Story layout to represent the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
DRQ4 Story Layout
Bottom half page Top half page Main headline of page  (Lead 
Story)
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Table 5 indicates that the “top-half page” layout was used most frequently (59.3 per cent) in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers to portray the West. Only 12.1 per cent of the stories were the main headline of the page.  
b. Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West 
during Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ4 Story Layout * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
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DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 89 170 259 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 11.8% 12.3% 12.1% 
Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) 
% of Total 4.2% 8.0% 12.1% 
Count 436 832 1268 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 57.9% 60.1% 59.3% 
Top half page 
% of Total 20.4% 38.9% 59.3% 
Count 228 383 611 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 30.3% 27.7% 28.6% 
DRQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Bottom half page 
% of Total 10.7% 17.9% 28.6% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 15 Story layout to represent the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 6, most stories about the West were used in the “top half page” layout during both the 
Conservative period (60.1 per cent) and the Reformist period (57.9 per cent).  
 
 
DRQ5: Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers during 
Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?    
a. Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers? 
DRQ5 Story Page 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Domestic news/politics 
page 523 24.5 24.5 24.5 
Foreign 
news/diplomacy page 1171 54.8 54.8 79.2 
Front page 444 20.8 20.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 16 Story page and the representation of the West 
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RQ5 Story Page
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Table 7 suggests that most stories about the West (54.8 per cent) appeared in the foreign news page of 
mainstream Iranian newspapers.   
 
 
b. Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers during 
Reformism and Conservatism?   
DRQ5 Story Page * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 179 344 523 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 23.8% 24.8% 24.5% 
Domestic news/politics 
page 
% of Total 8.4% 16.1% 24.5% 
Count 413 758 1171 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 54.8% 54.7% 54.8% 
Foreign 
news/diplomacy page 
% of Total 19.3% 35.5% 54.8% 
Count 161 283 444 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 21.4% 20.4% 20.8% 
RQ5 
Story 
Page 
Front page 
% of Total 7.5% 13.2% 20.8% 
Total Count 753 1385 2138 
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 17 Story page and representation of the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 8, stories about the West were most reflected in the foreign news/diplomacy page of 
mainstream newspapers during both the Reformist and Conservative periods, respectively with 54.8 per cent 
and 54.7 per cent.     
 
DRQ6: Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?  
a. Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ6 Story Production Method 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Pure Translation 139 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Transcreation (translation 
and creation) 1007 47.1 47.1 53.6 
Staff Writers 992 46.4 46.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 18 Story production method to portray the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
DRQ6 Story Production Method
Staff Writers Transcreation (translation and 
creation)  
Pure Translation 
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Table 9 suggests that transcreation was most frequently used in stories about the West (47.1 per cent) in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers, while pure translation was used to produce only 6.5 per cent of the stories 
related to the West.  
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b. Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ6 Story Production Method  * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 92 47 139 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 12.2% 3.4% 6.5% 
Pure Translation 
% of Total 4.3% 2.2% 6.5% 
Count 324 683 1007 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 43.0% 49.3% 47.1% 
Transcreation (translation 
and creation) 
% of Total 15.2% 31.9% 47.1% 
Count 337 655 992 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 44.8% 47.3% 46.4% 
DRQ6 Story 
Production 
Method 
Staff Writers 
% of Total 15.8% 30.6% 46.4% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 19 Story production method to represent the West during two political periods 
 
According to Table 10, transcreation was most frequently used (49.3 per cent) to produce stories related to the 
West during the Conservative period, while the highest number of West-related stories (44.8 per cent) during 
the Reformist Period was produced by staff writers.   
 
DRQ7: Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers primarily quote most frequently to 
portray West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers primarily quote most frequently to portray 
the West?  
 
DRQ7 Primary Source of News 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
International news 
agencies/press 399 18.7 18.7 18.7 
National/official news 
agencies/press 1003 46.9 46.9 65.6 
Unidentifiable/unknown 
sources 26 1.2 1.2 66.8 
Correspondents (no 
source) 709 33.2 33.2 100.0 
Else 1 .0 .0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 20 Primary source of news of the West in Iranian newspapers 
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Table 11 suggests that the majority of the news about the West (46.9 per cent) was taken primarily from 
national official Iranian news agencies/press.  
b. Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers quote most frequently to portray West 
during Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ7 Primary Source of News * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 173 226 399 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 23.0% 16.3% 18.7% 
International news 
agencies/press 
% of Total 8.1% 10.6% 18.7% 
Count 317 686 1003 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 42.1% 49.5% 46.9% 
National/official news 
agencies/press 
% of Total 14.8% 32.1% 46.9% 
Count 20 6 26 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.7% .4% 1.2% 
Unidentifiable/unknown 
sources 
% of Total 
.9% .3% 1.2% 
Count 242 467 709 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 32.1% 33.7% 33.2% 
DRQ7 
Primary 
Source 
of News 
Correspondents (no 
source) 
% of Total 11.3% 21.8% 33.2% 
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Count 1 0 1 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% .0% .0% 
Else 
% of Total .0% .0% .0% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 21 Primary source of news to represent the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 12, mainstream Iranian newspapers quoted national official news agencies/press most 
frequently to portray the West during both the Conservative and Reformist periods, respectively with 49.5 per 
cent and 42.1 per cent.   
 
DRQ8: Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
 RQ8 Main International Source of News 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Reuters 102 4.8 4.8 4.8 
AP 94 4.4 4.4 9.2 
AFP 192 9.0 9.0 18.1 
British media 134 6.3 6.3 24.4 
American media 181 8.5 8.5 32.9 
Arab media 101 4.7 4.7 37.6 
Other international 221 10.3 10.3 47.9 
No international source 1113 52.1 52.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 22 Main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
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Table 13 suggests that “other international” sources of news rather than Reuters, AP and AFP were used most 
frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers as their main international source of news about the West.  
b. Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ8 Main International Source of News * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 55 47 102 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.3% 3.4% 4.8% 
Reuters 
% of Total 2.6% 2.2% 4.8% 
Count 28 66 94 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.7% 4.8% 4.4% 
AP 
% of Total 1.3% 3.1% 4.4% 
Count 66 126 192 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.8% 9.1% 9.0% 
AFP 
% of Total 3.1% 5.9% 9.0% 
Count 34 100 134 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.5% 7.2% 6.3% 
British media 
% of Total 1.6% 4.7% 6.3% 
Count 61 120 181 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.1% 8.7% 8.5% 
DRQ8 Main 
International 
Source of 
News 
American media 
% of Total 2.9% 5.6% 8.5% 
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Count 32 69 101 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.2% 5.0% 4.7% 
Arab media 
% of Total 1.5% 3.2% 4.7% 
Count 92 129 221 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 12.2% 9.3% 10.3% 
Other international 
% of Total 4.3% 6.0% 10.3% 
Count 385 728 1113 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 51.1% 52.6% 52.1% 
No international source 
% of Total 18.0% 34.1% 52.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 23 Main international source of news about the West in the two political newspapers 
According to Table 14, “other international” sources of news were used as the main international source of 
news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both Reformism and Conservatism, 
respectively with 12.2 per cent and 9.3 per cent. From amongst the Big Four global news agencies, AFP was 
used as the main international source of news during both Reformism (8.8 per cent) and Conservatism (9.1 
per cent). 
 
DRQ9: Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ9 National Source of News 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
IRNA 578 27.0 27.0 27.0 
IRIB 217 10.1 10.1 37.2 
Other pro-Conservative 195 9.1 9.1 46.3 
Other pro-Reform 13 .6 .6 46.9 
Non-official news 
websites 2 .1 .1 47.0 
Weblogs 1 .0 .0 47.1 
Iran's government 
sources 20 .9 .9 48.0 
Experts/political 
observers/pundits 3 .1 .1 48.1 
Unidentifiable/unknown 2 .1 .1 48.2 
No national source 1107 51.8 51.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 24 National source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
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Table 15 suggests that IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) was the main national source of news about 
the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers, with 27 per cent of the majority of news quoting IRNA as their 
primary source. Some 51.8 per cent of the stories did not have any national sources of news.  
 
b. Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during 
Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ9 National Source of News  * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 259 319 578 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 34.4% 23.0% 27.0% 
IRNA 
% of Total 12.1% 14.9% 27.0% 
Count 69 148 217 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 9.2% 10.7% 10.1% 
IRIB 
% of Total 3.2% 6.9% 10.1% 
Count 3 192 195 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .4% 13.9% 9.1% 
Other pro-Conservative 
% of Total .1% 9.0% 9.1% 
Count 3 10 13 
DRQ9 
National 
Source of 
News 
Other pro-Reform 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .4% .7% .6% 
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% of Total .1% .5% .6% 
Count 0 2 2 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .0% .1% .1% 
Non-official news 
websites 
% of Total .0% .1% .1% 
Count 0 1 1 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .0% .1% .0% 
Weblogs 
% of Total .0% .0% .0% 
Count 9 11 20 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.2% .8% .9% 
Iran's government 
sources 
% of Total .4% .5% .9% 
Count 1 2 3 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% .1% .1% 
Experts/political 
observers/pundits 
% of Total .0% .1% .1% 
Count 2 0 2 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .3% .0% .1% 
Unidentifiable/unknown 
% of Total .1% .0% .1% 
Count 407 700 1107 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 54.1% 50.5% 51.8% 
No national source 
% of Total 19.0% 32.7% 51.8% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 25 National sources of news about the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 16, IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) was the main national source of news about 
the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both the Reformist and Conservative periods, respectively 
with 34.4 per cent and 23 per cent frequency.   
 
DRQ10: Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?    
a. Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
US 1435 67.1 67.1 67.1 
UK 199 9.3 9.3 76.4 
France 129 6.0 6.0 82.5 
Germany 76 3.6 3.6 86.0 
Group 5+1 92 4.3 4.3 90.3 
Not mentioned 207 9.7 9.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 26 Primary Western country/countries involved in stories about the West 
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Table 17 suggests that the United States was the most primary country involved in the majority of stories 
(67.1 per cent) about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers, followed by Britain (9.3 per cent).  
b. Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?    
DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 516 919 1435 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 68.5% 66.4% 67.1% 
US 
% of Total 24.1% 43.0% 67.1% 
Count 56 143 199 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.4% 10.3% 9.3% 
UK 
% of Total 2.6% 6.7% 9.3% 
Count 44 85 129 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 5.8% 6.1% 6.0% 
France 
% of Total 2.1% 4.0% 6.0% 
Count 30 46 76 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.0% 3.3% 3.6% 
Germany 
% of Total 1.4% 2.2% 3.6% 
DRQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Group 5+1 Count 18 74 92 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.4% 5.3% 4.3% 
% of Total .8% 3.5% 4.3% 
Count 89 118 207 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 11.8% 8.5% 9.7% 
Not mentioned 
% of Total 4.2% 5.5% 9.7% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 27 Primary Western country/countries in stories about the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 18, the United States was the most primary country involved in the majority of stories 
about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both Reformism and Conservatism; The United 
States was the main Western player in 68.5 per cent of the stories about the West during Reformism and 66.4 
per cent of the news during Conservatism.   
 
 
DRQ11: Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West 
during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?  
a. Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West? 
DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 124 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Negative 1097 51.3 51.3 57.1 
Neutral 794 37.1 37.1 94.2 
Stereotypical 1 .0 .0 94.3 
Negative stereotypical 115 5.4 5.4 99.7 
Non-relevant 7 .3 .3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 28 Headline direction towards the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
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Table 19 suggests that mainstream Iranian newspapers mostly used negative direction in headlines of stories 
related to the West. In other words, the direction of the headline of the majority of news stories about the 
West (51.3 per cent) was negative. Some 37.1 per cent of headlines of stories related to the West were neutral.      
 
b. Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during 
Reformism and Conservatism? 
DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 65 59 124 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.6% 4.3% 5.8% 
Positive 
% of Total 3.0% 2.8% 5.8% 
Count 340 757 1097 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 45.2% 54.7% 51.3% 
Negative 
% of Total 15.9% 35.4% 51.3% 
Count 276 518 794 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 36.7% 37.4% 37.1% 
Neutral 
% of Total 12.9% 24.2% 37.1% 
Count 0 1 1 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .0% .1% .0% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .0% .0% 
DRQ11 
Headline 
Direction (line) 
towards West 
Negative stereotypical Count 67 48 115 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.9% 3.5% 5.4% 
% of Total 3.1% 2.2% 5.4% 
Count 5 2 7 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .7% .1% .3% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total .2% .1% .3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 29 Headline direction towards the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 20, the headline direction of stories related to the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
was negative during both Reformism and Conservatism. In other words, the majority of news headlines 
during Reformism (45.2 per cent) and Conservatism (54.7 per cent) had a negative direction.   
 
 
DRQ12: Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?    
a. Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers?  
DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Politics 1937 90.6 90.6 90.6 
Economy and energy 45 2.1 2.1 92.7 
Socio-cultural 110 5.1 5.1 97.8 
Natural disasters and 
accidents 32 1.5 1.5 99.3 
Else 14 .7 .7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 30 Primary subject of story about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
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Table 21 suggests that the subject of the majority of news stories about the West (90.6 per cent) highlighted in 
mainstream Iranian newspapers was about politics. 
b. Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism?    
 
DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 633 1304 1937 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 84.1% 94.2% 90.6% 
Politics 
% of Total 29.6% 61.0% 90.6% 
Count 37 8 45 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.9% .6% 2.1% 
Economy and energy 
% of Total 1.7% .4% 2.1% 
Count 63 47 110 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.4% 3.4% 5.1% 
Socio-cultural 
% of Total 2.9% 2.2% 5.1% 
Count 7 25 32 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .9% 1.8% 1.5% 
Natural disasters and 
accidents 
% of Total .3% 1.2% 1.5% 
DRQ12 
Primary 
Subject 
of Story 
Else Count 13 1 14 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .1% .7% 
% of Total .6% .0% .7% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 31 Primary subject of story about the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 22, the subject of the majority of news stories related the West was about politics during 
Reformism (84.1 per cent) and Conservatism (94.2 per cent).  
 
DRQ13: Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?     
a. Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Domestic politics of the 
West 286 13.4 13.4 13.4 
Foreign policy of the West 1755 82.1 82.1 95.5 
Non-relevant 97 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 32 Policy aspects of the West highlighted in stories in Iranian newspapers 
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Table 23 suggests that foreign policy issues of the West were most highlighted in the news in mainstream 
Iranian newspapers. In other words, 82.1 per cent of stories related to West were about the foreign policy of 
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the West while only 13.4 per cent pertained to the domestic politics of the West.  
b. Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism?   
   
DRQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West  * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 103 183 286 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 13.7% 13.2% 13.4% 
Domestic politics of the 
West 
% of Total 4.8% 8.6% 13.4% 
Count 598 1157 1755 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 79.4% 83.5% 82.1% 
Foreign policy of the West 
% of Total 28.0% 54.1% 82.1% 
Count 52 45 97 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 6.9% 3.2% 4.5% 
DRQ13 Policy 
Aspects/Issues of 
the West 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 2.4% 2.1% 4.5% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 33 Policy aspects of the West highlighted in Iranian newspapers in two political periods 
 
According to Table 24, the policy subject of the majority of stories during Conservatism (83.5 per cent) and 
Reformism (79.4 per cent) was about the foreign policy of the West.  
 
DRQ14: Which aspect of Iran’s nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?    
a. Which aspect of Iran’s nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ1429 Iran nuclear issue 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Cooperation (detente) 90 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Conflict (tension) 58 2.7 2.7 6.9 
Non-relevant 1864 87.2 87.2 94.1 
Else 126 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 34 Iran nuclear issue in stories related to West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
 332 
RQ1429 Iran nuclear issue
ElseNon-relevantConflict (tension) Cooperation (detente) 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
RQ1429 Iran nuclear issue
 
Table 25 suggests that while 87.2 per cent of stories related to the West were not about Iran’s nuclear issue, 
the majority (5.9 per cent) of stories about Iran’s nuclear issue and the West highlighted the right of Iran to 
access peaceful nuclear technology. Some 4.2 per cent of such stories favoured cooperation while only 2.7 per 
cent sought conflict with the West.    
b. Which aspect of Iran’s nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during 
Reformism and Conservatism?    
 
DRQ14 Iran nuclear issue * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 1 89 90 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% 6.4% 4.2% 
Cooperation (detente) 
% of Total .0% 4.2% 4.2% 
Count 1 57 58 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% 4.1% 2.7% 
Conflict (tension) 
% of Total .0% 2.7% 2.7% 
Count 749 1115 1864 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 99.5% 80.5% 87.2% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 35.0% 52.2% 87.2% 
Count 2 124 126 
DRQ1429 
Iran nuclear 
issue 
Else 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .3% 9.0% 5.9% 
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% of Total .1% 5.8% 5.9% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 35 Iran nuclear issue highlighted in stories about the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 26, while 80.5 per cent of the stories published during the Conservative period were not 
about Iran’s nuclear issues, the majority (9 per cent) of related stories highlighted Iran’s right to access 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes during Conservatism. Regarding the Reformist period, since Iran’s 
nuclear issue was not on the spotlight during the Reformism, no analysis can be inferred from the table.   
 
DRQ15: What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?   
a. What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Cooperation with West 153 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Denial of the Western 
pattern of development and 
promotion of Vision 2025 4 .2 .2 7.3 
Opposition to West 228 10.7 10.7 18.0 
Violation of law/rules 44 2.1 2.1 20.1 
Terrorism, war and 
violence 501 23.4 23.4 43.5 
Interference of West in 
domestic affairs 70 3.3 3.3 46.8 
Western support for Israel 114 5.3 5.3 52.1 
Western threats 175 8.2 8.2 60.3 
Else (affairs of other 
countries than Iran) 
683 31.9 31.9 92.2 
Non-relevant 166 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 36 Dominant political theme of story about the West highlighted in Iranian newspapers 
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Table 27 suggests that while 31.9 per cent of stories were about relations between West and other countries 
than Iran (except for Iraq and Afghanistan), their dominant political theme was bilateral relations between the 
West and those countries. Out of stories related to relations between Iran and West (including stories about 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), 23.4 per cent were about terrorism, war and violence. Opposition to West 
was the theme of 10.7 per cent of the stories.  
b. What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism?   
DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 53 100 153 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.0% 7.2% 7.2% 
Cooperation with West 
% of Total 2.5% 4.7% 7.2% 
Count 4 0 4 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .5% .0% .2% 
Denial of the Western 
pattern of development and 
promotion of Vision 2025 
% of Total .2% .0% .2% 
Count 104 124 228 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 13.8% 9.0% 10.7% 
Opposition to West 
% of Total 4.9% 5.8% 10.7% 
Count 13 31 44 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 2.2% 2.1% 
Violation of law/rules 
% of Total .6% 1.4% 2.1% 
DRQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Terrorism, war and 
violence 
Count 173 328 501 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 23.0% 23.7% 23.4% 
% of Total 8.1% 15.3% 23.4% 
Count 33 37 70 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.4% 2.7% 3.3% 
Interference of West in 
domestic affairs 
% of Total 1.5% 1.7% 3.3% 
Count 59 55 114 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.8% 4.0% 5.3% 
Western support for Israel 
% of Total 2.8% 2.6% 5.3% 
Count 32 143 175 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.2% 10.3% 8.2% 
Western threats 
% of Total 1.5% 6.7% 8.2% 
Count 201 482 683 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 26.7% 34.8% 31.9% 
Else (affairs of other 
countries than Iran) 
% of Total 9.4% 22.5% 31.9% 
Count 81 85 166 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.8% 6.1% 7.8% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 3.8% 4.0% 7.8% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 37 Dominant political theme of stories related to West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 28, terrorism, war and violence accounted for the dominant political theme of stories 
related to the West during both Conservatism and Reformism, respectively with the frequency of 23.7 and 
23.0 per cent. Opposition to West comes next with 13.8 per cent for Reformism and 9 per cent for 
Conservatism.  
DRQ16: Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West 
during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West?  
DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Colonialism 17 .8 .8 .8 
Arrogance 154 7.2 7.2 8.0 
Colonialism and 
arrogance 4 .2 .2 8.2 
Interventionism 153 7.2 7.2 15.3 
Double standards 
and hypocrisy 31 1.4 1.4 16.8 
Mistrust and lack of 
confidence 7 .3 .3 17.1 
Enemy/animosity 50 2.3 2.3 19.5 
Else 9 .4 .4 19.9 
No stereotype 1713 80.1 80.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
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Table 38 Dominant stereotype of the West in Iranian newspapers 
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Table 29 suggests that while 80.1 per cent of stories related to West did not reflect any stereotype about the 
West, the majority of the stereotypes used (7.2 per cent) described the West as “arrogant” and 
“interventionist”.  
b. Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism 
and Conservatism? 
 
DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 8 9 17 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.1% .6% .8% 
Colonialism 
% of Total .4% .4% .8% 
Count 79 75 154 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.5% 5.4% 7.2% 
Arrogance 
% of Total 3.7% 3.5% 7.2% 
Count 3 1 4 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .4% .1% .2% 
Colonialism and 
arrogance 
% of Total 
.1% .0% .2% 
Count 57 96 153 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.6% 6.9% 7.2% 
Interventionism 
% of Total 2.7% 4.5% 7.2% 
DRQ16 
Dominant 
Stereotypes 
of the West 
Double standards 
and hypocrisy 
Count 13 18 31 
 337 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 1.3% 1.4% 
% of Total .6% .8% 1.4% 
Count 5 2 7 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .7% .1% .3% 
Mistrust and lack of 
confidence 
% of Total .2% .1% .3% 
Count 25 25 50 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.3% 1.8% 2.3% 
Enemy/animosity 
% of Total 1.2% 1.2% 2.3% 
Count 6 3 9 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .8% .2% .4% 
Else 
% of Total .3% .1% .4% 
Count 557 1156 1713 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 74.0% 83.5% 80.1% 
No stereotype 
% of Total 26.1% 54.1% 80.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 39 Dominant stereotypes of the West in mainstream newspapers in two political periods 
 
According to Table 30, the stereotype “arrogant” was used more than other stereotypes during Reformism to 
portray the West. In other words, while 74 per cent of the stories published in this period had no stereotype, 
the majority of stories (10.5 per cent) used the stereotype “arrogant” to represent the West. In the 
Conservative period, however, the majority of stories (6.9 per cent) used stereotype “interventionism” to 
portray the West, while 83.5 per cent of the news about the West did not have any stereotype.  
 
 
DRQ17:  Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers 
during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study to portray the West?   
a. Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
 DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Iran-West relations 218 10.2 10.2 10.2 
Iran-US relations 257 12.0 12.0 22.2 
Iran-UK relations 37 1.7 1.7 23.9 
Iran-France relations 30 1.4 1.4 25.4 
Iran-Germany relations 29 1.4 1.4 26.7 
Relations between the 
West and other countries 
other than 
1003 46.9 46.9 73.6 
Iran-Int'l Organisations 
relations 8 .4 .4 74.0 
West-Int'l Organisations 
relations 6 .3 .3 74.3 
None-relevant 550 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 40 Foreign relations subject of stories related to West in mainstream Iranian newspapers 
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Table 31 suggests that stories about relations between the West and other countries than Iran were used most 
frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers than other foreign relations subject. In fact, the foreign relations 
subject of the majority of stories (46.9 percent) was about relations between the West and other countries than 
Iran, followed by Iran-US relations (with 12 per cent).  
b. Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers during 
Reformism and Conservatism?  
 DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 40 178 218 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 5.3% 12.9% 10.2% 
Iran-West relations 
% of Total 1.9% 8.3% 10.2% 
Count 98 159 257 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 13.0% 11.5% 12.0% 
Iran-US relations 
% of Total 4.6% 7.4% 12.0% 
Count 14 23 37 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 
Iran-UK relations 
% of Total .7% 1.1% 1.7% 
Count 17 13 30 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.3% .9% 1.4% 
Iran-France relations 
% of Total .8% .6% 1.4% 
Count 13 16 29 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 1.2% 1.4% 
Iran-Germany relations 
% of Total .6% .7% 1.4% 
DRQ17 
Foreign 
Relations 
Subject of 
Story 
Relations between the 
West and other countries 
Count 376 627 1003 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 49.9% 45.3% 46.9% 
% of Total 17.6% 29.3% 46.9% 
Count 0 8 8 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .0% .6% .4% 
Iran-Int'l Organisations 
relations 
% of Total .0% .4% .4% 
Count 5 1 6 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .7% .1% .3% 
West-Int'l Organisations 
relations 
% of Total .2% .0% .3% 
Count 190 360 550 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 25.2% 26.0% 25.7% 
None-relevant 
% of Total 8.9% 16.8% 25.7% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 41 Foreign relations subject of story in two political periods 
 
According to Table 32, stories about relations between the West and other countries than Iran were most 
frequently used to portray the West during both Reformism and Conservatism, respectively with 49.9 and 
45.3 per cent frequency.    
 
DRQ18: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West 
relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West relations?  
DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 195 9.1 9.1 9.1 
Against (tension-conflict) 260 12.2 12.2 21.3 
Neutral 117 5.5 5.5 26.8 
Non-relevant 1566 73.2 73.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 42 Story direction towards Iran-West relations 
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Table 33 suggests that Iranian newspapers adopted a story direction which promoted conflict in Iran-West 
relations. Some 12.2 per cent of the stories promoted conflict, while 73.2 per cent of the stories were not 
related to Iran-West relations.   
 
b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West relations 
during Reformism and Conservatism? 
 
DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 71 124 195 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 9.4% 9.0% 9.1% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 3.3% 5.8% 9.1% 
Count 82 178 260 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.9% 12.9% 12.2% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total 3.8% 8.3% 12.2% 
Count 27 90 117 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 6.5% 5.5% 
DRQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West Relations 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.3% 4.2% 5.5% 
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Count 573 993 1566 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 76.1% 71.7% 73.2% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 26.8% 46.4% 73.2% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 43 Story direction towards Iran-West relations in two political periods 
 
According to Table 34, while the majority of the news (76.1 per cent during Reformism and 71.7 per cent 
during Conservatism) was not about Iran-West relations, Iranian newspapers promoted conflict in the 
relations between Iran and West during both Conservatism and Reformism, with the frequency of 12.9 and 
10.9 per cent, respectively. In other words, mainstream Iranian newspapers were against relations between 
Iran and West.  
 
DRQ19: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US 
relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US relations?  
DRQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 91 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Against (tension-conflict) 192 9.0 9.0 13.2 
Nuetral 74 3.5 3.5 16.7 
Non-relevant 1781 83.3 83.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 44 Story direction towards Iran-US ties 
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Table 35 suggests that Iranian newspapers promoted conflict when reporting Iran-US relations. While 83.3 
per cent of stories did not reflect relations between Iran and the US, 9 per cent of the stories were against Iran-
US relations.  
b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US relations during 
Reformism and Conservatism? 
 
 DRQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 33 58 91 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.4% 4.2% 4.3% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 1.5% 2.7% 4.3% 
Count 74 118 192 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 9.8% 8.5% 9.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total 3.5% 5.5% 9.0% 
Count 20 54 74 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.7% 3.9% 3.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total .9% 2.5% 3.5% 
Count 626 1155 1781 
DRQ19 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-US Relations 
Non-relevant 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 83.1% 83.4% 83.3% 
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% of Total 29.3% 54.0% 83.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 45 Story direction towards Iran-US ties in two political peruids 
 
According to Table 36, while the majority of news about the West (83.4 per cent during Conservatism and 
83.1 during Reformism) was not about relations between Iran and the US, Iranian newspapers promoted 
conflict in reporting Iran-US relations during both Reformism (9.8 per cent) and Conservatism (8.5 per cent).  
 
 DRQ20: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU 
relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU 
relations?  
DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 84 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Against (tension-conflict) 64 3.0 3.0 6.9 
Nuetral 49 2.3 2.3 9.2 
Non-relevant 1941 90.8 90.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 46 Story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties 
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Table 37 suggests that while 90.8 per cent of the news was not about Iran-EU3 relations, mainstream Iranian 
newspapers tended to promote cooperation in relations between Iran and EU3. 3.9 per cent of the stories were 
in favour of relations between Iran and EU3.  
 
b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU relations 
during Reformism and Conservatism? 
 
DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 43 41 84 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 5.7% 3.0% 3.9% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 2.0% 1.9% 3.9% 
Count 10 54 64 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% 3.9% 3.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .5% 2.5% 3.0% 
Count 12 37 49 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.6% 2.7% 2.3% 
Nuetral 
% of Total .6% 1.7% 2.3% 
Count 688 1253 1941 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 91.4% 90.5% 90.8% 
DRQ20 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-EU3 Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.2% 58.6% 90.8% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 47 Story direction towards Iran-EU ties in two political periods 
 
According to Table 38, while the majority of news about the West (91.4 per cent during Reformism and 90.5 
per cent during Conservatism) did not concern Iran-EU3 relations, mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to 
promote cooperation in 5.7 per cent of the news during Reformism, but promoted conflict in 3.9 per cent of 
stories during Conservatism.     
 
DRQ21: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK 
relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Did the Iranian newspapers promoted conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK relations?  
DRQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Against (tension-conflict) 29 1.4 1.4 2.4 
Neutral 21 1.0 1.0 3.4 
Non-relevant 2066 96.6 96.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 48 Story direction towards Iran-UK ties 
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Table 39 suggests that while 96.6 per cent of the stories were not about relations between Iran and the UK, the 
majority (1.4 per cent) of the stories related to Iran-UK ties promoted conflict between the two countries and 
was against bilateral relations.  
 
b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK relations during 
Reformism and Conservatism?  
 
DRQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 15 7 22 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.0% .5% 1.0% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total .7% .3% 1.0% 
Count 7 22 29 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .9% 1.6% 1.4% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .3% 1.0% 1.4% 
Count 9 12 21 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.2% .9% 1.0% 
Neutral 
% of Total .4% .6% 1.0% 
Count 722 1344 2066 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 95.9% 97.0% 96.6% 
DRQ21 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-UK Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 33.8% 62.9% 96.6% 
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Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 49 Story direction towards Iran-UK ties in two political periods 
 
According to Table 40, while the majority of news about the West (97 per cent during Conservatism and 95.9 
per cent during Reformism) did not reflect issues of mutual concern between Iran and the UK, 2 per cent of 
the stories were in favour of cooperation between the two countries during Reformism. During Conservatism, 
1.6 per cent of the news was against bilateral relations between Iran and UK.   
 
 
DRQ22:  Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting relations 
between West and other countries than Iran during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole 
period of study? 
a. Did the Iranian newspapers promoted conflict or cooperation when reporting relations between West 
and other countries than Iran?  
DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 97 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Against (tension-conflict) 691 32.3 32.3 36.9 
Neutral 222 10.4 10.4 47.2 
Non-relevant 1128 52.8 52.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 50 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and other countries than Iran 
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Table 41 suggests that while 52.8 per cent of the stories were not about relations between the West and other 
countries rather than Iran, the majority (32.3 per cent) of the respective news highlighted tension between the 
West and non-Iran countries.  
 
b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting relations between West 
and other countries than Iran during Reformism and Conservatism?  
 
 DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran * DRQ2 Publication Period  
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period  
Count 50 47 97 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 6.6% 3.4% 4.5% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 2.3% 2.2% 4.5% 
Count 252 439 691 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 33.5% 31.7% 32.3% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total 11.8% 20.5% 32.3% 
Count 81 141 222 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.8% 10.2% 10.4% 
Neutral 
% of Total 3.8% 6.6% 10.4% 
Count 370 758 1128 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 49.1% 54.7% 52.8% 
DRQ22 Story Direction 
towards Relations 
between the West and 
non-Iran 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 17.3% 35.5% 52.8% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 51 Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran 
 
According to Table 41, while the majority of news about the West (54.7 per cent during Conservatism and 
49.1 per cent during Reformism) was not about relations between West and non-Iran countries, the majority 
(33.5 per cent) of respective stories during Reformism and the majority (31.7 per cent) during Conservatism 
promoted tension and conflict between West-non-Iran relations.  
 
 
DRQ23:  What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism 
and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promoted in portraying the West?  
 DRQ23 Image of the West in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 77 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Negative 939 43.9 43.9 47.5 
Neutral 732 34.2 34.2 81.8 
Stereotypical 10 .5 .5 82.2 
Negative stereotypical 369 17.3 17.3 99.5 
Valid 
Non-relevant 11 .5 .5 100.0 
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Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 52 Image of the West in the news 
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Table 43 suggests that the majority of news about the West (43.9 per cent) presented a negative image of the 
West in mainstream Iranian newspapers. Some 34.2 per cent promoted a neutral image of the West.    
 
 
b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and 
Conservatism? 
 
DRQ23 Image of the West in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period  
Count 45 32 77 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 6.0% 2.3% 3.6% 
Positive 
% of Total 2.1% 1.5% 3.6% 
Count 248 691 939 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 32.9% 49.9% 43.9% 
Negative 
% of Total 11.6% 32.3% 43.9% 
Count 284 448 732 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 37.7% 32.3% 34.2% 
Neutral 
% of Total 13.3% 21.0% 34.2% 
DRQ23 
Image of the 
West in the 
story 
Stereotypical Count 1 9 10 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% .6% .5% 
% of Total .0% .4% .5% 
Count 165 204 369 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 21.9% 14.7% 17.3% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 7.7% 9.5% 17.3% 
Count 10 1 11 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% .1% .5% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total .5% .0% .5% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 53 Image of the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 44, while the majority of news about the West (49.9 per cent) presented a negative image 
of the West during Conservatism, the majority of news about the West (37.7 per cent) during Reformism 
promoted a neutral image of the West.  
 
DRQ24: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US during Reformism and 
Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US?  
DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 31 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Negative 771 36.1 36.1 37.5 
Neutral 530 24.8 24.8 62.3 
Stereotypical 2 .1 .1 62.4 
Negative stereotypical 323 15.1 15.1 77.5 
Non-relevant 481 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 54 Image of the US government in the news 
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Table 45 suggests that the majority of news about the West (36.1 per cent) presented a negative image of the 
US government in mainstream Iranian newspapers. Some 24.8 per cent promoted a neutral image of the US 
government.    
 
b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US during Reformism and 
Conservatism?  
 
DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 18 31 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 1.3% 1.4% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .8% 1.4% 
Count 215 556 771 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 28.6% 40.1% 36.1% 
Negative 
% of Total 10.1% 26.0% 36.1% 
Count 222 308 530 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 29.5% 22.2% 24.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total 10.4% 14.4% 24.8% 
Count 1 1 2 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% .1% .1% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .0% .1% 
DRQ24 Image 
of the US 
government in 
the story 
Negative stereotypical Count 152 171 323 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 20.2% 12.3% 15.1% 
% of Total 7.1% 8.0% 15.1% 
Count 150 331 481 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 19.9% 23.9% 22.5% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 7.0% 15.5% 22.5% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 55 Image of the US government in two political periods 
 
According to Table 46, while the majority of news about the US (40.1 per cent) presented a negative image of 
the US during Conservatism, the majority of news about the US (29.5 per cent) promoted a neutral image of 
the US during Reformism.  
 
DRQ25:  What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3 during Reformism and 
Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3? 
DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 52 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Negative 250 11.7 11.7 14.1 
Neutral 270 12.6 12.6 26.8 
Negative stereotypical 64 3.0 3.0 29.7 
Non-relevant 1502 70.3 70.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 56 Image of the EU3 in the news 
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RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story
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Table 47 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (70.3 per cent) did not present any image of 
the EU3, the majority (12.6 per cent) of respective news presented a neutral image of the EU3 governments.  
b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3 during Reformism and 
Conservatism?  
 
 DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 37 15 52 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.9% 1.1% 2.4% 
Positive 
% of Total 1.7% .7% 2.4% 
Count 57 193 250 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.6% 13.9% 11.7% 
Negative 
% of Total 2.7% 9.0% 11.7% 
Count 94 176 270 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 12.5% 12.7% 12.6% 
Neutral 
% of Total 4.4% 8.2% 12.6% 
Count 27 37 64 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 2.7% 3.0% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 1.3% 1.7% 3.0% 
DRQ25 
Image of 
the EU3 in 
the story 
Non-relevant Count 538 964 1502 
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% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 71.4% 69.6% 70.3% 
% of Total 25.2% 45.1% 70.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 57 Image of the EU3 in two political periods 
 
According to Table 48, while the majority of news about the West (71.4 per cent during Reformism and 69.6 
per cent during Conservatism) did not promote any image of the EU3, the majority (13.9 per cent) of 
respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the EU3 governments and the majority 
(12.5 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the EU3 governments.    
 
 
DRQ26:  What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK during 
Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK?  
DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 16 .7 .7 .7 
Negative 130 6.1 6.1 6.8 
Neutral 124 5.8 5.8 12.6 
Stereotypical 2 .1 .1 12.7 
Negative stereotypical 47 2.2 2.2 14.9 
Non-relevant 1819 85.1 85.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 58 Image of the UK in the news 
DRQ26 Image of theUK government in the story
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Table 49 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (85.1 per cent) did not present any image of 
the UK, the majority (6.1 per cent) of respective news presented a negative image of the UK government.  
b. What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK during Reformism and 
Conservatism?  
 
DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 3 16 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .2% .7% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .1% .7% 
Count 27 103 130 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 7.4% 6.1% 
Negative 
% of Total 1.3% 4.8% 6.1% 
Count 54 70 124 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.2% 5.1% 5.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total 2.5% 3.3% 5.8% 
Count 1 1 2 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .1% .1% .1% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .0% .1% 
Count 22 25 47 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.9% 1.8% 2.2% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 1.0% 1.2% 2.2% 
Count 636 1183 1819 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 84.5% 85.4% 85.1% 
DRQ26 Image of 
theUK government 
in the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 29.7% 55.3% 85.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 59 Image of the UK government in two political periods 
 
According to Table 50, while the majority of news about the West (85.4 per cent during Conservatism and 
83.5 per cent during Reformism) did not promote any image of the UK government, the majority (7.4 per 
cent) of respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the UK governments and the 
majority (7.2 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the UK 
governments.    
 
DRQ27:  What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France during Reformism 
and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France?  
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Positive 12 .6 .6 .6 
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Negative 84 3.9 3.9 4.5 
Neutral 81 3.8 3.8 8.3 
Negative stereotypical 9 .4 .4 8.7 
Non-relevant 1952 91.3 91.3 100.0 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 60Image of the French government in the news 
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story
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Table 51 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (91.3 per cent) did not present any image of 
the French government, the majority (3.9 per cent) of the respective news presented a negative image of the 
French government. 
 
b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France during Reformism and 
Conservatism?  
 
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 10 2 12 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% .1% .6% 
Positive 
% of Total .5% .1% .6% 
Count 18 66 84 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.4% 4.8% 3.9% 
Negative 
% of Total .8% 3.1% 3.9% 
Count 32 49 81 
DRQ27 Image 
of the French 
government in 
the story 
Neutral 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.2% 3.5% 3.8% 
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% of Total 1.5% 2.3% 3.8% 
Count 2 7 9 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .3% .5% .4% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% .3% .4% 
Count 691 1261 1952 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 91.8% 91.0% 91.3% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.3% 59.0% 91.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 61 Image of the French government in two political periods 
 
According to Table 52, while the majority of news about the West (91.8 per cent during Reformism and 91 
per cent during Conservatism) did not promote any image of the French government, the majority (4.8 per 
cent) of respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the French governments and the 
majority (4.2 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the French 
governments.    
 
 
DRQ28: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany during Reformism 
and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany?  
DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Negative 34 1.6 1.6 2.6 
Neutral 69 3.2 3.2 5.8 
Negative stereotypical 2 .1 .1 5.9 
Non-relevant 2011 94.1 94.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 62 Image of the Germany government in the news 
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Table 53 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (94.1 per cent) did not present any image of 
the Germany government, the majority (3.2 per cent) of the respective news presented a neutral image of the 
German government. 
b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany during Reformism and 
Conservatism?  
 
DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 9 22 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .6% 1.0% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .4% 1.0% 
Count 11 23 34 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 
Negative 
% of Total .5% 1.1% 1.6% 
Count 24 45 69 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.1% 2.1% 3.2% 
Count 2 0 2 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .3% .0% .1% 
DRQ28 Image of 
the Germany 
government in 
the story 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% .0% .1% 
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Count 703 1308 2011 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 93.4% 94.4% 94.1% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.9% 61.2% 94.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 63 Image of the Germany government in two political periods 
 
According to Table 54, while the majority of news about the West (94.4 per cent during Conservatism and 
93.4 per cent during Reformism) did not promote any image of the German government, the majority (3.2 per 
cent) of the respective news presented a neutral image of the German government during both the 
Conservatism and Reformism.   
 
DRQ29:  Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the 
West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study? 
a. Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the West?  
DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Positive 61 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Negative 187 8.7 8.7 11.6 
Neutral 344 16.1 16.1 27.7 
No photo 1546 72.3 72.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 2138 100.0 100.0   
Table 64 Journalistic photo direction towards the West in the news 
DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West
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Table 55 suggests that while 72.3 per cent of the stories about the West did not come with a photo, the 
majority (16.1 per cent) of the respective stories presented a neutral photo in the news about the West. Some 
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16.1 per cent presented a neutral photo.   
b. Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the West 
during Reformism and Conservatism?  
 
DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 30 31 61 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.0% 2.2% 2.9% 
Positive 
% of Total 1.4% 1.4% 2.9% 
Count 47 140 187 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 6.2% 10.1% 8.7% 
Negative 
% of Total 2.2% 6.5% 8.7% 
Count 104 240 344 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 13.8% 17.3% 16.1% 
Neutral 
% of Total 4.9% 11.2% 16.1% 
Count 572 974 1546 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 76.0% 70.3% 72.3% 
DRQ29 Journalistic 
photo direction 
towards the West 
No photo 
% of Total 26.8% 45.6% 72.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 65 Journalistic photo direction towards the West in two political periods 
 
According to Table 56, while the majority of news about the West (76 per cent during Reformism and 70.3 
per cent during Conservatism) did not have a photo, the majority (17.3 per cent) of the respective stories 
during Conservatism and 13.8 per cent during Reformism presented a neutral photo in stories about the West.     
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Appendix 3: Analytical Research Questions tables   
Analytical research questions investigate the impact of the political affiliation of 
newspapers on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). It also investigates 
the impact of the political periods on the representation of the West (in terms of 
relationship). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Analytical 
Research Questions (ARQ) sections. 
 
Analytical question (Relationship):  
Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and 
newspaper affiliation (ideology)?  
  
Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and 
the political period (discourse)?  
 
Analytical Research Questions Analysis1  
  
ARQ1: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and subject of 
the story when portraying the West?  
 
ARQ12 Primary Subject of Story * ARQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
     Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 192 1316 429 1937 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 89.7% 91.7% 87.7% 90.6% 
Politics 
% of Total 9.0% 61.6% 20.1% 90.6% 
Count 22 119 60 201 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 10.3% 8.3% 12.3% 9.4% 
RQ12 Primary 
Subject of Story 
Non-politics 
% of Total 1.0% 5.6% 2.8% 9.4% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 66 Relationship between newspaper affiliation and subject of story2 
 
                                                           
1 The null hypothesis is that the two variables are not related.  
2 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since four cells (26.7 per cent) had expected count less than 5, four categories of 
“economy and energy”, “social-cultural”, “natural disasters and accidents” and “Else” were merged into one 
“non-politics” category to avoid this statistical problem.    
 361 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.989(a) 2 .030 
Likelihood Ratio 6.687 2 .035 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.593 1 .107 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.12. 
 
According to the above tables, the Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 6.989 with 2 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.03 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper 
affiliation and subject of the story in the sample.  
 
ARQ2: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and layout of 
the story when portraying the West? 
 
ARQ4 Story Layout * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 39 162 58 259 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 18.2% 11.3% 11.9% 12.1% 
Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) 
% of Total 1.8% 7.6% 2.7% 12.1% 
Count 117 848 303 1268 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 54.7% 59.1% 62.0% 59.3% 
Top half page 
% of Total 5.5% 39.7% 14.2% 59.3% 
Count 58 425 128 611 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 27.1% 29.6% 26.2% 28.6% 
RQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Bottom half page 
% of Total 2.7% 19.9% 6.0% 28.6% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 67 Relationship between newspaper affiliation and layout of story 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.487(a) 4 .033 
Likelihood Ratio 9.651 4 .047 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.129 1 .719 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.92. 
 
 According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was 
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obtained as 10.487 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.033 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper 
affiliation and layout of the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ3: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and direction of 
the story when portraying the West?  
 
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper  
 
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 22 134 39 195 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 10.3% 9.3% 8.0% 9.1% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 1.0% 6.3% 1.8% 9.1% 
Count 15 192 53 260 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 7.0% 13.4% 10.8% 12.2% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .7% 9.0% 2.5% 12.2% 
Count 5 94 18 117 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 6.6% 3.7% 5.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total .2% 4.4% .8% 5.5% 
Count 172 1015 379 1566 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 80.4% 70.7% 77.5% 73.2% 
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 8.0% 47.5% 17.7% 73.2% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 68 Relationship between story direction and political affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.915(a) 6 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 23.959 6 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.427 1 .514 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.71. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 21.915 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.001 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper 
affiliation and story direction in the sample.  
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ARQ4: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and primary Western country involved when portraying the West?  
 
RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper  
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 127 985 323 1435 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 59.3% 68.6% 66.1% 67.1% 
US 
% of Total 5.9% 46.1% 15.1% 67.1% 
Count 18 130 51 199 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 8.4% 9.1% 10.4% 9.3% 
UK 
% of Total .8% 6.1% 2.4% 9.3% 
Count 9 93 27 129 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 4.2% 6.5% 5.5% 6.0% 
France 
% of Total .4% 4.3% 1.3% 6.0% 
Count 8 56 12 76 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 3.7% 3.9% 2.5% 3.6% 
Germany 
% of Total .4% 2.6% .6% 3.6% 
Count 5 69 18 92 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 4.8% 3.7% 4.3% 
Group 5+1 
% of Total .2% 3.2% .8% 4.3% 
Count 47 102 58 207 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 22.0% 7.1% 11.9% 9.7% 
RQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Not mentioned 
% of Total 2.2% 4.8% 2.7% 9.7% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 69 Relationship between primary Western country involved in the story and political affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 56.261(a) 10 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 48.967 10 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.459 1 .063 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.61. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 56.261 with 10 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
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statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and primary Western country involved in the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ5: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and stereotypes of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
 
RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 11 113 51 175 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 5.1% 7.9% 10.4% 8.2% 
Arrogance and 
colonialism 
% of Total .5% 5.3% 2.4% 8.2% 
Count 12 75 65 152 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 5.6% 5.2% 13.3% 7.1% 
Interventionism 
% of Total .6% 3.5% 3.0% 7.1% 
Count 10 65 23 98 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 4.7% 4.5% 4.7% 4.6% 
Suspicion toward West 
% of Total .5% 3.0% 1.1% 4.6% 
Count 181 1182 350 1713 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 84.6% 82.4% 71.6% 80.1% 
RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype 
% of Total 8.5% 55.3% 16.4% 80.1% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 70 Relationship between stereotypes of the West and political affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.655(a) 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 41.308 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
25.454 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.81. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 45.655 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 11 cells (40.7%) had expected count less than 5, several categories were 
merged to avoid this statistical problem. Categories merged include: “Colonialism”, “Arrogance” and 
“Colonialism and Arrogance” were merged into “Arrogance and colonialism”; “Double standards and 
hypocrisy”, “Mistrust and lack of confidence”, “Enemy/animosity” and “Else” were combined into 
“Suspicion toward West”;  
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population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and stereotypes of the West in the sample.  
 
ARQ6: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and story 
direction towards Iran-West relations in mainstream Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 22 134 39 195 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 10.3% 9.3% 8.0% 9.1% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 1.0% 6.3% 1.8% 9.1% 
Count 15 192 53 260 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 7.0% 13.4% 10.8% 12.2% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .7% 9.0% 2.5% 12.2% 
Count 5 94 18 117 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 6.6% 3.7% 5.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total .2% 4.4% .8% 5.5% 
Count 172 1015 379 1566 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 80.4% 70.7% 77.5% 73.2% 
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 8.0% 47.5% 17.7% 73.2% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 71 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-West relations and political affiliation 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.915(a) 6 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 23.959 6 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.427 1 .514 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.71. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 21.915 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.001 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.  
 
ARQ7: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and story direction towards Iran-US relations mainstream Iranian 
newspapers?  
 
RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations * RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
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RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 8 68 15 91 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 3.7% 4.7% 3.1% 4.3% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total .4% 3.2% .7% 4.3% 
Count 14 142 36 192 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 6.5% 9.9% 7.4% 9.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .7% 6.6% 1.7% 9.0% 
Count 4 56 14 74 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 1.9% 3.9% 2.9% 3.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total .2% 2.6% .7% 3.5% 
Count 188 1169 424 1781 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 87.9% 81.5% 86.7% 83.3% 
RQ19 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-US Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 8.8% 54.7% 19.8% 83.3% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within RQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 72 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-US relations and political affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.399(a) 6 .077 
Likelihood Ratio 12.057 6 .061 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.821 1 .365 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.41. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 11.399 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.077 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-US relations. Some 9.9 per cent of the stories published 
during Conservatism highlighted tension in relations between Iran and the US, while 1.9 per cent of the 
stories published during Reformism adopted a neutral direction towards Iran-US relations in the sample.    
 
ARQ8: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and story direction towards Iran-EU3 relations in mainstream Iranian 
newspapers?  
 
DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
DRQ20 Story 
Direction towards 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
Count 14 56 14 84 
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% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 6.5% 3.9% 2.9% 3.9% 
% of Total .7% 2.6% .7% 3.9% 
Count 1 37 26 64 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper .5% 2.6% 5.3% 3.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .0% 1.7% 1.2% 3.0% 
Count 1 41 7 49 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper .5% 2.9% 1.4% 2.3% 
Neutral 
% of Total .0% 1.9% .3% 2.3% 
Count 198 1301 442 1941 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 92.5% 90.7% 90.4% 90.8% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 9.3% 60.9% 20.7% 90.8% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 73 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties and political affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.114(a) 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 28.161 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.002 1 .963 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.90. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 26.114 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties in the sample. 
 
ARQ9: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and story direction towards relations between the West and other countries 
than Iran in mainstream Iranian newspapers? 
 
DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of 
Newspaper Crosstabulation 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 31 49 17 97
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 14.5% 3.4% 3.5% 4.5%
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 1.4% 2.3% .8% 4.5%
DRQ22 Story Direction 
towards Relations 
between the West and 
non-Iran 
Against (tension-conflict) Count 54 468 169 691
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% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 25.2% 32.6% 34.6% 32.3%
% of Total 2.5% 21.9% 7.9% 32.3%
Count 23 161 38 222
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 10.7% 11.2% 7.8% 10.4%
Neutral 
% of Total 1.1% 7.5% 1.8% 10.4%
Count 106 757 265 1128
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 49.5% 52.8% 54.2% 52.8%
Non-relevant 
% of Total 5.0% 35.4% 12.4% 52.8%
Count 214 1435 489 2138
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0%
Table 74 Relationship between story direction towards ties between the West and non-Iran and 
political affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 60.827(a) 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 44.566 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.438 1 .118 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.71. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 60.827 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and story direction towards ties between the West and non-Iran countries in the sample.  
 
ARQ10: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of the West presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
 
DRQ23 Image of the West in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 22 42 13 77 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 10.3% 2.9% 2.7% 3.6% 
Positive 
% of Total 1.0% 2.0% .6% 3.6% 
Count 55 656 228 939 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 25.7% 45.7% 46.6% 43.9% 
Negative 
% of Total 2.6% 30.7% 10.7% 43.9% 
Count 112 499 121 732 
DRQ23 
Image of 
the West in 
the story 
Neutral 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 52.3% 34.8% 24.7% 34.2% 
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% of Total 5.2% 23.3% 5.7% 34.2% 
Count 16 237 126 379 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 7.5% 16.5% 25.8% 17.7% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .7% 11.1% 5.9% 17.7% 
Count 9 1 1 11 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 4.2% .1% .2% .5% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total .4% .0% .0% .5% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 75 Relationship between image of the West and political affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 175.837(a) 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 138.734 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
11.490 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.10. 
 
According to the above tables, the Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 175.837 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of the West in the sample.  
 
ARQ11: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of the US presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
   
DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 8 12 11 31
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 3.7% .8% 2.2% 1.4%
Positive 
% of Total .4% .6% .5% 1.4%
Count 51 536 184 771
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 23.8% 37.4% 37.6% 36.1%
DRQ24 Image of the 
US government in the 
story 
Negative 
% of Total 2.4% 25.1% 8.6% 36.1%
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) had expected count less than 5, category “stereotypical” was 
merged with “negative stereotypical”.  
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Count 91 350 89 530
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 42.5% 24.4% 18.2% 24.8%
Neutral 
% of Total 4.3% 16.4% 4.2% 24.8%
Count 11 212 102 325
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 5.1% 14.8% 20.9% 15.2%
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .5% 9.9% 4.8% 15.2%
Count 53 325 103 481
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 24.8% 22.6% 21.1% 22.5%
Non-relevant 
% of Total 2.5% 15.2% 4.8% 22.5%
Count 214 1435 489 2138
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0%
Table 76 Relationship between image of the US gov't and political affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 84.960(a) 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 84.073 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.567 1 .211 
N of Valid Cases 
2138     
a  1 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.10. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 84.960 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of the US government in the sample.  
 
ARQ12: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of the EU3 presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
 
 DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 15 33 4 52 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 7.0% 2.3% .8% 2.4% 
Positive 
% of Total .7% 1.5% .2% 2.4% 
DRQ25 
Image of 
the EU3 in 
the story 
Negative Count 12 160 78 250 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) had expected count less than 5, category “stereotypical” was 
merged with “negative stereotypical”.  
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% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 5.6% 11.1% 16.0% 11.7% 
% of Total .6% 7.5% 3.6% 11.7% 
Count 28 200 42 270 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 13.1% 13.9% 8.6% 12.6% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.3% 9.4% 2.0% 12.6% 
Count 2 33 29 64 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper .9% 2.3% 5.9% 3.0% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 
Count 157 1009 336 1502 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 73.4% 70.3% 68.7% 70.3% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 7.3% 47.2% 15.7% 70.3% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 77 Relationship between image of the EU3 in the story and newspaper affiliation 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 66.688(a) 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 62.011 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.000 1 .984 
N of Valid Cases 
2138     
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.20. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 66.688 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of the EU3 in the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ13: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of the UK presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
    
DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 6 9 1 16
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.8% .6% .2% .7%
Positive 
% of Total .3% .4% .0% .7%
Count 3 81 46 130
DRQ26 Image of the 
UK government in the 
story 
Negative 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 1.4% 5.6% 9.4% 6.1%
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% of Total .1% 3.8% 2.2% 6.1%
Count 19 92 13 124
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 8.9% 6.4% 2.7% 5.8%
Neutral 
% of Total .9% 4.3% .6% 5.8%
Count 3 26 20 49
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 1.4% 1.8% 4.1% 2.3%
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% 1.2% .9% 2.3%
Count 183 1227 409 1819
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 85.5% 85.5% 83.6% 85.1%
Non-relevant 
% of Total 8.6% 57.4% 19.1% 85.1%
Count 214 1435 489 2138
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0%
Table 78 Relationship between image of UK gov't and newspaper affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 53.323(a) 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 51.858 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.090 1 .764 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.60. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 53.323 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of UK government in the sample.  
 
ARQ14: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of France presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
    
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
Count 2 9 1 12 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper .9% .6% .2% .6% 
DRQ27 Image 
of the French 
government in 
the story 
Positive 
% of Total .1% .4% .0% .6% 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 6 cells (33.3%) had expected count less than 5, category “stereotypical” was 
merged with “negative stereotypical”.  
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Count 5 61 27 93 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 4.3% 5.5% 4.3% 
Negative 
% of Total .2% 2.9% 1.3% 4.3% 
Count 6 62 13 81 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.8% 4.3% 2.7% 3.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total .3% 2.9% .6% 3.8% 
Count 201 1303 448 1952 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 93.9% 90.8% 91.6% 91.3% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 9.4% 60.9% 21.0% 91.3% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 79 Relationship between image of French gov't and political affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.795(a) 6 .185 
Likelihood Ratio 9.549 6 .145 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.390 1 .532 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.20. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 8.795 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.185 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of French government. While the majority of the stories about the West 
published in mainstream Iranian newspapers with different political affiliations (93.9 per cent in pro-Reform 
press, 90.8 per cent in pro-Conservative press and 91.6 per cent in non-aligned press) are not related to 
France, 2.8 per cent of stories in pro-Reform newspapers presented a neutral image of the France, 4.3 per cent 
of the pro-Conservative newspapers presented a negative image and 5.5 per cent of non-aligned press 
presented a negative image of France in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ15: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper 
affiliation and image of Germany presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?  
  
DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story * DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper 
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Total 
    Pro-Reform 
Pro-
Conservative Non-aligned   
DRQ28 Image of Positive Count 5 15 2 22 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 4 cells (26.7%) had expected count less than 5, category “negative 
stereotypical” was merged with “negative”. 
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% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 1.0% .4% 1.0% 
% of Total .2% .7% .1% 1.0% 
Count 2 27 7 36 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper .9% 1.9% 1.4% 1.7% 
Negative 
% of Total .1% 1.3% .3% 1.7% 
Count 5 52 12 69 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 2.3% 3.6% 2.5% 3.2% 
Neutral 
% of Total .2% 2.4% .6% 3.2% 
Count 202 1341 468 2011 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 94.4% 93.4% 95.7% 94.1% 
the Germany 
government in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 9.4% 62.7% 21.9% 94.1% 
Count 214 1435 489 2138 
% within DRQ3 Political 
Affiliation of Newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 10.0% 67.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
Table 80 Relationship between image of the German gov't and political affiliation1 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.948(a) 6 .177 
Likelihood Ratio 8.791 6 .186 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.006 1 .157 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.20. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 8.948 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.177 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between 
newspaper affiliation and image of German government. While the majority of stories about the West 
published in the Iranian press from different political affiliations (94.4 per cent in pro-Reform press, 93.4 per 
cent in pro-Conservative press and 95.7 per cent in non-aligned press) were not related to Germany, all the 
three political affiliations presented a neutral image of Germany (2.3 per cent in pro-Reform press, 3.6 per 
cent in pro-Conservative press and 2.5 per cent in non-aligned press) in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ16: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and subject of 
the story? 
 
DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
DRQ12 Politics Count 633 1304 1937 
                                                           
1 It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency 
should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the 
most similar categories. Since 5 cells (33.3%) had expected count less than 5, category “negative 
stereotypical” was merged with “negative”. 
 375 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 84.1% 94.2% 90.6% 
% of Total 29.6% 61.0% 90.6% 
Count 37 8 45 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.9% .6% 2.1% 
Economy and energy 
% of Total 1.7% .4% 2.1% 
Count 63 47 110 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 8.4% 3.4% 5.1% 
Socio-cultural 
% of Total 2.9% 2.2% 5.1% 
Count 7 25 32 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .9% 1.8% 1.5% 
Natural disasters and 
accidents 
% of Total .3% 1.2% 1.5% 
Count 13 1 14 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .1% .7% 
Primary 
Subject 
of Story 
Else 
% of Total .6% .0% .7% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 81 Relationship between Primary Subject of Story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 95.383(a) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 93.230 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
38.011 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.93. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 95.383 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and primary subject of story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ17: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and layout of the 
story? 
 
DRQ4 Story Layout * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 89 170 259 DRQ4 
Story 
Layout 
Main headline of 
page  (Lead Story) % within DRQ2 
Publication Period 11.8% 12.3% 12.1% 
 376 
% of Total 4.2% 8.0% 12.1% 
Count 436 832 1268 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 57.9% 60.1% 59.3% 
Top half page 
% of Total 20.4% 38.9% 59.3% 
Count 228 383 611 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 30.3% 27.7% 28.6% 
Bottom half page 
% of Total 10.7% 17.9% 28.6% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 82 Relationship between Story Layout and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.647(a) 2 .439 
Likelihood Ratio 1.639 2 .441 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.218 1 .270 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 91.22. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 1.647 with 2 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.439 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the 
publication period and story layout. The majority of the news about the West published in the two political 
periods (57.9 per cent during the Reformism and 60.1 per cent during Conservatism) was laid out at the top 
half page of newspapers in the sample.    
 
 
ARQ18: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and direction of 
the story towards Iran-West relations? 
 
DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 71 124 195 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 9.4% 9.0% 9.1% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 3.3% 5.8% 9.1% 
Count 82 178 260 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.9% 12.9% 12.2% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total 3.8% 8.3% 12.2% 
Count 27 90 117 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 6.5% 5.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.3% 4.2% 5.5% 
DRQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West Relations 
Non-relevant Count 573 993 1566 
 377 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 76.1% 71.7% 73.2% 
% of Total 26.8% 46.4% 73.2% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 83 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.516(a) 3 .015 
Likelihood Ratio 11.068 3 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.378 1 .240 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.21. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 10.516 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.015 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.  
 
ARQ19: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and primary 
Western country(ies) involved? 
 
DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 516 919 1435 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 68.5% 66.4% 67.1% 
US 
% of Total 24.1% 43.0% 67.1% 
Count 56 143 199 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.4% 10.3% 9.3% 
UK 
% of Total 2.6% 6.7% 9.3% 
Count 44 85 129 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 5.8% 6.1% 6.0% 
France 
% of Total 2.1% 4.0% 6.0% 
Count 30 46 76 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.0% 3.3% 3.6% 
Germany 
% of Total 1.4% 2.2% 3.6% 
Count 18 74 92 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 2.4% 5.3% 4.3% 
DRQ10 Primary 
Western 
Country/countries 
involved 
Group 5+1 
% of Total .8% 3.5% 4.3% 
 378 
Count 89 118 207 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 11.8% 8.5% 9.7% 
Not mentioned 
% of Total 4.2% 5.5% 9.7% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 84 Relationship between Primary Western Country/countries involved and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.754(a) 5 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 21.737 5 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.178 1 .673 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.77. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 20.754 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.01 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and primary Western country/countries involved in the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ20: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period 
and dominant political theme of stories related to West? 
 
DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
DRQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 53 100 153 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.0% 7.2% 7.2% 
Cooperation with West 
% of Total 2.5% 4.7% 7.2% 
Count 4 0 4 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period .5% .0% .2% 
Denial of the Western 
pattern of development and 
promotion of Vision 2025 
% of Total .2% .0% .2% 
Count 104 124 228 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 13.8% 9.0% 10.7% 
Opposition to West 
% of Total 4.9% 5.8% 10.7% 
Count 13 31 44 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 2.2% 2.1% 
Violation of law/rules 
% of Total .6% 1.4% 2.1% 
DRQ15 
Dominant 
Political 
Theme of 
Story 
Terrorism, war and 
violence 
Count 173 328 501 
 379 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 23.0% 23.7% 23.4% 
% of Total 8.1% 15.3% 23.4% 
Count 33 37 70 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.4% 2.7% 3.3% 
Interference of West in 
domestic affairs 
% of Total 1.5% 1.7% 3.3% 
Count 59 55 114 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 7.8% 4.0% 5.3% 
Western support for Israel 
% of Total 2.8% 2.6% 5.3% 
Count 32 143 175 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 4.2% 10.3% 8.2% 
Western threats 
% of Total 1.5% 6.7% 8.2% 
Count 201 482 683 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 26.7% 34.8% 31.9% 
Else 
% of Total 9.4% 22.5% 31.9% 
Count 81 85 166 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 10.8% 6.1% 7.8% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 3.8% 4.0% 7.8% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within DRQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 85 Relationship between Dominant Political Theme of Story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 82.366(a) 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 84.354 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.296 1 .021 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.41. 
 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 82.366 with 9 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and the dominant political theme of story in the sample.  
 
ARQ21: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and stereotypes 
of the West? 
 
RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
 380 
Count 90 85 175 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 12.0% 6.1% 8.2% 
Arrogance and 
colonialism 
% of Total 4.2% 4.0% 8.2% 
Count 57 95 152 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.6% 6.9% 7.1% 
Interventionism 
% of Total 2.7% 4.4% 7.1% 
Count 49 49 98 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.5% 3.5% 4.6% 
Suspicion toward West 
% of Total 2.3% 2.3% 4.6% 
Count 557 1156 1713 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 74.0% 83.5% 80.1% 
RQ16 Dominant 
Stereotypes of the 
West 
No stereotype 
% of Total 26.1% 54.1% 80.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 86 Relationship between Dominant Stereotypes of the West and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.370(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 34.052 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
28.102 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.52. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 35.370 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and dominant stereotypes of the West in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ22: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story 
direction towards Iran-West relations? 
 
 RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 71 124 195 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.4% 9.0% 9.1% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 3.3% 5.8% 9.1% 
RQ18 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-West 
Relations 
Against (tension-conflict) Count 82 178 260 
 381 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 10.9% 12.9% 12.2% 
% of Total 3.8% 8.3% 12.2% 
Count 27 90 117 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 6.5% 5.5% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.3% 4.2% 5.5% 
Count 573 993 1566 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 76.1% 71.7% 73.2% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 26.8% 46.4% 73.2% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 87 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.516(a) 3 .015 
Likelihood Ratio 11.068 3 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.378 1 .240 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.21. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 10.516 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.015 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.  
 
ARQ23: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story 
direction towards Iran-US relations? 
 
RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 33 58 91 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.4% 4.2% 4.3% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 1.5% 2.7% 4.3% 
Count 74 118 192 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 9.8% 8.5% 9.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total 3.5% 5.5% 9.0% 
Count 20 54 74 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.7% 3.9% 3.5% 
RQ19 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-US Relations 
Neutral 
% of Total .9% 2.5% 3.5% 
 382 
Count 626 1155 1781 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 83.1% 83.4% 83.3% 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 29.3% 54.0% 83.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 88 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.153(a) 3 .369 
Likelihood Ratio 3.234 3 .357 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.283 1 .595 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.06. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 3.153 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.369 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the 
publication period and story direction towards Iran-US relations. While the majority of news about the West 
(83.1 per cent during Reformism and 83.4 during Conservatism) did not have any direction towards Iran-US 
relations, 9.8 per cent of the news in Reformism and 8.5 per cent in Conservatism highlighted tensions 
between the two countries in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ24: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story 
direction towards Iran-EU3 relations? 
 
RQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 43 41 84 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 5.7% 3.0% 3.9% 
In favour of (détente-
cooperation) 
% of Total 2.0% 1.9% 3.9% 
Count 10 54 64 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% 3.9% 3.0% 
Against (tension-conflict) 
% of Total .5% 2.5% 3.0% 
Count 12 37 49 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.6% 2.7% 2.3% 
Neutral 
% of Total .6% 1.7% 2.3% 
Count 688 1253 1941 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 91.4% 90.5% 90.8% 
RQ20 Story 
Direction towards 
Iran-EU3 Relations 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.2% 58.6% 90.8% 
Total Count 753 1385 2138 
 383 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 89 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.677(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.898 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.441 1 .507 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.26. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 22.677 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and story direction towards Iran-EU3 in the sample.  
 
ARQ25: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the 
West presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ23 Image of the West in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 45 32 77 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 6.0% 2.3% 3.6% 
Positive 
% of Total 2.1% 1.5% 3.6% 
Count 248 691 939 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 32.9% 49.9% 43.9% 
Negative 
% of Total 11.6% 32.3% 43.9% 
Count 284 448 732 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 37.7% 32.3% 34.2% 
Neutral 
% of Total 13.3% 21.0% 34.2% 
Count 1 9 10 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .1% .6% .5% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .4% .5% 
Count 165 204 369 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 21.9% 14.7% 17.3% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 7.7% 9.5% 17.3% 
Count 10 1 11 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% .1% .5% 
RQ23 Image 
of the West 
in the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total .5% .0% .5% 
 384 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 90 Relationship between Image of the West in the story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 86.564(a) 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 87.195 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
27.929 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.52. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 86.564 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and image of the West in the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ26: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the 
US presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ24 Image of the US government in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 18 31 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% 1.3% 1.4% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .8% 1.4% 
Count 215 556 771 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 28.6% 40.1% 36.1% 
Negative 
% of Total 10.1% 26.0% 36.1% 
Count 222 308 530 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 29.5% 22.2% 24.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total 10.4% 14.4% 24.8% 
Count 1 1 2 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .1% .1% .1% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .0% .1% 
Count 152 171 323 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 20.2% 12.3% 15.1% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 7.1% 8.0% 15.1% 
Count 150 331 481 
RQ24 Image 
of the US 
government in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 19.9% 23.9% 22.5% 
 385 
% of Total 7.0% 15.5% 22.5% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 91 Relationship between Image of the US government in the story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.581(a) 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 52.285 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.712 1 .054 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 52.581 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and image of the US government in the story in the sample.  
 
ARQ27: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the 
EU3 presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 37 15 52 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.9% 1.1% 2.4% 
Positive 
% of Total 1.7% .7% 2.4% 
Count 57 193 250 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.6% 13.9% 11.7% 
Negative 
% of Total 2.7% 9.0% 11.7% 
Count 94 176 270 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 12.5% 12.7% 12.6% 
Neutral 
% of Total 4.4% 8.2% 12.6% 
Count 27 37 64 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 2.7% 3.0% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 1.3% 1.7% 3.0% 
Count 538 964 1502 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 71.4% 69.6% 70.3% 
RQ25 Image 
of the EU3 in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 25.2% 45.1% 70.3% 
Total Count 753 1385 2138 
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% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 92 Relationship between Image of the EU3 in the story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 47.949(a) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 47.482 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.894 1 .344 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.31. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 47.949 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and image of the EU3 in the story in the sample.  
 
ARQ28: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the 
UK presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ26 Image of theUK government in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 3 16 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .2% .7% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .1% .7% 
Count 27 103 130 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.6% 7.4% 6.1% 
Negative 
% of Total 1.3% 4.8% 6.1% 
Count 54 70 124 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 7.2% 5.1% 5.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total 2.5% 3.3% 5.8% 
Count 1 1 2 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .1% .1% .1% 
Stereotypical 
% of Total .0% .0% .1% 
Count 22 25 47 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.9% 1.8% 2.2% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total 1.0% 1.2% 2.2% 
Count 636 1183 1819 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 84.5% 85.4% 85.1% 
RQ26 Image 
of theUK 
government in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 29.7% 55.3% 85.1% 
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Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 93 Relationship between Image of the UK government in the story and  Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.537(a) 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 33.811 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.004 1 .951 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 33.537 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and image of the UK government in the story in the sample.  
 
ARQ29: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of 
France presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ27 Image of the French government in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 10 2 12 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.3% .1% .6% 
Positive 
% of Total .5% .1% .6% 
Count 18 66 84 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 2.4% 4.8% 3.9% 
Negative 
% of Total .8% 3.1% 3.9% 
Count 32 49 81 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 4.2% 3.5% 3.8% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.5% 2.3% 3.8% 
Count 2 7 9 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .3% .5% .4% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% .3% .4% 
Count 691 1261 1952 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 91.8% 91.0% 91.3% 
RQ27 Image 
of the French 
government in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.3% 59.0% 91.3% 
Count 753 1385 2138 Total 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 94 Relationship between Image of the French government in the story and Publication Period 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.524(a) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.771 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.139 1 .709 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.17. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 20.524 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is 
statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between 
the publication period and image of the French government in the story in the sample.  
 
 
ARQ30: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of 
Germany presented in Iranian newspapers? 
 
RQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story * RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation 
RQ2 Publication Period Total 
    
Reformist 
Period 
Conservative 
Period   
Count 13 9 22 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.7% .6% 1.0% 
Positive 
% of Total .6% .4% 1.0% 
Count 11 23 34 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 
Negative 
% of Total .5% 1.1% 1.6% 
Count 24 45 69 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 
Neutral 
% of Total 1.1% 2.1% 3.2% 
Count 2 0 2 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period .3% .0% .1% 
Negative stereotypical 
% of Total .1% .0% .1% 
Count 703 1308 2011 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 93.4% 94.4% 94.1% 
RQ28 Image of 
the Germany 
government in 
the story 
Non-relevant 
% of Total 32.9% 61.2% 94.1% 
Count 753 1385 2138 
% within RQ2 
Publication Period 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
Table 95 Relationship between Image of the Germany government and Publication Period 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.362(a) 4 .053 
Likelihood Ratio 9.545 4 .049 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.208 1 .272 
N of Valid Cases 
2138   
a  2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70. 
 
According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value  for the relationship between the above variables was 
obtained as 9.362 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic 
Significance of 0.053 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no 
doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is not a relationship between the two variables in the 
population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the 
publication period and image of the Germany government. While the majority of the news about the West 
during the two political periods (94.4 per cent during Conservatism and 93.4 per cent during Reformism) did 
not presented any image of the German government, 3.2 per cent of the news presented a neutral image of 
Germany in both the periods in the sample.  
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Appendix 4: President Obama’s Norouz message to Iran   
 
US President Obama delivered the following Norouz message to the Iranian people from the White House on 
March 20, 2009, which coincides with the Iranian New Year1.  
Today I want to extend my very best wishes to all who are celebrating Nowruz around the world.  
This holiday is both an ancient ritual and a moment of renewal, and I hope that you enjoy this special 
time of year with friends and family.  
In particular, I would like to speak directly to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Nowruz is just one part of your great and celebrated culture. Over many centuries your art, your music, 
literature and innovation have made the world a better and more beautiful place.  
Here in the United States our own communities have been enhanced by the contributions of Iranian 
Americans. We know that you are a great civilization, and your accomplishments have earned the respect of 
the United States and the world.  
For nearly three decades relations between our nations have been strained. But at this holiday we are 
reminded of the common humanity that binds us together. Indeed, you will be celebrating your New Year in 
much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays -- by gathering with friends and family, exchanging 
gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.  
Within these celebrations lies the promise of a new day, the promise of opportunity for our children, 
security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations. Those are shared hopes, 
those are common dreams.  
So in this season of new beginnings I would like to speak clearly to Iran's leaders. We have serious 
differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the 
full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the 
international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is 
honest and grounded in mutual respect.  
You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful 
place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place 
cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true 
greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to 
destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.  
So on the occasion of your New Year, I want you, the people and leaders of Iran, to understand the 
future that we seek. It's a future with renewed exchanges among our people, and greater opportunities for 
partnership and commerce. It's a future where the old divisions are overcome, where you and all of your 
neighbors and the wider world can live in greater security and greater peace.  
I know that this won't be reached easily. There are those who insist that we be defined by our 
differences. But let us remember the words that were written by the poet Saadi, so many years ago: "The 
children of Adam are limbs to each other, having been created of one essence."  
With the coming of a new season, we're reminded of this precious humanity that we all share. And 
we can once again call upon this spirit as we seek the promise of a new beginning.  
 
Thank you, and Eid-eh Shoma Mobarak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 The full text has been taken from the official website of the White House.  
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Appendix 5: Ayatollah Khamenei’s response to Obama’s Norouz message    
 
The following is the full text of the speech delivered on March 21, 2009 by Ayatollah Khamenei the Supreme 
Leader of the Islamic Revolution to a group of people in the holy city of Mashhad1. 
 
In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful 
All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of all sentient beings, and peace and greetings be upon our 
Master and Prophet, Ab-al-Qassem Al-Mustafa Muhammad, and upon his immaculate and infallible 
household, especially the one remaining with Allah on earth. 
I thank God Almighty who has bestowed upon me the blessing and the opportunity to make a 
pilgrimage to this holy shrine, and to visit the dear people of Mashhad. I pray to God Almighty to make this 
Eid and the New Year auspicious for our nation.  
This year marks the first year of the fourth decade of the Islamic Revolution - which has been termed 
the decade of justice and progress. Therefore, I will mention a few points on this occasion, both regarding 
some important domestic and international issues. We intend the fourth decade of the Islamic Revolution to 
be the decade of progress and justice in the Islamic Republic. The Iranian nation, with its great movement and 
by establishing the Islamic Republic, has moved towards making progress and administering justice ever 
since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution.  
. 
. 
. 
As for international issues that our country has to face, I will only discuss one issue: The problems 
between our country and the US. These problems have represented one of the most important tests facing the 
Revolution since the very beginning. Since the victory of the Revolution, the confrontation and interaction 
with the US government has unfurled as a great test for the Iranian nation. This great test has always been 
there throughout the past thirty years. Since the very beginning, the US government has treated our 
Revolution angrily and their tone has always been aggressive. Of course considering their calculations, they 
are justified in their attitude. They had full control over Iran before the Revolution. They had absolute control 
over our vital resources. America had carte blanche at our decision-making centers. At all our important 
centers, Americans could employ and fire whoever they wanted. Iran was a ranch on which Americans and 
American soldiers as well as others could graze freely. They lost all these advantages. Is it really possible for 
them to repress their aggressive opposition? Since the victory of the Revolution, the US government - both 
Republican and Democratic Presidents - treated the Islamic Republic unfairly. Everybody knows this. Inciting 
the few opponents of the Islamic Republic and supporting the separatist groups and terrorist acts were the first 
measures taken by Americans at the beginning of the Revolution. In every part of the country, in which there 
was a trace of a separatist movement, we discovered American involvement. Sometimes we could detect their 
financial support and some other times we could even spot their agents. That caused a lot of harm to our 
people. Unfortunately, they are still doing the same things.  
Some of the outlaws on the Iran-Pakistan border are linked to American agents. That is to say, these 
outlaws talk to US agents on wireless devices and receive orders from them. We have tapped their lines of 
communications. There are terrorist murderers in our neighboring countries that are in contact with American 
officers. Unfortunately, such actions are still being done. That is how their enmity started and they went on to 
seize Iran's properties and freeze its assets. The Pahlavi regime had given Americans incalculable amounts of 
money in order to get airplanes, helicopters, and weapons from them. Some of these things had been 
manufactured in the US. They refused to give us what they had sold to the Pahlavi regime. They also refused 
to give back several billion dollars that belonged to us. Surprisingly, they even stored these things in a place 
and charged us for the storage costs. They usurped a nation's properties, refused to return them, and charged it 
for the storage costs. That is how they have treated us since the beginning. The properties of the Iranian nation 
are still there in the US and some European countries. We asked them for many consecutive years to give 
back our properties on several occasions. We told them that they had already received the money for these 
things. They told us that these things have been manufactured under the US license and, therefore, they were 
not allowed to deliver them to us. They are still holding the properties of the Iranian nation.  
                                                           
1 Although Ayatollah Khemenei did not officially give a response to Obama, this speech is regarded as the 
unofficial response by the Iranian leader to Obama’s Norouz message. The first section of Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s speech is deleted here since they are about domestic issues of Iran which are irrelevant to this 
topic. The full text has been taken from the official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader.  
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They gave Saddam the green light to attack our country. That was another measure taken by the US 
to harm our nation. If Saddam had not received the green light from the US, most probably he would not have 
attacked our borders. An eight-year war was imposed on our country, during which about 300,000 Iranian 
civilians and youth were martyred. Throughout the war, especially in the last few years, Americans supported 
and helped Saddam. They provided him with financial support, weapons, technical information, political 
assistance, satellite intelligence, and media support. They used to use their satellites to record the activities of 
our forces at the front. Then they used to send the information to Saddam to use them against our youth and 
forces. 
They turned a blind eye to Saddam's crimes. A tragic event took place in Halabcheh. Different cities 
throughout the country were targeted by missiles. Our houses were destroyed. Chemical weapons were used 
in the front line against us. They turned a blind eye to these crimes. They did not raise any objections. Instead, 
they helped Saddam. That was another measure taken by the US government against our nation. Then towards 
the end of the war, our passenger plane was targeted by missiles fired from an American warship and was 
downed in the Persian Gulf. There were about 300 people on that plane. They were all killed. Then instead of 
reprimanding the officer who shot down the plane, the then US President awarded a medal to the officer. Do 
they really expect our nation to forget this? Could our nation ever forget this?  
They supported the terrorists who killed our men, women, and children. They supported the terrorists 
who killed our great religious scholars and young children. They allowed these terrorists to continue their 
activities from inside their country. They constantly broadcast spiteful propaganda against our country. 
Throughout the years, especially during the two terms of the previous US President [George Bush], all US 
Presidents insulted our nation whenever they started to talk nonsense about our people, our country, our 
government officials, and the Islamic Republic. That has been the same for many years.  
They undermined the security of the region, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They flooded 
the region with different weapons to oppose the Islamic Republic and of course to let their arms 
manufacturing companies line their own pockets in the process. They provided unconditional support for the 
Zionist regime. You saw one manifestation of this regime's oppression in Gaza two or three months ago. They 
caused a great tragedy, killing numerous men, women, and children. Their bombing raids, missiles, and 
bullets massacred about 5000 people in 22 days. That was while the US government supported the Zionist 
regime until the end of the war. Whenever the UN Security Council decided to pass a resolution against the 
Zionist regime, America intervened and supported the Zionists. 
They used every opportunity to threaten our country. They constantly threatened us with a military 
attack. They said they had a military option on the table. They made many other threats. They threatened our 
nation every time they said something against our country. Of course these threats had no effect on our nation, 
but their threats demonstrated their enmity. They constantly insulted the Iranian nation, government, and 
President. A few years ago, an American said that the Iranian nation had to be wiped out. Recently an 
American official said a good Iranian is a dead Iranian. That is how they insulted our great and honorable 
nation, a nation that has only tried to defend its identity and independence. 
They imposed sanctions on our country for thirty years. Of course these sanctions turned out to be a 
blessing in disguise. We should thank Americans for the sanctions they imposed on us. If it had not been for 
their sanctions, we would not have achieved this level of scientific progress. These sanctions have awakened 
us to the realities, forcing us to grow independently. But they did not intend to do us a favor. They wanted to 
show their enmity. For thirty years they treated the Iranian nation in this way. Now the new US administration 
says that it is prepared to negotiate with Iran, urging us to let bygones be bygones. They say they have 
extended a hand towards Iran. What kind of hand is that? If the hand that has been extended to us is an iron 
hands covered with a velvet glove, it does not have any positive meaning. They congratulated the Iranian 
nation on Norouz, but in the same message they accused the Iranian nation of supporting terrorism, seeking 
nuclear weapons, and things like that. 
I do not know who is making the decisions in America. Is it the President? Is it the Congress? Or is it 
the unknown people who pull the strings? I want to say that there is a logic behind our actions. The Iranian 
nation has acted logically since the very first day. When we want to make decisions about important issues, 
we do not act on the basis of our emotions. We do not make emotional decisions. We make our decisions on 
the basis of rational calculations.  
They invite us to negotiate and form relations with them. They shout slogans of change. Where is the 
change you are talking about? What is it that has changed? Clarify this for us. What is it exactly that has 
changed? Has your enmity towards the Iranian nation changed? Where are the signs of this change? Have you 
released the assets of the Iranian nation? Have you lifted the unfair sanctions? Have you stopped slandering, 
negative propaganda, and allegations against our great nation and its populist government officials? Have you 
given up your unconditional support for the Zionist regime? What is it that has changed? They only change 
their slogans while their actions remain the same. We have not seen any changes. Even their rhetoric is the 
same. The new US President insulted the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic right after he was 
inaugurated as President and delivered his inaugural address. Why? If you really believe there has been a 
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change, show us. We cannot see any change. I would like to tell everybody - including US government 
officials as well as others - that the Iranian nation will neither be deceived nor intimidated. 
First of all, verbal change is not enough. Of course I have not noticed much verbal change either. 
There must be genuine change. I would like to tell American government officials that the kind of change to 
which they only pay lip service is a necessity for them. You have no other choice: You must change. If you do 
not change, the divine laws of nature will force you to change. Nature will force you to change. You must 
change, but this change must not be in words only and there must be no ulterior motives. You cannot talk 
about change if you only change your policies and pursue the same goals. This kind of change does not 
constitute genuine change: That is deception. If there is any genuine change, it must manifest itself in action. I 
advise the US government officials or whoever makes the decisions there - be it the President, the Congress, 
or other people - that the situation in which the US government is involved is harmful to the American nation 
as well as the US government. You ought to know that you are one of the most hated countries in the world. 
Other nations burn your flag. Muslim nations shout "Down with the US" throughout the world. What is the 
reason behind so much hatred? Have you ever tried to investigate this issue? Have you ever scrutinized it? 
Have you learnt any lessons? 
The reason is that you treat the world in a domineering manner. You speak in an arrogant manner. You try to 
impose your ideas on the entire world. You interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. You apply 
double standards. Sometimes when a deeply frustrated Palestinian youth snaps under pressure and carries out 
a martyrdom-seeking operation, you attack him with negative propaganda. But when the Zionist regime 
caused that tragedy in Gaza in only 22 days, you turned a blind eye to all the crimes it committed. You label 
the Palestinian youth as a terrorist and at the same time you say that you are committed to the security of the 
Zionist regime, which should be considered a terrorist regime by all standards. These are the reasons why you 
are hated in the world. This advice is in your best interest. You must give up your arrogant tone for your own 
wellbeing and for the future of your country. You must stop domineering behavior. Do not interfere in the 
internal affairs of other nations. Do not encroach on the rights of other people. Do not define interests for 
yourselves in every part of the world. If you do these things, you will see that the global attitudes towards the 
US will gradually change. Pay attention to these recommendations. That is my advice to the US government 
officials - the US President and the others. Think about these recommendations carefully. Have them 
translated. Of course you must not ask the Zionists to translate them for you. You must consult moral people.  
As long as the US government continues the ways, actions, positions, and policies it has adopted in 
the past thirty years, we will act the way we have in the past. Our nation hates to be the object of your 
simultaneous attempts at negotiation and pressurizing. Our nation hates to negotiate while being pressurized. 
The simultaneous use of threats and negotiation will not work with our nation. We do not have a record of the 
new US President and administration. We will observe and then judge them. If you change, our behavior will 
change too. If you do not change, our nation will not change, as it has only become more and more 
experienced, patient, and powerful in the past thirty years. 
Dear God, please do not withhold your mercy and blessings from our nation. Unfortunately, I was 
informed that the esteemed and loyal wife of our magnanimous Imam (r.a.) passed away today. This 
honorable lady was a precious blessing to our nation. She patiently stood by Imam Khomeini (r.a.) - who was 
the pivot of the heart of our nation - in all hardships and in all circumstances. She was a prominent lady. I 
extend my condolences to the Iranian nation and her family members and relatives on the loss of this lady. 
May Allah bestow His mercy and blessings on her. O God, associate the soul of this honorable lady with Your 
saints. O God, associate the souls of our magnanimous Imam (r.a.), his esteemed children, and his wife with 
Your saints. Make us appreciate our dear Imam (r.a.) forever. Bestow Your blessings and guidance on all our 
people, especially the dear youth. O God, send down Your rain onto our parched lands and for our people. 
 
Greetings be upon you and Allah's mercy and blessings  
